

THE
SELEUKID EMPIRE,
281-222 BC

WAR WITHIN THE FAMILY



Edited by
Kyle Erickson

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
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Stemma of the Seleukid House, from Seleukos I to Antiochos III

INTRODUCTION

Kyle Erickson

On the death of Antiochos, king of Syria, his son Seleukos, succeeding in his stead, commenced his reign with murder in his own family, his mother Laodike, who ought to have restrained him, encouraging him to it. He put to death his step-mother Berenike, the sister of Ptolemy, king of Egypt, together with his little brother, her son. By perpetrating this cruelty, he both incurred the stain of infamy, and involved himself in a war with Ptolemy.

– Justin Epitome 27.1.1–3.¹

The death of Antiochos II (246 BC) has often been used to mark a turning point in the Seleukid empire. After agreeing to marry Berenike following his success in the war with Ptolemy Philadelphos, he died with two wives and two sets of relatively young competitors for the throne. Whether or not he had followed the practice of his father and grandfather in designating a successor remains unclear, although he may have appointed his eldest son as joint ruler in the months before his death.² Nonetheless, Seleukos was able to adopt the diadem without difficulty in Babylonia. However, the double marriage by Antiochos II to two powerful women, Laodike from the house of Achaïos and Berenike sister of Ptolemy, left considerable room for the interested parties to gain concessions from his young son when he took the throne.

The literary tradition concerning Seleukos II is for the most part fairly hostile: he is blamed for the death of his step-mother and her child, and he was also involved not only in a war with Ptolemy but also with his own brother. It is this fratricidal war, rather than the Ptolemaic invasion, that is often looked to as a cause of significant Seleukid weakness.

A further complication in Seleukos' attempt to reform his ancestral kingdom was the breakaway of Baktria and Parthia, which most scholars have dated to about this period.³ According to the traditional narrative, Seleukos' weakness in fending off the threats of Ptolemy in the western half of the empire marked a significant drain on his resources and power, which in turn left him unable to deal with the various rebellions in the east.

The events from Antiochos II's success in the Second Syrian War until the death of Achaïos the Younger at the hands of Antiochos III are commonly used to highlight the fragile nature of Seleukid power, even by those who have subscribed to a 'strong' view of the empire. We can see this

conundrum aptly on display in Austin's summary for the *Blackwell Companion to the Hellenistic World*:

On the other hand the Seleukid empire had all the limitations of monarchical empires. The risks inherent in dynastic struggles could never be eliminated, as shown by the conflict of the two rival brothers Seleukos II and Antiochos Hierax, the rivalry between the descendants of the two brothers Seleukos IV and Antiochos IV, and the proliferation of rival and short-lived rulers in the final decades of the dynasty. The size of the empire created obvious problems for the rulers.⁴

The authors in this book all espouse the 'strong' view of the Seleukid empire. Rather than stressing the power of the individual kings or the loyalty of their subordinates, the authors find the empire's strength is a result of the centre's ability to adapt to 'centrifugal tendencies' within its constituent territories. We argue that by co-opting as vassals and client states groups that had been previously classified as rebels the Seleukid kingdom achieved its remarkable longevity.⁵ This shift of perspective from focus on weakness to appreciation of fundamental strength helps explain the reactions of Antiochos and Seleukos to the 'break-away' of the eastern portion of the empire. Furthermore, it casts Antiochos III's later successes in the region in a different light, as he was able to re-affirm the Seleukid status quo rather than 'restore' the empire. It was only with the failure of Antiochos VII's campaign against the Parthians that the charismatic power of the Seleukid kings was irretrievably broken.

The question that this volume asks is not whether we can find the origins of Seleukid fragmentation in the first century of Seleukid rule, but rather can we therein find the ties that bound the empire together against a series of catastrophes that could have easily torn the empire completely apart. Instead of Bevan's assessment of the empire, as lacking natural vitality and fatalistically being a "sick man" from its birth,⁶ the authors find the strength of the Seleukid empire not in the ability to control large swathes of territory, but rather in the ability of the king and his court to tie the nobles politically, be they local land-holders or Graeco-Macedonians that journeyed with Seleukos to the ends of the earth, binding the nobles and other powerful groups to the king through the mutual recognition of their sovereignty. This flexibility in political arrangement which was guaranteed only by concessions may not have entailed much more than the traditional Achaemenid style of governing,⁷ but it does appear to have developed into a particularly Seleukid political system.

The following chapters argue against the conventional idea that if the Seleukids operated as successors to the Achaemenids then there is little evidence that Seleukid governance left an appreciable mark on the

territories and regions that were governed. Rather, many of the chapters argue instead for the integrity of imperial culture throughout the empire, both in the east and in the west – if not the integrity of the empire itself.

I. Sources

It is rather trite to say that the sources for our knowledge of the Seleukid empire are uneven, often hostile, and shine light on only a few particular areas while leaving large gaps, particularly in the east. While this assessment is for the most part true of the literary evidence, the archaeological, epigraphic and numismatic evidence provides substantive resources through which we can approach the totality of the empire. All of the chapters in this volume deal to some extent with areas in which the silence of our sources allows for a multiplicity of interpretations.

The authors have thus attempted to tread carefully the line between arguments based on these silences variously for and against continuity with better known periods. They also offer new interpretations of familiar literary material that, when combined with the few areas enlightened by numismatic and epigraphic discoveries, shed some light on often dark corners of Seleukid history.

The sources used in the volume cover the entire expanse of the empire, and range from the archaeological excavations of the temple that may once have held the remains of Seleukos Nikator and perhaps even the majority of the Seleukid kings in Seleukeia-in-Pieria, to the works of church chroniclers who preserved the scanty remains of Phylarchus' history. A written history of the eastern portion of the Seleukid empire, should it exist, remains to be discovered by future historians. Until that time, the record of the cities of Baktria and Parthia and the coinage of their kings allow us to construct at least a skeletal outline of this pivotal region. While the chapters may all justifiably attack Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus for his placement of the foundation of Parthia to coincide with the start of Rome's rise to prominence, he still serves as a fertile starting ground from which the numismatic histories of the region can be written.

In Asia Minor, we move closer to *terra cognita* but still the hazards of the epigraphic record do not allow us to gain a full understanding of the background to many of the events recorded therein. The record for individuals, even prominent ones, is not without problems. The women related to Achaïos married into both the Seleukid and Attalid families, but the epigraphic record for the patriarch of the family remains elusive. It is impossible to write about the Seleukids without remarking on these difficulties. Nevertheless, the papers in this volume attempt to craft this diverse material into a viable structure on which a history of the

empire in the third century, even with the remaining gaps, can be carefully hung.

II. Background to this volume

This publication has grown out of the work of the Seleukid Study Group, and contains selected papers from the Seleukid panel at the Celtic Conference in Classics held in Bordeaux in 2012. The framework for the panel developed out of the discussions from the first two Seleukid Study Days held in Exeter and Waterloo in 2011. The discussion at the first study focused around the family of Antiochos I and the second furthered these discussions into the reign of Antiochos II.⁸ It was felt by all of the participants that new developments in Seleukid historiography required the reassessment of not only the foundation of Seleukid rule, established by the first two kings, but also of the very nature of the empire and our understanding of Seleukid rule. It was decided that the major questions for the first century of Seleukid rule that needed to be readdressed fell into two broad categories: the first was the nature of Seleukid power and the methods by which it was or failed to be maintained, and the second was a re-examination of the roles that women played in the dynasty. The first of these topics resulted in both the panel at the Celtic Conference in Classics, graciously organised by Anton Powell, and the present volume. The second theme was discussed at the fourth Seleukid Study Day, hosted by McGill University.⁹

Over the last two decades Seleukid scholarship has once again seen a marked expansion.¹⁰ The publication of a new catalogue of Seleukid coinage by Houghton and Lorber (and Hoover for the second volume)¹¹ allowed for a wider range of scholars to engage with another source of evidence without first specializing in numismatics. Additionally, increased interest in the east after Sherwin-White's and Kuhrt's 1991 and 1993 volumes¹² and a move away from straightforward dichotomies of post-colonialist and colonialist discourse has led to new analyses of the various kingdoms that arose from the body of the Seleukid state. Furthering Sherwin-White's and Kuhrt's analysis that the loss of the eastern provinces was not fundamentally destructive to the Seleukid empire, the papers in this volume recast our views on the breakaway of the eastern provinces as an incomplete phenomenon that left the new powers at least nominally connected to the Seleukid king of kings,¹³ even if that title was not yet adopted. This re-evaluation of the nature of independence has also occurred in our understanding of the western portions of the empire, where the nature of usurpation and legitimacy has been questioned.¹⁴

Recent studies of the Seleukid empire have tended to focus either on the empire as a whole,¹⁵ or on a single king, most often Antiochos III, or on

the foundation of the dynasty. Relatively little attention has been paid to the period that followed this foundation and its consolidation under Seleukos I and Antiochos I. In an attempt to fill some of this gap, the focus for the panel and for the volume is the first century of Seleukid rule, or roughly the 3rd century BC. Many of the participants at the conference, not all of whom are reflected in the volume, highlighted the need to reassess the nature of the Seleukid state after its foundation by Seleukos I and what has traditionally been viewed as a period of decline. This work was furthered by the Danish project on the Hellenistic period,¹⁶ as well as by many of the volumes in the TOPOI series.¹⁷ The publication of Ma's thesis on *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor* defined a mechanism by which it became possible to discuss the interchange between the major powers and the minor powers in terms of a dialogue of power rather than either a simple top-down imposition or bottom-up resistance. More recent work on the nature of Seleukid power by Capdetrey re-enforced Sherwin-White's and Kuhrt's fundamental departure from views that held the Seleukid empire as a purely Macedonian enterprise, and recognised the significance of local actors and the process of their interaction with the royal house.¹⁸

In re-interpreting Seleukid power as dynamic and created through negotiation, absorption into the elite, as well as coercion, the place of the Seleukid empire in the overall narrative of Near Eastern history has been queried, alongside that of Alexander. Our modern framing of the empire has built on the view that 'their approach was "supra-national" in that the status of subject communities was not determined by race or culture, and outward respect was shown by the rulers for local traditions and cults'.¹⁹ It is now the nature of the 'supra-national' approach that has been questioned. The following chapters attempt to answer the question of how far this approach allowed for the recognition of the independence of subordinate powers and to what extent the very nature of Seleukid power required the reconciliation with at least the practical aspects of significant independence.

III. Nature of Seleukid Study Project

The Seleukid Study Group emerged out of discussions from the Seleukid Dissolution conference held in Exeter in 2008. It became clear at that conference that there was still much work to be done on all aspects of the Seleukid empire, but particularly on the nature of the empire outside the reigns of Antiochos III and IV. The collaborative work begun at that conference provided the opportunity for a series of workshops on Seleukid empire to emerge. After the inaugural panel on Antiochos I at the Workshop 'Opportunities for Interdisciplinary Scholarship' (Waterloo, December

2010), the first workshop dedicated entirely to Seleukid matters was held in Exeter in August 2011, bringing together not only the authors of the present volume but also a wide range of scholars and doctoral students. The proceedings of the workshop were never intended to be published as a collection, but the group present at that meeting went on to form the core of an emerging Seleukid Study Group. Further meetings have been held in Waterloo (November 2011), Bordeaux (September 2012), Montreal (February 2013), Brussels (July 2015), and Nipissing (September 2017). The proceedings of the Bordeaux meeting form this volume thanks to the support of Anton Powell and the Classical Press of Wales. The work of the Seleukid Study Group has greatly influenced the form and conception of the present volume, raised significant issues and proposed a variety of new solutions to old problems in the understanding of the Seleukid empire. The authors are indebted to all of the members of the group, but particularly to Alex McAuley and Chris Fleming for their help in editing and to Altay Coşkun for his tireless efforts in promoting Seleukid studies and the group.

IV. Structure of this volume

The volume is divided into four sections: the first deals with the establishment of Seleukid power in Asia Minor; the second focuses on the transition of Seleukid power between generations; the third examines the Seleukids' interaction with three new powers in the eastern half of the empire: Parthia, Baktria, and the Frataraka; and the final set of chapters proposes a new chronology of the Laodikean War and the War of the Brothers and offers two new solutions to the vexing question of the Soter coinage.

The first section of the volume begins by re-examining the development of Macedonian settlements in Asia Minor. Rather than being a result of Seleukid or Attalid foundations, Mitchell argues that the largest period of Macedonian settlement in the region followed in the immediate wake of Alexander's conquests. Subsequently, these settlers formed a significant bloc of manpower that needed to be managed by the various kings who controlled the region. By removing these settlements from the agency of the ultimately victorious successors, Seleukos in the first instance and later the Attalids, new explanations for their loyalty need to be found. This volume argues that the strategies of control and oversight of these settlements can be analysed in terms similar to the traditional settlements elsewhere in the empire. One key strategy that the Seleukids appear to have pursued, not only in Asia Minor but across the empire, was the appointment of loyal men to large estates with power extending over even wider regions.

The next two chapters in this first section illustrate one such family in Asia Minor, that of Achaïos. McAuley first examines the early history of the family and proposes two possible chronologies in which we can fit Achaïos' career. He argues that Achaïos' personal relationship with the Seleukids and his long service in their employ set the stage for receipt of land in Asia Minor through which he was able to win over the already settled Macedonians as well as indigenous populations. This provided Achaïos with a substantial power base that proved useful for his family until the reign of Antiochos III. D'Agostini picks up the narrative of the house of Achaïos with its most famous member, Achaïos the Younger. She reassesses the nature of the evidence for Achaïos in Polybios to help explain his initial reluctance to take the diadem before eventually doing so. She paints a picture of Achaïos as treading a similar line in terms of his own independence and power as the following three chapters argue was done for the early Parthians, Baktrians and the dynasts of the Frataraka.

The second section of the volume focuses on the transfer of power between generations. The first paper here re-examines the evidence for the temple of Seleukos at Seleukeia-in-Pieria. Wright emphasizes the importance of the creation of a dynasty in Antiochos' burial of his father. Holton picks up similar themes during the reign of Antiochos I. He argues on the significance of the joint kingship between Antiochos I and his son Seleukos. Despite the importance of joint kingship for defining the early history of the Seleukid empire; its failure with Antiochos I and Seleukos may have established some of the reason for Antiochos II's failure to appoint a co-ruler until the end of his life.

The third section examines the contentious period of the breakdown of Seleukid power in the eastern half of the empire. All three chapters argue that the collapse of Seleukid power in the region was incomplete, with the new emerging powers developing a limited form of independence in which they were nominally subordinate to Seleukid authority. In the first chapter, Strootman re-examines the evidence for the breakaway of the Parthian state. He argues that Parthian independence is not complete until over a century after it has been traditionally dated. Under this new assessment, the Parthians are relatively loyal vassals of the Seleukid state until after Antiochos III's failure against the Romans.

Wenghofer takes a similar view of the Baktrians, even if he dates their independence slightly earlier than the current consensus. He challenges Jakobsson's reinterpretation of Diodotid silver coinage, which posits the existence of a third heretofore unattested Diodotid king bearing the name Antiochos Nikator, in order to argue that Diodotos I openly proclaimed himself king in Baktria at a single stroke precisely in the year 250 BC and,

moreover, that such a claim must not be viewed as a rebellion against Seleukid hegemony over Baktia. Instead, he accepts the existence of Antiochos Nikator but argues that, instead of rebelling from the Seleukids, Diodotids and the Euthydemid dynasty that succeeded them ruled in Baktia as loyal vassals or “sub-kings” down to the overthrow of the Euthydemids by Eukratides I in ca. 170 BC.

In the final chapter in this section, Engels makes a similar argument regarding the Frataraka Vahbarz. Rather than seeing his tetradrachm issue, which depicts an Iranian figure killing a Greek figure, as a symbol of Persian rebellion against the Seleukids, he reads the legends on the coin to imply a loyalty to the Seleukids. As loyal vassals, the coinage may have demonstrated Iranian support against other Greek invaders (in this case, the Ptolemies), rather than resistance to Seleukid power. Through the combination of the three chapters a new vision emerges of the Seleukid east during the reigns of Antiochos II and Seleukos II. Rather than a series of newly independent powers threatening the eastern portion of the empire, we instead see relatively loyal vassals who submit to Seleukid authority.

The final two chapters form the fourth section of this volume and re-evaluate the wars that follow the death of Antiochos II. Coşkun argues for the synchronisation of the Third Syrian War, the Laodikean War, and the War of the Brothers. This approach marks a major rethinking of our understanding of the events in the Third Century. Rather than an extended period of hostility between the two brothers, Coşkun argues for a limited period of conflict between 245 and 241. This has wide-reaching ramifications for our understanding of relationships between the two Seleukid kings and the status of usurpers. Erickson takes Coşkun’s study as a starting point to re-evaluate the question of who could have produced the so-called ‘Soter coinage’. Erickson rejects the variety of previous attributions and explores the new hypothesis timed to Antiochos Hierax’s control of Syria before arguing for a date in the reign of Antiochos II.

As the following chapters demonstrate, the evidence for the Seleukid third century is often fragmentary, biased or contradictory. As a result, the arguments often rest on speculations drawn from a large range of tangential sources. Furthermore, all of the chapters challenge some prevailing assumptions, and, as a result, new speculations arise from the dissolution of old unwarranted certainties. It may be helpful, at times, for researchers of the future to explore a new range of logical possibilities, to which they can then apply new logic or new material discoveries of their own.

Notes

¹ (Trans. Rev. John Selby Watson 1853) *Mortuo Syriae rege Antiocho, cum in locum eius filius Seleukos successisset, hortante matre Laodice, quae prohibere debuerat, auspicia regni a parricidio coepit; quippe Beronice, nouercam suam, sororem Ptolomei, regis Aegypti, cum paruulo fratre ex ea suscepto interfecit. Quo facinore perpetrato et infamiae maculam subiit et Ptolomei se bello inplicuit.*

² See Coşkun this volume for the argument that Seleukos II was named king before the death of Antiochos II.

³ See Lerner 1999 for summary.

⁴ Austin 2003, 132.

⁵ Austin 2003, 131.

⁶ Bevan 1902b, 75-6.

⁷ See Engels 2011 for summary of the relation of the Seleukids to the Achaemenids and relevant scholarship.

⁸ For a summary of the conferences see: Seleukid Study Day I: <http://www.hsozkult.de/hfn/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-3866>; Seleukid Study Day II: <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=35069>

⁹ Coşkun and McAuley 2016.

¹⁰ See Ogden 2002, ix for a discussion on the popularity or supposed lack thereof for works on the Hellenistic world in general.

¹¹ Houghton and Lorber 2002; Houghton, Lorber, and Hoover 2006.

¹² Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1987; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993.

¹³ Engels 2013; Plischke 2014; Engels, Strootman and Wenghofer in this volume.

¹⁴ Chrubasik 2012.

¹⁵ Capdetrey 2007, Grainger 2010, and Kosmin 2014 provide good examples of this type of holistic overview of a topic within the empire.

¹⁶ Bilde et al. 1990; Bilde et al. 1993; Bilde et al. 1996.

¹⁷ E.g. Satre 2003; Chankowski and Duyrat 2004.

¹⁸ Capdetrey 2007.

¹⁹ Austin 2003, 128.

DISPELLING SELEUKID PHANTOMS: MACEDONIANS IN WESTERN ASIA MINOR FROM ALEXANDER TO THE ATTALIDS

Stephen Mitchell

The purpose of this chapter is to re-examine the evidence for Macedonian settlements in the western Asia Minor regions of Lydia and Phrygia. These settlements, many of them explicitly referred to as *katoikiai*, have almost invariably been interpreted by modern scholars as Seleukid or Attalid foundations. There is, however, surprisingly little unambiguous evidence that the Seleukids undertook any programme of settlement or colonization in western Asia Minor, and Attalid initiatives in the regions that they controlled after 188 BC often appear to have been secondary developments rather than primary acts of settlement foundation. I argue that the creation of most of these communities, some apparently exclusively Macedonian, others involving mixed populations, should be dated to the last quarter of the fourth century BC, and they should be seen as an immediate consequence of Alexander's conquest of the Persian Empire. Obtaining land for the settlement of Greeks in Asia had been a significant theme in the speeches of Isocrates through the middle years of the fourth century and this was also one of the major motivations for Macedonian aggression under the leadership of Philip and Alexander. The evidence of coin hoards and archaeology, as well as inscriptions, makes it clear that these objectives were realised for the most part during the generation before Seleukos I was able to take control of western Asia Minor. Moreover, this wave of Macedonian colonization was widely remembered and commemorated in the Roman imperial period.

Seleukid historiography, ancient and modern, has been dominated by a top-down approach. Ancient writers – Polybios, Diodoros, Justin – identify the kings as the prime agents. It is the rivalry, both internal and external, of the hellenistic kingdoms, those magnificent dynasties, to adopt Daniel Ogden's lightly ironic phrase, that shaped the destinies of men and women, and the fate of the ancient world between the death of Alexander and the rise of Rome.¹

There is, however, another story to be told, and an alternative model for understanding the processes and dynamics of early hellenistic history, which can be applied to Asia Minor, and specifically to the agricultural and economic heartland of western Turkey, where the Phrygians and Lydians had emerged as major regional powers in the first half of the first millennium BC. From the later fourth century Phrygia and Lydia were among the most important areas of Macedonian settlement. These settlements are hardly attested in the narrative histories which focus on royal agency, but abundantly documented through inscriptions, numismatic finds, a handful of significant archaeological discoveries, and local historical traditions which became conspicuous in the second and third centuries AD. This documentation reveals the large scale of Macedonian colonisation in western Asia Minor.

Modern scholars have broadly reached a consensus that these Macedonian settlements were founded by the royal dynasties, either Seleukid or Attalid, which controlled Lydia and Phrygia in the third and second centuries BC. There is a tendency, reflected and documented in Cohen's standard study of the hellenistic settlements, to argue that the majority of hellenistic foundations in western Anatolia were Seleukid.² Frank Daubner has recently contested these assumptions in a reappraisal of the dating, status and function of Seleukid and Attalid foundations in western Asia Minor.³ He suggests that the foundation of most of the Lydian *katoikiai* should be attributed to the Attalid kings Eumenes II and Attalos II, and that these colonies were peopled by emigrants from Macedonia after the overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom by the Romans following the battle of Pydna in 168 BC. But this hypothesis in turn is unconvincing. The only positive evidence cited to support the idea of a mass migration of Macedonians to Asia at this period, is found in references to a few prominent individual Macedonian refugees who appeared in the aftermath of Pydna in Ptolemaic service in Egypt.⁴ It seems inconceivable that the Roman victors would have allowed uncontrolled large scale emigration of their beaten enemies to Asia, and the narrative sources give not the slightest hint that any such major population displacement occurred in the 160s BC. The concentration of epigraphic evidence for Macedonian settlements in Lydia in the 160s and 150s BC (see pp. 18–21 below) certainly indicates that these communities were then beginning to use inscriptions to honour local military leaders or their current rulers, and formed a significant part of the Attalid kingdom, but it does not demonstrate that they first came into being at this period. The origins of these settlements can be traced much earlier.⁵

Sardes, the most important centre of Achaemenid power in western

Anatolia, surrendered during the first phase of Alexander's campaign to wrest control of Asia Minor from the Persian king and free the Greek cities of the coastal regions. Alexander is said to have allowed freedom and autonomy to the people of Sardes and the rest of the Lydians, but took particular care to establish a garrison in the city and to secure the revenues from the region.⁶ Thereafter, his campaign left Lydia and the interior regions untouched, as the army advanced through Ephesos and Miletos to Karia and Lykia, and then swept north from Pamphylia to the old centres of Gordion and Ankyra, in eastern Phrygia. Most of Lydia and Phrygia was thus undisturbed by warfare, but offered rich lands which invited colonisation. For kings and dynasts this extensive territory would be a source of manpower and taxation.

I. Regional dynasts of the fourth and third century

Lydia and Phrygia became crucial battlegrounds in the struggles between Alexander's successors. The battle of Ipsos in 301 BC, in which the coalition of Kassander, Seleukos I, and Lysimachos defeated Antigonos Monophthalmos and his son Demetrios, was fought in eastern Phrygia, at a site a few kilometres north of Afyonkarahisar, where the routes from west Anatolia converged before opening up into the steppic country of central and eastern Asia Minor. The battle site was close to the city of Dokimeion, one of the oldest Macedonian settlements of Asia Minor. Diodoros' narrative of the preliminaries to the battle, in 302 BC, indicates that the region south of Afyon around Synnada, including territory controlled by Dokimeion's founder Dokimos, contained several strongholds and treasuries of Antigonos.⁷

Dokimeion was one of a significant group of Macedonian foundations which lay in the transitional frontier zone between the more fertile territories of western Phrygia and Lydia, and the barer steppic landscapes of eastern Phrygia, Cappadocia and Lycaonia. From north-west to south-east these outlying Macedonian settlements comprised Dorylaion (modern Eskişehir), Dokimeion (Iscehisar, east of Afyon), Lysias (unlocated) and Philomelion (Akşehir). After the 270s BC the northern part of central Anatolia was occupied by the Galatians, and the arrival of those warlike invaders laid further emphasis on the importance of these Macedonian settlements as frontier positions.

The founder and first ruler of Dorylaion is unknown, although the name Dorylaos is Macedonian, and he should be identified as a significant figure in the entourage of Alexander himself or one of the early *diadochoi*. Current orthodoxy is to attribute the settlement to an initiative of Antigonos Monophthalmos,⁸ but two observations should be made to qualify this.

First, Lysimachos chose Dorylaion as a well-supplied and well-watered base camp for his forces before the battle of Ipsos, indicating that its allegiance to Antigonos was at best flimsy.⁹ Second, the place took its name not from any of the major kings but from a subordinate, who was evidently operating with a significant degree of autonomy. The otherwise obscure Dorylaos should be one of the energetic and semi-independent dynasts in the formative generations after the death of Alexander.

We know more about Dokimos, founder of Dokimeion. He had been a general serving under Perdikkas, who was taken captive at the battle fought by Alketas and the Pisidians against Antigonos in 319 BC, and changed sides. Still in the service of Antigonos, he surrendered the Phrygian city of Synnada to Lysimachos in 302 BC. Evidently Dokimeion had been created as his base between 319 and 302.¹⁰ Another Macedonian principality was the region controlled by the settlements of Lysias and Philomelion, which nestled on the eastern flank of Sultan Dağ facing out to the central Anatolian steppe.¹¹ Two generations of the dynastic family in charge of these cities are relatively well documented: that of Lysias, son of Philomelos, who supported Seleukos II in the war with Attalos I of Pergamon during the 220s BC and was honoured as a benefactor at Delphi,¹² and his own son, also called Philomelos, who engaged in a war with the Pisidian city of Isinda in 188 BC.¹³ Richard Billows has made the persuasive conjecture that another Lysias, who was active in Asia Minor as a general under Seleukos I against Demetrios in 286 BC, should be identified as the grandfather of the Delphic benefactor. We thus have evidence for four generations of the family, which probably alternated the names Lysias and Philomelos: Lysias (active 286 BC) – [Philomelos] – Lysias (supporter of Seleukos II) – Philomelos (engaged in Pisidian war 188 BC).¹⁴

Two other less noticed cities, which do not carry dynastic names, should be added to these. One was Derbe in eastern Lycaonia, whose territory lay at the head of the difficult routes which led from Laranda (modern Karaman) across the Taurus mountains towards Seleukeia ad Calycadnum and the Cilician coastal cities, notably Corycus. In 51 BC, when Cicero was governor of Cilicia, the ruler of Derbe bore the name Antipatros, common for Macedonians. Strabo records that during the 30s BC he controlled a *tyranneion* in this northern borderland of the Taurus mountains, but was regarded as a brigand and eventually killed by Amyntas the Galatian. A fragmentary inscription from Uşak, ancient Temenouthyrae on the border of Lydia and Phrygia, provides the name of his father, Perilaos, and this confirms the family's Macedonian descent.¹⁵ As Syme remarks, Antipater of Derbe controlled an area of strategic importance situated on the high road from Asia to Syria, and was therefore a political leader of

some consequence in the civil war period of the mid first century BC. Moreover, his connection to a city in the Lydo-Phrygian borderland may owe at least something to the strong tradition of Macedonian settlement there. One of the sons of Antipater the elder, regent of Macedon after the death of Alexander from 323 to 319, was called Perilaos. Syme observed that Perilaos had shown historical sense in choosing the name Antipatros for his heir; Louis Robert suggested that the names Perilaos and Antipatros would have alternated between generations, as did those of Lysias and Philomelos.¹⁶ The combination of names in the same descent line invites a straightforward explanation. There is no reason why Perilaos, a younger son of the Macedonian regent, should not be the original founder of this strategically placed dynasty around the end of the fourth century BC.¹⁷

Another outlying foundation of this early period was the city of Cretopolis in Pisidia, situated at a mid-point on the main route which led from the Maeander valley to the cities of the Pamphylian coast.¹⁸ Nicholas Sekunda has put forward strong arguments for identifying its founder as Nearchus the Cretan, appointed satrap of Lycia and neighbouring parts of south-west Asia Minor in 333 BC, perhaps in a complimentary position to Antigonos Monophthalmos, whose satrapy was greater Phrygia.¹⁹ This seems the most plausible explanation for the origins of the city's name, and in turn points to the ethnic identity of its first settlers. Nearchos participated in Alexander's eastern campaigns, but according to Justin his and Antigonos' commands in Asia Minor continued after Alexander's death.²⁰ The actual date and circumstances of the foundation are less clear cut. Sekunda prefers a date between 333 and 331 for the founding of Cretopolis, as it corresponds with a period when Nearchos was in a position of independent command, but the period 323–19 is not excluded, especially as Nearchus, who had commanded Alexander's fleet returning from India, may by no means have been an outright subordinate of Antigonos even at this period. A plausible scenario is that he founded the settlement for his veterans when they returned from the East.²¹

In summary, after Alexander's conquest of Asia Minor, many traditionally sensitive frontier areas in Asia Minor appear to have come under the control of experienced Macedonian commanders, who were veterans of Alexander's own campaigns or of the early diadochic period, and who established their own small dynasties based on newly founded settlements, some of which bore their names. The precise relationship of these local dynasts to the overall kingship of Antigonos Monophthalmos, or other major rulers, is not well defined. It is important to recall, of course, that several of them came into being almost a generation before the leading successors of Alexander asserted their claims to the title of 'king' in 306 BC.

Since Dorylaion, Dokimeion and the regions around them contained strongholds which served as treasuries, they were natural targets for Lysimachos in the campaign that ended with Antigonos' defeat at Ipsos.

The emergence of local rulers and regional dynasties in western Asia Minor was not confined to the immediate post-Alexander generation. In his account of Macedonian dynasts in Asia Minor,²² Billows has traced the history of several other intermediate regional powers during the late fourth and third centuries. These include the sequence of local rulers in Karia which included Asandros, Pleistarchos, Eupolemos and Olympichos; Achaïos, the Seleukid scion, based in the Lycus valley on the Phrygian-Karian boundary; and Lysimachos' son Ptolemaios, who established himself at Telmessus in western Lycia. Billows places these rulers in the context of other smaller dynasties of early hellenistic Asia Minor: the family of Philetairos, a Graeco-Macedonian/Paphlagonian associate of Dokimos, who took charge of the treasury at the former Lysimachian stronghold of Pergamon after the battle of Koroupedion, and was before long to emerge from the shadow of Seleukid control as the founder of the Attalid dynasty; Mithridates, of royal Persian descent, who established a power-base among the Mysians and the Mariandynians of north-west Anatolia, before his successor, known to modern scholarship as Mithridates I Ktistes, moved the dynastic centre first to Paphlagonia and eventually to Pontic Amaseia;²³ and the Thracian and Persian dynasts who controlled the emergent kingdoms of Bithynia and Cappadocia. Billows concludes that the 'physical suitability of Anatolia and the local dynastic tradition combined with the equally traditional centrifugal tendencies of the Macedonian upper class to produce a bumper crop of dynasts'.²⁴ This judgement runs the risk of reductivity. The origins and status of these fourth-century power holders were heterogeneous. Recent studies have drawn attention to the variety rather than the similarities between this crop of local leaders in late fourth-century Asia Minor.²⁵ Most of the powerful figures in western Anatolia were of Macedonian origin or have clear Macedonian connections. However, the conquest of the western satrapies of the former Persian empire by Alexander, and the struggles among his successors over three generations, led to a fragmentation of political power and not to outright and sustained domination by any individual king or dynasty. The history of the early Macedonian settlements needs to be interpreted against this political backdrop.

II. The Macedonian settlements

The territories controlled by these primarily Macedonian dynasties, however, did not coincide with the parts of Asia Minor where Macedonian

colonisation is best attested: Lydia, and western and central Phrygia. The dynasts controlled frontier domains, rather than the prime territory of Macedonian agricultural colonists. When Lysimachos crossed into Asia to challenge Antigonos in 302 BC, it is striking that he also avoided Lydian and Phrygian territory. He sent his general Prepelaos to win over the coastal regions of Aeolis and Ionia, while he himself advanced from the Propontis through hellespontine Phrygia to Synnada.²⁶ Thus, as during Alexander's invasion in the previous generation, the fertile Hermus valley around and behind Sardes, and the upland region of Phrygia further east, were spared from the attentions of hostile armies.

Nevertheless, the next battles for control of Asia Minor took place precisely in the rich lowlands of Lydia, which were home first to Persian and later to thousands of Macedonian colonists. Koroupedion, where Seleukos I Nikator defeated Lysimachos in 281 BC, was part of the flat plain of the Hermus valley east of Magnesia and west of Sardes.²⁷ History virtually repeated itself in 189 BC, when the Romans defeated Antiochos III at a decisive battle which was also fought in the Hermus valley, about thirty kilometres west of Koroupedion in the plain to the north of the city of Magnesia. The locations of these two battles, in prime areas of agricultural settlement and Macedonian colonisation, are in themselves proof of Seleukid determination to control the resources of western Anatolia.

We should hesitate, however, before referring to this as Seleukid territory, for Lydia and Phrygia were certainly never claimed to be at the heart of the Seleukid empire. The reach of Seleukid hegemonic power is generally identifiable and definable by the presence of royal foundations, in particular by cities named after members of the dynasty. However, it is striking that Lydia and Phrygia are not identifiable as Seleukid by virtue of new city foundations named after members of the dynasty. 'Seleukid' Asia Minor took shape around the East-West route from Syria to the Aegean, which ran through the cities of Laodikeia Catacecaumene, Antioch by Pisidia, Apamea, Laodikeia on the Lycus, Antioch on the Maeander, and Seleukeia-Tralleis. This was what Strabo calls the *koinē hodos*, 'the common road', which followed the Maeander valley from the coast before entering upland Anatolia.²⁸ There was not a single city or settlement in Phrygia and Lydia, north of this route, which certainly took a Seleukid dynastic name. Stratonikeia, which was situated in the northern border area between Lydia and Mysia, at a strategic mid-point along the cross-country route from Smyrna and Sardes to Kyzikos, was probably named after the wife of Eumenes II of Pergamon, and originated under Attalid rule like its neighbours Apollonis and Attaleia in the upper Caicus basin.²⁹

There were also relatively few Attalid city foundations in the region,

even though the Pergamene kings controlled Lydia and much of Phrygia definitively after the defeat of Antiochos III at Magnesia. Only Attaleia, Apollonis and Philadelphia in Lydia, and Eumeneia in Phrygia, clearly took their names from the royal family. Apollonis, named after the Kyzikene wife of Attalos I,³⁰ and Attaleia,³¹ located in north Lydia close to Thyateira, both appear to have been founded in the first half of the second century BC as settlements that harboured important military reserves (soldiers, ephebes) for the Attalid kings.³² Philadelphia was a foundation of Attalos II (159–38 BC), although there were certainly earlier Macedonian settlers in the vicinity.³³ Phrygian Eumeneia, founded by Eumenes II or his brother Attalos II,³⁴ occupied an important strategic position controlling access between the Maeander valley and upland Phrygia.³⁵ According to an inscription from Apollonis, the city was founded by one of the king's brothers (Philetairos, Attalos or Athenaeus) as the result of a synoecism.³⁶ Two texts from the immediate neighbourhood of Apollonis appear to come from Macedonian communities which formed part of the synoecism. A stele dated to the 37th year of Eumenes II (161/0 BC) was set up by οἱ ἐκ Διοδύης Μακέδονες, 'the Macedonians from Diodya',³⁷ and this was followed in the seventh year of Attalos II (153/2 BC) by a similar stele put up by [οἱ ἐκ .]εσπούρων Μακέδονες, 'the Macedonians from (.)espura', for Derdas son of Derkylides, their *stratēgos*.³⁸

What was, then, the nature of Macedonian colonisation in western Anatolia?³⁹ Lydia, in particular, with easy access to the coastal cities of the eastern Aegean, was one of the most fertile and productive regions of western Asia. It had already attracted colonies of Persian settlers under Achaemenid rule, when Sardes was the focal point of Persian power in the western satrapies. Several of these colonies, including the settlements of the Hyrkaneis and the Maibozanoi, the villages of Dareiukome and Hierokome, and the important sanctuary of Hypaepa, all of Persian origin, lasted until the Roman empire.⁴⁰ But the Macedonians in the region must soon have outnumbered the Persians. The elder Pliny referred to a whole segment of the population living in the assize district of Sardes as *Macedones*,⁴¹ and this is confirmed by the Flavian inscription from Ephesos which listed communities of Asia according to their assize districts.⁴² These incomers evidently mixed and intermarried with the indigenous populations. A subsequent passage of Pliny mentions a community of Mysomacedones in the assize district of Ephesos, and other evidence suggests that this mixed community of Mysians and Macedonians should be located somewhere in the mountain range of the Mesogis, which separated the Hermus from the Cayster valley.⁴³ Mysians, like Macedonians, formed a significant element in Attalid forces.⁴⁴

It is difficult to be precise about the number of attested Macedonian colonies in Lydia as there are varying categories of evidence. Some documents explicitly denote the Macedonians settled at or around a named place. A statue base on the acropolis of Pergamon for Menogenes son of Menophantos, an associate (*syngenēs*) and *nomophylax* of Eumenes II, had been set up by [οἱ περὶ Νά]κρασον or [οἱ περὶ Ἀ]κρασον Μακεδόνες, ‘the Greeks around Nakrasos/Akrasos’. It is impossible to determine the correct restoration since the two communities of Nakrasos (or Nakrason) and Akrasos, both located in the upper Caicus valley, developed into small cities under the Roman empire. The Macedonians of Nakrasos/Nakrason appear in the city’s title in the time of Hadrian, who was honoured by an inscription set up by ἡ Μακεδόνων Νακρασειῶν βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ‘the council and people of the Macedonians at Nakrasos/n’.⁴⁵ Akrasos also had a city constitution in third century AD, as is shown by a milestone set up by Ἀκρασιωτῶν ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ‘the council and people of the Akrasiotai’.⁴⁶

The term that was most widely used for rural settlements in Lydia was *katoikia*, with its cognates *katoikoi* and *katoikountes*. Although the overwhelming majority of inscriptions relating to these settlements dates from the second and third centuries AD, most scholars have assumed that the colonies originated in the hellenistic period, and Christof Schuler argues strongly for this view in his comprehensive study of rural settlements in hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor.⁴⁷ His arguments have been strengthened by the discovery and publication of a hellenistic decree found in a sanctuary near Apollonia on the Rhyndakos in Mysia, which honours the commander and another member of a unit of *doryphoroi* for their benefactions to the *katoikia*.⁴⁸ Important fresh evidence for the hellenistic settlement of Lydia is now also provided by the dossier of documents relating to privileges given by Eumenes II to the settlement at Apolloniucharax, which included a new influx of Mysians at the time of this royal grant in the mid 160s BC.⁴⁹ Some, but clearly not all, of these *katoikiai* were explicitly Macedonian. The largest of the Lydian settlements appears to have been Thyateira, which was described by Strabo as a *katoikia* of Macedonians, situated at the edge of the territory of the Mysians.⁵⁰ An inscription which reads Βασιλεῖ Σελεύκῳ | τῶν ἐν Θυατείροις | Μακεδόνων οἱ ἡγεμόνες καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται, ‘the commanders and soldiers of the Macedonians for King Seleukos’ shows that Thyateira had close links to Seleukos I.⁵¹ A story circulated that Thyateira had really been called Θυγάτειρα by Seleukos I during his war with Lysimachos, after it was reported that a daughter had been born to him there, but this false etymology is a transparent device to establish a closer link between Thyateira and Seleukos than its foundation history warranted. In fact the name of the settlement is plainly of local Lydian origin.⁵²

A votive inscription dated to the 37th year of Antiochos I and his son Seleukos, 276/5 BC, shows that Thyateira was then part of Seleukid territory, but it seems certain that it came under Attalid influence around the middle of the third century BC.⁵³ Another inscription possibly of the late fourth or early third century BC names the inhabitants as οἱ περὶ Θυάτειρα Μακεδόνες,⁵⁴ and a funerary text which has also been dated to the late fourth century simply identifies the dead man, Menedemos son of Neoptolemos, by the ethnic Μακεδών.⁵⁵ If the early dating of these texts is correct, they prove that the Macedonian settlement at Thyateira was pre-Seleukid. The main city divinity, Tyrimnos, was of Macedonian origin, and had no specific Seleukid associations.⁵⁶ Later settlers in the neighbourhood, such as οἱ ἀπὸ βασιλέων Ἀττάλου καὶ Εὐμένους κατοικοῦντες Μερνουφυτά, ‘the settlers of Mernuphyta established by kings Attalos and Eumenes’, may have been dependent on Thyateira.⁵⁷

Inscriptions, Roman imperial coin issues, and passages of the elder Pliny and Tacitus identified the inhabitants of the Lydian city of Hyrkamis, located south-west of Thyateira in the direction of Magnesia ad Sipylum, as the Hyrkaneis Macedones (ΥΡΚΑΝΩΝ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΩΝ) and the ethnic Μακεδών Ὑρκάνιος appears on an inscription of the first half of the second century BC.⁵⁸ The name Hyrkamis was evidently given to the place by its well attested Persian settlers,⁵⁹ but the territory also attracted Macedonian colonists. A hybrid population of Achaemenid settlers from Hyrkania and later arrivals from Macedonia, uniting the dominant ethnic groups of the new-born hellenistic world, should have delighted Alexander. An honorific stele from the reign of Eumenes II (188–59 BC), found at a village near Hyrkamis itself, identifies οἱ ἐξ Ἀγαθείρων Μακεδόνες, ‘the Macedonians from Agatheira’, who honoured a certain Seleukos son of Menekrates, doubtless a leading member of their community.⁶⁰

Macedonian *katoikoi* have been identified in south-east Lydia around the city of Philadelphia. They include οἱ ἐκ Κοβηδύλης Μακεδόνες, ‘the Macedonians from Kobedytle’, who set up an honorific stele for their fellow citizen (*politēs*), Philo...son of Ptolemaios, under Eumenes I in the late 170s or late 160s BC.⁶¹ The κάτοικοι ἐν Ἀδρούτοις, ‘settlers in Adrouta’, who are also attested on the territory of the city of Philadelphia by an inscription of 25/4 BC, need not necessarily be Macedonians, although this possibility is suggested by the find of an early hellenistic gravestone in the same village which names the deceased as Macedonians.⁶² The appearance of the Illyrian name Pleuratos on a dedication to Apollo Tarsios found at the east Lydian city of Tabala also suggests that its population contained a kernel of Macedonian settlers, where Illyrian nomenclature was not uncommon.⁶³

This represents only a selection of the evidence for Macedonian

settlement in Lydia in the hellenistic period, extending from the region around Thyateira to the north, across the north part of the Hermus river plain, to the neighbourhood of Philadelphia in the south-east. Although some of these communities followed Seleukid or Attalid dating schemes, erected statues for Seleukid or Attalid rulers or their generals, or made dedications to cults that had specific Seleukid or Attalid associations,⁶⁴ none of the *katoikiai* is said to have been founded by the Seleukids or Attalids. Moreover, the small number of Attalid city foundations appears to represent a secondary development, dating to the middle years of the second century BC under Eumenes II and Attalos II. In all cases their demonstration of loyalty to one or another of the hellenistic dynasties appears simply to reflect their allegiance at that particular period, and should not be interpreted as a lasting condition created by the act of foundation.

The evidence for Macedonian settlement in Phrygia to the east is also extensive, although it takes different forms. Several cities that issued bronze coinage under the Roman empire adopted the practice that we have seen with Lydian Hyrkamis, and identified their inhabitants explicitly as Macedonians. Between the Flavian period and the third century AD Blaundus, a small city on the Lydian-Phrygian borderland,⁶⁵ minted coins with the reverse legend ΒΛΑΥΝΔΕΩΝ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΩΝ, sometimes abbreviated to MAK or simply to M.⁶⁶ This official usage is confirmed by a third-century inscription set up in honour of the son of a Roman senator by Βλαυνδέων Μακεδόνων ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ‘the council and people of the Macedonians at Blaundus’.⁶⁷ At the eastern edge of Phrygia the city of Dokimeion adopted a similar practice and issued coins in the name of the ΔΟΚΙΜΕΩΝ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΩΝ through the second and third centuries AD.⁶⁸ The coinage of the small central Phrygian city of Peltai resembles that of Blaundus. Imperial period issues were usually identified by the ethnic ΠΕΑΘΗΝΩΝ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΩΝ, with the latter name usually abbreviated.⁶⁹ Peltai, moreover, is one of the few Phrygian communities which is attested epigraphically in the hellenistic period. Its council passed a decree in honour of the people of Antandros, which was located on the Aegean coast in the northern part of Aeolis, acknowledging the services rendered by a foreign judge (*dikastēs*), who was sent from Antandros to Peltai, which is explicitly identified as a *polis*.⁷⁰

In a new study of oracular myths associated with city foundations, Johannes Nollé has drawn attention to the repeated appearance of a mythologem that was particularly associated with the foundations of Alexander the Great.⁷¹ The distinctive element in these myths was the appearance of an eagle, which swooped down on a sacrifice being offered

by the prospective city founder to Zeus, seized the carcass, and then dropped the bones at another location, thereby designating the site of the future city. This motif has been further explored in detail in two studies by Daniel Ogden.⁷² Coin types of Blaundos show two elements of this foundation story. One pattern shows the founder with the thunderbolt of Zeus in his left arm holding a *patera* over a sacrificial altar; an eagle flies away above the scene. Smaller issues display simply an eagle grasping two thigh-bones in its talons. The obverse of one of the coins with this simpler motif carries the portrait of a clean shaven figure wearing the skull and pelt of the Nemean lion in place of a helmet, one of the iconographic motifs used by Alexander the Great as he laid claim to the divine aura of Heracles. Nollé argues convincingly that the figure on the foundation myth issues should be identified not as the god Zeus, but as Alexander himself who was already depicted with Zeus' attributes during his life time. He himself reserves judgement about the historical basis of this claim, but rightly draws attention to the parallel claim of Phrygian Eukarpia (see below), and points out that the accounts of Alexander's advance through Asia Minor say nothing about his activities in Phrygia, but do not exclude the possibility that he established settlements there. Any such settlements are likely to have been small. *Polis* status and the elaboration of the foundation myth were later developments.⁷³

The transformation of a Macedonian *katoikia* into a *polis* is shown in detail by the now famous dossier of letters sent by Eumenes II initially to the settlers (κατοικοῦντες), and then, after the promotion of the community to city status, to the council and people of the Toriatai, the inhabitants of the place referred to in later sources as Tyriaion in south-east Phrygia.⁷⁴ The community was not exclusively Macedonian, as one of the delegates to the king, whose petition had initiated the community's promotion, bore a Galatian name, Brennos. More importantly, the essence of the royal decision was to grant civic status both to the existing settlers and the indigenous peoples living with them: *συνχωρῶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς μεθ' ὑμῶν συνοικοῦσιν ἐνχωρίοις εἰς ἓν πολίτευμα συνταχθῆναι καὶ νόμοις τε χρῆσθαι ἰδίους*, 'I grant both to you yourselves and to the native people living with you the right to be enrolled into a single civic body and to use your own laws'. The letters can be dated to the immediate aftermath of the Treaty of Apamea in 188 BC, whereby the whole of Anatolia north of the Taurus was removed from Seleukid control and came under Attalid overlordship. But there is no reason to suppose that the original *katoikia* had been founded by the Seleukids. It lies, in fact, in the eastern marches of Phrygia on the route, Strabo's 'common road', that ran west from Iconium to Philomelion, and was controlled in the third and second centuries by the dynasty of Lysias

and Philomelos. Like the communities of Mysomacedones in the west, the Toriatai were a hybrid community formed from a fusion of immigrant Macedonians and the local indigenous population. The name of its founder, like those of most of the other *katoikiai* that have been mentioned, is unknown, but a plausible foundation date would be in the last quarter of the fourth century, the period when, by right of Alexander's conquest, Macedonian military settlers had their earliest opportunity to occupy land in Asia Minor. The recent observations of Peter Thonemann provide support for this. He suggests that the centre of the *katoikia* of Toriaion should be identified with a fortified stronghold on the north side of the hill of Kale Tepesi, about eight kilometres ENE of Ilgin. The site, 60 x 70 metres across, was defended by walls, which survive to a height of seven metres on the north side, four square towers along the south curtain, and a large bastion to the north-east. The irregular ashlar masonry combines narrow courses below and above an irregular course of much more massive proportions. It resembles the late classical or early hellenistic defensive walls of Karian Alabanda and Knidos, rather than the more even ashlar style which is typical of most later hellenistic fortifications, and appears definitely earlier than the second century BC. Thonemann suggests that it might have been built by the Seleukids, but his own proposed date-range of 350–275 BC, based on these archaeological comparisons, is completely compatible with the notion that Toriaion was pre-Seleukid foundation.⁷⁵

A statue base of the Roman imperial period from Çorhisar, in the area of the plain of Sandıklı south of Afyon, the south Phrygian Pentapolis, carries the inscription Ἀλέξανδρον Μακεδόνα κτίστην τῆς πόλεως, 'Alexander the Macedonian, founder of the city'.⁷⁶ The community, which is usually identified as the small city of Eukarpia, 'Fine Fruits', a name which highlights its importance as an agricultural settlement, thereby asserted that its founder had been Alexander the Great himself. Two other inscriptions, also of the Roman imperial period, refer to *klērouchoi*, a term normally applied to the lot-holders of hellenistic military settlements, and *triakontarchai*, perhaps a category of company commanders, and confirm Eukarpia's hellenistic origins.⁷⁷ As with the case of Blaundus, Alexander's personal agency as founder of the city may have been very modest, but there is nothing intrinsically implausible in the claim. During 334/3 BC Alexander had reclaimed western Asia Minor from Persian control. In accordance with the declared aims of his campaign, freedom and autonomy was restored to the Greek cities of the coast, but the hinterland was now his by right of conquest. The legal and political status of this royal land has been a subject of much discussion, but it is not in doubt that the way was now open for Macedonian colonies to become established across the region,

peopled either by new settlers from Macedonia or by returning veterans from the East. Christian Mileta, in an excellent discussion of Alexander's creation of *basilikē chōra* in Asia Minor, follows the *communis opinio* in dating most of the Lydian and Phrygian Macedonian settlements to the Seleukid and Attalid periods, but the logic of his own analysis suggests that the main wave of colonisation and settlement should have been earlier. It was anticipated from the start that the new Macedonian *katoikiai* would provide Alexander, and of course his successors, with an important source of recruits and taxation revenue. At the same time the lands of Lydia and Phrygia formed a rich bounty with which Alexander could reward his subjects and followers. Macedonian colonial foundations, as exemplified by Eukarpia, fit precisely into this scenario.⁷⁸

A few inscriptions for these settlers from Macedon and surrounding areas have been noted in Phrygia. These include the gravestone of Demetria daughter of Bacchios, from Larisa in Thessaly, buried at Synnada,⁷⁹ the funerary epigram of the strikingly named Philippos the Macedonian, who had obtained land and been buried in alien Phrygia, near Afyon, but had been born in the Macedonian region of Elemia,⁸⁰ and the verses for Demetrios, buried at Kepez on the western edge of the Phrygian highlands, who had received many crowns for his courage in battle and been buried in the plains of Phrygia, famous for their horses.⁸¹ This appears to be a small harvest of hellenistic funerary epigraphy, but the number of contemporary inscriptions from Lydia is equally modest, and it would be wrong to assume that Macedonian settlement in Phrygia was sparse.⁸² Early hellenistic inscriptions from the interior of Anatolia are simply rarities.

A better indicator of the extent of early Macedonian settlement in central Anatolia is the distribution of coin hoards, containing silver Alexander III tetradrachms. Later batches of the Alexander coinage are supplemented by smaller numbers of tetradrachms struck for Philip III, Lysimachos or Seleukos I. Collectively the date-range for the burial of these hoards, usually containing between about twenty and a hundred coins each, ranges from c. 325 to 280 BC. The *Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*, published in 1973, registered eight such hoards from Phrygia or western Cappadocia, including the exceptionally large group from Sinanpaşa near Afyon (*IGCH* 1395: 682 coins, c. 318 BC), and smaller hoards from Eskişehir (*IGCH* 1396: 63 coins, c. 315 BC), Yunak (*IGCH* 1397: 16 coins, c. 300 BC), Karaman (*IGCH* 1398: 49 coins, c. 300 BC), Ankara (*IGCH* 1399: 179+ coins, c. 290–85 BC), Aksaray (*IGCH* 1400: 19 coins, c. 281 BC) and Gordion (*IGCH* 1401: 42 coins, c. 280 BC). Hoards of this period with a guaranteed provenance from western Asia Minor are scarcer, but include those from Aphrodisias (*IGCH* 1283: 9 coins, c. 305 BC), Muğla (*IGCH* 1292: 52 coins, c. 285–80 BC),

BC), and Manisa (*IGCH* 1293: 24 coins, c. 280 BC). However, *IGCH* records eleven further Asia Minor hoards of silver tetradrachms of this period. Many of these are likely to have originated in western Anatolia, especially the Lydian region, before they passed into the hands of antiquities dealers and others.⁸³ This forty-year old list can certainly be updated. A very recent addition is the hoard of thirty-two Alexander tetradrachms buried between 315 and 310 BC, now in the collection of Kırşehir Museum, from north-west Cappadokia.⁸⁴

Very little work has been done to identify archaeological traces of Macedonian settlement in Asia Minor. Apart from his proposal concerning the site of Tyriaion, Thonemann has acutely suggested that the small, heavily fortified, hellenistic site which occupies the upper levels of the Early Bronze Age mound at Seyitömer Hüyük north of Cotiaeum (Kütahya) is likely to have been a Macedonian *katoikia* in northern Phrygia.⁸⁵ The ancient name of this site is unknown, but there is a very good case for suggesting that another Macedonian *katoikia* was located at a far more familiar site, the old Phrygian capital of Gordion. Gordion was the location of one Alexander's most famous exploits, the cutting of the famous knot, a feat which by repute opened his path to the conquest of Asia. It was also one of the commercial and strategic hubs of west central Anatolia, controlling the crossing of the Sangarius river and serving as a gateway on a main route between western and central Anatolia. As such it should have been a prime site for a Macedonian settlement, and the recent excavations and publications suggest that the Hellenistic A level at Gordion, dated c. 333–275 BC, perfectly fits this description. The settlement at this period appears to have been egalitarian, consisting of mud-brick housing units built on stone foundations, without any monumental public architecture. The finds, however, were dominated by black glaze pottery and other Greek fine wares, and transport amphorae. The first Greek inscriptions from the site, often garbled personal names carved as graffiti on this pottery, also belong to this period. Gordion is likely to have been controlled by Macedonian settlers from the moment of Alexander's passage in 333 until the arrival of the Galatians in the mid-270s, an episode which appears to have brought an end to ceramic imports from the Aegean and left other important traces at the site.⁸⁶

Further evidence for hellenistic settlement in north-eastern Phrygia is provided by a newly-published letter sent by Attalos, brother of Eumenes II, to two officials named Sosthenes and Herodes, recorded on an inscription found at Pessinous.⁸⁷ The letter begins by referring to a petition which had been addressed to Attalos by a certain Aribazos (the name is Iranian), ἡγέμων τῶν ἀπὸ Κλεονναείου Γαλατῶν καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ Ἀμορίου κατοίκων,

‘the commander of the Galatians from Kleonnaeion and the *katoikoi* from Amorium’. Aribazos was registered among those based in Kleonnaeion but nothing had been settled or ordered concerning the former mercenaries who were in the place, ἔφησεν ἀναφέρεισθαι ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῷ Κλεονναεῖ(ῳ) / κ] αἱ διὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ὄντων πρότερον / μισθοφόρων μηθὲν διατετάχθαι. Another clause in the petition refers to κλήρους...ὄντας ἡγεμονικοῦς, ‘allotments... commanded by a *hēgemōn*’, under his control.⁸⁸ The inscription offers a glimpse of two military settlements in Asia Minor probably in the 180s BC. Thonemann has identified Kleonnaeion, where the Galatians were based, with a previously unlocated hellenistic polis which issued coins with a legend that has previously been read as ΛΕΟΝΝΑΙΤΩΝ, but is now clearly to be understood as [Κ]ΛΕΟΝΝΑΙΤΩΝ. These include types depicting Kybele and a lion, which are strikingly similar to late hellenistic issues of Pessinus. Kleonnaeion accordingly seems to have been the name given to a *polis* at Pessinus itself, where the inscription was found. The toponym derives from Kleonnas, a hypocoristic form of Kleonikos, presumably the name of the settlement’s founder, just as Dokimeion had been founded by Dokimos, and Dorylaion by a presumed Dorylaos.⁸⁹ The personal name Kleonikos is notably frequent in Thessaly and Macedonia,⁹⁰ and Kleonnas/Kleonikos is very likely to have been another Macedonian leader. The Galatians, referred to as μισθόφοροι, mercenaries, were certainly later arrivals in the settlement, and may be compared with the Galatian element that can be identified among the inhabitants of Toriaion/Tyriaeum (see above). The new inscription also provides the earliest documentary evidence for Amorium, later to become a city of eastern Phrygia, with an important history stretching into the Byzantine age. The *katoikoi* of Amorium are not ethnically identified, and by this date we might reasonably assume them to have been a mixed group. It is inherently plausible that the earliest of these settlers would have been drawn from Alexander’s Macedonian troops, and several coins of Amorium, issued in the Roman imperial period, which depict an eagle with a thigh-bone, allude to a foundation legend similar to that of Blaundus, but no coins or inscriptions of the imperial period identify the population as Macedonian, and the coin types seem to be associated with local legends about the birth of Zeus, rather than to Alexander the Great as the city’s founder.⁹¹

The extensive settlement of colonists in Lydia and Phrygia was surely driven by the need to find land for a rapidly growing population in Macedonia and the adjacent areas of northern Greece and the southern Balkans in the fourth century. Already in the mid-fourth century Jason of Pherae was reported by Isocrates as giving advice to Philip II, that he should invade the Persian king’s territory in Asia, so as to

settle in permanent abodes those who now, for lack of the daily necessities of life, are wandering from place to place and committing outrages upon whomsoever they encounter. If we do not stop these men from banding together, by providing sufficient livelihood for them, they will grow before we know it into so great a multitude as to be a terror no less to the Hellenes than to the barbarians.⁹²

In fact, the injunction to his fellow Greeks to look east for new lands to settle in Asia was a *topos* of Isocrates' speeches throughout his career. In the *Panegyrikos* of 380 BC he reproached the Greeks of his day for fighting one another rather than looking for land overseas:

It is my opinion that if anyone should come here from another part of the world and behold the spectacle of the present state of affairs, he would charge both the Athenians and the Spartans with utter madness, not only because we risk our lives fighting as we do over trifles when we might enjoy in security a wealth of possessions, but because we continually impoverish our own territory while neglecting to exploit that of Asia.⁹³

The recommendation was made quite specifically in the *Panathenaikos* of the late 340s:

I, for my part, have led the way in discourses which exhort the Hellenes to concord among themselves and war against the barbarians, which urge that we should unite in colonizing a country so vast and vulnerable that those who have heard the truth about it assert with one accord that if we are sensible and cease from our frenzy against each other we can quickly gain possession of it without effort and risk, and that this territory will easily accommodate all the people among us who are in want of the necessities of life.⁹⁴

There is a close parallel to be drawn here with another major demographic phenomenon of the early hellenistic period, the crossing of the Galatians into Asia Minor in 279 BC and their occupation of territory in central Anatolia. Within a decade of invading Anatolia, the Galatians' expanding and warlike population seized their opportunity to occupy and colonise new lands in north central Asia Minor, which were exposed by a political power-vacuum.⁹⁵

The Macedonian 'Landnahme' in Lydia and Phrygia was driven by similar motivations. The pressure to migrate and seize territory came not from the *diadochoi* and the hellenistic kings, but from the Macedonian population itself. Their opportunity was created in the long perspective by the collapse of the Lydian and Phrygian kingdoms, leaving vulnerable and leaderless local populations. The Persians made the first move, and established large and enduring settlements, especially in Lydia. But Philip II was already aware that settlement in Asia Minor could function as a

safety valve for a Macedonian demographic explosion, and Alexander's victories opened the door for a major wave of colonisation. Macedonians moved into Phrygia long before the end of the fourth century BC. It seems likely that an early and probably large wave of settlement was initiated by Alexander himself immediately after the conquests of 334/3 BC. Certainly the communities at Blaundus and Eukarpia in the second century AD believed Alexander to have been their founder. Other settlements took their names from local leaders who emerged from the entourage of Alexander, Dokimos and Nearchos, or from dynasts of the third century, such as Philomelos and Lysias. There is, in contrast, virtually no evidence to show that the Seleukids were active as founders of military or agricultural settlements in Lydia and Phrygia. One of the main reasons for this is that most of the work of colonisation had been achieved already by the end of the fourth century.

The *diadochoi* naturally sought to gain the allegiance of these settlers, as this emigrant Macedonian population represented a huge military resource and controlled territory which could be an important source of revenue. The Seleukids, victorious both at Ipsos in 301 and at Koroupedion in 281 BC, were the most successful competitors for the allegiance of the settlers in the first half of the third century. Before long the chief beneficiaries were the Attalids. The Macedonians from Lydia combined with Mysians to form important contingents of the Attalid armies.⁹⁶ It may even have been to counterbalance increasing Attalid dominance over the Macedonian population that Antiochos III introduced 2000 Jewish settlers to key places in Lydia and Phrygia after the successful campaign to recapture Sardes in 213 BC.⁹⁷ Any advantage thus gained was only temporary, and evaporated completely after the battle of Magnesia. Now the Attalids were the only power in the land. The Macedonian settlements of Lydia and Phrygia were at the heart of their kingdom. The integration and development of these Macedonian communities thereafter became a major strand in the exercise of Attalid power, as they began to impose a much tighter form of regional government than had ever been achieved by the Seleukids.⁹⁸ The notion that the Seleukids themselves had initiated a policy of military and agricultural settlement in western Asia Minor in the early part or middle of the third century is a myth. It is long overdue that these phantom Seleukid *katoikiai* were banished from the historical record.

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Notes

¹ Ogden 1999, vii; compare Ogden 2002, ix–xxv.

² Cohen 1995, 195–242 (Lydia) and 277–326 (Phrygia), reviews most of the individual examples and cites most of the earlier literature.

³ Daubner 2011.

⁴ Daubner 2011, 52–3.

⁵ For a re-appraisal of the Attalid kingdom under Eumenes II, see Thonemann 2013a.

⁶ Arrian I.17.2–4: ‘Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ Σάρδεων προὔχρει· καὶ ἀπέχοντος αὐτοῦ ὅσον ἑβδομήκοντα σταδίους Σάρδεων ἦκον παρ’ αὐτὸν Μιθρήνης τε ὁ φρουράρχος τῆς ἀκροπόλεως τῆς ἐν Σάρδεσι καὶ Σαρδιανῶν οἱ δυνατώτατοι, ἐνδιδόντες οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν, ὁ δὲ Μιθρήνης τὴν ἄκραν καὶ τὰ χρήματα. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν κατεστρατοπέδευσεν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἑρμῷ ποταμῷ· ἀπέχει δὲ ὁ Ἑρμος ἀπὸ Σάρδεων σταδίους ὅσον εἴκοσιν· Ἀμύνταν δὲ τὸν Ἀνδρομένους τὴν ἄκραν παραληψόμενον ἐκπέμπει ἐς Σάρδεις· καὶ Μιθρήνην μὲν ἐν τιμῇ ἅμα οἱ ἦγεν, Σαρδιανούς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Λυδοὺς τοῖς νόμοις τε τοῖς πάλαι Λυδῶν χρῆσθαι ἔδωκεν καὶ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι ἀφῆκεν;’ (*Alexander himself advanced against Sardes. When he was about seventy stades from Sardes, Mithrenes, the commander of the garrison of the acropolis at Sardes and the most powerful of the Sardian leaders approached him; the latter surrendered the city, while Mithrenes handed over the citadel and the treasury. Alexander himself set up camp in the plain of the river Hermos, which is about twenty stades from Sardes, and he sent Amyntas the son of Andromenes to Sardes to take control of the citadel. He took Mithrenes with him in an honourable fashion, and granted the people of Sardes and the other Lydians the right to use the ancient laws of the Lydians and allowed them to be free.*) Arrian I.17.7: κατέλιπε δὲ τῆς μὲν ἄκρας τῆς Σάρδεων ἐπιμελητὴν Πausανίαν τῶν ἐταίρων, τῶν δὲ φόρων τῆς συντάξεώς τε καὶ ἀποφορᾶς Νικίαν, Ἄσανδρον δὲ τὸν Φιλῶτα Λυδίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τῆς Σπιθριδάτου ἀρχῆς, δούς αὐτῷ ἱππέας τε καὶ ψιλοὺς ὅσοι ἱκανοὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἐδόκουν;’ (*Alexander left behind Pausanias, one of his companions, to be commandant of the citadel of Sardes, while Nicias supervised the levying and delivery of the taxes and he put Asander son of Philotas in charge of Lydia and the rest of the domain of Spithridates, giving him as many cavalry and light-armed troops as seemed sufficient for the circumstances.*)

⁷ Diodoros XX.107.2–4 (trans. Oldfather): ‘[Lysimachos] first attempted to invest Abydos and set about preparing missiles and engines and the other equipment; but when there arrived by sea to assist the besieged a large body of soldiers sent by Demetrius, a force sufficient to secure the safety of the city, he gave up this attempt and won over Hellespontine Phrygia, and also laid siege to the city of Synnada, which possessed a great royal treasure. It was at this very time that he even persuaded Docimus, the general of Antigonos, to make common cause with him, and by his aid he took Synnada and also some of the strongholds that held the royal wealth.’

⁸ Cohen 1995, 299 citing the earlier bibliography.

⁹ Diodoros XX.108.6–7.

¹⁰ Diodoros XVIII.45.3; XIX.16; XX.107.3–4; Dokimos was named as city founder in three epigrams of the Roman imperial period, see Merkelbach and Stauber 2001, 382 ff., 1//53/01, 02 and 07; see Cohen 1995, 295–6.

¹¹ Wilhelm 1911, 48–63; Holleaux 1915. The site of Lysias should be north of Oinan Gölü, near Çay, but has not been decisively identified.

¹² *I. Pergamon* I nos. 26 and 35 (from Attalos I's victory monument); *Fouilles de Delphes* IV no. 156: θεοί. | ἔδοξε ταῖ πόλει τῶν Δελφῶν ἐν ἀγορᾷ τελείῳ, σὺν ψάφοις | ταῖς ἐννόμοις· ἐπειδὴ Λυσίας Φιλομήλου Μακεδῶν | διατελεῖ τὰ τε ποτὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν εὐσεβέων, καὶ τῇ πόλει κοινᾷ καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχανόντοισι ἀεὶ καθ' ἰδίαν | Δελφῶν φιλανθρωπῶς χρεόμενος, ἀναγράψαι Λυσίαν | καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐγγόνους εὐεργέτας τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τὰς πόλιν προέξενον; 'Gods. It was resolved by the city of the Delphians during a fully empowered meeting, with votes cast according to the laws: since Lysias son of Philomelos the Macedonian has conducted himself with pious actions towards the god and the sanctuary, and has behaved generously towards the city as a community and towards those who have happened to be at Delphi on private business, that Lysias himself and his descendants should be listed as benefactors of the sanctuary and that he should be a *proxenos* of the city.'

¹³ Polybios XXI.35.2. This Philomelos should also probably be identified with the official named in the dossier of 209 BC, inscribed at Philomelion, which relayed instructions of Antiochos III concerning the administration of sanctuaries; see SEG 2004, 1353.

¹⁴ Polyainos IV.9.5: 'Demetrios had encamped under mount Taurus. Seleukos, who was afraid that he would secretly make his escape into Syria, detached Lysias with a body of Macedonians to secure the pass over the Amanides mountains, through which Demetrios would be obliged to march; and he ordered them to kindle a number of fires there. By this timely movement Demetrius saw his intended route cut off, and his escape blocked'; see Billows 1995a, 99–100.

¹⁵ Keil and von Premerstein 1911, 135 no. 248: ἐ[πε]ί | [Ἀν]τιπάτρος Περιλάου Δερβήτης πολλὰς ἀποδείξ[ει]ς | [παρέ]σχηται τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς εὐνοίας ἐν παντ[ί] καὶ[] [ρῶ]ι | -]; 'since Antipater son of Perilaos of Derbe has provided many demonstrations of his goodwill towards us on every occasion...'; See Cicero, *ad fam.* XIII.73.2; Strabo XII.1.4; 6.3: τῆς δ' Ἰσαυρικῆς ἔστιν ἐν πλευραῖς ἡ Δέρβη, μάλιστα τῇ Καππαδοκίᾳ ἐπιπεφυκὸς τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου τυραννεῖον τοῦ Δερβήτου· τοῦ δ' ἦν καὶ τὰ Λάρανδα· ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ τὰ Ἰσαυρα καὶ τὴν Δέρβην Ἀμύντας εἶχεν, ἐπιθέμενος τῷ Δερβήτῃ καὶ ἀνελὼν αὐτόν, τὰ δ' Ἰσαυρα παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων λαβών; 'Derbe, and in particular the little dynasty of Antipater of Derbe which extended to Cappadocia, is situated on the flanks of Isaurian territory; Laranda was also part of it. In our time Amyntas held both Isaura and Derbe; he had attacked the man of Derbe and removed him, while he received Isaura from the Romans'; Strabo XIV.5.24; see Syme 1979, 128–31.

¹⁶ Robert 1980, 243–4.

¹⁷ Plutarch, *Mor.* 486a, noted by Syme.

¹⁸ For the identification of the site, see Mitchell 1994, 129–36.

¹⁹ Sekunda 1997; Arrian III.3.6: Νέαρχον δὲ σατραπεύειν Λυκίας καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης Λυκίας χώρας ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸν Ταῦρον τὸ ὄρος; 'Nearchos was satrap of Lycia and the region surrounding Lycia as far as the Taurus mountain'; compare Arrian I.29.3 on Antigonos in Phrygia.

²⁰ Justin XIII.4.14–15; cf Orosius III.23.9.

²¹ Sekunda's discussion is avowedly speculative. If Diodoros XVIII.44 is not anachronistic, Cretopolis must have been founded before 319 BC. Another early Macedonian settlement can be identified west of Cretopolis at Themisionium,

which was probably founded by Themison, another officer in the entourage of Antigonos Monophthalmos; see Cohen 1995, 325–6.

²² Billows 1995a, 81–109.

²³ Bosworth and Wheatley 1998; Mitchell 2002, 50–54; Mitchell 2005.

²⁴ Billows 1995a, 81–109 at 107. Billows' book is helpfully and interestingly reviewed by Mileta 1998.

²⁵ Among other studies which modify Billows' discussion, see Descat 1998, definitively refuting Billows 1989, an attempt to redate the activities of Eupolemos to 294–287 BC. For Ptolemy son of Lysimachus and Termessus, see Meadows 2012, a new interpretation of the inscription first published by Wörrle 1978 (*SEG* 1978, 1224).

²⁶ Diodoros XX.107.3–4.

²⁷ Strabo XIII, 4. 6, 626 and 4. 13, 629.

²⁸ Strabo XIV.2 29, 663 : ἐπεὶ δὲ κοινὴ τις ὁδὸς τέτριπται ἅπασιν τοῖς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς ὁδοιποροῦσιν ἐξ Ἐφέσου, καὶ ταύτην ἔπεισιν. See Magie 1950 II, 789–92.

²⁹ Robert 1935, 43–82, especially 47–50, argued that the city was named by Antiochos I after his mother Stratonike. The numismatic foundation for this hypothesis was removed by Robinson 1954, and in the second edition of *Villes d'Asie Mineure* Robert acknowledged that Stratonikeia could also have been named after Stratonike, wife of Eumenes II, and saw no means of deciding between a Seleukid or an Attalid foundation (Robert 1962, 252–60). Cohen 1995, 236 inclines to the Seleukid hypothesis. It is, however, relevant that the other royal city foundations in the upper Caicus valley were Attalid (see nn. 31–2).

³⁰ For Apollonis, see Strabo XIII.4.4, 625 and the full testimonia collected by P. Herrmann, *TAM* V.2, pp. 419–22. Robert's earlier discussion (Robert 1935, 31–40) was revised in Robert 1962, 252–60 in the light of Robinson's numismatic study, summarised by Cohen 1995, 201–4.

³¹ For Attaleia, see *InPergamon* I no. 13, referring to [ἀξ]ιώματα ἃ ἐπεχ[ώρη]σεν Εὐμένης Φιλεταίρο[ν τοῖς]ἐ[μ] Φιλεταιρεῖαι στρατιώταις καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἀτταλείαι, 'the requests which Eumenes son of Philetairos granted to the soldiers in Philetaireia and those in Attaleia'. Other testimonia have been collected by P. Herrmann, *TAM* V.2, pp. 295–7, and discussed in Cohen 1995, 205–6.

³² Six fragmentary ephebic catalogues have been recorded at Apollonis (*TAM* V.2, 1203–08), and although these post-date the creation of the Roman province of Asia, they point to the earlier significance of the city as an Attalid military colony.

³³ See G. Petzl, *TAM* V.3, ix and his commentary on n. 1424.

³⁴ Cohen 1995, 301–2, citing Eutropius IV.4.2 (Eumenes II) and Stephanus Byz. sv Eumeneia (Attalos II). Perhaps the latter was acting on behalf of his brother, as may have happened at Apollonis.

³⁵ Thonemann 2011a, 130–78.

³⁶ *TAM* V.2, 1187: – – υἱὸν βασιλέως [Ἀττάλου, | τὸν κτίστην καὶ εὐεργέτην, προνοήσαντα | τοῦ συν|οικισμοῦ τῆς πόλεως καὶ συνεκ|τελέ]σαντα τὴν τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ [βασιλέως | Εὐ]μένου πρόθεσιν κτλ. '...son of king Attalos, founder and benefactor, who made provision for the synoecism of the city and completed the project of his brother king Eumenes.'

³⁷ TAM V.2.1188 (The Macedonians from Doidya), found at Palamut.

³⁸ TAM V.2, 1190 (The Macedonians from [.]Jesura), found at Dereköy. It is not certain whether the term *stratēgos* here denotes a magistrate or the general of a military contingent. Note, also, that this text must postdate the foundation of Apollonis.

³⁹ For orientation and documentation of the older literature, see the authoritative note of Magie (1950) II, 972–4 n. 3.

⁴⁰ The evidence for Persian settlement in Lydia, most dating to the hellenistic and Roman periods, is collected by Sekunda 1985.

⁴¹ Pliny, NH V, 111: Sardiana nunc appellatur ea iurisdictio, conveniuntque in eam extra praedictos Macedones, Cadieni, Philadelphini et ipsi in radice Tmoli Cogamo flumini adpositi Maeonii, Tripolitani, iidem et Antoniopolitae – Maeandro adluuntur –, Apollonhieritae, Mysotimolitae et alii ignobiles; ‘That jurisdiction is now called Sardian, and besides the people already mentioned, the following now come together in it – the Macedonians, the people of Cadi, the Loreni, the Philadelphians, the Mæonians situated by the river Cogamus at the foot of Mount Tmolus, the people of Tripolis, who are also called the Antoniopolitae, on the banks of the Mæander, the Apollonihieritæ, the Mesotimolitæ, and some others of no note’. The text cited in the following note shows that the Macedones were listed as a separate community, not as an ethnic designation of the people of Cadi.

⁴² Habicht 1975, 65 col. I, 1, and 72–3 (*I.Ephesos* I no. 13; SEG 37, 884): Μακεδόνες, Ἀγκυρανοί, Συναίται, Μοκαδινοί, Καδυηνεῖς.

⁴³ Pliny NH V, 120: verum Ephesum, alterum lumen Asiae, remotiores conveniunt Caesarienses, Metropolitae, Cilbiani Inferiores et Superiores, Mysomacedones, Mastaureses, Briullitae, Hypaepeni, Dioshieritae; ‘but the more remote peoples – the people of Caesaria and Metropolis, the upper and lower Cilbiani, The Mysomacedonians, the Mastaureses, the Briullitae, the people of Hypaepa and the people of Dioshieron – come together at Ephesos, the other beacon of Asia’. See Cohen 1995, 220–2, quoting Strabo XIII.4.5, 625: ὑπέρκειται δὲ τῶν Σάρδεων ὁ Τμῶλος, εὐδαμὼν ὄρος, ἐν τῇ ἀκρωρείᾳ σκοπὴν ἔχον, ἐξέδραν λευκοῦ λίθου, Περσῶν ἔργον, ἀφ’ οὗ κατοπτεύεται τὰ κύκλῳ πεδία καὶ μάλιστα τὸ Καῦστριανόν· περιουικοῦσι δὲ Λυδοὶ καὶ Μυσοὶ καὶ Μακεδόνες; ‘Tmolus lies above Sardes, a fertile mountain with a look-out point at the summit, an exedra of white marble, Persian work, from which the plains can be viewed in a circle, especially that of the Cayster; and Lydians, Mysians and Macedonians dwell round about.’

⁴⁴ See *OGIS* 338 = *IGR* IV 289, the decree of Pergamon, which dealt with affairs after the death of Attalos III and the bequest of his kingdom to Rome, and which conferred citizenship on the Macedonians and the Mysians, among other categories of Attalid soldiers

⁴⁵ *IGR* IV 1160 (copied at Bakır, but perhaps from one of the nearby sites at Maltepe or Ilyaslar).

⁴⁶ *IGR* IV 1163 (found at Kırkağaç, where inscriptions have been brought from throughout the region, see Robert 1962, 73–4), a milestone for the emperor Tacitus; an earlier Latin text on the same milestone was dedicated to Septimius Severus). The site of Akrasos was evidently in the upper Caicus valley and probably close to Nakrasos/Nakrason. It cannot strictly be demonstrated that

Akrasos contained a Macedonian community, although an inscription from the nearby village of Ilyaslar mentions a Macedonian (Lechat and Radet 1887, 477 n. 54).

⁴⁷ Schuler 1996, 33–41, with a catalogue of relevant texts at 301–3.

⁴⁸ SEG 43, 879; see Schuler 1996, 33–4 for the significance of the text.

⁴⁹ Herrmann and Malay 2007, 49–58 (SEG 57, 1150), now re-interpreted by Thonemann 2011b.

⁵⁰ Strabo XIII.4.4, 625: κατοικία Μακεδόνων, ἣν Μυσῶν ἐσχάτην τινὲς φασίν; ‘a settlement of Macedonians, which some say is the most remote of the Mysian ones.’

⁵¹ TAM V.2, 901.

⁵² Stephanus Byz. s.v. Thyateira.

⁵³ See P. Herrmann, TAM V.2, p. 309.

⁵⁴ TAM V.2, 1166, which was dated by its discoverer, G. Radet, to the time of Alexander the Great

⁵⁵ TAM V.2, 1109. P. Herrmann dates the text ‘altae III vel II a. Chr. n.’, but Cohen 1995, 240 n. 2 refers to the suggestion of Launey 1949, 338 that it should date to the late fourth century BC.

⁵⁶ TAM V.2, p. 314.

⁵⁷ TAM V.2, 959, a text of the second century BC which indicated that the settlement had been founded by Attalos I and Eumenes II, probably at the end of the former’s reign. There is no warrant for Cohen’s suggestion that ‘at the very least it is clear that the Attalids established a colony at Mernouphyta with an eye to Thyateira, either to counter it, if it was still Seleukid, or to control it, if it had come under Attalid rule’ (Cohen 1995, 218).

⁵⁸ IG IX.1, 3², 750 (from Amphissa); for the coins and inscriptions see TAM V.2, p. 463.

⁵⁹ Strabo XIII.4.13, 629: εἶτα τὸ Ὑρκάνιον πεδῖον, Περσῶν ἐπονομασάντων καὶ ἐποίκουσ ἀγαγόντων ἐκεῖθεν (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ Κύρου πεδῖον Πέρσαι κατονόμασαν); ‘then there is the Hyrkanian plain, which was given its name by the Persians and had received colonists from there (viz. Hyrkania); in the same way the Persians gave the name to the plain of Cyrus’. Another sub-group were οἱ ἐγ Λασνέδδων, ‘the men from Lasnedda’, located in the eastern corner of Hyrkanian territory, although the fact that they were responsible for setting up a votive for the indigenous Anatolian divinity Papias may suggest they were an indigenous rather than an immigrant community (TAM V.2, 1321; cf. also 1322).

⁶⁰ TAM V.2, 1307 (from Halitpaşa).

⁶¹ TAM V.1, 221 = TAM V.3, 1423. I would not infer from the use of the term *politéis*, that Kobedyle was a *polis*, as does Daubner 2011, 55.

⁶² TAM V.3, 1429 (the *katoikoi* honour Artemidoros son of Neoptolemos); TAM V.3, 1669: Ἀριστοκλέης Εἰκαδίου Μηνογένης Ἀριστοκλέους Μακεδόνε[ς].

⁶³ TAM V.1, 195.

⁶⁴ There are dedications to Zeus Seleukios and the Meter Theon at Hyrkanis, TAM V.2, 1306, and to Zeus Seleukios and the Nymphs at Nisyra, another presumably Macedonian *katoikia* in the middle Hermus region, TAM V.1, 426.

⁶⁵ Filges 2003 and Filges 2006. Filges follows the general view that the Macedonians

of Blandus must have been a Seleukid military colony (Filges 2006, 21); so also Cohen 1995, 290–2.

⁶⁶ Head 1911, 648; *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. Sammlung Aulock Index* (Berlin 1981), 27, citing SNG Von Aulock 2922, 2924, 2926–32, 8222 for the various abbreviations.

⁶⁷ IGR IV 717.

⁶⁸ *Sammlung Aulock Index* (Berlin 1981), 28, citing SNG Von Aulock 3545, 3549, 3551–2, 3554–6, 8356.

⁶⁹ *Sammlung Aulock Index* (Berlin 1981), 42, citing SNG Von Aulock 3907–12, 3914, 3919, 3914, 8432–4.

⁷⁰ Michel 1900 no. 542 (set up at Antandros): ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ κτλ. The reference to the *polis* is in line 8.

⁷¹ Nollé 2015.

⁷² Ogden 2011a and 2011b.

⁷³ Nollé 2015, 16–22 presents the material and argument in detail. See Nollé 2015, 21 n. 97 for Eukarpia, and n. 99 on Arrian I, 29 and Curtius III.1.11.

⁷⁴ SEG 47, 1745; English translation by Austin 2006, 412–4 no. 236.

⁷⁵ Thonemann 2008, esp. 46–8 and plates 1–3 for the site and its fortifications; see also Belke and Mersich 1990, 215–6 s.v. Bulasan, with plates 31 and 32.

⁷⁶ Ramsay 1887, 478–9; Legrand and Chamonard 1893, 277; Ramsay 1897, 702 no. 638; IGR IV 692.

⁷⁷ See MAMA XI 45 with commentary; Calder 1956 (SEG 15, 810), with *Bull. ép.* 1958, 467; further discussion in B. M. Levick and S. Mitchell, MAMA IX, xli–xlii.

⁷⁸ See Mileta 2002 and Mileta 2008, especially 127–33.

⁷⁹ MAMA IV 49.

⁸⁰ SEG 43, 937 (an inscription in Afyon Museum, originally published in the commentary to MAMA X 220; the text should not be assigned to the territory of Dorylaeum): Φίλιππος Μακεδών. / ἔνθα με γαῖα ἐκάλυψε Φίλιππον Σωρία υἱόν, / μητρός δὲ Ἀντιγόνης, κρύπτομ' ὑποχθόνιος· / ἀλλοτρίας δὲ ἔλαχον χώρας καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ. / Εἰμὶ δὲ Ἐλημώτης, ἐκ πόλεως δὲ Τελᾶ (?); ‘*Philippus the Macedonian. Here the earth has covered me, Philip son of Sorias, whose mother was Antigone, concealed beneath the ground. I acquired an allotment in a foreign land, and not myself of my own choice. I am a man of Elemia, from the city of Tela.*’ Nigdelis 1995, 173–9 shows that Philippus was a native of Macedonian Elemia, but the identity of the city of Tela (or Etela, or Detela) remains perplexing.

⁸¹ MAMA X 220.

⁸² See now Thonemann 2013b, especially 16–24 for the Macedonian settlements. Note his comment on p. 17, that ‘the prime motor for the arrival and diffusion of Greek culture in Phrygia was large-scale Graeco-Macedonian colonial settlement beginning in the immediate aftermath of the Macedonian conquest of the mid 330s and continuing through the third and second centuries BC.’

⁸³ *IGCH* (= Thompson, Mørkholm and Kraay 1973) 1436 (53 coins, c. 323 BC); 1437 (89 coins, c. 321 BC); 1438 (70 coins, c. 320 BC); 1439 (80+ coins, c. 320 BC); 1440 (90+ coins, c. 320 BC); 1441 (48+ coins, c. 315 BC); 1442 (24+ coins, c. 310 BC);

1443 (29+ coins, c. 310 BC); 1444 (205+ coins, c. 300 BC); 1445 (40+ coins, c. 300 BC); 1446 (50 coins, c. 280 BC).

⁸⁴ Arslan and Devocioğlu 2011.

⁸⁵ Thonemann 2013b, 24; for a summary based on the Turkish excavation reports see S. Mitchell, in *JHS Archaeological Reports* 45 (1998–99), 181.

⁸⁶ See the brief but pertinent summary of recent work at Gordion by Thonemann 2013b, 20; for the inscriptions see Roller 1987.

⁸⁷ Tsetskhladze and Avram 2014, revised with a new historical interpretation by Thonemann 2015.

⁸⁸ Thonemann 2015, 117 lines 4–8.

⁸⁹ Thonemann 2015, 122–5.

⁹⁰ See LGPN III.1 and IV.2 s. v. Κλεόνικος for details.

⁹¹ Nollé 2015, 22–6.

⁹² Isocrates, *Philipp* 120–121 ὅπου δ' Ἰάσων λόγῳ μόνον χρησάμενος οὕτως αὐτὸν ἠῦξησεν, ποίαν τινὰ χρὴ προσδοκᾶν περὶ σοῦ γνώμην αὐτοὺς ἔξειν, ἣν ἔργῳ ταῦτα πράξει, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν πειραθῆς ὅλην τὴν βασιλείαν ἐλεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, χώραν ὅτι πλείστην ἀφορίσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὡς λέγουσί τινες, ἀπὸ Κιλικίας μέχρι Σινώπης, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτίσαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ, καὶ κατοικίσαι τοὺς νῦν πλανωμένους δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ λυμαινομένους οἷς ἂν ἐντύχῳσιν (Loeb trans. G. Norlin).

⁹³ Isocrates, *Panegyrikos* 133: ἡγοῦμαι δ', εἴ τινες ἄλλοθεν ἐπελθόντες θεαταὶ γένοιτο τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων, πολλὴν ἂν αὐτοὺς καταγνῶναι μανίαν ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν, οἱ τινες οὕτω περὶ μικρῶν κινδυνεύουмен, ἔξδὼν ἀδεῶς πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν χώραν διαφθείρουмен, ἀμελήσαντες τὴν Ἀσίαν καρποῦσθαι (trans. G. Norlin).

⁹⁴ Isocrates, *Panathenaios* 13–14: ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἢ λοιδορουμένους ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις περὶ μεσεγγυήματος σφίσις αὐτοῖς ἢ λυμαινομένους τοὺς συμμάχους ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὃν ἂν τύχῳσι συκοφαντοῦντας, ἐμὲ δὲ τῶν λόγων ἡγεμόνα τούτων γεγεννημένον, τῶν παρακαλούντων τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐπὶ τε τὴν ὁμόνοιαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τὴν στρατείαν τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους, καὶ τῶν συμβουλευόντων ἀποικίαν ἐκπέμπειν κοινῇ πάντας ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοσαύτην χώραν καὶ τοιαύτην, περὶ ἧς ὅσοι περ ἀκηκόασιν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἡμᾶς τε, εἰ σωφρονήσαιμεν καὶ πανσαίμεθα τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους μανίας, ταχέως ἂν ἄνευ πόνων καὶ κινδύνων κατασχεῖν αὐτήν, ἐκείνην τε ῥαδίως ἂν ἅπαντας δέξασθαι τοὺς ἐνδεεῖς ἡμῶν ὄντας τῶν ἐπιτηδείων (trans. G. Norlin).

⁹⁵ Strobel 1996; Mitchell 2003.

⁹⁶ OGIS 266 (trans. Austin 2006, 320–3 no. 196, the pact between Eumenes I and his mutinous troops, referring to settlements at Philetaireia in the Troad, Attaleia in northern Lydia, and Tralles in the lower Maeander valley); TAM V. 2, 1203–8 (the ephebic lists from Apollonis); see above p. 20.

⁹⁷ Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* XII.147–53; trans. Austin 2006, 275–8 no. 267. Austin revealingly comments that ‘this is the most explicit information available on the establishment of a military colony in the Seleukid empire’. I would argue that there was no occasion to offer similar accounts of the Macedonian foundations in this region as they were not Seleukid military colonies at all.

⁹⁸ Thonemann 2013a.

THE HOUSE OF ACHAIOS: RECONSTRUCTING AN EARLY CLIENT DYNASTY OF SELEUKID ANATOLIA

Alex McAuley

For nearly the entire first century of Seleukid rule a substantial portion of Anatolia stretching from Lydia and Phrygia through to the Kilikian Gates was held under the sway of a family whose wealth of contemporary influence is equalled only by the poverty of its attestation. The family is often labelled ‘The House of Achaïos’ after its homonymous founder and its final representative: the youngest, the renowned challenger to the throne of Antiochos III, and the oldest, the obscure patriarch of the dynasty. Among the members of Achaïos’ family are some of the most influential figures in the first century of Seleukid rule: Laodike I, the controversial queen of Antiochos II who lent her name to the Third Syrian War; Laodike II, the wife of Seleukos II and mother of both Seleukos III and Antiochos III; Antiochis, the mother of Attalos I of Pergamon; Alexandros, the Seleukid Satrap of Sardis; and Andromachos, general of Seleukos II, all hail from this lineage.¹ But despite the family’s clear prominence in early Seleukid administration and its close interrelation with the dynasty, it has thus far received only oblique scholarly attention. While many of the above individuals have been the subjects of episodic discussion, a synthetic treatment of the dynasty as a whole remains lacking.² There has been a particular ambivalence among scholars towards the identity of the progenitor of the dynasty itself, Achaïos, whose precise background has by and large been acknowledged as unknowable.³

My aim in this chapter is to examine the nature of early Seleukid imperial administration by reconstructing the early generations of this local client dynasty in Asia Minor. Though some have elaborated the structural character of the House of Achaïos’ dominion in Anatolia, precisely how and by whom this dominion was first acquired are questions that remain nebulous yet are nonetheless consequential.⁴ I aim to unravel the family’s tangled strands of descent beginning with particular focus on its patriarch and posit two reconstructions – both plausible, though one preferable to the other in my opinion – of his origins and station. Achaïos’ own prestige is best

glimpsed through that of his later progeny, thus I shall then turn to more succinct biographical treatments of his descendants and their places within the Seleukid Empire.⁵ The revised dynastic pedigree which I advocate reconfigures some of our suppositions regarding the character of Seleukid imperial administration, so by way of conclusion I shall try to fit this reshaped piece back into the mosaic that is the early Seleukid domain. With the House of Achaïos, I hope to demonstrate that regional rule by dynastic proxy was not a reactionary stop-gap measure to prevent territorial loss, nor is the system of rule a symptom of Seleukid decline; rather it is an innate characteristic of the Empire since its first generation. This innate characteristic became such, in this instance as elsewhere, thanks in no small part to the dynastic prominence of Seleukid royal women.

I. Achaïos revisited: the tradition and the evidence

In a family full of shadowy and ill-attested figures, the forefather of the House of Achaïos is by far the most spectral. The original Achaïos – hereafter referred to as Achaïos the Elder, following Wörrle’s appellation (*Achaïos der Ältere*) – is a figure who has long haunted the footnotes of Seleukid scholarship, leading to much speculation but precious little consensus and even less by way of direct discussion. The most popular, though by no means unchallenged, hypothesis – advanced by Beloch – has been that Achaïos the Elder must have been an unattested son of Seleukos I Nikator, based on his family’s subsequent pre-eminence and his own apparent sway.⁶ The objections to such an identification of convenience are both numerous and poignant, and particularly in recent decades Beloch’s notion has increasingly been dismissed; Mehl aptly writes ‘*diese Abstammung ist mit dem vorhandenen Quellenmaterial freilich nicht beweisbar* (this lineage is, with the available evidence, certainly not provable).’⁷ That Seleukos I had another son (perhaps older than Antiochos I) who was completely unattested by either literary or epigraphic sources, and that the descendants of this son would have gone on to intermarry with their close siblings with such striking regularity for the next three generations without provoking any comment from ancient authors, seem to me untenable suppositions. Far more ancient ink was spilled over far less. Most of the recent authors to mention Achaïos the Elder – Billows, Capdetrey, Grainger – have left the question of his ancestry unresolved, instead referring to him ambiguously as a ‘close relative’ of the Seleukids who has ‘all the marks of a dynast,’ to quote Billows.⁸ I too believe that he was related to the main house, though I argue that it was by marriage, not paternity. Before proceeding, however, it would be salutary to review the facts of the case, as it were.

First, discussions of Achaïos the Elder begin with the one seemingly

concrete piece of evidence: a votive inscription unearthed in the summer of 1971 by V. M. Strocka near Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos, dated to January, 267.⁹ A certain Achaïos, described as the *kyrios tou topou* (lord of the region), is honoured along with two of his officials – Banabelos the *oikonomos* and Lachares the *eklogistēs* – for having generously ransomed several prisoners taken during the war with the Galatians, and sacrifices are to be made annually in the Temples of Zeus and Apollo in honour of him and his officials, respectively.¹⁰ I defer to Wörrle’s thorough analysis of the inscription and its context as well as Corsten’s more recent recapitulation, save for two remarks: first, that Achaïos had his own *oikonomos* and *eklogistēs* and is acknowledged as *kyrios tou topou* implies an official recognition of his power and organisation thereof that must have come from the Seleukid House itself; and second, that the residents of the area turned to Achaïos and his officials for such assistance suggests that his authority was more than that of simply a local landowner.¹¹ For our present inquiry, the inscription captures Achaïos at the twilight of his career and thus furnishes us with a useful endpoint of reference.

Second, in our literary sources a man in Anatolia named Achaïos appears twice as the father of two daughters who married into prominent families. Eusebios (1.251) refers to the (in)famous Laodike who married Antiochos II as the daughter of Achaïos, and in his discussion of Pergamene succession Strabo (13.4.2) identifies Attalos I as ‘the son of Attalos and Antiochis, daughter of Achaïos’.¹² I have elsewhere dated the marriages of Antiochis to Attalos and Laodike to Antiochos II to c. 271 and c.265, respectively, and thus we can safely suppose that the Achaïos mentioned in both sources is the same as the epigraphic Achaïos by virtue of geographic proximity and chronological contemporaneity.¹³ Though neither author elaborates on the descent or station of Achaïos himself, the marriages of his two daughters to the Seleukid and Attalid houses within the same generation implies that the man himself had near-royal status.¹⁴ Achaïos’ own pedigree must have been substantial to say the least when we consider that at this point in time the *epigonoï* were almost exclusively marrying into each other’s families and not yet into regional or subordinate families such as his. The fact that the marriages of his children took place at all is recognition enough of Achaïos’ own status, as such prominent suitors would seek equally prominent brides.¹⁵ The rough contemporaneity of the above inscription with these royal marriages of his daughters further reinforces the notion that Achaïos was a well-established regional potentate whose fame stretched beyond his immediate holdings.

Third, his name itself gains us little direct insight but nonetheless affords some interesting comments. The name ‘Achaïos’ is not one that appears

with any popularity during the classical or early hellenistic period, and our Achaïos is among the first recorded individuals to bear it. Out of the 42 'Achaïoi' attested in the *LGPV*, only two pre-date the period which I hypothesize for our Achaïos – one in Athens, and one in Thessaly.¹⁶ Onomastic research thus gives us little if any suggestion of his geographic origins, though it does provide us with the illuminating observation that his name is one that becomes, if not popular, then at least quite prominent specifically in Anatolia as the hellenistic period progresses. This comes as little surprise, given the Hellenic exhibition inherent in the name and the common use of *achaios* as an adjective denoting a Greek living in a predominantly non-Greek region.¹⁷ Though one is tempted to attribute the subsequent regional prevalence of the name to onomastic imitation of a popular provincial potentate, this would be little more than intriguing but ultimately idle speculation. At any rate, the tenable conclusion to be drawn from the name is that Achaïos was of Greek or perhaps Graeco-Macedonian descent. Such is the entirety of the ancient source record as described by most authors.¹⁸

There is, however, one other element that seems to have evaded the notice of nearly all save Bevan, and it is on this overlooked detail that my own reconstruction hinges. Buried deep in the footnotes of volume II of his magisterial *House of Seleucus* is a reference to Strabo's account of the urban geography of the eastern province of Aria, which reads 'and the cities [of Aria] are Artakaena, Alexandria, and Achaia, named after their founders' (Strabo 11.10.1).¹⁹ According to the geographer, one of the principal cities in what is now Herat Province on the North-Western edge of Afghanistan bordering Iran and Turkmenistan was the eponymous foundation of a man named Achaïos. We can further securely identify it as a Seleukid city and perhaps hazard a guess at the date of its foundation because two cities named 'Achaia' are listed by Appian in his detailed account of Seleukos I's foundations 'in the barbarous regions' (App. *Syr.* 57). Synthesizing the two accounts thus yields a scenario in which a certain Achaïos founded a city in the Far East and named it after himself as part of the widespread Seleukid urban programme that was implemented during the latter half of Nikator's reign.²⁰

Yet this attribution raises as many questions as it provides answers, not least among which is whether or not we can realistically attribute such an early hellenistic foundation to someone whom we are supposing to be neither a reigning king nor the immediate successor of one. A closer examination reveals that for a prominent general or official to found an eponymous city is not entirely without precedent in the adolescent decades of the period, particularly in Western Asia Minor.²¹ Dokimeion in Phrygia

is well attested to have been founded by Dokimos, likely a general of Antigonos.²² Another Phrygian city, Lysias, according to Cohen was probably founded by a homonymous general of Nikator who went on to become the patriarch of another minor Anatolian dynasty attested in votive inscriptions at Delphi from 242.²³ Nearby Philomelion can also likely be attributed to Philomelos of the same lineage.²⁴ Finally, by all accounts it appears that Themisonion was founded by Themison, the favourite of Antiochos II, at roughly the same time as the latter received his epithet 'Theos' from the Milesians.²⁵ Further contemporary instances of this abound, and are aptly discussed by Stephen Mitchell in his contribution to this volume which causes us to bear in mind that the Seleukids were neither the sole nor dominant power in the region. Although in individual instances it is unclear whether the cities' founders were acting as loyal subordinates or splinter dynasts, when we consider them as a whole it becomes evident that an eponymous foundation does not necessarily imply a break of fealty to the main house. Thus in this light not only is there a precedent for such an act by early hellenistic generals, but the potential of a specifically Seleukid precedent. That the aforementioned examples all date from approximately the same period in which Achaïos' influence would have been ascendant only serves to strengthen the possibility. These cities arose as the dynamics of power within the hellenistic world were as yet juvenile, and a remark by Cohen merits repetition as caution against retrojecting structures that had not yet solidified as he writes of this period from 310–300 that 'it is possible that the distinction of king, prince, dynast, and agent, and the responsibilities of each, were not fully defined at the time.'²⁶

However if this *ketistēs* is indeed our Achaïos who figures so prominently in Anatolia during the reign of Antiochos I, the matter of his presence in the far East some three decades previously must now be addressed.

II. Achaïos reconstructed

The identification of the Achaïos who appears prominently in Anatolia during the 260s with the Achaïos who is credited by Strabo as having founded an eponymous city in Aria thus allows us to hazard a reconstruction of his career. This does not dispel all ambiguity, however, and in the interest of transparency I propose two scenarios which are identical in theme and mechanism, but divergent in chronology. The first – the 'high' chronology – dates the ascendance of Achaïos to the last decade of the fourth century (310–300) in the East under Seleukos I, and the second – the 'low' chronology – posits that the man's stock was rising roughly a decade or two later during the co-regency of Antiochos I in the East (292–281). Though initially drawn to the former, I have since favoured the

latter as more plausible. Neither comes without its own suppositions, and it would be imprudent to disqualify either completely – Bouché-Leclercq's disclaimer rings true as he writes that a similar predicament is '*un débat qui peut durer indéfiniment, car toute solution comporte des postulats indémontrables*.'²⁷ Nevertheless in the case of Achaïos all roads lead to Anatolia, and either scenario entails a rather more nuanced reappraisal of how he was related to the main Seleukid house.

First, the high chronology. As onomastics have already evinced, we can presume that Achaïos himself was Greek, perhaps specifically of Macedonian extraction though not necessarily so. The city of Achaia that can be attributed to our Achaïos, geographically speaking, is one of the last in a long string of Seleukid city foundations stretching eastward from Babylon into Baktria which we can perhaps attribute to the reign of Seleukos I, specifically to his campaigns in the East after he took the Diadem around 305.²⁸ Unfortunately the period from 308–302 in which Nikator branded his authority into the landscape of the East has produced barely a whisper from our sources, and that he emerged supreme, as Bevan puts it, 'is almost all that can be elicited from the documents.'²⁹ Nevertheless it was in the summer of 302 that Seleukos marched Westward towards Cappadocia, and thus in this chronology the foundation of Achaia must have occurred at some point during those six years.³⁰ To have founded a city Achaïos must have been at the very least of age, say perhaps 25–30 if we place him in the highest ranks of Nikator's army, and thus we can place his birth in c.330. Achaïos would have been too young to accompany the original expedition of Alexander on campaign, and instead must have been a representative of the next generation of Eastern adventurers under Seleukos alone. His early career would place him in the retinue of Nikator as he was consolidating his hold on his satrapy-cum-Empire, steadily gaining prominence along with his master. Achaïos' years of service during the ill-documented campaigns then won him an eponymous city foundation. Given that the foundation of such cities is a defensive strategy of consolidating conquered territory, it is probable that the foundation of Achaia occurred during the closing years of Nikator's offensive.³¹ In keeping with general early-hellenistic practice, one can likely hypothesize a land grant bestowed on Achaïos as well – and at any rate the mention of Achaïos' son Alexandros, the Seleukid Satrap of Sardes, in the decrees of King Ashoka further suggests an Eastern connection for the family.³²

His stay in the East was only temporary, however, as I suspect Achaïos would have then accompanied Seleukos on his march to reconsolidate the Western domains and subsequently campaign against Monophthalmos in Anatolia, where the pair would have arrived in 301. In this reconstruction

Achaïos would have been present at the Battle of Ipsos in 301, and then likely against Lysimachos at the Battle of Koroupedion. Helen Lund's detailed analysis of Asia Minor during the reign of Lysimachos and his struggle against Antigonos for Anatolian dominance gives us little reason to presume that Achaïos was a defector to the Seleukid banner after either Ipsos or Koroupedion.³³ The ancients mention several such local potentates who sensed that the winds of change were blowing and decided to abandon the sinking ship of Lysimachos in favour of Nikator; Achaïos' conspicuous absence among them suggests that his loyalty was consistently Seleukid, and that he was neither native to nor already established in Anatolia before it fell under Seleukid dominion.³⁴ It is interesting that Memnon discusses Nikator's settlement of essentially every part of Anatolia save Lydia and Phrygia and if we insert Achaïos into the gap then we gain a near-complete picture of the division of the region.³⁵ It then follows logically that Achaïos was given a sizeable estate near what would become Laodikeia on the Lykos by Seleukos I in 281 as both a reward for his years of loyal service to the Seleukid throne, and as his next task of governance. By this point in his life his taste for campaigning would have abated, and instead it seems that he settled happily into the role of the *kyrios tou topou* (lord of the region) as which he appears in our inscription from 267. So much for the high chronology, though before advancing the alternative the point must be raised that such a reconstruction necessitates a remarkable (perhaps implausible) longevity for Achaïos, who would have been over sixty by the time he makes his epigraphic debut. I refer the reader to Appendix II for a more concise outline of his career trajectory.

The second 'low' chronology (Appendix III) differs primarily with regard to the date of Achaïos' rise to prominence in the East, and instead posits that his ascent occurred during the co-regency of Antiochos I. In this scenario the origin and mechanism of Achaïos' later prestige is the same, though the timing is shifted forward by approximately a decade. Accordingly, the Graeco(-Macedonian?) background of Achaïos and his martial character remain, but it was in the period from 292–281 that he earned his repute through his service to the Seleukids in the East. During this decade Antiochos I was co-regent and satrap of Babylon, from where he campaigned further east and consolidated the Seleukid hold on a region first grasped by his father. The campaigns and policies of Antiochos left their mark on the region stretching from the Iranian plateau into Baktria and it was under his stewardship that the majority of Seleukid foundations in the region appear.³⁶ Achaïos would have been an indispensable officer or general throughout. If Achaïos was active in the East from 292–281 then he would have been born closer to 315 and gradually climbed the

rungs of the Seleukid military hierarchy in his early twenties. For his loyal service to Antiochos I, in this scenario, he was then accorded the honour of naming a city after himself at some point in the mid-280s. Even though Appian attributes the foundation of Achaia to Nikator's policies, there is an equally strong – if not stronger – case to be made that the city was instead built under the orders of Antiochos I. Given that, in formal terms, the co-regency of Antiochos I is still considered to be the 'reign of Nikator' by our Greek sources, there is no inherent contradiction in this.³⁷ The neighbouring city of Artakaena was rebuilt by Antiochos I, not Seleukos, and it was Antiochos who was the most prolific city-builder in the Seleukid East.³⁸ Several of the foundations attributed to Seleukos I are held by Cohen to have been founded instead by Antiochos – not least amongst them Achaia itself.³⁹ Thus it becomes perhaps more plausible that Achaios was given his authority as *ketistēs* from Antiochos rather than Nikator, and the possibility remains that he was granted land.

Following his service under Antiochos as co-regent, Achaios would have then accompanied the new Seleukid successor on his march westward to secure his inheritance in the wake of the assassination of Nikator by Ptolemy Keraunos in September of 281. As Antiochos brought Syria and southern Anatolia back into the Seleukid fold over the next three years, he founded numerous cities – Antioch on the Meander (Strabo.13.2.15), Seleukeia-Tralles (Pliny *NH* 5.108), Nysa (Strabo 14.1.43–6), among many other colonies – and clearly sought to institutionalize the Seleukid dominion over the region.⁴⁰ It is as a part of this pacification of Asia Minor that I believe Achaios was granted his estates and governorship of the area – what better man to leave in charge of a chronically unstable region only recently reconquered than a trusted general and confidant who had proven his worth and fidelity in the East? Thus it is after two decades of service to Soter, first as a general in the East where he won his own city foundation, and then in Anatolia where he was given a domain to hold in fief as a trusted friend, that Achaios was made the wealthy and influential *kyrios tou topou* as which he appears in January of 267. By this point he would have been ruling over a substantial Macedonian population that had implanted itself into the region since after the campaigns of Alexander, hence the Greek titulary and epigraphic habit.⁴¹ I find this scenario to be more plausible thanks to the more realistic longevity it attributes to Achaios, as by the time he appears in the Anatolian inscription he would have been in his early fifties. As we shall see, the dates for the birth and marriages of his children align more neatly with this lower chronology. And indeed there is a thematic and structural character to this reconstruction that seems more in keeping with the general practices of Soter throughout

his empire.⁴² Achaïos then stands as another exemplar of a wider trend, and not as an exception – and it is precisely in this context that he could more understandably evade the notice of the ancients and fade into a background cast of similar personae.⁴³ Yet the common strands that run through both scenarios – military service in the East, the reward of a city foundation, accompaniment of the monarch to the West, and the gift of Anatolian lands to be governed – in many ways render the chronological concerns academic. There is, I believe, one other common strand that unites the two.

In either scenario, Achaïos was given something else in addition to his Anatolian holdings: a wife. While others have explained away his esteem by making him an unattested son of Seleukos, on onomastic and dynastic grounds I instead believe that a Seleukid princess was the cachet of his pedigree. He himself was not a Seleukid; he married one, and thus he enjoys a more indirect – though no less binding – tie to the main dynasty. The eye perusing the *stemma* of the family (Appendix I) is drawn to an interesting feature: every female in the family has one of two quintessentially Seleukid names (Laodike, Antiochis), but none of the males. In isolation this may seem an anomaly, but when compared to the genealogies and onomastic patterns of other Seleukid client dynasties a broader pattern emerges. Particularly in Asia Minor, dynasties into which Seleukid women were married as a reward for and guarantor of fealty nearly always tend to adopt exclusively Seleukid names for their female progeny over successive generations.⁴⁴ Pontus, Cappadocia, and Kommagene are the principal examples of this, and their reasons for such onomastic adaptation are quite practical: it was Seleukid recognition which had secured them in their local hegemony, and their Seleukid marriage connections set them above their peers by drawing them into a more exclusive dynastic circle. Naming successive generations of their daughters ‘Laodike’ or ‘Antiochis’ flaunted their Seleukid pedigree, and identified them as links in a dynastic chain that stretched back to Nikator himself. Small wonder, then, that anyone who was able would be so eager to parade their lineage so openly. The mechanism is always the same: a Seleukid princess is given in marriage in one generation, and then as early as the next all subsequent women bear Seleukid names, while men retain their patrilineal nomenclature. The proof of a feudal dynamic of power sealed by a marriage alliance is always in the names.

The House of Achaïos fits into this pattern perfectly. By the second generation of the family we count a Laodike and an Antiochis, in the next, another Laodike; the male scions, for their part, retain the non-Seleukid names of Alexandros, Achaïos, and Andromachos.⁴⁵ Achaïos and his

progeny therefore exhibit all the signs of being related to the main dynasty through the marriage of a Seleukid princess, and thus I argue Achaïos was given the hand of a Seleukid princess as both a reward for and guarantor of his future loyalty. The mechanism is fundamental to Seleukid rule, and is certainly not out of character for Seleukid monarchs.⁴⁶ Based on what we know of the lives of Achaïos the Elder's children – particularly the marriages of his daughters – all three must have been born in the mid-280s BC, and thus his marriage must have taken place by c.285 at the latest.⁴⁷ In either scenario above, this would make his marriage predate the acquisition of his lands in Anatolia and instead place it during the apex of his military career.⁴⁸ Given the timing, this wife of Achaïos would have to be a daughter of Seleukos I – perhaps the Laodike mentioned only by John Malalas – but one cannot say more with any certainty.⁴⁹ Arguing strongly for the precise identity of his wife is little more than grasping at straws, but in a sense the question is irrelevant. Her exact name is not so important as her royal stature, and I think it likely that she was one of the many Laodikai who must haunt the stemma without having been directly attested. It is not difficult to posit the existence of a Seleukid woman who was otherwise unattested, especially given the dynasty's penchant for presenting itself publically as an artificially-narrowed reigning triad of King/Husband-Queen/Wife-Heir/Son to the exclusion of other living relatives, as I have elaborated elsewhere.⁵⁰ We can only catch some glimpse of this shadowy 'Laodike' indirectly through the lens of her progeny, though it must have been through her that Achaïos the Elder derived the dynastic pedigree that would so elevate his family in the generations to come.

III. The epigonoï of Achaïos

In the end, perhaps the best argument in favour of the status I have here ascribed to Achaïos is the subsequent prominence with which his family figures in both local and imperial affairs. Such a prominence is both the result and indication of the royal marriage by which Achaïos' personal accomplishments were transformed into dynastic patrimony. Fortunately the careers of his children and grandchildren are far better attested than his own, and piecing together their respective biographies is a rather more straightforward affair. Yet their own careers speak also to their patriarch, and thus they become indispensable in stitching together a more-or-less seamless account of the family. In the interest of brevity my discussion of the subsequent two generations of the House of Achaïos will err towards synopsis, and I refer the reader again to our digital prosopography of the family for fuller individual recapitulations.

Given the date of her marriage, it is safe to presume that Antiochis was

the older of the two daughters born to Achaïos and 'Laodike' shortly after their marriage between 290–285. Antiochis is attested directly only once as the wife of Attalos (adopted son of Philetaïros) and the mother of the man who would be adopted by Eumenes in 263 and become Attalos I in 241 (Strabo 13.4.2). We can reconstruct the dates of her marriage, and thus approximate the date of her birth, thanks to Strabo's comment that Attalos I was 28 when he inherited the Pergamene throne. Thus he was born in 269, and his mother must have been married by 270 at the latest. Of most interest to us, however, is the character of the match itself: at this point both Philetaïros and Achaïos were loyal Seleukid vassals who governed contiguous territories in southern Anatolia, and the union of Attalos and Antiochis shows that such a manoeuvre among Seleukid vassals was at the very least tolerated, and at the most encouraged.⁵¹ As early as 270 we thus see the emergence of a network of intermarriage and interrelation not only between the main house and its subordinates, but among those subordinates themselves. The familial character of the Seleukid Empire is one of its earliest defining traits.⁵² This marriage, along with Antiochis' patently Seleukid name – which could perhaps have been a patronymic tribute to the grandfather of Achaïos' spouse – reinforces our suppositions regarding the nature of the family's connection to the main dynasty.

The career of Antiochis' more infamous sister further advances our hypotheses. Laodike, the wife of Antiochos II Theos, and, as some ancient and modern authors would have it, the instigator of the Laodikean War (Third Syrian War) needs little introduction, so extensive is her (ill) repute in the ancient sources. Based on the date of her later marriage to Antiochos II, we can surmise that Laodike was born at some point after her sister.⁵³ There is a disagreement in the sources regarding her identity: Polyainos 8.50 states that she was the half-sister of Antiochos II, while a fragment of Porphyry (F32.6) identifies her explicitly as the daughter of Achaïos. I agree with Bouché-Leclercq and Nourse in siding with the latter.⁵⁴ As with Antiochis, the character of her marriage is illustrative as it provides a preview of the sort of marital back-and-forth with client dynasties that would bring Antiochos III to marry the Pontic Laodike several decades later. A connection between the main house and the subordinate is first established with an outgoing marriage of a princess to the potentate (Achaïos to his Seleukid princess), and then these ties are strengthened as a woman chosen from that same client dynasty is married back to the main house (Laodike to Antiochos). Laodike and Antiochos II would thus have been cousins, and as ever the Seleukids tread the fine line between exogamy and endogamy with their principal marriages. For the

Seleukids themselves, the marriage would have been a useful way of renewing the bonds of loyalty and interrelation between the two houses that had been established a generation earlier – and indeed we see Antiochos II making a similar reaffirmation elsewhere with the marriage of his sister Stratonike to Demetrios II of Macedon.⁵⁵ At any rate, the marriage of Laodike reveals that the house of Achaïos had sufficient standing to make it a nuptial candidate for not only other regional dynasts, but the main imperial house itself. This in turn recasts the marriage of Antiochos III as a manoeuvre that was in keeping with an already-established regional precedent.⁵⁶

The last attested member of the second generation of the house of Achaïos was the brother of our aforementioned princesses, Alexandros of Sardis. We have no attestation of his early life but can retrospectively date his birth to around the same time as his two sisters, and Porphyry's note (F 32.6) that Alexandros was the brother of Laodike (wife of Antiochos II) allows us to identify him as a member of the House of Achaïos with little reservation. By all accounts he followed in his father's footsteps as a loyal subordinate of the Imperial lineage around his family's holdings in Anatolia. He first appears in a series of inscriptions from Sardes dated to between 261–244 as a Seleukid satrap with military and civil authority over the region.⁵⁷ An inscription from Bargylia describes him as being 'left behind by King Antiochos (I)' and thus it is likely that he was confirmed the next satrap of the region following the death of his father.⁵⁸ Merkelbach (correctly, I believe) identifies him as the 'Alexander' mentioned in the decrees of King Ashoka; that a man such as he would have been known to this far-Eastern king at all is testament to both his personal renown and perhaps to an eastern connection for his family.⁵⁹ Though we have no mention of any spouse or issue of his, the character of his dominion speaks clearly: he has a mix of martial and civic authority in keeping with that of a Seleukid satrap, it is reasonable to presume that his heredity played no small part in his acquisition thereof, and his base of power was centred at Sardes but stretched into parts of Karia. All of this influence, of course, was wielded in the name of the king to which he was related.

The next generation of the family allows only more concise remarks. The general of Seleukos II, Andromachos, who appears in Polybios and Polyainos hails from a background that is so muddled as to preclude any substantive discussion of his career in relation to our present themes.⁶⁰ I again refer the reader to our more exhaustive analysis of the divergent information regarding his heredity, which allows us only to say abstrusely that he was 'somehow' related to the House of Achaïos.⁶¹ We encounter a similar problem with Laodike (II), the wife of Seleukos II Kallinikos:

references in Polybios (4.51.4) and Polyainos (4.17) allow us only to suppose that she was the niece of Kallinikos' mother (the Achaïad Laodike I), and thus hailed from what was by now the third generation of the family. Whether her paternity is to be attributed to Andromachos or to another Achaïos is irresolvable. Regardless, that a subsequent Seleukid king opted to choose his bride from the House of Achaïos and reaffirm the ties that bound the two already-intertwined lines demonstrates that the family's prestige and influence were neither insignificant nor evanescent. If anything this, along with the increasing prominence of the family in the upper echelons of Seleukid imperial administration, shows that its stock continued to rise as it remained loyal to its ancestral overlords. While I refer to Monica D'Agostini's subsequent discussion of Achaïos 'the Younger' for a more detailed analysis of his territory and career, it is fitting to end this account of the family's evolution by noting that Polybios introduces this last scion of the House of Achaïos by describing him as 'Achaïos, the ruler of all Asia on this side of the Taurus, [who] had now not only the state but the power of a king.'⁶² How far, then, the lineage had come from its first Achaïos to its last!

IV. Conclusions: Achaïos in his historiographical context

When we combine all of the aforementioned elements, the following concise recapitulation of the House of Achaïos emerges. Achaïos the Elder, a Greek (or Graeco-Macedonian) by birth, rose to the highest ranks of the Seleukid court and military under either Seleukos I or Antiochos I during a decade of service in the East of the Empire. As a reward for his loyal service, he was given the privilege of an eponymous city foundation in what is now Afghanistan, along with the hand of a Seleukid princess in marriage. As part of the settlement of Asia Minor after Koroupedion, Achaïos was given substantial estates in Phrygia and Lydia, and concurrently was made governor and administrator of the region by the king. He and his Seleukid wife produced two daughters and one son: the oldest daughter, Antiochis, was married to the budding Attalid dynasts of neighbouring Pergamon, while the younger, Laodike, was married to the heir apparent, Antiochos II. Alexandros, Achaïos' son, assumed governorship of a region stretching into Karia after his father's death, and rose in prominence to become Satrap of Sardes during the reign of his brother-in-law. The third generation of the family included Laodike, who married Seleukos II in a renewal of the ties between the two families, and Andromachos, the prominent general of Seleukos II during the War of the Brothers. The last attested member of the family is Achaïos the Younger, who proclaimed himself *basileus* and perished at the hand of his cousin,

Antiochos III, in 213. The lineage of the House of Achaïos, by all accounts, died along with him.

Perhaps the most salient feature to be glimpsed in the House of Achaïos is one that all too easily escapes our notice: it was the women of the House of Achaïos, just as much if not more so than their male counterparts, who were responsible for the perpetuation of the line and its prestige. Of course the continued fealty of men like Achaïos the Elder and Alexandros bound the family to the Seleukid House politically, but the marriages of their sisters and daughters allowed for a more lasting link to be forged between the two – one that perhaps could not be so easily broken or discarded as an oath. The marriage of ‘Laodike’ to Achaïos the Elder and the conferral of all of the status her pedigree afforded marks the transformation of Achaïos’ prestige from personal into dynastic, and the vaunted station of his progeny would likely not have been possible without his royal wife. It was through ‘Laodike’ that the family’s repute was transmitted to their daughters of the next generation, whose own marriages then both reinforced and extended the line, and the pattern continues here as it does elsewhere in the Seleukid realm. It is by these women that the line between official and dynast is drawn. That such lines were drawn as they were speaks to an awareness among the Seleukids themselves of the eminent role their wives and daughters played in the plot of hellenistic *dynasteia*. But this system of Seleukid rule was not bound by weddings alone, and it was in the combination of these women’s marriages along with the loyalty and service of their male relatives that the web of interrelation, fealty, and interdependence that bound the Seleukid Empire was spun.⁶³ That these ties were rewoven over generations is the dynastic mechanism by which such notions were made hereditary. For illuminating instances of this dynamic in other parts of the Seleukid whole, I refer the reader to the chapters of Rolf Strootman (Arsacids) and David Engels (Frataraka) in this volume.

What sets the House of Achaïos apart from other Seleukid vassal states is that it appears so early in the life of the Empire (281–279), and it is this that gives us cause to reconsider some of our basic assumptions regarding the evolution of Seleukid imperialism.⁶⁴ The ‘old’ view of the Empire was as fatalistic as it was commonplace, as Bevan articulates it:


The empire, a magnificent tour de force, had no natural vitality. Its history from the moment it misses the founder’s hand is one of decline. It was a ‘sick man’ from its birth. Its construction occupied the few glorious years of Seleukos Nikator, its dissolution the succeeding two and quarter centuries. Partially restored again and again, it lapses almost immediately into new ruin. The restorations become less and less complete (1902, 1.76)

Much has been written to the contrary in recent years, notably again by David Engels, Rolf Strootman, and Laurent Capdetrey, though perhaps more entrenched biases remain difficult to expurgate.⁶⁵ The reconstruction of the House of Achaïos I have advanced here brings to light a very different state of affairs than Bevan perceived. Achaïos and his progeny reveal that as early as the reign of Seleukos I (or Antiochos I, depending on chronological preference) vassalistic rule by a client proxy was intrinsic to the Seleukid approach to Empire. That Achaïos was installed in his corner of Anatolia as part of a broader process of *après-guerre* territorial consolidation suggests that this proto-feudalistic system was a calculated strategy, not a reactionary stop-gap measure meant to stave off decline in a time of crisis.⁶⁶ It was not the last-ditch effort of a desperate king to salvage what he could of a dwindling inheritance, but rather an indispensable means by which that inheritance was created. It was a mechanism of consolidation as much as of perpetuation.⁶⁷ The freedom with which Achaïos readily joined his own family to other budding dynasties in the region through marriage, the agency and authority inherent in attestations of his son Alexandros, and the willingness of two generations of Seleukid kings (Antiochos II and Seleukos II) to choose their queens from among his daughters (Laodike I) and granddaughters (Laodike II), all speak to the potential for such autonomy and esteem among Seleukid adherents. That there was no contradiction inherent in this mix of autonomy and subordination that defines their relationship to the monarchy sheds further light on the flexibility inherent in the system.⁶⁸ Such was the fundamental character of the Seleukid empire since its initial generation, as the House of Achaïos represents the first instance of this intermingling of the dynastic with the imperial, the familial with the political that came with intermarriage and regional subordination, but by no means the last.⁶⁹ And in nearly all of our attested instances, this intermingling occurred via the prominence attached to Seleukid royal women like our faceless 'Laodike,' wife of Achaïos.

To entrust the governance of a region of Anatolia to a loyal general was an act in which we can trace Achaemenid roots both mechanically and geographically; the same can be said of the act of giving him a princess in marriage in addition to his commission.⁷⁰ Yet there is something unmistakably Hellenic in the career of Achaïos and his progeny that we perceive not least in the votive inscription with its formulae, titulary, and cultic traditions. Subsequently we see hints of the Macedonian tradition in the marriages of Antiochos II and Seleukos II to their cousins of subordinately noble rank.⁷¹ The combination of the three, though, is another matter. In this we see the creation of something new during the first century of Seleukid rule, as the structure of an empire was formed that in some ways resembled its

Achaemenid predecessor, in others borrowed from its Macedonian roots, and in still others innovated creatively as it drew inspiration from either. Albeit faintly, Achaïos the Elder did leave tracks of his passage through the desert, tracks spanning the breadth of an empire that, despite its diversity, was perhaps more consistently coherent than we had supposed.

Appendix I: Stemma of the House of Achaïos



Appendix II: the 'high' chronology – Achaïos during the reign of Seleukos I

c.330(?)	Born in Greece or Makedonia
?–c.308	Early military service to Nikator
308–302	With Nikator during campaigns in the East Foundation of Achaïa, likely closer to 302
301	Arrives in Anatolia, present at Ipsos
c.285	Marriage to Seleukid princess
281	Given estates as part of post-Koroupedion settlement by Nikator
267	Attested epigraphically as <i>kyrios tou topou</i> (lord of the region)

Appendix III: the 'low' chronology – reign of Antiochos I

c.315(at the latest)	Born in Greece or Macedonia
292–281	Service under Antiochos I in the East mid-280s: Foundation of Achaïa c.285: Marriage to Seleukid princess
September 281	Departs for the West along with Antiochos I
279	Given estates and governorship as part of Antiochos I's settlement of Anatolia
267	Attested epigraphically as <i>kyrios tou topou</i> (lord of the region)

Notes

¹ To establish the identity of the individuals in question and their equivalents in other prosopographical sources: Achaïos ‘the Elder’ = Akhaïos (S5) in Grainger 1997, 217–218; dNP Achaeus [4]. Laodike I = Laodice I in McAuley 2013; Laodike (1) in Grainger 1997, 47; dNP Laodike [II 3]. Laodike II = Laodice II in McAuley 2013; Laodike (2) in Grainger 1997, 47–48; dNP Laodike [II 5]. Alexandros = ‘Alexander’ in D’Agostini and McAuley 2012b; Alexander (O1) in Grainger 1997, 75. I have chosen to label him as ‘Alexandros’ in this chapter in order to prevent confusion with Alexander the Great. Andromachos = ‘Andromachus’ in D’Agostini and McAuley 2012c; dNP Andromachos [2]. Antiochis = ‘Antiochis of Pergamon’ in D’Agostini and McAuley 2012a. Achaïos ‘the Younger’ = ‘Achaeus the Younger’ in D’Agostini and McAuley 2012; dNP Andromachos [5].

² Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 543 and vol. II n.73; Bevan 1902b 1.269 for the earliest treatments.

³ See note 6 below.

⁴ The most recent scholars to address the House of Achaïos directly or indirectly are Billows 1996, 96–98; Grainger 1997 127–128; Capdetrey 2007 149; Grainger 2010, 109–110.

⁵ Achaïos himself is seldom discussed directly; rather, he comes into consideration as the father or grandfather of Seleukid queens or other notables – particularly Achaïos the Younger. It is through the recurrent connections to the Seleukid house visible in the dynasty’s stemma (McAuley 2013) that his own personal links to the main dynasty become evident.

⁶ A sentiment most explicitly supported by Beloch 1927, 204–206 but also hypothesized by Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 543. Grainger 1997 127–128 rejected Beloch’s hypothesis though expresses his favour of it in 2010, 109n.43.

⁷ Mehl 1986, 226 provides the most convincing refutation of Beloch’s hypothesis. Ogden 1999, 119–120 describes the theory as ‘unpersuasive’, which Grainger 2010, 109 counters by writing ‘To say that it is “unpersuasive” as a theory, as Ogden *Polygamy*, does, is itself unpersuasive without discussion.’ Such is the irresolution of the matter.

⁸ Billows 1995a, 97, who also rejects the hypothesis of Beloch. Capdetrey 2007, 149 also captures the ambiguous sentiment: ‘Achaïos était un personnage éminent de la cour séleucide, même s’il n’est pas certain qu’il fut le frère d’Antiochos I^{er}.’ (Achaïos was a prominent figure in the Seleukid court, even if it is not certain that he was the brother of Antiochos I) Bevan 1902b, 1.157, 1.202, and 1.269 n.3 leaves the issue unresolved, as do most scholars who write about the more renowned Achaïos the Younger, such as Dodd 2009, 82. Ma 1999, 50–62 discusses Achaïos the Elder via the later usurper.

⁹ *I Laodikeia am Lykos* 1. Wörrle 1975, 59–87 remains in my opinion the best modern treatment of the inscription. The identification of the epigraphical ‘Achaïos’ with our Achaïos here under discussion is advanced by Wörrle 1975, 77 n.80, also see Billows 1995a, 96; Ogden 1999, 132; Grainger 2010, 68 and 109. Also D’Agostini 2013a.

¹⁰ Besides Wörrle 1975, for commentary see also: Corsten 1997, 7–17; Bar-

Kochva 1973, 1–8; Burstein 1985, 24–25; Bielman 1994, 23; and Billows 1995a, 96–97.

¹¹ On the titles of the officials, Capdetrey 2007, 306–309 and 310–312. On Seleukid administrative titulary more specifically, see Bielman 1994, 90–94; Savalli-Lestrade 2001, 263–294; and Capdetrey 2007, 262–263.

¹² Strabo 13.4.2: ἐκ δὲ Ἀττάλου καὶ Ἀντιοχίδος τῆς Ἀχαιοῦ γεγονώς Ἀτταλος (Attalos, born of Attalos and Antiochis the daughter of Achaïos).

¹³ See ‘Antiochis of Pergamon’ and ‘Laodice II’ in D’Agostini and McAuley, 2012 and note 8 above.

¹⁴ Grainger 2010, 109.

¹⁵ The marriage patterns of the early successors are systematically outlined in Cohen 1973, 354–6. Then again, at this point the divisions between principal successor kingdoms and minor dynasties were as yet fragile. See Mitchell’s chapter in this volume for an illustrative discussion of Macedonian (not Seleukid) settlement in Asia Minor after the campaigns of Alexander.

¹⁶ Achaïos in Athens = LGPN 2.84, Achaïos (13). Achaïos in Thessaly = LGPN 3B.83, Achaïos (1). For the other Achaïoi, see LGPN 1.97; 2.84; 3A.87; 3B.83; 5A.94. That the name appears in former Seleukid regions of Lydia, Bithynia, Mysia, Kyzikos, Pergamon, Pontus, etc... further suggests an imperial or regional connotation of the name.

¹⁷ *LSJ* sv ‘Achaïos’.

¹⁸ The Greco-Macedonian descent of Achaïos has been presumed by nearly all who have discussed him, though few have thus far offered substantiation for the claim.

¹⁹ Strabo 11.10.1: πόλεις δὲ Ἀρτακάνηνα καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρεια καὶ Ἀχαΐα, ἐπώνυμοι τῶν κτισάντων, commented on by Bevan 1902b, 1.269 n.3.

²⁰ See also Grainger 1990a, 64–113 for strategic concerns of city foundations in general. Also Cohen 1978 and 1995, broadly.

²¹ See Mitchell’s discussion of regional dynasts of the fourth and third century in his chapter in this volume.

²² Diod.20.107.3–4; Paus.1.8.1, Cohen 1995, 297; also Mitchell in this volume.

²³ Cohen 1995, 311

²⁴ For this and Cohen’s illuminating general discussion of city foundations by prominent officials and generals, see Cohen 1997, 297–312.

²⁵ App. *Syr.* 65 and Droysen as discussed by Cohen 1978, 15 n. 55; the city foundation would follow logically as at the time Themison was a prominent minister of Antiochos II.

²⁶ Cohen 1995, 297.

²⁷ Bouché-Leclercq 1913, note to p. 73 in vol. 2.

²⁸ Cohen 2013 section IV; Cohen 1978, 12–19. Also see Grainger 1990b, 95–114 for Nikator’s conquests, and 114–138 for settlement of the kingdom.

²⁹ Bevan 1902b, 1.57.

³⁰ Diod. 20.113.4.

³¹ On the general strategy of city foundations as securing territory, especially in contested regions, see Grainger 1990a, 86–106.

³² D’Agostini 2013a and Merkelbach 2000 on Alexander of Sardis and King

Ashoka. On *kyria* in general, see Boffo 2001, 233–255 and Capdetrey 2007, 148–150.

³³ Lund 1992, 88–104 and 187–202.

³⁴ Perhaps most notably Philetairos, but among others discussed by Lund 1992, 186–192. Strabo 13.4.1; Paus. 1.10.4; App. *Syr.* 64. Again, see Mitchell for other emergent Macedonian potentates in the region, prior to and contemporary with Achaïos and his family.

³⁵ Memnon. *FGrH* 434 F.1.1–2; 2.1–2; 3.1–3; 4.1–7; *parmi autres*, as discussed also by Lund 1992, 186–202.

³⁶ Cohen 1978 and Bevan 1902b, 1.267–279.

³⁷ For the dynamics of this joint rule and its formulary, see Holton in this volume.

³⁸ Bevan 1902b, 1.269, also Cohen 1978, 19.

³⁹ On Achaïa specifically: Cohen 1978, 19n.79. I agree with Cohen in putting more confidence in Strabo's attribution of the city's foundation than in Appian's. On Iranian foundations more generally: Cohen 1978, 18–22 and Tarn 1985, 3–33; and section IV of Cohen 2013.

⁴⁰ For other instances of Antiochos I's settlement of Seleukid affairs in Anatolia, see Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 31–36 – especially at Nysa and Herakleia Pontos. On these city foundations specifically, Cohen 1978, 12–16.

⁴¹ See Mitchell in this volume.

⁴² A broad claim, to be sure, but nonetheless one that seems tenable. Antiochos' epigraphic presence in Anatolia, his defeat of Galatian tribes, along with his Anatolian city foundations and administrative organization of the region (Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 31–40; Cohen 1978, 12–19). Soter's penchant for diplomacy and interaction via a dynasty related to the main house by marriage can also be seen in the marriage of Apama to Magas of Kyrene; Paus. 1.7.1–3 and McAuley (forthcoming). Anatolia itself seems to have been pre-disposed to such rule by client dynasts as discussed in Bryce and Billows 1995a. Also Lund 1992, 104–127; and Capdetrey 2007, 118–129.

⁴³ For more general discussions of hetaireia and the dynamics of benefaction see Hatzopoulos 1996, 335–6; Boffo 2001, 234–255; Mehl 2003, 147–160. Also D'Agostini 2013a, n. 34.

⁴⁴ I refer the reader to the 'Related Dynasties' section of McAuley 2013 for more specific manifestations of these onomastic patterns.

⁴⁵ Billows begins to remark on this at 1995, 97 in the context of Antiochis but does not fully develop the discussion.

⁴⁶ See McAuley (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion of Seleukid 'secondary women' and the diplomatic role played by their strategic marriages to Seleukid vassals. Also consult the dynasty's stemma in McAuley 2013, the ideology of which is elaborated in McAuley 2011.

⁴⁷ See individual entries in D'Agostini and McAuley 2012, as well as individual discussions below.

⁴⁸ Refer to the entries in D'Agostini and McAuley 2012, especially 'Antiochis.' It is her birth – presumably the first of Achaïos' children – that necessitates the marriage by c.285.

⁴⁹ Malalas p.198; Eustathius 915; Ogden 1999, 119. Malalas' remarkable onomastic incompetence makes this precise identification speculative at best.

⁵⁰ McAuley 2011, 18–36. Also available on the *Seleukid Genealogy* website.

⁵¹ For a more comprehensive survey of the Attalid ramifications of the marriage: Hansen 1947, 28–35.

⁵² A metaphor elaborated by Coloru 2012, and marital patterns elaborated by McAuley (forthcoming).

⁵³ Antiochos II must have been married for at least several years before his accession in 261, thus if we place the marriage c.265, Laodike must have been born by 280 at the latest.

⁵⁴ Nourse 2002, 261–262; Bouché-Leclercq note to p.73 in vol. 2; Grainger 1997, 4–8, Mehl in *dNP* sv. 'Laodike [II 5]' also concur with this identification. On the historiographical tradition of this Laodike, see Coşkun in this volume. Infamous reception amongst the ancients: Phylarchus *FGrH* 81 F24; Plin. *HN*. 7.53; App. *Syr.* 65; Polyainos 8.50.

⁵⁵ Justin 28.1.2, Eus.Chron.1.249.

⁵⁶ The famous wedding of Antiochos and Laodike at Seleukeia-Zeugma in 222 is recounted by Pol. 5.43.1–4. For the dynamics of their marriage, see Ma 1999, 255 and Jones 1993.

⁵⁷ Billows 1995a, 97–98; Merkelbach 2000 126–128; *OGIS* 229 = I. Magnesia am Sipylos I; D'Agostini 2013b.

⁵⁸ Syll3 426 = I. Iasos 608 46–48 καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ [καταλ]ελειμμένῳ ὑπὸ [τοῦ][β]ασιλέως. Also *OGIS* 229; SEG 4.422 = I. Tralleis 25.

⁵⁹ Merkelbach 2000.

⁶⁰ See entry in D'Agostini and McAuley 2012; mentioned by Polybios 4.17, 4.51.4, and 8.22.11; Polyainos 4.17.

⁶¹ Contemporary discussion by Billows 1995a, 98–102.

⁶² Pol. 4.2.4–5.

⁶³ A similar pattern emerges in Cappadocia with the marriage of Stratonike (daughter of Antiochos II) to Arirathes III in c.255 (Diodorus 13.19.6; Grainger 2010, 131; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 32–36; Macurdy 1932, 83; Bevan 1902b, 2.55–59; van Dam 2002, 20–28). These bonds of marriage were renewed with the marriage of Antiochis (daughter of Antiochos III) to Ariarathes IV, who is reconfirmed as a Seleukid vassal. See App. *Syr.* 5; Diod. 31.19.6–7; Pol. 31.17.2; Hansen 1947, 68–73, Ma 1999, 92–3. See also discussion in McAuley (forthcoming), and for the Pontic instance of this pattern see McGing, 1986. The marriage of Antiochos III to the Pontic Laodike is another instance of this, and for the longer trajectory of Seleukid-Pontic relations see Erciyas 2006, 2–19.

⁶⁴ The prevailing scholarly sentiment is that reliance on vassal states was a mechanism not widely introduced until the reign of Seleukos II, and later brought to prominence by Antiochos III with disastrous consequences. Refer to Bikerman 1938b, and note 62 above.

⁶⁵ Capdetrey 2007, 122–159 and 283–294; Strootman 2010 and 2011; Engels 2011.

⁶⁶ Bikerman 1938b ascribes to the old view, as does Bevan 1902b. Engels 2011 and Strootman 2011a advance a somewhat feudalistic model, while Capdetrey

2007, 130–133 describes more of a tributary structure. That we see the establishment of Achaïos in Anatolia occurring at the same time as the swathe of city-foundations discussed by Cohen 1978 and in Syria by Grainger 1990a suggests that this was a consolidating tactic. The numerous city foundations of Antiochos I and II in the region under Achaïos' control further speaks to this – Cohen 1978, 4–19 for several examples, and note 38 above. That these city foundations occurred at the same time as Achaïos' installation and the adoption of Attalid rule over Pergamon (Hansen 1947) suggests a twofold strategy. At the same time, we must acknowledge Mitchell's convincing arguments that neither the Seleukids nor the Attalids were solely responsible for the region's urban geography, and were rather joined by a cohort of early Macedonian settlers and dynasts.

⁶⁷ The use of this technique of 'feudalisation' as Engels labels it (2011, 22) again appears in the settlements of Antiochos III between 212–205 in Armenia (see note below), Parthia (Pol. 10.27–31, Justin 41.5.7) Baktria (Pol. 11.34.3–6), and India (Pol. 11.39.11ff). Again, see Engels 2011, 22–23. That Antiochos III employed this strategy as the empire was expanding, not contracting, is similarly telling.

⁶⁸ The flexibility of satrapal autonomy is compounded by the later Seleukid tendency to assign territories to their former rulers after they were conquered – e.g. Armenia (Strabo. 11.13.1; Arr. *Anab.* 4.18.3; 7.4.5; Diod. 18.3.3) and Media Atropatene (Pol. 5.55.10); for a more detailed list cf. Engels 2011; 22–24.

⁶⁹ Strootman 2011a further elaborates on this 'neither western nor eastern' character of the Empire and its court.

⁷⁰ On Achaemenid precedents to Seleukid marriages, see McAuley 2011, 12–18; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1983, 26; Brosius 1996, 80–81; also Melville 2004 on the Neo-Assyrian precedent.

⁷¹ McAuley 2011, 10–12; Nourse 2002, 53–8 and 67–71; Carney 1995, 382–3.

ASIA MINOR AND THE MANY SHADES
OF A CIVIL WAR.
OBSERVATIONS ON ACHAIOS THE YOUNGER
AND HIS CLAIM TO THE KINGDOM OF ANATOLIA

Monica D'Agostini

When civil war occurs, especially if involving a dynastic conflict, inevitably the victorious faction becomes the legitimate regime and credits itself with the rightful claim to exert authority. In the process of overcoming the social fracture following internal conflict, the claim to legitimacy of the defeated party must be discredited and the impact of its past government is to be minimised, if not annihilated. Hellenistic history, and specifically that of the Seleukid Empire, offers numerous instances of such developments, as political and administrative institutions are created and consolidated.¹ Among these instances, Achaïos the Younger appears to constitute a very unusual as well as under-appreciated case. A representative of the dynasty that controlled and secured Asia Minor for – and, after a marriage alliance, with – the Seleukids during the third century, Achaïos ruled Asia Minor for almost ten years and forced Antiochos III into at least three costly years of war, before being defeated in a treacherous ambush. Nevertheless, the foundations of his claim, and the impact of his actions are almost completely ignored by, or have disappeared from, the extant sources, both material and literary: Achaïos' precious metal issues were recalled and melted by his opponent Antiochos III² and there are no surviving epigraphic documents concerning the king;³ they too were likely destroyed after his fall.

Among literary sources, Achaïos is mentioned briefly by Polyainos (*Strat.* 4.17), whereas Trogus' references to the king in the *Prologi* (*Prol.* 30) find no correspondence in the information preserved in Justin's *Epitome*: the other extant accounts dealing with the end of the third century do not yield any information on him. The sole loud exception to this silent scenario is also chronologically the closest to the events: Polybios, who considers Achaïos 'the ruler of all Asia on this side of the Taurus,' who 'had now not only the state, but the power of a king' (4.2.6). The historian delivers a rather accurate, if fragmentary, account of Achaïos' venture, paying attention not

only to the factual information, but also to the ideology of power and the support base Achaïos employed to ground his claim.

I. Polybios as a source on Achaïos

Polybios, as mentioned, is our main source on Achaïos' claim to power and the subsequent Anatolian civil war: his approach to the actions of the Seleukid usurper is different from what might be expected from him.⁴ If Polybios, in the first chapters of his work, depicts Achaïos with a certain detachment, in the latest fragments he comes close to showing sympathy for the usurper: the traces of the negative attitude which the historian often has towards hellenistic kings and dynasts gradually disappear from his account of Achaïos. Normally Polybios expresses ethical disapproval of autocracies, even though he states that he wanted not to slander hellenistic kings and dynasts with false information but to evaluate their behaviour in each particular historical context (8.8.3–11.8). Polybios, as Virgilio highlighted,⁵ was deeply influenced by his own experience and by the Roman defeat of the hellenistic monarchies. The comparison in the *Histories* between Roman institutions and monarchic ones emphasized the inferiority of the latter, as being unlimited in scope and entirely subject to the will of the ruler.⁶ The only hellenistic kingdom generally favourably presented by Polybios is that of Ptolemaic Egypt.⁷

Surprisingly, then, the account of the Anatolian civil war by Polybios is never hostile either to Achaïos, even if he is a usurper,⁸ or to the Ptolemies – Ptolemy III and IV whenever they are mentioned. These chapters also include a significant amount of information about the Attalids and regional events in Asia Minor. Since Plutarch reports that Polybios visited Sardes and collected material for his work from the people of the city,⁹ the account of these events, at least in part, may draw detailed information from these meetings. In addition to the local testimonies, Polybios also employed at least one literary source for his Anatolian account, whose interest was not centred on the Greek mainland. The author used by Polybios shows awareness of developments in Asia Minor, has a perspective on events close to the Ptolemaic one,¹⁰ and pays frequent attention to Rhodian involvement.¹¹ It is likely that at least part of the tradition on Achaïos may come from the Rhodian historian Zenon, whose use elsewhere by Polybios is well known.¹² Zenon, on the one hand, recounted the history of the island from its mythical origins until the first half of the 2nd century BC. On the other hand, he carefully recorded contemporary Mediterranean political events: he consistently employed a horizon broader than the local Rhodian one, relating the events of the island to the occurrences of the hellenistic world.¹³ If we consider that Zenon was reporting hellenistic

events from a Rhodian point of view, and that Rhodes was an ally of the Ptolemies, we find a perspective on Achaïos' events that correlates well with Polybios' outlook.¹⁴

II. The background of the family of Achaïos

The vicissitudes of the dynasty of Achaïos, which ruled western Anatolia in the 3rd century BC, are difficult to reconstruct. While the historiographical sources are quite interested in the queen Laodike I, wife of Antiochos II,¹⁵ the male representatives of this family, Achaïos the Elder and Alexander of Sardes, are instead mainly known from material evidence.¹⁶ The situation changes in the last quarter of the 3rd century, when Achaïos the Younger attracts the attention of a rather limited number of ancient authors.

A brief passage by Polyainos records that during the War of the Brothers, Achaïos, with his father Andromachos,¹⁷ generals of Seleukos II, halted Antiochos Hierax's offensive against Syria and chased him into Armenia, where they were defeated by a clever stratagem (*Strat.* 4.17).¹⁸ This passage is related to a chapter of Plutarch (*De frat. am.* 486 A–B) and to a fragment of Porphyry (*FGrHist* 260 F 32.8), recorded in the Armenian version of Eusebios:¹⁹ the Seleukid queen Laodike I, daughter of Achaïos the Elder, during the War of the Brothers supported her youngest son Antiochos Hierax's claim to rule Asia Minor and the northern satrapies, against her eldest son Seleukos II. Laodike I asked her brother Alexander, governor of Sardes, for assistance since he was the direct successor of Achaïos the Elder and ruled the territory of Lydia and Karia from Sardes on Seleukid behalf. This alliance is also confirmed by the halting of Seleukos II's numismatic production in Sardes, the king's main Anatolian mint: conversely, the mints in Troad and Asiatic Hellespont during the War of the Brothers begin issuing a large number of coins for Antiochos Hierax.²⁰

Even if the two generals of Seleukos II, Andromachos and Achaïos, and the son and the daughter of Achaïos the Elder, Laodike II and Alexander of Sardes, all belonged to the same family,²¹ Andromachos, *philos* of Seleukos II and commander of the Seleukid army, arguably belonged to a cadet branch. Therefore, the War of the Brothers caused a split within the branches of the family: on one side Alexander of Sardes and Laodike I organized the Anatolian support for Antiochos Hierax, while Andromachos and his son Achaïos continued serving in the upper ranks of the army under Seleukos II.

With the death of Antiochos Hierax²² the War of the Brothers came to a close and the two siblings, Laodike I and Alexander, disappear from the literary sources. Conversely, Achaïos the Younger with his father Andromachos,

having fought on the victorious side of Seleukos II, are among the protagonists of the subsequent Eastern Mediterranean events.

With regard to the dynastic background of the two generals, Polybios, who does not deliver any account of the War of the Brothers, states repeatedly that they were related to the royal house through dynastic ties: 'for Andromachos was Achaios' father and brother of Laodike the wife of Seleukos' (4.51.4);²³ 'For Achaios was the son of Andromachos the brother of Laodike the wife of Seleukos' (8.20.11).²⁴ Due to the lack of other sources, it is not possible to determine whether Laodike was the wife of Seleukos II or of his son and successor Seleukos III, or indeed the precise degree of kinship between Laodike, Andromachos, and Achaios the Elder. Nevertheless, Beloch and Walbank convincingly suggested that the Laodike mentioned, wife of Seleukos II, was the daughter of Andromachos and the sister of Achaios,²⁵ and thus that Achaios was not only a *philos* of Seleukos II and Seleukos III, but also a close relative.²⁶

III. The ideology of Achaios' royal claim²⁷

Achaios' enterprise is mentioned for the first time in the so-called second proem of the *Histories* (4.1.1–2.11). In this passage Polybios, introducing the main topic of his work, lists the 'new' rulers of the Mediterranean, who acquired power more or less simultaneously in 222/221:²⁸

But my chief reason for beginning at this date was, that Fortune had then so to speak rebuilt the world. For Philip, son of Demetrios, being still quite a boy, had inherited the throne of Macedonia, Achaios, the ruler of all Asia on this side of the Taurus, had now not only the state but the power of a king, Antiochos surnamed 'the Great' who was still very young had but a short time previously, on the death of his brother Seleukos, succeeded him in Syria, Ariarathes at the same time had become king of Cappadocia, and Ptolemy Philopator king of Egypt, while not long afterwards began the reign of Lykourgos, king of Sparta. The Carthaginians also had but recently appointed Hannibal to be their general in the campaign I mentioned. Since therefore the personalities of the rulers were everywhere new, it was evident that a new series of events would begin, this being the natural and usual consequence. (4.2.4–10).²⁹

Thus, as we see, Achaios is considered among the 'new' rulers of the Mediterranean as the king of Asia Minor, and listed between the two main eastern enemies of Rome in the 3rd century: after the ruler of Macedonia Philip V and before Antiochos III, king of Syria. The king Achaios, 'the ruler of all Asia on this side of the Taurus'³⁰ (4.2.6), is identified with the aforementioned general of Seleukos II who confronted Antiochos Hierax (Polyain. 4.17),³¹ and his ascent through the ranks of the Seleukid army and

his assumption of the diadem are narrated by Polybios in a flashback during the account of the war between Rhodes and Byzantion in the late 220s (4. 48.1–4. 51.6).³²

During the conflict the Byzantines asked both Achaïos and Attalos I for assistance; however only Achaïos promised his aid, because Attalos was confined within the limits of Pergamon by Achaïos himself. Polybios, mentioning again Achaïos' outstanding position among all of the rulers of Asia Minor,³³ supplies the king's ancestry and career: when Seleukos III became king in 226/225,³⁴ Achaïos, his relative and *philos*, led a campaign with him against Attalos I to recover the territories of Asia Minor conquered by Pergamon during the last phase of the War of the Brothers (4.48.5–13).³⁵ Nevertheless, Seleukos III was murdered by two Gauls, Nikanor and Apturios, probably mercenaries serving in his army, during the course of the campaign.³⁶ Achaïos, having gained extensive popularity and support among the ranks of the army, largely formed by military settlers from the area (κάτοικοι),³⁷ avenged the king's death by executing his murderers (4.48.9). Moreover Achaïos' growing popularity is said to have affected the army who decided to offer him the diadem:

Achaïos, as his (Seleukos') kinsman, at once avenged his murder by putting Nikanor and Apturios to death and taking the command of the army and the direction of affairs in his hands, conducted both with prudence and magnanimity. For though the opportunity was favourable and he was eagerly urged by the troops to assume the diadem, he decided not to do so, and holding the throne for the younger brother Antiochos, advanced energetically and recovered the whole of the country on this side of the Taurus.³⁸

Achaïos' authority in the Anatolian Seleukid *basileia* was evident:³⁹ in addition to his military charisma, he had Seleukid blood in his veins, and by virtue of these qualities he acted against the two murderers of Seleukos III. The execution had a propagandistic meaning: it was usually the prerogative of the successor of a murdered king to act as avenger, in order to assert his power and promote his role as the administrator of justice.⁴⁰

Accordingly, it is significant that Achaïos decided to recognise his cousin Antiochos III as the successor of Seleukos III, to refuse the diadem,⁴¹ and instead to devote his efforts to the recovery of Asia Minor. However, in the summer of 222 the circumstances changed: the king of Pergamon, Attalos I, was finally defeated, and Asia Minor,⁴² which had been lost to Pergamon by Hierax, was recovered. On the occasion Achaïos' command became kingship, as recorded by Polybios:

When he met with a success that surpassed his expectations, having shut up Attalos in Pergamon itself and made himself master of all the rest of the

country he was so elated by his good fortune that in a very short space of time he swerved clean away from rectitude, and having assumed the diadem and styled himself king he was at this moment the most imposing and formidable of all the kings and potentates on this side of the Taurus (4.48.11–12).⁴³

According to Polybios, then, Achaïos waited for the defeat of Attalos in early 222 to claim the royal title over the land he conquered,⁴⁴ implying that the defeat of Attalos I served as the *archē* of Achaïos' rebellion. The general decided to carry out the expedition against Attalos that had been planned by the last two Seleukid kings, but had thus far been neglected by the reigning king Antiochos III. After and through his victory over Attalos, Achaïos claimed royal power over the conquered lands (καὶ διάδημα περιθέμενος καὶ βασιλέα προσαγορεύσας), and became ruler of the region (τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πάντων ἦν ἐγκρατής), assuming the title of *basileus*.

Even if the term *dorikētētos chōra*, the spear-won land (δορικήτος χώρα) is not explicitly used in Polybios' text, it is likely that some such idea was invoked by Achaïos to legitimate his new royal title after the military victory over Attalos I.⁴⁵ As has been pointed out by Franca Landucci Gattinoni (2003, 199–224), the title

βασιλεὺς δεῖνα, since its earliest and most debated attestation, is connected to military victory and appears to reaffirm, prepare, and imply the necessity of the military aspect of the hellenistic monarchy, that legitimises itself through the spear-won conquest.⁴⁶

With the expression *dorikētētos chōra*⁴⁷ scholars generally mean, as Capdetrey (2007, 136) phrases it: 'the field, real or claimed, of a personal sovereignty, founded on a violent territorial acquisition.'⁴⁸ This principle of legitimation was the basis of Alexander the Great's conquests and it was reaffirmed in the kingdoms of the Diadochoi. Starting with the age of the Epigonoï, this principle was eclipsed by dynastic legitimacy in order to stabilise the succession to the throne.⁴⁹ The claim of *dorikētētos chōra* emerged again, though, only in the context of attempted usurpations and rebellions: until the early 2nd century BC, whoever demanded independence from the Epigonoï claimed that he was entitled to it because of his military victory over his spear-won land.⁵⁰ Attalos I himself claimed the royal title by virtue of his victory against the Galatians: even if he had already been exerting a king-like power over the region of Pergamon, he decided to ground his claim on his military victory, assuming the title of king and exerting royal power on his spear-won land.⁵¹ Consistently, when Achaïos claimed the title of *basileus* of the land he conquered with his victory over Attalos I, he acted in accordance with this ideology of power based on military

conquest.⁵² With Attalos and Achaïos we witness a resurgence in the Seleukid kingdom of a power structure that over the course of the 3rd century had been abandoned by the main lineage of succession. In particular, Achaïos' claim to the Anatolian diadem, based on military victory, openly contrasted with Antiochos III's claim which was rooted in the dynastic principle.

Achaïos claimed his kingship not over all land of the Seleukid Empire, but specifically over central and south Anatolia; he thus had a specific connection to the land over which he asserted his kingship, as clearly appears from the circumstances of the ceremony of coronation described by Polybios:

For Achaïos, while the king was absent on his expedition against Artabazanes,⁵³ feeling sure that Antiochos would meet with some misfortune and even if this were not the case, hoping – owing to the king's being so far away – to invade Syria before his return and, with the assistance of the Kyrrhestai (who were in revolt), to make himself master speedily of the whole kingdom, set out on his march from Lydia with a large army. On reaching Laodikeia in Phrygia he assumed the diadem and for the first time he ventured to take the title of king and use it in his letters to towns,⁵⁴ taking this step chiefly at the instigation of the exile Garsyeris.⁵⁵ (5.57.2–5).⁵⁶

Achaïos the Younger was the last representative of the family which had ruled Lydia and Karia for the past 50 years; his ancestor Achaïos the Elder was not only the governor of the area, but he had been attributed with honours.⁵⁷ In particular, the first extant evidence about Achaïos' family, is the inscription proclaiming Achaïos the Elder Saviour (Σωτήρ), and 'Lord of the land' (κύριος τοῦ τοπῶν) because he protected the people, *laoi*, of the area of Laodikeia on the Lykos from the Galatians (*IK Laodikeia am Lykos* 1). The relevance of this land and these people for the ruling dynasty was enhanced by Antiochos II when he founded Laodikeia on the Lykos in honour of his wife Laodike I daughter of Achaïos the Elder (Steph. Byz. s.v. Λαοδίκεια 411, 13 Meineke).⁵⁸ Therefore, choosing to travel with the army and assume the title in Laodikeia on the Lykos, in lieu of the capital Sardes, Achaïos the Younger openly stressed the long-standing rule of the Achaïos dynasty in South-West Anatolia.⁵⁹

The general claimed his rule over the Anatolian people which had been under his ancestors' authority, and he devoted the following years to successfully defending his kingdom against the expansionist aspirations of the Pergamene Attalos, the Bithynian Prusias, and the Galatians. Feared and respected, as Polybios highlights (5.77.1–78.6), he spent the early 210s proving himself as lord and protector of his kingdom, as confirmed by the numismatic evidence. There are only one extant gold stater and five silver



Fig. 1. Achaïos AR tetradrachm from Sardes (Numismatica Ars Classica NAC AG, Auction 78, Lot 327 reused by permission)

tetradrachms minted by Achaïos, whereas several bronze coins have survived: all coins of known provenance have been found in Sardes, which appears to have been the main or only mint of Achaïos.⁶⁰ (Figure 1) The iconography is the same on the precious metal issues: on the obverse a diademed and draped bust of Achaïos bearded and mature, remarkably different from the young and delicate early portraits of Antiochos III. On the reverse there is the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΧΑΙΟΥ (of King Achaïos) with an archaizing Athena Alkis in an attack pose, brandishing a spear and a shield, and a small horse head, probably as a countermark.⁶¹ Although, on the one hand, for the silver issues there is an anchor visible on the shield, as a clear reference to his Seleukid kinship, on his coins Achaïos predominantly stressed the ancient Macedonian basis of his claim, as Houghton and Lorber (2002, 348) underlined:

The likeness of Achaïos lies outside the mainstream of Seleukid portraiture, presenting him as a seasoned and hard-bitten military man, with a force of character not seen since the posthumous portraits of the dynastic founder. His personal reverse type honours Athena Alkis, the principal goddess of Pella in Macedon, and evokes the military glory of the Diadochi.

On the bronze coins the theme of the military victory associated with Athena Alkis is reiterated by the presence of Zeus, rare on Seleukid issues. It is evident that Achaïos' coins emphasized the king's experience, military value, and the devotion to the old Macedonian divinities, thereby opposing the Seleukid dynastic claim with a reactionary image of a warrior king, divinely guided.⁶²

IV. Achaïos' political network and support

The practical circumstances which encouraged and sustained the Anatolian secession from the Seleukid Kingdom in 222 involved not only Achaïos' connection to the area by virtue of his lineage, but also the political support he received from foreign Mediterranean partners.

Already in 222, shortly before Achaïos' assumption of the royal title,⁶³ he received a request for cooperation from the Ptolemies. According to Polybios, Hermias, the most powerful Seleukid courtier, showed a letter to Antiochos III stating that Ptolemy III was offering Achaïos support for claiming the diadem (5.42.7–8).⁶⁴ However, Polybios also considered the letter a forgery, an instance of Hermias' vicious behaviour. The counsellor is indeed historiographically portrayed as the 'dark side' of Antiochos' reign, a theme that applies to several other counsellors of hellenistic kings of this period: Apelles and Demeter of Pharos, the counsellors of Philip V, and Sosibios counsellor of Ptolemy IV.⁶⁵ Polybios delivers a version of the events suggestive of a bad attitude on Hermias' part, indeed a typical attitude of hellenistic royal courtiers in his *Histories*. If we reject such bias, then we may rather consider as authentic the correspondence which Hermias brings before Antiochos III accordingly: so Walbank and Schmitt.⁶⁶ In 222 there was an attempt at cooperation between Achaïos and Ptolemy III, just before Achaïos proclaimed himself king.

Following Achaïos' claim of the diadem, evidence of diplomatic contacts between Egypt and the Anatolian king surfaces in the account of the aforementioned war between Rhodes and Byzantium. The latter had asked Achaïos for help, causing the Rhodians to react in order to prevent the alliance, and perhaps in an attempt to bring Achaïos over to their side. With this intent the Rhodians contacted the Ptolemaic power, and sent an embassy to the court of Ptolemy IV, requesting that Achaïos' father Andromachos be freed: the general was being 'kept' (κατεχόμενον) in Alexandria and apparently played a pivotal role in Mediterranean diplomatic relations.

(the Rhodians) knowing that Achaïos' father was detained at Alexandria, and that Achaïos was exceedingly anxious for his father's safety, hit upon the idea of sending an embassy to Ptolemy, and asking him to deliver this Andromachos to them. They had indeed previously made this request without laying any great stress upon it: now, however, they were genuinely anxious for it, in order that by doing this favour to Achaïos they might put him under such an obligation that he would do all they demanded. When the ambassadors arrived, Ptolemy at first deliberated as to detaining Andromachos considering that his differences with Antiochos had not yet been decided, and that Achaïos, who had just proclaimed himself king,

could exercise a decisive influence in certain important matters; for Andromachos was Achaïos' father and brother of Laodike the wife of Seleukos.⁶⁷ (Polybios 4.51.1–4)

Overcoming Ptolemy's uncertainty, the Rhodians returned Andromachos to his son, thereby providing the base for a new partnership between these three Mediterranean powers: Egypt, Rhodes and Anatolia (4.51.5–6).

Polybios does not mention the reasons that brought Andromachos to Alexandria in the first place, nor does any other source.⁶⁸ Nevertheless it may be that Ptolemy III, in exchange for supporting Achaïos' claim in 222, demanded some kind of guarantee or indeed guarantor. Andromachos might have gone to Egypt as guarantor of the deal in 222,⁶⁹ later returning to Anatolia thanks to Rhodian intermediation in 221, as the result of a new deal struck with the new Egyptian king Ptolemy IV. This reconstruction is consistent with the policy of interference in the Mediterranean undertaken by the Ptolemies in the 220s, most clearly shown by their intervention with the Achaian League and Kleomenes.⁷⁰

This renewed diplomatic partnership between Ptolemy IV and Anatolia appears to be rather active and strong compared with the previous relations between Achaïos and Ptolemy III. It is indeed mentioned as one of the decisive elements of the Fourth Syrian War from its beginning.⁷¹ In the winter of 220–219, during his preparations for the war in Koile Syria, Antiochos explicitly accused Achaïos of being in cooperation with Ptolemy (Polyb. 5.57.2)⁷² and of having attempted to lead his army against their 'original and natural king' (Polyb. 5.57.6).⁷³ However, the army of the Anatolian king, although not depriving Achaïos of his leadership, refused to march against Antiochos in Syria. Achaïos, in order to win back the army's trust, campaigned in Pisidia,⁷⁴ and procured for his soldiers rich booty (5.57.7–8).

There is continuing debate about the contradictory behaviour of Achaïos' army, which induced and supported Achaïos' rebellion, but then refused to follow him into Syria. I believe, however, that Achaïos' troops hoped to establish an autonomous, that is separate, kingdom in Anatolia, refusing their support when Achaïos attempted to add Antiochos' realm.⁷⁵

Even more obscure is the reason for Achaïos' attempt to campaign in Syria, for which Polybios does not give a concrete explanation. Considering that this is the only occasion from 222 to 213 on which Achaïos tried to lead his army outside Anatolia, it is indeed likely that Achaïos intended to give Ptolemy military support, but was forced to withdraw.⁷⁶ Achaïos' decision to move his troops towards Syria on the eve of the war between Antiochos and Ptolemy over the very same stretch of territory is difficult to see as pure coincidence;⁷⁷ compare the later request of Ptolemy IV to

include Achaios in his treaty with Antiochos III in the winter of 219–218 (Polyb. 5.67.1–67.13). The question of Achaios was apparently the only matter preventing a peace agreement between the two sovereigns: from Antiochos III's perspective, the inclusion of Achaios in the treaty would amount to recognition of the latter's power in Asia Minor, thus

Antiochos absolutely refused to listen to this, thinking it a scandalous thing that Ptolemy should venture to take rebels under his protection or even allude to such persons (5.67.13).⁷⁸

Finally, evidence of a synergy between Achaios and Ptolemy during the war⁷⁹ can also be detected in Polybios' comment at the conclusion of the conflict in 217, when Ptolemy IV defeats Antiochos in the Battle of Raphia: the historian stresses Ptolemy's inability to take advantage of the weakness of Antiochos, who was threatened in Anatolia by Achaios (5.87.2).⁸⁰

The cooperation between Achaios and Ptolemy IV was a determining factor against Antiochos III, not only during the Fourth Syrian War, but also in the Anatolian Civil War when the two Seleukid cousins fought for the control of the region between 216 and 213. The beginning of the three-year war is unclear since most of the relevant Polybian passages are now lost,⁸¹ but it is explicit that after Raphia Antiochos sought an understanding with Attalos against their common Anatolian enemy, Achaios (Polyb. 5.107.4).⁸² After a lacuna, the extant account is devoted to the siege of Sardes and its Acropolis, in 215/214 and 214/213, by the Seleukid army.⁸³ By 214 Antiochos had succeeded in entering the city walls of Achaios' capital,⁸⁴ and laid siege to the citadel where the court and the royal family were. Together with Achaios, his wife Laodike, his *philoi*, the military commander of Sardes (Aribazos), and the garrison, in the acropolis there was also the Egyptian Sosibios, Ptolemy IV's principal courtier and advisor.⁸⁵ The Egyptian diplomat set about organizing Achaios' escape from Sardes, contacting Bolis, a Kretan inside the acropolis, who was the intermediary with Kambylos, the chief of the Kretans under Antiochos III's command. The two Kretans were supposed to find an agreement with the representatives of Rhodes and Ephesos, Nikomachos and Melankoma, who were Ptolemaic allies. However, the Kretans stole Sosibios' money and, deceiving Achaios and Sosibios as well as the diplomats from Rhodes and Ephesos, sold Achaios to Antiochos III. Sosibios' diplomatic mediation and rescue attempt is described in detail by Polybios:

Sosibios received this suggestion with joy, and since he was firmly convinced either that it was impossible to rescue Achaios from his dangerous situation, or that once one regarded it as possible, no one could do it better than Bolis, since, moreover, Bolis himself helped matters on by displaying such zeal, the

project rapidly began to move. Sosibios both advanced funds to meet all the expenses of the undertaking and promised a large sum in the event of its success, then by dwelling in the most exaggerated terms on the rewards to be expected from the king, and from Achaïos himself whom they were rescuing, raised the hopes of Bolis to the utmost.⁸⁶ (8.15.6–8)

Additionally, Sosibios' and Achaïos' plan aimed to allow the Anatolian king to escape to territories currently under Ptolemaic control and to reorganize his forces in order to strike back, as Polybios described:

It should be known that the notion of Achaïos was, when once he had escaped from his present perilous position, to hasten without any escort to Syria, for he had the greatest hope that, by suddenly and unexpectedly appearing to the people in Syria while Antiochos was still occupied in the siege of Sardes, he would create a great movement in his favour and meet with a good reception at Antioch and throughout Koilesyria and Phoenicia.⁸⁷ (8.17.10–11)

The presence and the prominence of Sosibios in Sardes, his attempt to save Achaïos with the help of Rhodes and Ephesos – both Ptolemaic allies – as well as the escape plan which involves Achaïos fleeing to Koile-Syria and Phoenicia – both Ptolemaic areas – show the pivotal role of the partnership between Ptolemy IV and Achaïos in the Eastern Mediterranean. This cooperation, built on the previous contacts between Ptolemy III and Achaïos, was re-established through Rhodian mediation, and grew stronger, appearing as an actual alliance during the Fourth Syrian War and the Seleukid Civil War in Anatolia. After successfully keeping Antiochos away from Asia Minor for almost a decade, the co-operation now ended, in 214/213. During their attempted escape from Sardes, Achaïos and his *philoi* fell into an ambush; he was brought into Antiochos III's tent and horribly executed. Sardes fell soon after and was severely punished for its second rebellion from the Seleukids in 20 years.

V. Conclusion: the strengths and limits of 3rd-century hellenistic kingship

On a practical level, the stable and powerful ten-year dominion of Achaïos over Asia Minor developed through local dynastic connections, military supremacy, and diplomatic relationships – in particular with Ptolemaic Egypt and Rhodes. As his dynastic ties show, he is the last representative of a powerful family, locally rooted in Southwestern Asia Minor and closely bonded to the Seleukids through kinship – and thus linked directly to the throne. Nevertheless, the propaganda of his claim to legitimacy stressed above all his military charisma, his ability successfully to re-conquer and to defend Anatolia from the neighbouring kings, dynasts, and the Galatian

menace. Choosing to assume the diadem in Laodikeia in front of the army after his victory over Attalos I, he opposed the dynastic claim of the representative of the main Seleukid bloodline, Antiochos III,⁸⁸ his legitimacy as ruler emanating instead from the Macedonian ideology of the spear-won land. As suggested by Houghton and Lorber (2002, 348), ‘to promise a renewal of a Seleukid dynasty that had grown degenerate through internecine rivalries and the accession of immature kings’ he reconnected himself to the age of the Diadochoi and employed Macedonian political structures based on the close relation between king, land and army that had fallen into disuse in the establishment of the hellenistic *basileiai*.⁸⁹ The bonds with the army and the Anatolian land acted not only as Achaïos’ strengths but also as limits: the loyalty of the army to Achaïos in Asia Minor forced Antiochos III into a rather protracted Anatolian campaign between 216 and 213, and for long prevented the Seleukid king from conquering Achaïos’ capital Sardes and defeating the usurper in battle. However, as also noted by Mittag (2008, 47–56), the army’s unwillingness to campaign south of Taurus, out of Anatolia and against Antiochos III, forced Achaïos to withdraw when he was advancing towards Syria. Achaïos rooted his claim to kingship on his relations with the Anatolian land and the army, consequently limiting his legitimacy in the eyes of his people and soldiers within the boundaries of Asia Minor, as constantly underlined by Polybios.

Polybios’ account pays careful attention to the undertaking of Achaïos, as Anatolian king and Seleukid usurper; this may suggest that a local perspective influenced him when he collected information on these events in Sardes. The thesis is further supported by Polybios’ description of the final hours of Achaïos’ life: a moving and unexpectedly sympathetic attitude is shown by the historian towards the rebel, who comes close to celebrating the grandeur of the defeated king betrayed by fate.

For Achaïos was the son of Andromachos the brother of Laodike the wife of Seleukos; he had married Laodike the daughter of King Mithridates, and had been sovereign of all Asia on this side of the Taurus; and now when he was supposed by his own forces and those of the enemy to be dwelling secure in the strongest fortress in the world, he was actually sitting on the ground bound hand and foot and at the mercy of his enemies, not a soul being aware of what had happened except the actual perpetrators of the deed.⁹⁰ (8.20.11–12)

[...]

Thus did Achaïos perish, after taking every reasonable precaution and defeated only by the perfidy of those whom he had trusted, leaving two useful lessons to posterity, firstly to trust no one too easily, and secondly not to be boastful in the season of prosperity, but being men to be prepared for anything.⁹¹ (8.21.10–11)

In conclusion, Achaïos' vicissitudes are to be considered much more than just the rebellion of a minor rogue general of the kingdom against the central Seleukid throne: Achaïos is the last example of the fundamental structure of the first century of Seleukid rule. This long first century is characterized by a fluid and shifting dialogue between the central dynasty and regional rulers, the latter of both local and Graeco-Macedonian origin. This century of internal wars and ambivalent alliances is also a period of experimentation with old and new power dynamics. The early Seleukid kings exerted their power through and with regional dynasts, supported politically and militarily by local roots, thanks to a web of political links (treaties, *dōreai*) and familial (marital) bonds. The complex background that surrounded Achaïos the Younger, and links him to Anatolian lands and to the Seleukids, finds its roots in the first Seleukid generation and its strength in the dynasty's refined networking policy of the 3rd century, making the House of Achaïos the best illustration of how Seleukid power structures developed over the course of that century. Consequently, the defeat of Achaïos the Younger represented the change of this ruling strategy that had allowed local dynasties to grow stronger and challenge the central power: with the reign of Antiochos III the main dynasty would openly inaugurate a centralized, less fluid and firmer, ideology of power.

Notes

¹ On usurpers, dynasts and king in Asia Minor and Seleukid world see Billows 1995a, 81–110 and recently Chrubasik 2016.

² Houghton and Lorber 2002, 348 and Ehling 2007, 497–501. We only have one gold stater and two silver tetradrachms surviving from Achaïos' only mint in Sardes.

³ Ma 1999, 57–59; Chrubasik 2012, 65–83. According to Polybios 5.57.5, Achaïos wrote to the cities of Anatolia as soon as he claimed the diadem. Nevertheless, there are rather few extant inscriptions from the area dating between 220 and 214/213 and none of them openly mentions Achaïos: *I. Tralleis* 17 mentions a strategos, Themistokles, who might be identified as Achaïos' general, Polyb. 5.77.8; Welles 1934, 41 and Ma 1999, 269. Among the other inscriptions, *I. Magnesia* 16, from Magnesia on the Maeander, concerns the dispatching of ambassadors to Greek cities, neighbouring kings and dynasts for the Panhellenic recognition of the local games. Moreover, two other inscriptions mention the same ambassador Menodoros Timeou: *I. Delphinon* 143= *I. Tralleis* 20 concerns an alliance in 218/217 between Miletos and Tralles, whose representative was Menodoros Timeou; *I. Tralleis* 26 is an honorific decree for Menodoros, to celebrate his embassy to an unspecified king. It cannot be excluded that the king who received Tralles' embassy through Menodoros was Achaïos.

⁴ See Thornton 2001, 545–6. In general on Polybios' methodology see Pédech 1964; Sacks 1981, 21–95; Meister 1990, 160–66; Schepens 1990, 39–61; Huss

1993, 90–103; Eckstein 1995; Zecchini 2003a, 123–41 and id. 2003b, 413–22, and id. 2005, 12–23; Champion 2004; Schepens 2007, 39–55 (51–4); Pelling 2007, 244–58; McGing 2010; Gibson and Harrison 2013.

⁵ Virgilio 2007, 49–73 and Virgilio 2008, 315–45.

⁶ Walbank 1957, 27; Pédech 1964, 359; Meister 1990 p. 163–66; Zecchini 2003a, 123–41.

⁷ Huss 1976; Walbank 1979, 180–9; Marasco 1979/1980, 159–182, Ager 2003, 35–50; McGing 2010, 117–119.

⁸ Schmitt 1964, 161–4 and 175–83; Will 1962, 72–129; Ager 2003, 35–50. On Polybios on Anatolian events between 222 and 214 see also Hansen 1971; Walbank 1957; McShane 1964; Allen 1983; Heinen 1984; Billows 1995a, 98–9 and 110; Ma 1999, 54–63; Chanotis 2005, 57–77; Marek 2010, 275–80; D'Agostini 2014, 37–60.

⁹ 'Polybios says that he had a conversation with this woman in Sardes, and that he admired her good sense and intelligence' (*Mulier*. 12 s.v. Chiomara).

¹⁰ As already noticed by Walbank 1957, 30, even if, he states, 'to attach importance to the few names which happen to have survived is an error'.

¹¹ Heinen 1984, 412–45, (432–33).

¹² The few things we know about Zenon are from Polybios (16.14), from Diogenes Laertius (7.35), from the Chronicle of Lindos (*FGrHist* 523 F 2; 3; 1 C § 35 and 40), and from Diodoros (5.55.9). Zenon is a contemporary of Polybios as proved by the correspondence between the two (16.20.5–7); he is an historian with political military training, which makes him reliable for Polybios, especially because he is a native of the place he himself is writing about. Polybios states that Zenon writes of the same events he is writing about (16.14.4). Modern scholars have various opinions about the genre of Zenon's work: Wiemer 2001, 11–13 thinks it is a monograph on Rhodes from a philo-Roman perspective. See also Lenfant 2005, 183–204; Dillery 2007, 221–30. Thornton 2003, 570–2 suggests that Zenon wrote an annalistic work with a broader horizon, not only a local history, as shown from many references of Polybios. Regardless, Zenon was widely known and read in the ancient world: in fact, it is not only Polybios who mentions him, but Diodoros also knows and uses him as a source (5.55.9). Walbank 1957, 30 and id. 1967, 515–17; Wiemer 2001, 21–32; Zecchini 2003a, 123–41; Lenfant 2005, 183–204 (202–3); Thornton 2003, 570–2 n. 4. On Rhodian historiography see Funke 1994, 255–72; Wiemer 2001, 11–3.

¹³ See Primo 2010, 239–63.

¹⁴ Cf. Primo 2009a, 138–41.

¹⁵ On Laodike I: Martinez-Sève 2003, 690–706; Coşkun 2016, 107–34; D'Agostini 2016, 35–60 with bibliography.

¹⁶ This study is a part of a broader project on the house of Achaïos hailing from the PhD thesis of M. D'Agostini, *Da Laodice I a Laodice III, l'orizzonte politico delle regine Seleukidi*, Università di Bologna, 2013. This contribution is therefore closely related to two other articles: a first one on Achaïos the Elder and Alexander of Sardes, D'Agostini 2013, 87–106, and a second one on Laodike of Sardes, D'Agostini 2014, 37–60. This last part of the project on Achaïos the Younger has been developed with the cooperation of McAuley in this volume. On the family

of Achaios the Elder see Corradi 1927, 218–32; Meloni 1949, 535–53 and id. 1950, 161–83; Will 1962, 72–129; Schmitt 1964, 30–1; McShane 1964; Hansen 1971; Wörrle 1975, 59–87; Allen 1983; Heinen 1984, 412–45 (421–33), Huss 1993, 72–74; Billows 1995a, 98–99 and 110; Ma 1999, 54–63; Ehling 2007, 497–501; Marek 2010, 275–80; Grainger 2010, 172–227; Ager 2012, 421–29.

¹⁷ The kinship between the two is clearly stated in Polybios 4.51.1–6.

¹⁸ See Bianco 1997, 147.

¹⁹ Eusebios himself states he uses Porphyry as source of his *Chronicon*: *FGrH* 260 T 2. On Porphyry of Tyre see Primo 2009a, 289–303. cf. for a different attribution of the *Chronicon*: Toye 2016 ‘Porphyry (260)’ *BNJ*.

²⁰ That the Hellespont was Antiochos Hierax’ and Laodike’s base is underlined by Boehringer 1993, 37–47 and Houghton and Lorber 2002, 291–6 and 318–22. On Seleukos II’s loss of the mints of Sardes and Ephesos see Houghton and Lorber 2002, 241–8.

²¹ See Beloch 1927, 205–6; Meloni 1949, 535–53; Walbank 1957, I, 501; Schmitt 1964, 30–1; Wörrle 1975, 59–87; Will 1979, 298–9; Ma 1999, 54; D’Agostini 2013, 87–106; McAuley in the volume.

²² The sources are ambiguous about the death of Antiochos Hierax: Justin (27.4.7–11) states that he was killed by raiders. According to Porphyry *FGrHist* 260 F 32.8 he escaped to Thrace and died there. Finally, Trogus (*Prol.* 27) and Justin (27.3.12) say that he was murdered by Galatians. It is possible that Attalos I defeated Antiochos Hierax and forced him into Thrace, where he was killed, while Attalos I conquered most of Asia Minor. See Coşkun in this volume for an alternative course of the war and its ending.

²³ Polyb. 4.51.4: ἦν γὰρ Ἀνδρόμαχος Ἀχαιοῦ μὲν πατὴρ, ἀδελφὸς δὲ Λαοδίκης τῆς Σελεύκου γυναικός. The translation is an adaptation of Shuckburgh 1962 *ad loc.*

²⁴ Polyb. 8.20.11: Ἀχαιὸς γὰρ ἦν Ἀνδρομάχου μὲν υἱὸς τοῦ Λαοδίκης ἀδελφοῦ τῆς Σελεύκου γυναικός.

²⁵ Beloch 1927, 205–6 and Walbank 1957, 501 and id. 1967, 96. Most scholars accept this reconstruction: see Billows 1995a, 96–9; Wörrle 1975, 59–87; Thornton 2001, 583. See also Meloni 1949, 535–53; Schmitt 1964, 30–1; Ma 1999, 54.

²⁶ On the relation between king and *philoi* and the tensions within the court see recently Strootman 2014a, 145–184.

²⁷ In general on Achaios the Younger and the rebellion see Beloch 1927, 205–6; Meloni 1949, 535–53 and id. 1950, 161–83; Will 1962, 72–129; Wörrle 1975, 59–87; Huss 1993, 72–74; Ehling 2007, 497–501; Marek 2010, 278–79; Ager 2012, 421–29; Chrubasik 2012, 65–83.

²⁸ Polybios claims to be the heir of Aratos of Sicyon (1.3.1), whose work ended in the year 222/221. Consistently, Polybios states he used Aratos as the main source for the events before 222 (2.40–63). On Aratos of Sicyon see recently Beck and Eckstein 2016 ‘Aratos of Sicyon (231)’ *BNJ*. See also Walbank 1933; Urban 1979; Meister 1975, 93–5; Habicht 1995, 176–9; Meister 1990, 188–90.

²⁹ Polyb. 4.2.4–10: μάλιστα δ’ ἀπὸ τούτων ἡρξάμεθα τῶν καιρῶν διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν τύχην ὥς ἂν εἰ κεκαινοποιημένοι πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις καιροῖς. Φίλιππος μὲν γὰρ ὁ Δημητρίου κατὰ φύσιν υἱὸς ἔτι παῖς ὢν ἄρτι παρελάμβανε τὴν Μακεδόνων ἀρχήν· Ἀχαιὸς δὲ τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου δυναστεύων οὐ μόνον προστασίαν

εἶχε βασιλικήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν· ὁ δὲ Μέγας ἐπικληθεὶς Ἀντίοχος μικροῖς ἀνώτερον χρόνοις, τὰδελφοῦ Σελεύκου μετῆλλαχότος, ἔτι κομιδῇ νέος ὢν τὴν ἐν Συρίᾳ διεδέδεκτο βασιλείαν. ἅμα δὲ τούτοις Ἀριαράθης παρέλαβε τὴν Καππαδοκῶν ἀρχήν. ὁ δὲ Φιλοπάτωρ Πτολεμαῖος ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καιροῖς τῶν κατ' Αἴγυπτον ἐγεγόνει κύριος. Λυκοῦργος δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων μετ' οὐ πολὺ κατεστάθῃ βασιλεὺς. ἥρηντο δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι προσφάτως ἐπὶ τὰς προειρημένas πράξεις στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν Ἀννίβαν. οὕτως δὲ τοιαύτης περὶ πάσας τὰς δυναστείας καινοποιίας οὔσης, ἔμελλε πραγμάτων ἔσεσθαι καινῶν ἀρχή. The English translation of Polybios is from Paton 2010 for book 4 and Paton 2011 for books 5–8.

³⁰ See Bearzot 2003, 21–44; Capdetrey in this volume and Chrubasik 2016 on hellenistic dynasts. The expression ‘on this side of the Taurus’ is often used in both Polybios and Strabo to define northwestern Anatolia. This geographic reference belongs to the official Seleukid chancellery and is used in the titles of royal governors or officers. For example it is used in an inscription of 197 from Euromos, *SEG* 36.973 to define Zeuxis’ position, ‘governor in charge of the affairs on this side of the Taurus’ on Antiochos III’s behalf, see Schmitt 1964, 158–60; Ma 1999, 53–4 and 338.

³¹ Will 1962, 72–129; Schmitt 1964, 30–1.

³² The war started around 221, due to the tariffs that Byzantium imposed on cargo arriving from Pontos (4.47–52). According to Polybios, the Rhodians and Byzantines attempted to involve all of the main powers of Asia Minor in the conflict, including Attalos I of Pergamon, Prusias of Bithynia and the Ptolemies.

³³ Polybios mentions him again as the one ‘who was now master of all the country on this side of the Taurus and had recently assumed the royal title’. Polyb. 4.48.3: ὁ δ’ Ἀχαιοὺς, κρατῶν μὲν τῆς ἐπὶ τὰδε τοῦ Ταύρου, βασιλεὺς δὲ προσφάτως αὐτὸν ἀναδεειχώς.

³⁴ On Achaios’ family see above. Porphyry (*FGrHist* 260 F 32.9 and 44), states that Seleukos III ruled for three years, whereas according to Appian *Syr.* 66 [348] he reigned only for two years.

³⁵ According *OGIS* 277= *Inscr. Pergamon* 36 during the campaign, Seleukos III lost Sardes. Porphyry also states that he took refuge in Phrygia (*FGrHist* 260 F 32.9) where he issued coins with his name. See Schmitt 1964, 109–11; Mørkholm 1969, 5–20; Ma 1999, 43–50 and 55; Kosmetatou 2003, 159–74.

³⁶ Polybios mentions the Galatian Nikanor and Apturios as killers, whose names are also in Porphyry *Against the Christians* (*FGrHist* 260 F 44). But the same author in *Chronicon* (*FGrHist* 260 F 32, 9) mentions only Nikanor, a Galatian. Appian *Syr.* 66 [348] states instead that Seleukos was poisoned by his *philoi*, who were disappointed because of the way the war against Attalos was developing.

³⁷ Mittag 2008, 47–56: the army led in Asia Minor by Seleukos III likely had a large component of *katoikoi* interested in the recovery the Anatolian lands from Attalos I. Antiochos III’s army in the 220s appears to consist mainly of mercenaries, paid by his counsellor and *philos* Hermias: Polyb. 5.50.1–5. See also Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 364.

³⁸ Polyb. 4.48.9–10: Ἀχαιοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀναγκαιότητα τὸν φόνον αὐτοῦ μετῆλθε παραχρήμα, τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικάνορα καὶ τὸν Ἀπατούριον ἀποκτείνας, τῶν τε δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ὄλων πραγμάτων φρονίμως καὶ μεγαλοψύχως προσέστη. τῶν γὰρ καιρῶν παρόντων

αὐτῷ, καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄχλων ὁρμῆς συνεργούσης εἰς τὸ διάδημα περιθέσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ προείλετο ποιῆσαι, τηρῶν δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀντιόχῳ τῷ νεωτέρῳ τῶν υἱῶν, ἐνεργῶς ἐπιπορευόμενος ἀνεκτᾶτο τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου πᾶσαν. See Will 1982, 16 and Grainger 2010, 183–84.

³⁹ According to Mørkholm 1969, 5–20 Achaios already had ‘king-like powers’ even before he claimed the title; see also Ma 1999, 45–50; Ager 2012, 421–29.

⁴⁰ Alexander the Great avenged Darios by killing Bessos in order to show his royal power and to affirm his role as administrator of justice: see De Sensi Sestito 1998, 167–200.

⁴¹ At the time of Seleukos III’s death, Antiochos III was in Babylon (Polyb. 2.71.4; Porph. *FGrHist* 260 F 46; Euseb. *Chron.* 1.40.12). Polybios (5.40.6–41.2) states that Antiochos III acquired the royal title and, advised by Hermias, appointed Achaios in charge of the conquest of Asia Minor, recognized Molon and Alexander as satraps of Media and Persia, and Epigenes as head of the army in Syria.

⁴² It is difficult for modern scholars to define phases and movements of the war between Achaios and Attalos: see Schmitt 1964, 109–11; Ma 1999, 54–55; Kosmetatou 2003, 159–74; Ager 2012, 421–29. Prusias was indignant at the Byzantines attempting to mediate between Achaios and Attalos in 223/222, to obtain help against Rhodes and Prusias himself (Polyb. 4.49.1–2). Consequently, Prusias claimed as *casus belli* against Byzantium the chance of an alliance between Achaios and Attalos. Nevertheless, the Rhodian mediation failed as shown by the subsequent Polybian passages where the two are again shown as enemies. Ager 2012, 421–29 highlights that there is no evidence of a treaty or an alliance between Achaios and Attalos (Polyb. 5.107.4), ‘Achaios is always presented by Polybios as the enemy of Attalos and the upstart Pergamene kingdom’.

⁴³ 4.48.11–12: τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων αὐτῷ παραδόξως εὐροούντων, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν Ἀτταλον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ Πέργαμον συνέκλεισε, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πάντων ἦν ἐγκρατὴς, ἐπαρθεὶς τοῖς εὐτυχίμασι παρὰ πόδας ἐξώκειλε. καὶ διάδημα περιθέμενος καὶ βασιλεῖα προσαγορεύσας αὐτὸν βαρύντατος ἦν τότε καὶ φοβερώτατος τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα τότε Βυζάντιοι πιστεύσαντες ἀνεδέξαντο τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Ῥοδίους καὶ Προυσίαν πόλεμον. It might be possible to retrace the territories he conquered from the account of later events, see Meloni 1949, 535–53; Allen 1983, 37; Ager 2012, 421–29.

⁴⁴ On hypothesis on the causes, of Achaios’ rebellion see also Schmitt 1964, 171–73; Will 1962, 72–129 and Will 1982, 24; Ma 1999, 57–59.

⁴⁵ I do not refer the term ‘legitimation’ to the modern meaning of hereditary right, but to the broader meaning of ideological justification employed by a king as basis to ground his right to rule.

⁴⁶ ‘βασιλεὺς δεῖνα fin dalle attestazioni più antiche, e talvolta più discusse e discutibili, è in genere legata a momenti di vittoria militare e sembra ribadire, preparare e presupporre la necessità dell’aspetto militare della monarchia ellenistica che si auto-legittimava con la “conquista con la lancia” (δορικήτος χώρα)’.

⁴⁷ See Bikerman 1938a, 14; Mehl 1980–1981, 173–212; Faraguna 1998, 349–395; Virgilio 2003b; Chaniotis 2003, 431–445; Landucci Gattinoni 2003, 199–224; Primo 2009a, 139 and Capdetrey 2010, 17–36.

⁴⁸ 'le champ, réel ou revendiqué, d'une souveraineté royale essentiellement personnelle, fondée sur une appropriation du territoire par la force'.

⁴⁹ Mehl 1980–1981, 173–212 and Virgilio 2003, 69–85.

⁵⁰ Walbank 1984, 62–100 highlights that the main requirement of hellenistic kings is to be victorious in battle. Unlike Romans, the hellenistic king is considered a winner according to the land he conquered and the protection he gives to his people, not according to the number of enemies he kills, as is indicated by the epithet *sōtēr* acquired after a military victory. See Chaniotis 2003, 431–45 and on the relevance of military success for hellenistic kings, and Muccioli 2013, 333–52 on the pivotal role the military sphere played in the hellenistic royal titles and propaganda.

⁵¹ *Polyb.* 18.41.7, *Liv.* 33.21.3 and *Strab.* 13.624 testify that Attalos bases his claim to the royal title on his victory over the Galatians in the battle on the Kaikos (Caecus) river, even if Philetairos, the forefather of the dynasty, had already exerted power close to that of a king: Walbank 1984, 62–100; Virgilio 1993, 15–16 and 29; Billows 1995, 104–7; Kosmetatou 2003, 159–74; Mitchell 2005, 521–30; Capdetrey 2007, 117–8; Orth 2008, 485–95; Marek 2010, 275–8 and Marcellesi 2012, 65–86 e 96–97.

⁵² Mehl 1980–1981, 173–212 (191–194) in his analysis of the principle of δορίκτητος χώρα shows that under the Diadochoi the principle did not apply to a satrap, a 'functionary', acting on behalf of the government, nor to an independent territorial owner or ruler. Such an interpretation appears to be based on Antiochos III's description of the concept, when he tried to convince the Romans of his right to rule Asia Minor. This is indeed precious evidence, since it is the earliest attestation of the idea, and the sole occurrence in the *Histories* of Polybios (18.51.4). Ma 1999, 26–52; Primo 2009, 25–26; King 2010, 373–91. Nevertheless, Antiochos III's claim and, therefore, Mehl's interpretation of it, are deeply affected by the outcome of the several rebellions and secessions of the third century, when members of local dynasties of the Seleukid Empire styled and called themselves as *basileis* having conquered or defended the territories of their realm and established kingdoms alternative to the Seleukids: Molon, Alexandros, Attalos, Mithridates II.

⁵³ According to Polybios 5.55.4–5, already during the campaign of Antiochos III in Media Atropatene against Artabazanes a rumour spread in the kingdom about Antiochos' life being in danger. Will 1962, 72–129 observes that if the king had died after the birth of his son and successor, the power would have been exerted by Hermias as guardian for the new-born king, instead of by Achaïos, as the closest relative of the deceased king. According to Will, the false news of Antiochos' death induced Achaïos to rebel, to avoid suffering the consequences of Hermias' guardianship. However, it is worth noting that usually the guardian of the successor to the throne is a member of the ruling dynasty. On the rumour see Meloni 1949, 535–53 and id. 1950, 161–83; Will 1962, 72–129 and id. 1982, 24; Allen 1983, 3; Ager 2012 421–29.

⁵⁴ According to Walbank 1957 *ad loc.* the act of writing to the cities and to other territorial institutions of the kingdom is recognized as a king's prerogative: the functionary writes only as intermediary of the king. On royal correspondence and

the functionary's role see Ma 1999, 179–242; Bertrand 2006, 89–104; Capdetrey 2006, 105–25, and id. 2007, 335–59; Bencivenni 2010, 149–78 (with status quaestionis at 150–151 n. 6); Virgilio 2010, 101–22 and id. 2011, 25; Landucci 2013, 99–111.

⁵⁵ On this obscure counsellor of Achaïos see Schmitt 1964, 172 n.1.

⁵⁶ 5.57.2–5: ὁ γὰρ Ἀχαιοὺς, καθ' οὗς καιροὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀρταβαζάνην ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐστράτευσεν, πεισθεὶς καὶ παθεῖν ἄν τι τὸν Ἀντίοχον. καὶ μὴ παθόντος ἐλπίσας διὰ τὸ μήκος τῆς ἀποστάσεως φθάσεν ἐμβαλὼν εἰς Συρίαν καὶ συνεργοῖς χρησάμενος Κυρρησταῖς τοῖς ἀποστάταις γεγονόσι τοῦ βασιλέως ταχέως ἄν κρατῆσαι τῶν κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν πραγμάτων, ὥρμησε μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως ἐκ Λυδίας. παραγενόμενος δ' εἰς Λαοδίκειαν τὴν ἐν Φρυγίᾳ διάδημά τε περιέθετο καὶ βασιλεὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐτόλμησε χρηματίζειν καὶ γράφειν πρὸς τὰς πόλεις; Γαρσηήριδος αὐτὸν τοῦ φυγάδος εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος μάλιστα προτρεψαμένου.

⁵⁷ See Chaniotis 2003, 431–45; D'Agostini 2013, 87–106.

⁵⁸ Primo 2010, 63–76, cf. Steph. Byz *s.v.* Ἀντιόχεια 100, 4 Meineke.

⁵⁹ On Laodikeia on the Lykos see Will 1962, 72–129; Cohen 1995, 308–310; Primo 2010, 63–76; Olshausen 2012. The city is defined as 'subject (sujette)' by Capdetrey 2007, 215–217, i.e. with a limited autonomy and closely bonded to the central power.

⁶⁰ There are at least five tetradrachms currently attested according to the latest online auctions. On the coins: Newell 1941, n° 1439, 1440, 1441, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1445, 1446, 1448, 1449, 1450; Mørkholm 1969, 5–20, and id. 1991, 126–7, n° 403, 404, 405; Houghton and Lorber 2002, 347–350, n° 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959. See also Le Rider 1991, 81–88 on the bronze coin sealed in the foundations of the statue of Artemis, in the Artemision of Sardes, and the offer to the temple in 220.

⁶¹ The horse head is present on almost all of the extant coins. Even if it is likely that it was a countermark, it has also been suggested that it could be Achaïos' symbol: see Ehling 2007, 497–501.

⁶² Houghton and Lorber 2002, 348. According to Mørkholm 1969, 5–20, Achaïos aimed 'to be shown as a victor who has acquired a legitimate right to his possessions by his success as a military leader'. See also Mørkholm 1991, 126–7.

⁶³ The events are subsequently analysed in chronological order, even if Polybios often inserts descriptions of Achaïos' actions into accounts of other events, as a flashback or *excursus*. This specific episode is narrated in an *excursus* right before the passages devoted to the Fourth Syrian War and after the account of the rebellion of Molon and Alexander against Antiochos III and his counsellor Hermias in 222. On the date of the rebellion see Walbank 1957 *ad loc.* On Molon and Alexander, Polybios states that in 222 the two satraps, tired of Hermias ruling the kingdom on Antiochos' behalf, started a rebellion, hoping to have Achaïos' support. But Achaïos, probably still occupied with Attalos, remained loyal to Antiochos III, confirming the choice he had made earlier when he rejected the diadem 5.40.7–54.13. On the rebellion see Newell 1938, 85–86 and id. 1941, 204–5; Meloni 1949, 535–53; Walbank 1957 *ad loc.*; Will 1962, 72–129 and id. 1982, 18–23; Schmitt 1964, 116–50.

⁶⁴ 5.42.7–8: διὸ καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον ἐπιστολὴν πλάσας ὡς παρ' Ἀχαιοῦ διαπεσταλμένην

προσήνεγκε τῷ βασιλεῖ, διασφαύσαν ὅτι Πτολεμαῖος αὐτὸν παρακαλεῖ πραγμάτων ἀντιποιήσασθαι καὶ φησι καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασι χορηγήσειν πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολάς, ἐὰν ἀναλάβῃ διάδημα καὶ φανερός γένηται πᾶσιν ἀντιποιούμενος τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἣν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἔχειν αὐτὸν καὶ νῦν, τῆς δ' ἐπιγραφῆς αὐτῷ φθονοῦντα τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης διδόμενον ἀποτρίβεσθαι στέφανον.

⁶⁵ Ager 2003, 35–50; McGing 2010, 117–119. On Hermias see Walbank 1957 *ad loc.* 'he sat in the synedrion, set on foot state trials, surveyed the administration of provinces, conducted business with foreign states, and concerned himself with military supplies and the paying of troops.'. Cf. Will 1962, 72–129 and *id.* 1982, 17–8.

⁶⁶ Walbank 1957 *ad loc.* and Schmitt 1964, 161–4 and 167–71. On letters in Polybios see Zecchini 2003b, 415–22 and Virgilio 2011, 30–2.

⁶⁷ Polyb. 4.51.1–4: θεωροῦντες δὲ τὸν πατέρα τὸν Ἀχαιοὺ κατεχόμενον ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ, τὸν δ' Ἀχαιὸν περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενον τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς σωτηρίαν, ἐπεβάλοντο πρεσβεύειν πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαῖον καὶ παραιτεῖσθαι τὸν Ἀνδρόμαχον, καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἐκ παρέργου τοῦτο πεποικότες, τότε δ' ἄληθινῶς σπεύδοντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος, ἵνα προσενεγκάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Ἀχαιὸν τὴν χάριν ταύτην ὑπόχρεων αὐτὸν ποιήσονται πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρακαλούμενον. ὁ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος, παραγενομένων τῶν πρέσβων, ἐβουλεύετο μὲν παρακατέχειν τὸν Ἀνδρόμαχον, ἐλπίζων αὐτῷ χρήσεσθαι πρὸς καιρόν, διὰ τὸ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἄκριτα μένειν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ τὸν Ἀχαιὸν ἀναδεδεχότα προσφάτως αὐτὸν βασιλέα πραγμάτων εἶναι κύριον ἱκανῶν τινῶν· ἦν γὰρ Ἀνδρόμαχος Ἀχαιοῦ μὲν πατὴρ, ἀδελφὸς δὲ Λαοδίκης τῆς Σελεύκου γυναῖκος. The translation is an adaptation of Shuckburgh 1962 *ad loc.*

⁶⁸ Beloch 1927, I, 686 n.3 suggests that Andromachos is captured by Attalos I during the military events in Asia Minor in 226–222 and then given by the king of Pergamon to Ptolemy III. See Meloni 1949, 535–53; Walbank 1957 *ad loc.* Thornton 2001, 584–5 is hesitant about this hypothesis and points out that is hard to decide how Andromachos arrived in Egypt, especially considering the cautious vocabulary used by Polybios, who defines Andromachos as 'held' in Egypt.

⁶⁹ The letter is inserted after Molon's rebellion and before Antiochos' campaign against Artabazanes, thus between 222 and 221, roughly at the same time Andromachos was held in Alexandria.

⁷⁰ On Ptolemy III's foreign policy see Marquaille 2008, 39–64. On the relation between Achaios and the Ptolemies see Walbank 1957, 573; Meloni 1949, 535–53 and *id.* 1950, 161–83; Schmitt 1964, 166–71; Ager 2012, 421–29. Cf. Huss 1993, 72–4; Will 1982, 24–5 and 47–8.

⁷¹ On the Fourth Syrian War see Will 1982, 26–40 and 47–8; Grainger 2010, 195–218.

⁷² 5.57.1–2: Ἀντίοχος δὲ παραγεγόμενος εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, καὶ διαφεῖς τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς παραχειμασίαν, διεπέμπετο πρὸς τὸν Ἀχαιὸν, ἐγκαλὼν καὶ διαμαρτυρόμενος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ τετολημῆναι διάδημα περιθέσθαι καὶ βασιλέα χρηματίζειν, δεύτερον δὲ προλέγων ὡς οὐ λανθάνει κοινοπραγῶν Πτολεμαίῳ καὶ καθόλου πλείῳ τοῦ δέοντος κινούμενος. 'Antiochos sent to Achaios messages of remonstrance, protesting in the first place against his having ventured to assume the diadem and style himself king, and next informing him that it was no secret that he was acting in concert with Ptolemy and generally displaying an unwarranted activity'.

⁷³ 5.57.6: προάγοντος δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτοῦ, καὶ σχεδὸν ἤδη περὶ Λυκαονίαν ὄντος,

αἱ δυνάμεις ἐστασίασαν, δυσαρεστούμεναι τῷ δοκεῖν γίνεσθαι τὴν στρατείαν ἐπὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχοντα βασιλέα. 'He continued to advance and was nearly in Lycaonia when his troops mutinied, the cause of their dissatisfaction being that, as it now appeared, the expedition was against their original and natural king'.

⁷⁴ On Pisidia's population see Syme 1995, 198–9 and Thornton 2002, 440.

⁷⁵ Schmitt 1964, 171–3, Ma 1999, 56–7 and Mittag 2008, 47–56. Cf. Will 1962, 72–129 suggests that the rebellion of Achaïos is directed against Hermias (as likely was Molon's attempt to secede), and that Achaïos is going to Syria in order to assume the regency for Antiochos' son. The troops rebel when they find out about Hermias' death and the return of Antiochos.

⁷⁶ Will 1982, 26.

⁷⁷ Ma 1999, 56–57: 'Achaïos may have thought of himself within Seleukid legitimacy, as is suggested by the coinage he issued at Sardes, repeating Seleukid symbols (especially the anchor, on the shield of admittedly un-Seleukid Athena Alkis: WSM no. 1440) and by the fact that Achaïos never again tried to attack the Syrian heartland of the dynasty, even when Antiochos III was at war in Koile Syria'.

⁷⁸ 5.67.12–13: μάλιστα δὲ παρεῖχε δυσχρησίαν ἀμφοτέροις τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἀχαιόν. Πτολεμαῖος μὲν γὰρ ἐσποῦδαζε περιλαβεῖν ταῖς συνθήκαις αὐτόν. Ἀντίοχος δὲ καθάπαξ οὐδὲ λόγον ἠνείχετο περὶ τούτων, δεινὸν ἡγούμενος τὸ καὶ τολμᾶν τὸν Πτολεμαῖον περιστέλλειν τοὺς ἀποστάτας καὶ μνήμην ποιεῖσθαι περὶ τινος τῶν τοιούτων. Walbank 1957 *ad loc.* states that the attempt to include Achaïos in the treaty is the proof of a deal between the two. Schmitt 1964, 166–71; McGing 2010, 124–125. According to Will 1962, 72–129 and *id.* 1982, 47–48 and Grainger 2010, 201–4 Ptolemy's request was fabricated in order to gain time.

⁷⁹ Walbank 1957 *ad loc.* 'Ptolemy's contention clearly shows that Achaïos was his ally, formally or informally'.

⁸⁰ 5.87.2: ἡπίσται μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ὄχλοις διὰ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐλάττωμα περὶ αὐτόν, ἐφοβεῖτο δὲ τὸν Ἀχαιὸν μὴ συνεπίθῃται τοῖς καιροῖς. See Will 1962, 72–129, Huss 1976, 69; Ager 2003, 35–50; McGing 2010, 125–126. On Raphia see Heinen 1984, 412–45 (437–439).

⁸¹ The fragments of books 7 and 8 do not allow a congruous association of the siege of Sardes of 215 with the events of 219 described in book 5.72.1–78.6, *i.e.* the campaign of Achaïos in Pisidia and his war with Attalos. On the expedition of Achaïos in Pisidia see Meloni 1950, 161–83; Walbank 1957 *ad loc.*; Will 1982, 47–48; Ma 1999, 58; Dmitriev 1999, 397–411. On Attalos' expedition into Achaïos' territory while he was in Pisidia, and the new war between the two kings, see recently Ager 2012, 421–29.

⁸² According to some modern scholars this deal included the recognition by the Seleukids of the kingdom of Pergamon: Schmitt 1964, 264–7; Ma 1999, 59–60; Grainger 2010, 216–8.

⁸³ Polyb. 7.15.1–18.10 and 8.15.1–21.11.

⁸⁴ According to Polybios' fragments 7.15.1–18.10, the Kretan Lagora finds a sector of the city walls that is not well guarded. Antiochos selects a group of soldiers and sends them to enter the city there, while the rest of the army is attacking Achaïos' forces on the other side of the city. Aribazos, commander of

Sardes, is surprised by the events and cannot repel the attack from two sides at once, thus they have to abandon the main city and retreat in the acropolis.

⁸⁵ Sosibios was already mentioned by Polybios at 5.35–39: these chapters describe the relationship between Ptolemy IV Philopator and Kleomenes, the Spartan king who was looking for help against the Achaians. See also Plut. *Cleom.* 33.5. Meloni 1949, 535–53 (545–6); Will 1962, 72–129; Ager 2003, 35–50.

⁸⁶ 8.15.6–8: τοῦ δὲ Σωσιβίου δεξαμένου τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, καὶ διειληφότος ἢ μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι σωθῆναι τὸν Ἀχαιὸν ἐκ τῶν περιστώτων, ἢ δυνατόν καθάπαξ ὑπάρχοντος διὰ μηδενὸς ἂν ἐτέρου γενέσθαι τοῦτο βέλτιον ἢ διὰ Βώλιδος, τοιαύτης δὲ συνδρομῆς καὶ περὶ τὸν Βῶλιν προθυμίας, ταχέως ἐλάμβανε τὸ πρᾶγμα προκοπὴν. ὃ τε γὰρ Σωσίβιος ἅμα μὲν προεδίδου τῶν χρημάτων εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν εἰς τὰς ἐπιβολάς, πολλὰ δ' εἰς γενομένων ὑπισχνεῖτο δώσειν, τὰς δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ παρ' Ἀχαιοῦ τοῦ σφῶζομένου χάριτας ἐξ ὑπερβολῆς αὔξων εἰς μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἦγε τὸν Βῶλιν.

⁸⁷ 8.17.10–11: ἦν γὰρ τις ἐπίνοια περὶ τὸν Ἀχαιὸν τοιαύτη, πρῶτον μὲν διαφυγεῖν τοὺς ἐνεστώτας κινδύνους, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ποιήσασθαι δίχα προόδου τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς κατὰ Συρίαν τόπους: πάνν γὰρ εἶχε μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἐπιφανεῖς ἄφνω καὶ παραδόξως τοῖς κατὰ Συρίαν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ἔτι διατρίβοντος Ἀντιόχου περὶ τὰς Σάρδεις, μέγα ποιήσειν κίνημα καὶ μεγάλης ἀποδοχῆς τεύξεσθαι παρὰ τε τοῖς Ἀντιοχεῦσι καὶ τοῖς κατὰ Κοίλην Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην.

⁸⁸ Antiochos III's point of view is clearly different as is evident from the negotiation he has with Ptolemy in 219, when he refers to Achaios as a rebel and refuses to call him a king.

⁸⁹ On the pivotal role that the relation between the king and the army played in Macedonian kingship see recently Anson 1991, 230–47; Billows 1995, 11–23; Hatzopoulos 1996, 441–60; Hammond 2000, 141–8; Chaniotis 2005, 62–8; Heckel 2009, 69–82; King 2010, 373–91; Carney 2015, 27–59.

⁹⁰ 8.20.11–12: Ἀχαιὸς γὰρ ἦν Ἀνδρομάχου μὲν υἱὸς τοῦ Λαοδίκης ἀδελφοῦ τῆς Σελεύκου γυναικὸς, ἔγχε δὲ Λαοδίκην τὴν Μιθριδάτου τοῦ βασιλέως θυγατέρα, κύριος δ' ἐγγόνει τῆς ἐπὶ τὰδε τοῦ Ταύρου πάσης. δοκῶν δὲ τότε καὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεσι καὶ ταῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐν ὀχυρωτάτῳ τόπῳ τῆς οἰκουμένης διατρίβειν, ἐκάθητο δεδεμένος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ὑποχείριος γενόμενος τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, οὐδέπω γινώσκοντος οὐθενὸς ἀπλῶς τὸ γεγονὸς πλὴν τῶν πράξαντων.

⁹¹ 8.21.10–11: Ἀχαιὸς μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κατὰ λόγον πράξας, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς τῶν πιστευθέντων ἡττηθεῖς ἀθεσίας, κατεστρέψατο τὸν βίον, κατὰ δύο τρόπους οὐκ ἀνωφελὲς ὑπόδειγμα γενόμενος τοῖς ἐπεσομένοις, καθ' ἓνα μὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδενὶ πιστεῦειν ῥαδίως, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς τὸ μὴ μεγαλυνεῖν ἐν ταῖς εὐπραγίαις, πᾶν δὲ προσδοκᾶν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας. Walbank 1957 *ad loc.* on the vicissitudes of Fortune. On this terrible execution see Walbank *ad loc.*; Sherwin White and Kuhrt 1993, 125–9; Thornton 2002a, 467–8; Ma 1999, 61; Ehling 2007 497–501; Kosmin 2014, 159.

SELEUKOS, ZEUS AND THE DYNASTIC CULT AT SELEUKEIA IN PIERIA

Nicholas L. Wright

Philetairos, the prince of Pergamon, bought the body of Seleukos from Keraunos for a large sum of money, burned it, and sent the ashes to his son Antiochos. The latter deposited them at Seleukeia-by-the-Sea, where he erected a temple to his father, and made a precinct round it. The precinct is called Nikatoreion.¹

With these simple words, Appian of Alexandria summarised the apotheosis of the first Seleukid king. The creation of an official dynastic cult during the reign of Antiochos I, manifested in the erection of the Nikatoreion, was to be a central pillar around which the Seleukid royal ideology evolved until its apogee under Antiochos IV Epiphanes in the early 160s BC. There might appear to be a natural progression from divine descent to living godhead but the ideological framework within which a king could eventually be conceptualised as *theos epiphanēs* was ultimately predicated on the existence of a formalised and state-sponsored cult of earlier generations of the Seleukid family.

Throughout his reign, Seleukos I demonstrated a devotion to the gods, both Olympian and Eastern. However, as illustrated through the iconographic programme for his royal coinage and in his sponsorship of building programmes, Seleukos appears to have favoured Zeus above all other gods as his state's patron (Figures 1–3).² Seleukos I's relationship with Zeus has often been overlooked as a result of the dynastic preference for Apollo demonstrated by his immediate successors. Although Apollo's oracle at Didyma was responsible for a series of prophecies foretelling the foundation of the Seleukid kingdom and was indeed honoured with special reverence by the kings, the dynastic mythology that made Apollo the family's progenitor seems to have solidified only in the reign of Antiochos I.³ The famous oracular sanctuary of Apollo at Didyma in Ionia received Seleukid funding for a rebuilding programme in the early third century BC and a new oracular sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis may have been established by Seleukos I in the Antiochene suburb of Daphne, but the tutelary deity of both Antioch and Seleukeia-Pieria – the two most important settlements in North Syria – was Zeus.⁴



Fig. 1. Seleukos I AR tetradrachm from Seleukeia in Pieria (Houghton and Lorber 2002 plate 29.1b)



Fig. 2. Seleukos I AR tetradrachm from Seleukeia on the Tigris (Colin E. Pitchfork coll.)



Fig. 3. Seleukos I AR stater from Babylon (Houghton and Lorber 2002 plate 88.8b)

Epigraphic evidence from Kilikian Olba shows that Seleukos I sponsored repair work and the maintenance of the sanctuary of the indigenous Zeus-Tahunt,⁵ and the cult centre of Atargatis and Zeus-Hadad at Hierapolis in Kyrrhestis received significant royal attention during his reign.⁶ Seleukos' attitude towards Zeus is hardly surprising and should be considered, in the first instance, entirely appropriate for his role as a king of the Macedonians (albeit, those Macedonians resident in Asia). Traditionally, Macedonian kings presided over their kingdom's religious festivals in their role as the chief priest of Zeus.⁷ Combined with the overwhelming dominance of Zeus as a coin type across the corpus of Seleukos I's emissions,⁸ the epigraphic and historic record illustrates the Successor's conscious attempt to fulfil the role of 'Macedonian king' by making Zeus the primary focus of his religious attention. Furthermore, by giving pre-eminence to Zeus' indigenous parallels, Seleukos was also conforming to vernacular Semitic traditions which saw the ruler's authority as a derivative of the power of the local sky-god.⁹ The true plasticity of Zeus iconography in the hellenistic East and the figure's inherent popularity would become abundantly clear in later generations.¹⁰

The close relationship between the monarch and the gods led easily towards Seleukos I's affiliation with, and eventual incorporation into, divine worship. The traditional link between the Macedonian king and his

divine counterpart strengthened under Philip II and Alexander III the Great who both adopted or appropriated aspects of Zeus' divinity. The *dēmos* of Eresos on Lesbos dedicated two altars to a syncretised Zeus Philippeios in thanks for the king's benefactions.¹¹ Although on this occasion the impetus behind the divine association appears to have emanated from the civic body rather than from the king, Alexander the Great altered the paradigm by casting himself in the image of Zeus and other Olympian gods. The king was scandalously said to dress up as various gods and was certainly depicted by Apelles holding a thunderbolt in a painting for the temple of Artemis at Ephesos. He is shown on the reverse of the famous 'elephant medallion' dekadrachm (dated c.324 BC) bearing the same attribute (Figure 4).¹² When the living king is shown wielding the symbol of Zeus, it ceases to be easy to draw a distinction between comparison and identification.¹³

A growing religious scepticism and disillusionment with the traditional gods in the late classical-hellenistic period facilitated the admission of the king into an already crowded pantheon.¹⁴ As early as 327 BC, Anaxarchos is said to have stated before Alexander's court that it was more reasonable for the Macedonians to honour the king as a god than to worship Herakles or Dionysos.¹⁵ A generation later, the ithyphallic hymn to Demetrios Poliorketes (291 BC) clearly demonstrated a growing dichotomy between the distant impotence of the Olympians and the immediacy and efficacy of a successor monarch: 'For other gods are either far away, or they do not have ears, or they do not exist, or do not take any notice of us, but you we can see present here, not made of wood or stone, but real.'¹⁶ The paradigm was clearly outlined by McEwan for whom 'one might believe vaguely in the power and the glory of the Olympians, but he could see and feel the glory and the power of the *Diadochoi*. The local god fed nobody in time of famine, but the king could and did.'¹⁷

During Seleukos I's lifetime too, a civic cult dedicated to the king was installed at Ilion which included an altar, games and the renaming of a month in tribute to the king.¹⁸ Similar games in honour of the king were also held at Erythrai.¹⁹ At Lemnos, Seleukos was honoured with a *naiskos* (shrine) and his name was substituted for that of Zeus in festive libations although the evidence for the latter may be posthumous.²⁰ Just like Philip



Fig. 4. Alexander the Great AR elephant medallion dekadrachm (©Trustees of the British Museum) (Houghton and Lorber: 2002 plate 29.1b)

II at Eresos, Seleukos was saluted with divine honours for his philanthropic benefactions to Greek cities. Unlike Alexander the Great, Seleukos I made no overt move towards declaring himself a god.²¹ His actions, however, might be seen by the Greeks in Asia as god-like. In addition to providing support to existing cities, his foundation of new cities and, by extension the proliferation of Hellenic culture, was seen as the typical role of the Greek 'culture-hero'. Seleukos was renowned for his plethora of new foundations (or refoundations) at any or all of which he might also expect to be worshipped in the role of *oikist* as either hero or god.²²

It may be supposed that it was in the role of *oikist* that Antiochos I chose to entomb his father within the Nikatoreion, a temple-*hērōon*, at Seleukeia in Pieria. However, in so doing, he must have been aware that he was also enacting the creation of an official cult of the Seleukid dynasty, a fact evidenced by later inscriptions.²³ The city chosen by Antiochos was a Graeco-Macedonian colony situated on the eastern Mediterranean coast in the foothills of the Amanos mountains, to the north of the Orontes estuary (Figure 5).²⁴ Like its sister cities in the Syrian Tetrapolis (Antiocheia by Daphne, Apameia on the Axios and Laodikeia by the Sea), Seleukeia was founded in 300 BC by Seleukos I Nikator, flush with victory over his Antigoniid rivals at Ipsos. Although overshadowed for most of its history by Antioch to the East, it would seem that Seleukeia was intended from the offset to equal, or indeed be preeminent among, the other Tetrapolis cities.²⁵

The city was named after its *oikist* who had already founded a synonymous city on the banks of the Tigris from which to administer Mesopotamia and the East; parallel foundations named after living *diadochoi*, Lysamacheia, Kassandreia and Antigoneia, were created to be principal centres in other Successor kingdoms.²⁶ Seleukeia in Pieria was founded on 23 Xanthikos (April), a month before the creation of Antioch, and may have shared with the latter city the dispersed Graeco-Macedonian population of Antigoneia.²⁷ Moreover, it would also seem likely that Seleukos preferred to transfer Antigoneia's mint and its officials to Seleukeia rather than to Antioch thereby facilitating the first Seleukid coin issues in Syria.²⁸

Arguably the most telling indication of the city's early prominence, however, was its selection as the site of Seleukos I's mausoleum in 281 or 280 BC. Ptolemy Keraunos, the murderer of Seleukos, had seized control of the traditional Macedonian royal necropolis at Aigai and rebellion in Syria prevented Antiochos I from pursuing any immediate claim to Macedon.²⁹ It was the duty of a Macedonian king to bury his predecessor and, as Appian tells us, Antiochos chose Seleukeia in Pieria to contain not only the sepulchre of his father but also, with the creation of the Nikatoreion, to form the hub of his dynasty's emerging mythology.³⁰



Fig. 5. Map of hellenistic Syria

Of course, Seleukeia's pre-eminence was not to last; during the third Syrian or 'Laodikean' war (246–241 BC), Ptolemy III managed to seize control of Seleukeia through treachery – the defences were considered impregnable – and left a Ptolemaic garrison in the city which was not ejected until the fourth Syrian war (219 BC).³¹ During the period of Egyptian control, the city remained a proverbial thorn in the side of Seleukid prestige and was fully eclipsed by Antioch as the centre of the Seleukid administration in the Levant.

A number of divine portents were associated with Seleukos' foundation of Seleukeia in Pieria. According to Appian, '...when he was about to build the two Seleukeias a portent of thunder preceded the foundation of the one by the sea, for which reason he consecrated Thunder as a divinity of the place, and accordingly the inhabitants worship thunder and sing its praises to this day.'³² Malalas provides a further tale which more explicitly linked the city with Zeus (alluded to by Appian's thunder),

...Seleukos went up to Mount Kasios in order to sacrifice to Zeus Kasios. After completing the sacrifice and cutting the meat, Seleukos prayed [to be shown] where to found a city. Suddenly an eagle snatched the meat from the sacrifice and took it away to the old city. Following behind with his augurs, Seleukos found that the meat had been dropped near the sea below the old city, in the place called the trading-station of Pieria. Immediately he constructed walls and built the foundations of a city, which he called Seleukeia after his own name.³³

It is clear from Malalas that Zeus was the premier deity with whom Seleukos' city-building programme was associated. Zeus Kasios is initially instrumental in the foundation of Seleukeia and later a sacrifice to Zeus at Antigoneia led to the foundation of Antioch; Seleukos' first act upon founding the latter city was the dedication of a temple to Zeus Bottios.³⁴ By civilising, subduing or otherwise controlling the – at times unpredictable – Orontes River valley with the creation of Seleukeia and the other Tetrapolis cities, it can be argued that Seleukos I was casting his own image in the mould of Zeus who had previously fought with the wild-natured Typhon in the same area, creating the river as a by-product of the struggle.³⁵ According to Ogden, these foundation myths derive their meanings from Seleukos' '...participation in a wider system of narratives, and by means of the similarities expressed with and differences expressed from these other narratives.'³⁶

The Nikatoreion itself has been tentatively identified by Hannestad and Potts as the Doric temple at Seleukeia excavated as part of the 1937–1939 Princeton University expeditions to neighbouring Antioch.³⁷ A preliminary study of the Doric temple had been conducted in 1924 by Seyrig and Perdrizet but the archive and drawings were lost before reaching France

and the investigation was never published.³⁸ The Princeton expedition procured the lease on the land surrounding the temple in 1937 and conducted one season of fieldwork amid rising political tensions in 1938. The outbreak of war in 1939 caused the premature cessation of the Princeton expedition and the incomplete and hasty nature of the excavation is unfortunately reflected in the publication material.³⁹

The Doric temple was placed conspicuously on the edge of Seleukeia's upper city on a large terrace on Mount Koryphos in accordance with Greek planning principles. Sited in such a way, it was visible from most of the lower city, Mount Koryphos above, the harbour below and the surrounding hinterland.⁴⁰ The location afforded dramatic views south along the coast to Mount Kasios which, as we have seen, was believed to have been instrumental in the foundation myth of the city (Figures 6–7).⁴¹



Fig. 6. Seleukeia in Pieria Doric temple



Fig. 7. Mount Kasios viewed from the Seleukeia in Pieria Doric temple

From what remains of the temple foundations, the building has been reconstructed as an east-facing peripteral hexastyle temple of the Doric order with a distyle in-antis *pronaos* and 12 columns along each long side on a three-stepped *krēpidōma* (Figures 8–9).




Fig. 8. Seleukeia in Pieria Doric temple (Stillwell 1941 plan 9)




Fig. 9. Seleukeia in Pieria Doric temple (after Stillwell 1941 plan 9)



Fig. 10. Seleukeia in Pieria Doric temple crypt (Stillwell 1941 figure 42)

Overall the foundations measure 18.6 by 36.9 metres. The excavators dismiss the possibility that the temple was provided with an *epinaos* or *opisthodomos* at its western end. The *naos* of the temple probably led directly to the *adyton* which was built above a square subterranean crypt which measured approximately 4.5 metres across. The crypt was accessed from within the temple by a stairway which took up much of the northern half of the *adyton* (Figure 10). An alteration to the western end of the south face of the *krepidoma* indicates that a secondary passageway led to the crypt directly from outside. It is suspected that this secondary access to the crypt was a later improvement, although the excavators provide no clear indication of the date of the initial construction, nor of any alterations. The use of finely cut ashlar blocks in the temple foundations and crypt, together with an examination of extant moulding fragments, led Stillwell to suggest a probable construction date around the end of the fourth century BC although a date in the first century BC was also posited.⁴² It appears that no pottery, coins or other small finds were recorded during the hurried excavation that might have further assisted with the monument's dating.

Only a single small find is published from the context of the temple excavations. A 17.5cm high damaged bronze statuette of a goddess was recovered from the fill between the pavement supports (Figure 11). Stillwell identified the figure as Isis-Aphrodite and suggests that she may have been associated with the focus of worship in the temple but advanced no further discussion on either the goddess or the sanctuary's principal deity.⁴³ The figure is naked but for a headdress composed of a celestial-disc flanked by cow horns and feathers (or ears of grain). The headdress



Fig. 11. Bronze statuette from the Seleukeia in Pieria Doric temple (Stillwell 1941 plate 16.365)



Fig. 12. Antiochos VII Æ unit from Antioch (private coll.)

was a common symbol in the Graeco-Roman period and is well known as an attribute of the Egyptian deity Isis. The universality of the cult of Isis led to her endemic worship across the hellenistic Mediterranean, and despite the political differences between the Seleukid court and Ptolemaic Alexandria, she was a commonly honoured deity in Seleukid Syria.⁴⁴ The head-dress of Isis was even used as a reverse type on Seleukid royal coinage from the mid-second century BC, coming to dominate royal bronzes under Antiochos VII Sidetes (Figure 12).⁴⁵ The Ptolemaic occupation of Seleukeia between 246 and 219 BC may have increased the goddess' prominence in the city although explicit evidence for any spike in popularity is lacking.

Although Stillwell identified the statuette as a composite Isis-Aphrodite, the very syncretic nature of Isis in the hellenistic period makes such specific identification unnecessary.⁴⁶ The Hellenised Isis was a multifaceted and flexible goddess, patron of royalty, women, sailors and dispenser of personal salvation whose attributes and trappings could be transferred to other universal goddess figures such as Atargatis and Astarte (Figure 13). Such a small-scale statuette could not constitute the sanctuary's *xoanon* and the depositional history of the figure is unknown – her relationship to the deity worshipped at the Doric temple cannot be tested. She may have been one of the sanctuary's ancillary deities (*synnaoi theoi*), a votive offering or perhaps a figure from a domestic shrine, relocated to the site of the temple during or following the structure's demolition.

However, the presence of the subterranean chamber at the west end of the temple

foundations suggests that the temple may have been built as a *hērōon*; in Seleukeia in Pieria such a significant building could only have been the structure described by Appian as being built for the interment of Seleukos I. Physical evidence for royal burials during the hellenistic period is practically non-existent. Although the period saw a multitude of kings and dynasts, only two known hellenistic tombs are certifiably royal – ‘royal tomb II’ at Vergina (ancient Aigai), Macedonia, and the Hierothesion at Nemrud Dağ in Kommagene, both of which took the form of tumuli. As Vergina royal tomb II belonged to either Philip II or Philip III Arrhidaïos, and Nemrud Dağ was constructed for Antiochos I of Kommagene, we are provided with evidence for either end of the hellenistic period but very little information on the intervening generations.⁴⁷

The cremated remains of Seleukos are unlikely to have reached Antiochos before the spring of 280 BC, giving a construction

date for the Seleukeia Nikatoreion in the first quarter of the third century BC. Such a date is generally consistent with Stillwell’s preferred construction period for the Doric temple. If the temple at Seleukeia can be shown on the balance of proof to have housed the sepulchre of Seleukos I it illustrates a departure from traditional Macedonian practices in the construction of a grand edifice built in line with a contemporary religious architectural canon. The establishment of a founder cult for Seleukos at Seleukeia is accepted by modern scholars but it has been claimed that the erection of a temenos and of a temple with all associated rituals and paraphernalia was unprecedented.⁴⁸

Several *hērōa* are known from the hellenistic period and all combine some form of *naiskos* with a crypt which held the remains of a local hero. While it may be true that the Nikatoreion was unique as a royal tomb, it was not without parallel. The *hērōon* of the *oikeist* Kineas at Ai Khanoum initially consisted of a distyle in-antis structure of mud-brick built on a three-stepped *krēpidōma*. The *pronaos* there was slightly wider than the *adyton* which resulted in the building assuming an inverted T-shape. Below the *adyton*, a mud-brick lined crypt contained a limestone sarcophagus with a round



Fig. 13. First century AD Syrian bronze statuette of Ba'alat Gebal (©Trustees of the British Museum)

hole drilled through the lid into which libations could be poured directly from the *adyton* above.⁴⁹ Although built using vernacular methods and materials, the *hērōon* followed a standard hellenistic form of shrine and celebrated its inherent Greekness with the display of a number of maxims received directly from Delphi.⁵⁰ As Kineas and Seleukos both served with Alexander the Great, the earliest phase of the Aī Khanoum *hērōon* must be relatively close in date to the construction of the Nikatoreion. Similar T-shaped *hērōa* were built during the second century BC at Kalydon in Aitolia and for Attalos I and Eumenes II at Pergamon.⁵¹ Closer to Seleukeia, it seems likely that Temple C at Gerasa (Seleukid Antiocheia on the Chrysorhoas) may have served as a *hērōon* from the second or first centuries BC.⁵²

The so-called mausoleum at Aī Khanoum was even closer in form to the Doric temple at Seleukeia (Figure 14). The mud brick structure took the form of an Ionic-order peripteral temple built on a three-stepped *krēpidōma*. The mausoleum's superstructure consisted of a *pronaos*, *naos* and *adyton*. A set of stairs descended from the centre of the *naos* to a crypt below the




Figure 14: Aī Khanoum mausoleum (after Bernard 1975, figure 9)

adyton which housed two stone sarcophagi and the remains of five individuals. A later burial was interred in a mud-brick repository in the *naos* above. The mausoleum's temple-like form was complimented by the addition of an altar located immediately to the east of the entrance according to Greek religious architectural traditions.⁵³ Although the mausoleum probably dates to the third century BC, it was built above an earlier structure on the site which had the same orientation and dimensions. Like the *hērōon* of Kineas, the Aī Khanoum mausoleum seems to be an early feature of the city which, due to the mud-brick construction, required restoration and successive phases of rebuilding. As with the *hērōon*, the excavators conjecture libation-pouring at the mausoleum while the presence of the altar suggests that there may have been other forms of offering conducted for the dead.⁵⁴

The proposed construction date of the Doric temple at Seleukeia in Pieria, its obvious religious nature and the presence of the subterranean crypt located below the *adyton*, all favour the suggestion that the structure was part of the sanctuary constructed by Antiochos I in 280 BC. The prominent physical situation of the precinct also supports such an attribution. The sanctuary overlooked the main lower city and harbour and in turn the temple complex would have been visible from them. Such a location might be deemed desirable in the temple dedicated to the city's founder and patron. Furthermore, the temple was intervisible with both the summit of Mount Koryphos above and the summit of Mount Kasios to the south, both of which were considered the abodes of Zeus, patron of the city. Rituals within the temenos would have been within sight of all of the most significant topographical features in the region.

As stated above, by interring his father – the previous king – Antiochos I was staking his irrefutable claim to the succession. Since his appointment as co-monarch in 293 BC, the succession can never really have been in doubt but, by performing the physical ritual of burial, Antiochos was both acting in line with customary filial piety and also in the traditions of Macedonian kingship. Furthermore, the burial of Seleukos within a cultic precinct acknowledged, or indeed enforced, the deceased's apotheosis on a state level. Previous cults of Seleukos had been initiated by individual cities and were not, therefore, state-wide. They had no measurable impact beyond a city's own territory. Although Seleukos' god-like state had been alluded to on royal coinage during his lifetime, he officially used no deifying epithets and any divine attributes (such as bull's horns) were attached to clothing worn by the king, not part of his body.⁵⁵ God-like in life, the state proclaimed that Seleukos had become a god in death; by extension, his descendants, especially his son and heir, were one step closer to their own divinity and their unchallengeable right to rule the Seleukid legacy.

An inscription from Seleukeia in Pieria dated to the reign of Seleukos IV shows that Seleukos was not admitted into the pantheon as a stand-alone minor deity. Rather, his apotheosis had revealed him to be none other than a syncretised aspect of Zeus; after listing annual priesthoods at Seleukeia for Zeus Olympios, Zeus Koryphaios, and Zeus Kasios, the inscription follows on immediately with the priest of Seleukos Zeus Nikator.⁵⁶ The god and the king who, between them, were the reason for the city's very existence were thereafter united. While Antiochos aligned himself more with Apollo and was thus deified as Antiochos Apollo Soter on his own death,⁵⁷ each subsequent Seleukid king received more generic posthumous titles (such as Theos or Kallinikos) and was posthumously integrated within a dynastic cult organised under a single priest.⁵⁸ Not until the reign of Antiochos IV Epiphanes would a Seleukid king achieve such obvious deification but, for Epiphanes, the nature and cause of his apotheosis were very different.

The worship of Seleukos Zeus Nikator may have spread beyond the political and historical boundaries of the Seleukid state. During the Roman Imperial period, a cult dedicated to Zeus Seleukeios is attested in Lydia, at Delphi and at Egyptian Alexandria. The origin of the cult is uncertain but it may well refer to the deified Seleukos I, or perhaps the Zeus of Seleukeia who was both part of the pre-Greek religious landscape and intimately entwined with the cult of the first Seleukid.⁵⁹

Early modern reuse of spolia from the superstructure of the Doric temple at Seleukeia, combined with the hastily conducted excavations and cursory publication of the temple mean that it may never be possible to fully confirm the nature of the sanctuary. The presence of the finely worked crypt supported by comparative evidence from the Aï Khanoum mausoleum and *hērōon*, the thoughtful placement of the temple at a key location within both the natural and built environment of the city and the structure's survival through the Roman period with no evidence for a later building phase, all lend their weight to Hannestad's and Potts' identification. The Doric temple at Seleukeia in Pieria probably does represent the remains of the Nikatoreion. As the sepulchre of Seleukos I, the sanctuary was founded within the conceptual framework of royal apotheosis, a direct result of the interaction of Greek and non-Greek in the East. A dynastic mythology connecting or equating Seleukos I with Zeus appears to have been a conscious creation of the king's own lifetime; Seleukos repeatedly emphasised his personal relationship with various manifestations of Zeus on his coinage and in his building works. Antiochos I solidified that relationship (and his own divine descent) when he posthumously incorporated Seleukos into the cult of the supreme god.

Notes

¹ App. *Syr.* 63.

² Wright 2007–2008, 529–30, id. 2012, 25–7; Erickson 2013.

³ App. *Syr.* 56; Diod. Sic. 19.90; Welles 1934, no.5; *OGIS* 227 = Rehm 1958, no.493; Dignas 2002, 39–43; Austin 2006, no.175; Just. *Epit.* 15.4. Hadley 1969, 152 argues that the Justin passage post-dated the battle of Ipsos (301 BC) but was probably current by 278 BC since Apollo is referred to as the ancestor of the dynasty in *OGIS* 219 = Austin 2006, no.162. It should be remembered that Seleukos also received prophecies from other sources, such as the Chaldaean astronomers of Babylon, see App. *Syr.* 56; Diod. Sic. 19.55.7–9; see Hadley 1969 for a full account of early Seleukid mythology.

⁴ Paus. 1.16.3, 8.46.3; *OGIS* 213–4; Rehm 1958, no.480; Parke 1986, 125; Austin 2006, no.51; Lib. 11.85–8; Malalas *Chron.* 8.199–200; Strabo 2.6; *CIG* 4458; Downey 1961, 67–8, 82–6; Cabouret 1997, 1007–13.

⁵ Cook 1940, 642 n.1; MacKay 1968, 82–3; Teixidor 1989, 88.

⁶ Ael. *NA* 12.2; Lucian *Syr. D.* 17.

⁷ Le Bohec-Bouhet 2002, 44. See also the discussion of Archelaos' foundation of the Olympian Games at Dion found in Badian 1982, 35; Borza 1990, 173–4 n.30.

⁸ For previous discussions regarding Seleukos' coin imagery see Wright 2007–2008; Wright 2009/10; Wright 2012, 25–7; Erickson 2013.

⁹ Green 2003, 172–3, 285–8.

¹⁰ Wright 2007–2008; id. 2009/10, 197–9; id. 2012, 33–4, 41–4.

¹¹ Le Bohec-Bouhet 2002, 43.

¹² *FGrH* 126 F 5; Plin. *HN* 35.92; Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 4.3. For a comprehensive account of the elephant medallion discussion, see Holt 2003.

¹³ Nock 1928, 32.

¹⁴ The Greek cities of Asia Minor were already willing to worship the Spartan *stratēgos* Lysander as a living god at the close of the fifth century BC. Plutarch (*Vit. Lys.* 18) states that he was the first living being to be honoured in such a way by the Greeks, see also Price 1984, 27. Van Straten 1993, 255–6, 263–4 notes the growing physical distance and a developing 'verticality' between deities and devotees in votive reliefs between the classical and hellenistic periods. The same process is perhaps illustrated by the perceived distancing of the gods during sacrificial rituals, see Gill 1974, 127–33, 137.

¹⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 4.10.5.

¹⁶ Austin 2006, no.43; see also Chaniotis 2011, 173–81.

¹⁷ McEwan 1934, 26.

¹⁸ *OGIS* 212 = *I.Ilion* 31.

¹⁹ I.Erythrai 205.

²⁰ Bevan 1901, 627; *OGIS* 212.

²¹ Wright 2012, 49–52.

²² Nock 1928, 27; App. *Syr.* 57, 63; *CIG* 4458 = Austin 2006, no.207; Rostovtzeff 1935, 58; Graham 1964, 29. A papyrus fragment found at Dura-Europos records the existence of a priesthood of Seleukos Nikator operating in AD 180 which was presumably a continuation of a Seleukid period cult, see *P.Dura*

25.3–4. Here he was probably worshipped in the guise of the city's *oikeist* and was thus an integral part of the civic identity regardless of the wider political situation which saw the city under Parthian occupation by the early first century BC and incorporated within the Roman province of Syria from AD 165. Unfortunately, the priesthood is not attested before the second century AD and the possibility remains that it was an archaising Seleukid revival as part of the Second Sophistic rather than a perpetual cult of the city's founder.

²³ *CIG* 4458 = Austin 2006, no.207.

²⁴ Geographic coordinates: 36°7 N, 35°55 E. Much of the ancient harbour now lies under the modern fishing villiage of Çevlik, Hatay Province, in the Republic of Turkey.

²⁵ See for example App. *Syr.* 57.

²⁶ See Cohen 2006, 128 n.3 for a discussion of the various schools of thought regarding Seleukeia's primacy in the tetrapolis.

²⁷ Malalas *Chron.* 8.199–200. Diod. 20.47.6 *contra* Strabo 16.24, Lib. 11.92 and Malalas *Chron.* 8.198–9.

²⁸ The pattern of minting suggests that a shift in economic primacy from Seleukeia to Antioch may have already begun late in the reign of Seleukos I, see Houghton and Lorber 2002, vol. 1, 22–3.

²⁹ App. *Syr.* 62; Just. *Epit.* 17.1.7–2.5; *OGIS* 219 = Austin 2006, no.162.

³⁰ Green 1990, 13.

³¹ Grainger 2010, 153–70.

³² App. *Syr.* 58.

³³ Malalas *Chron.* 8.199. Note the parallel foundation myth for Antioch found in *Chron.* 8.200.

³⁴ Malalas *Chron.* 8.199–200.

³⁵ Ogden 2011a, 155, 157.

³⁶ Ogden 2011a, 159.

³⁷ Hannestad and Potts 1990, 116; see also Høtje 2009, 124 n.15; Wright 2012, 73–7; *contra* Held 2002, 240–1.

³⁸ Stillwell 1941, 5 n.5.

³⁹ Stillwell 1941, 4–5, 7.

⁴⁰ Malkin 1987, 147–8.

⁴¹ Malalas *Chron.* 8.199; Chapot 1907, 222–3.

⁴² Stillwell 1941, 33–4.

⁴³ Stillwell 1941, 34, 124 no.365.

⁴⁴ Turcan 1996, 76–8; Sosin 2005.

⁴⁵ Wright 2012, 30–3.

⁴⁶ *P. Oxyrhynchus* 11.1380; Witt 1971, 126; Merkelbach 1995, 96.

⁴⁷ On Vergina, see Andronikos 1978; id. 1984; Borza 1981; id. 1985; Bartsiakas 2000. On Nemrud Dağ, see Sanders 1996; see also Høtje 2009, 124 n.15. The newly excavated Kasta Tomb at Amphipolis will, presumably, prove another important link in the sequence of monumental hellenistic funerary sites. At a press conference on 30th September 2015, excavation director Katerina Peristeri identified three monograms from within the tomb which she linked to Alexander's close companion Hephaiston who died in 324 BC. However, the remains of five

individuals (including a woman over 60 years old, two men in their 30s or 40s, and an infant) were recovered from below the third chamber in November 2014 and analysis of the remains is ongoing. Any identification of the tomb's chief occupant must for now remain highly speculative.

⁴⁸ Brodersen 1989, 184–5.

⁴⁹ Bernard 1973, 85–111.

⁵⁰ Robert 1968, 421–6.

⁵¹ Dyggve *et al.* 1934; Boehringer and Krauss 1937, 84.

⁵² Wright 2012, 132–4.

⁵³ Bernard 1975, 180–5.

⁵⁴ Bernard 1975, 189.

⁵⁵ Wright 2012, 55–9.

⁵⁶ *CIG* 4458.10–20 = Austin 2006, no.207.

⁵⁷ Wright 2012, 27–9, 37–41.

⁵⁸ However, note that the dynastic priesthood honoured Seleukos Nikator and Antiochos Soter without the names Zeus or Apollo at Antiocheia in Persis, see Bevan 1901, 636; Austin 2006, no.190. The omission of the Olympian syncretism in Iran may be related to an awareness of indigenous religious sensibilities.

⁵⁹ Seyrig 1939; Fraser 1949.

THE IDEOLOGY OF SELEUKID JOINT KINGSHIP: THE CASE OF SELEUKOS, SON OF ANTIOCHOS I

John R. Holton

The 280s had seen the Seleukid empire, the largest of the hellenistic kingdoms, massively expand westwards under the dynasty's founder Seleukos Nikator.¹ After Nikator's assassination in August or September 281, this kingdom was inherited by his son Antiochos I and was beset by an array of political and military threats, exposing some deeper structural problems that were in urgent need of solution. In this chapter I examine the Seleukid kingship itself in this period of upheaval, specifically the institution of joint kingship. Diarchy had been successful in the first generation of Seleukid rule, under Antiochos I and his father Seleukos Nikator in the period 294–281, but is reported to have experienced severe problems in the second generation, under Antiochos I and his son Seleukos Antiochou (henceforth simply Seleukos) in the period 279–266 BC.² This chapter argues that, notwithstanding these problems, the second generation of Seleukid diarchy was the backdrop for a fundamental shift in the ideological structuring of Seleukid joint kingship, namely the development of a more integrated, more unified, and more symmetrical royal image as part of a broader attempt at repairing the rupturing frameworks of Seleukid imperial power. It is for this reason, alongside the intrinsic interest it presents, that the case of Seleukos, son of Antiochos I, is worth emphasising not just in the history we write of the Seleukid dynasty, where it remains virtually unknown, but also as an important stage in the evolution of the multiform institution of hellenistic kingship.

I. Approaching joint kingship

There exists only limited discussion of joint kingship – two kings over a single kingdom (or, conceivably, more than two) – in modern scholarship on the hellenistic period, despite the increasing attention paid to hellenistic kingship in general.³ As well as potentially deleterious to an inclusive understanding of the power structures and ideological innovations of the hellenistic royal states, the scholarly neglect of joint kingship is somewhat surprising. From the death of Alexander in 323 to the death of Cleopatra

VII in 30,⁴ there are cases of royal diarchy throughout the entire chronological range of the hellenistic era; it was used particularly extensively in the Ptolemaic and Seleukid dynasties, but was by no means unknown in others, such as the Attalid, Antigonid, and Graeco-Baktrian states.⁵ Even so, it is rare that modern works recognise the basic concept of joint kingship for what it is: multiple monarchs ruling in one kingdom, or multiple *basileis* yet a single *basileia*. We might note, for instance, the convention that the younger of two joint kings does not figure as king on modern chronological tables and dynastic lists, given as aids to the reader, until the point of the elder king's death.⁶ We might also refer to the more problematic fact that scholars typically opt to refer to the younger joint king in an inventive variety of ways which belie his actual designation in the documentary evidence: 'co-regent', 'vice-regent', 'joint-regent', 'crown prince', 'heir to the throne', or 'successor' are the preferred modern terminology,⁷ in contrast to the simple usage of 'king' that is evident, at least in our case of Antiochos I's son Seleukos, from the contemporary context – whether *basileus* in Hellenophone sources, or (particularly for the Seleukids) *šarru* in Babylonian.

Modern conventions such as this, and the preconceptions of segmented, linear, 'mon-archic' regnal periods on which they are based, attenuate and even contradict the ideas of joint kingship that were developed and advertised in the ancient contexts; they also gloss over and perpetuate a modern under-appreciation of the ideological as well as functional significance of joint kingship. It should be considered, instead, that when contemporary records speak of multiple reigning monarchs in their edictal and dating formulae, we might treat these facts in their own terms,⁸ even while anticipating the inevitable revelation, after further scrutiny, that there was actually a disparity between ideology and function, between image and reality – in other words, that there was a very real, personally determined dynamic of seniority and juniority that inhered in the diarchic institution. Indeed, if we were to assume, from the start, a functional disparity of authority of this kind between two diarchic *basileis*, then the undeniable fact of an ideological symmetry, such as is presented by the case of Seleukos and his father Antiochos I, is even more striking and thus even more pregnant. In other words, if the centrally devised image of a particular joint kingship belied its real-life practice, whether proven or simply postulated, then examining the nature of the dissonance, and the rationale behind it, could further illuminate the political reality.⁹ It could suggest a meaningful, strategic intentionality related to, and based on, contemporary political concerns and problems.

The issues outlined above are explored in this chapter's central discussion.

Before examining the specific case of Antiochos I's son Seleukos, however, some orientation is warranted for the peculiarity of the hellenistic royal family and its institutionalisation of diarchic sharing of power. Ogden notes that the hellenistic dynasties 'strikingly flouted almost all of the Graeco-Macedonian world's general rules of family structure, family conduct, and family self-presentation',¹⁰ an observation that rings true for the issue of the jointly ruling father and son, with or without notional parity of power and status. The Argead Macedonian royal house, most notably, had developed no mechanism of joint kingship,¹¹ in spite of its systemic problems of succession and legitimation, with the exception of the diarchy (Philip III Arrhidaios, Alexander's mentally deficient half-brother, with Alexander IV, Alexander's posthumous son by Rhoxane) introduced after the death of Alexander – the eventual failure of which is itself a final, definitive demonstration of the dynasty's structural weakness in this area.¹² The Iliadic dictum οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη: εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, εἷς βασιλεὺς (*Il.* 2.204–5, 'It is not a good thing to have many rulers: let there be one ruler, one king') seems to be fairly indicative of the long-term Graeco-Macedonian view of the ordered structuring of autocratic institutions. This is not to say that the Graeco-Macedonian world was not, politically, heterogeneous and changeable over time, or to suggest that this complex reality can be meaningfully encapsulated in a single string of words indicating a single, context-specific attitude. The Homeric injunction against πολυκοιρανίη, however, neatly captures an evidently more widely and deeply ingrained aversion, evidenced by its relative rarity of practice, to institutionalised divisions of autocratic authority and leadership. We must consider that such divisions were, for the most part, contrary to Graeco-Macedonian societal and intellectual norms and thus conceptually unusual.

Although rare, joint kingship, or comparable diarchic divisions of authority in institutional settings, was of course by no means unprecedented. In mythical tradition, the most notable case in point is the rule of the sons of Oedipus over Thebes, for which a system of alternation was (unsuccessfully) developed to enable successive periods of rule for the brothers Eteokles and Polyneikes.¹³ This case might be considered negatively instructive in a study of attitudes towards diarchy, as it actually bears out and illuminates the problematic nature of dividing autocratic authority between multiple individuals: Eteokles and Polyneikes attempted, in the end, to supplant each other, and ultimately killed each other in a fateful monomachy.¹⁴ Even while recognising the influence of a tragic cycle of reciprocity, it is difficult to imagine a more cautionary tale regarding a diarchic set-up, or a clearer exemplification of its obvious dangers.

It is these same dangers to which Plutarch alludes, much later in time, when he discusses, notably, the advent of the hellenistic practice of joint kingship with the dual accession of Antigonos and Demetrios after Salamis in 306. The context of Plutarch's narrative at this point is significant: Antigonos parades, before visiting ambassadors, how little he feared his son's share in *basileia* by remaining conspicuously unperturbed at Demetrios' entrance armed with a spear; thus implying, Plutarch suggests, that

ισχύν τινα πραγμάτων βασιλικῶν καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπιδείξιν οὕσαν τὴν πρὸς
υἱὸν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ πίστιν.

a strength of his kingly office and evidence of its power existed in the form of the harmony and trust with his son.

He goes on to ruminate on the sad truth, and the peculiarity in this case, that,

οὕτως ἄρα πάντα δυσκοινώνητον ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ μεστὸν ἀπιστίας καὶ δυσνοίας,
ὥστε ἀγάλλεσθαι τὸν μέγιστον τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχων καὶ πρεσβύτατον
ὅτι μὴ φοβεῖται τὸν υἱόν.

so antisocial in every way is empire, so full of mistrust and ill-will, that the greatest and eldest of Alexander's *diadochoi* celebrated the fact that he was not afraid of his son. (Plut. *Demetr.* 3.3)

For Plutarch, the act of sharing kingship within a family unit – as represented emblematically in the father-son pair of Antigonos and Demetrios, the first attested father-son kings in all Graeco-Macedonian history – flew in the face of the danger that was held to militate against sharing ultimate political power. The potential danger defied in this case is the very same as that which was tragically realised in the narrative of Eteokles and Polyneikes, namely that it would have been an easy step for one of the two diarchs, already fully elevated to royal station, to transgress familial bonds (just as, Plutarch suggests, empire itself is *δυσκοινώνητος*, anti-communal) and violently overthrow his royal partner. Plutarch's reflection on the situation of Antigonos and Demetrios, then, brings into clear focus the rationale behind joint kingship's prior rarity, one which had already become ingrained through a wide store of paradigmatic mythical narratives of violent upheaval within familial power structures.¹⁵ In Plutarch's view, it was the unique relationship of *ὁμόνοια καὶ πίστις*, 'harmony and trust', between Antigonos and Demetrios that enabled them to avoid the danger of collegial usurpation via parricide and so allowed their joint kingship to be uniquely successful.

Standing as something of a paradox among such attitudes, the most obvious historically attested example of diarchy is the Spartan dual

kingship,¹⁶ namely the two co-existent, co-terminous, interrelated but lineally separate royal houses of the Agiadai and the Eurypontidai.¹⁷ After the development of the ephorate and *gerousia*, the Spartan diarchy was effectively a single (albeit important) cog within a larger oligarchic machine of state governance. Difficulties of interpretation have been traditionally inspired, however, by the nature of the diarchy's origins *prior* to the oligarchic constitutional balancing, and indeed by the necessity of its continued existence after this. How should we imagine the earliest generations of this joint kingship, which was constituted by two separate royal lines, and the dynamics of its continued functioning as an autocratic institution?¹⁸ Drews' assertion on this point is suggestive of such difficulties of conceptualisation: arguing against a royal diarchy prior to the *eunomia*, he suggests that, '[w]e have all heard about kingdoms divided between two princes, or about co-regencies of father and son, but one can hardly visualize a single state ruled by two sovereigns.'¹⁹ His implication of a qualitative difference between 'co-regencies of father and son' and 'two sovereigns', the former not constituting two fully-empowered rulers of equal status and function, might be regarded as something of a barometer for modern preconceptions about what joint kingship entailed. The *a priori* convictions affecting our understanding of the Spartan diarchy are in many ways reminiscent of those impinging on our hellenistic examples.

Despite not featuring, as the hellenistic kingdoms did, cooperative rule within a single family line, the Spartan royal diarchy is nonetheless a methodologically helpful comparandum that offers some mutually applicable questions and concerns. The problem of discerning the exact nature of the Spartan institutional set-up prior to the oligarchic constitution, for instance, somewhat mirrors the fact of the unstated rationale for the introduction of royal diarchy in the early hellenistic dynasties. Moreover, the difficulties in reading through the fog of Spartan ideological projections, which obscure the probably contested reality and structural weaknesses of its diarchy, can be considered, in some senses, to be essentially the same as the problem of variances between the ideology and practice of hellenistic joint kingship. Although it might be imagined that the continuation of the Spartan diarchy into that state's oligarchic, post-Lykourgan period indicates its successful adaptation and acclimatisation to a new socio-political field, it is equally (and perhaps more) plausible to suggest that the specialism entailed by the institutionalised existence of two *basileis* sat very much at odds with the equalising trajectory on which Spartan society was then set, and accordingly that the ideology of Spartan diarchy distorted and suppressed the fact of the frequency with which the institution was internally challenged.²⁰ This kind of structural weakness was very particular to the Spartan state, it must

be noted, and different from a habitual prejudice against the diarchic form *per se*, even if they were perhaps complementary and mutually reinforcing problems. For very singular and context-determined reasons, it can be argued that the Spartan diarchy sat oddly, and existed on a precarious footing, within a society that was historically disposed to accept it but which, through forces of socio-political change, came to distance itself from it. The Spartan solution, or at least the diarchic response to its own institutional weakness in this regard, might have been to ‘shout more loudly’, in ideological terms, about its stability.²¹ In a quite similar vein, we might imagine that the sustained stress on ideological symmetry that can be found in certain cases of hellenistic joint kingship sometimes functioned to mitigate structural weaknesses, whether real or potential, and its conceptual peculiarity. And we might ask, in turn, the more important questions: what particular functions did an ideological stress on symmetry serve, and what were the problems that it was intended to solve or forestall?

Even while appreciating the benefits afforded by a comparative perspective, it remains true that hellenistic joint kingship presents its own unique features, as its use in the earliest generations of the hellenistic dynasties was structured in terms of father-son cooperative rule – very much unlike the two separate Spartan royal families, for instance. This lends hellenistic joint kingship an especial significance, as its particular form represents an innovation in the structuring of Graeco-Macedonian royal power, not to mention an institutionalisation of principles antithetical to the dynamics that governed father-son relations more commonly, as evidenced by a wide range of historical and mythical cases in point.²² Antigonos Monophthalmos’ investiture of his son Demetrios Poliorketes as king alongside himself in 306 represents the first attested case of father-son joint kingship in all of Graeco-Macedonian history, and it clearly served as the catalyst for the spread and replication of the institution across the rival dynasties, which similarly structured their diarchies according to father-son pairs: Seleukos Nikator with his son Antiochos I from 294–281, for instance, and Ptolemy Soter with his son Ptolemy Philadelphos from 285–282.²³ The original case of the hellenistic practice of diarchy represents, as Plutarch recognises, a unique familial situation, not a typical one. In some ways it is unsurprising, given the embedded cultural attitudes described above, that this unusual practice is reported to have broken down when hellenistic royal diarchy entered into its second generation. Seleukos’ joint kingship with his father Antiochos I, the main focus of the remainder of this chapter, is said to have resulted in the former’s execution after thirteen years of joint reign. As will be made clear, the circumstances surrounding this disintegration of the second Seleukid diarchy are opaque,

and the details transmitted by our fragmentary sources should be subject to a strong degree of scepticism. Even before the death of this Seleukos, however, his diarchy with his father forms an illuminating case in point for studying hellenistic joint kingship: how their relationship was seen as functioning, and how it was ideologically structured, reveal much about the value and purpose of the practice more generally, and can point to some useful ways forward for its study. In its very abortiveness, the diarchy between Seleukos and his father Antiochos I offers a significant analytical opportunity.

II. Seleukos, son of Antiochos I

Seleukos, son of Antiochos I, is a largely unknown figure in hellenistic history, in spite of a (joint) reign of some thirteen and a half years (Babylonian records attest a reign of at least 4 January 279 – 14 August 266, for which see section IV, below) – far longer than many of the better-known Seleukid kings.²⁴ There are only three literary sources attesting to his existence, all of which are extremely cursory in their reporting; one of these does not name Seleukos directly, and the other two are extremely late and give opposing points of fact. The Greek epigraphic record and the Babylonian documentary evidence, discussed in the next sections of this chapter, are more revealing but are not usually considered in any great detail. Because of this, although there have been isolated notices regarding his life, there has been no full attempt in the wider scholarship to discern the nature of Seleukos' joint kingship with his father. In other words, the transition from the first to the second incarnation of Seleukid diarchy, and the changes and ideological manoeuvring that this transition entailed, have not been sufficiently explored and explicated. Given that the continuation of diarchy into a second generation of the Seleukid kingship represents a move away from an experimental form of organising royal power – as noted above, the widespread development of joint kingship within a family unit was an innovation of the early hellenistic world – and a move towards institutionalisation as customary practice, examining the joint reign of Seleukos with his father Antiochos I points to some significant ramifications for understanding the evolution of Seleukid kingship more broadly.

Bevan's account, though now over a century old, is still fairly representative of modern outlines for Seleukos.²⁵

The elder son of Antiochos I, bearing the name of his grandfather Seleucus, had been designated the successor. From the earlier years of the reign of Antiochos till some time between 269 and 265 he had been associated with his father as joint-king, and had perhaps been given the government of Babylon and Iran. Then there came a dark suspicion between father and

son. Antiochus gave command that the prince was to be put to death; and it was done. His younger brother Antiochus stepped into his place and was made partner in the throne. (Bevan 1902, 1.169)

This evocation of a ‘dark suspicion between father and son’, followed for the most part by later scholars, is drawn from two of our three sources.

Ut in Syria rex Antiochos, cognomine Soter, altero filio occiso, altero rege nuncupato Antiocho, decesserit.

How King Antiochos, surnamed *Soter*, died in Syria, after killing one of his sons and appointing the other, Antiochos, as king. (Trogus, *Prol.* 26)

Ὅτι Ἀντιόχου, οὗ ἐπώνυμός ἐστι πόλις παρὰ Ἀσσυρίοις, υἱὸς Σέλευκος καὶ Ἀντίοχος ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Θεός· ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Σέλευκος ἐπιβουλευεῖν ὑποπτευθεὶς τῷ πατρὶ κατακτείνεται.

Sons of Antiochos, for whom the city in Assyria is named, were Seleukos and the Antiochos surnamed *Theos*: but Seleukos, when suspected of conspiring against his father, was executed. (John of Antioch fr.55 = *FHG* IV, p.558)

These two texts combine to provide a narrative: Seleukos was executed by his father Antiochos I following suspicion of his treachery, after which followed the elevation of Seleukos’ brother Antiochos (II) to the Seleukid *basileia*. Incidentally, Trogus’ duplication of *rex* in his brief notice suggests that the Seleukid joint kingship at this time consisted of two figures with the title of king: the *rex* Antiochos (I) made Antiochos (II) *rex* after executing another of his sons (Seleukos), presumably also *rex*.²⁶ John of Antioch confirms Trogus’ report of the execution in question, and explicitly names the son in question as Seleukos; they are undoubtedly referring to one and the same figure. The phrase John of Antioch uses in his description of Seleukos’ downfall, ἐπιβουλευεῖν ὑποπτευθεὶς (‘suspected of conspiring’), tells us nothing definitive about the nature of Seleukos’ alleged conspiracy, nor that its existence was ever proven. These sources are the entire basis on which our narrative of Seleukos’ treason and execution rests, and although many scholars have accepted their veracity without criticism, they are far from unproblematic.²⁷

Our third and final literary notice of Seleukos’ existence is the latest of the three, namely Malalas’ overview of the reign of Antiochos I.

Μετὰ δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν Σελεύκου ἐβασίλευσεν ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀντίοχος ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Σωτήρ ἔτη εἴκοσι· ὅστις Ἀντίοχος ἐφίλησε τὴν ἰδίαν μηρυιάν Στρατονίκην τὴν θυγατέρα Δημητρίου, καὶ ἔλαβεν αὐτὴν γυναῖκα· ἀφ’ ἧς εἶχεν υἱοὺς δύο, Σέλευκον, ὅστις μικρὸς ἐτελεύτησε, καὶ Ἀντίοχον τὸν ἐπικληθέντα Θεοιδῆ. Καὶ ἐτελεύτησεν Ἀντίοχος ὁ Σελεύκου καὶ ἐβασίλευσε μετ’ αὐτὸν Ἀντίοχος ὁ Θεοειδὴς ἔτη ιε’.

After the kingship of Seleukos, his son Antiochos, surnamed Soter ['Saviour'], reigned for twenty years. This Antiochos was in love with his stepmother Stratonike, daughter of Demetrios [*sc.* Poliorketes], and took her as his wife. He had two sons by her: Seleukos, who died young, and Antiochos, surnamed Theoides ['Godlike']. And after Antiochos son of Seleukos died, Antiochos Theoeides reigned for fifteen years. (Malalas *Chron.* 204–5)

Malalas' account of an early death for Seleukos is singular, and unless Seleukos' 'dying young' can be taken as a result of execution (which is *prima facie* improbable: there is no reason to think that this is implied), it is difficult to reconcile this picture with the narrative forwarded by Trogus and John of Antioch. Del Monte suggests that Malalas is making a moralising point at this juncture in his narrative: that his notice of Seleukos' death while still young is a censorious judgement of his parents' marital union, standing as a stark proof of their 'colpevole amore'.²⁸ This suggestion seems unlikely, and an over-reading of the text; but it remains, in that case, to ponder the discrepancy between the two accounts of Seleukos' demise. A decision on this point, it should be noted, crucially influences any historical interpretation of the second Seleukid diarchy. Attempted treason and resultant execution of the younger *basileus* might indicate a failure of the diarchic form and an institutional weakness in terms of how the Seleukid royal house chose to structure itself. Conversely, Seleukos' premature death might indicate simply an interruption to an effectively functioning institution, whose operations were resumed, and thereafter continued to be effective, through the elevation of the new *basileus* Antiochos (II). How to decide on this point will be addressed more fully below, after a review of all the evidence for Seleukos: as we will see, the Greek epigraphic record and the Babylonian evidence, never before examined systematically in relation to Seleukos, are far more revealing of the nature of the second Seleukid diarchy.

III. Seleukos in the Greek epigraphic record

The Greek epigraphic record is illuminating when read against the scant literary sources. There are five surviving inscriptions that attest to Seleukos' joint reign. Qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, this inscriptional evidence is superior, and it gives insight into the ideologies with (and through) which the nature of the diarchy between Antiochos I and Seleukos was articulated. Set into broader terms, it offers us a window into the central, officialised version of how the joint kingship between this father and son functioned and how it figured into the construction and conveyance of Seleukid power. It also enables us to observe some continuities and

changes between the first Seleukid diarchy (Seleukos Nikator and Antiochos I) and the second (Antiochos I and Seleukos). Moreover, while the literary sources discussed above do not explicitly term Seleukos king, the five epigraphic attestations unequivocally confirm that he was in fact so. There should be no doubt, if indeed there ever was, that Seleukos was fully recognised as *basileus* within the Seleukid kingdom during his co-reign with his father.

The earliest three Greek inscriptions recording Seleukos' existence and joint rule detail two reigning kings through a dating formula. (Only the introductory lines of these have been reproduced here.)

ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ. βασιλευόντων Ἀντιόχου καὶ Σελεύκου τοῦ Ἀντιόχου, ἐβδόμου καὶ τριακοστοῦ ἔτους, μηνὸς Ὑπερβερεταίου. Ἀπόλλωνι Πιτυαηνῶι εὐξάμενος Ἀργεῖος Φανοκρίτου ἀνέθηκε τὴν στήλην...

By good fortune. In the reigns of Antiochos and Seleukos son of Antiochos, in the thirty-seventh-year, in the month Hyperberetaion. To Apollo Pityainos, Argeios, son of Phanokritos, promised and dedicated a *stèle*... (TAM V,2 881, September 275 BC; from Thyateira, Lydia)

βασιλευ[ό]ντων Ἀντι[ό]χου καὶ Σελεύκου,] τετά[ρτου] καὶ τεσσ[αρακοστοῦ] ἔτους,] μηνὸς [Δύσ]τ[ρο]ου...

In the reigns of Antiochos and Seleukos, in the forty-fourth year, in the month Dystros... (Tabai 1, February 268 BC; from Tabai, Karia).

βασιλευόντων Ἀντιόχου καὶ [Σ]ελεύκου πέμπτου καὶ τεσσαρακοστοῦ ἔτους, μηνὸς Περιτίου, ἐπ' Ἑλένου ἐπιμελητοῦ <τοῦ> τό[πο]υ· ἐκκλησίας γενομένης ἔδοξε Νεοτειχεῖταις καὶ Κι<δ>διοκωμίταις...

In the reigns of Antiochos and Seleukos, in the forty-fifth year, in the month Peritios, when Helenos was overseer of the district, a meeting of the assembly was held and it was resolved by the people of Neoteichos and Kiddiourke... (IK Laodikeia am Lykos 1, January 267 BC; tr. Austin², adapted; from near Laodikeia on the Lykos, Phrygia).

The basic formula with which these inscriptions begin is thus, 'In the reigns of Antiochos and Seleukos, in the Xth year, in the month Y.' Only the earliest of the three inscriptions qualifies Seleukos' name with τοῦ Ἀντιόχου: one could explain this by pointing to the fact that the inscription had been composed in an early stage of the joint kingship, and so to the necessity (whether real or perceived) of the additional, explanatory identification for Seleukos' relationship to the other *basileus*; on the other hand, comparable Babylonian evidence (for this particularly diarchy, as well as for others) intermittently adds the qualification of 'son',²⁹ so it is not unique and probably does not have a deeper, context-specific meaning. The arresting aspect of the dating formula, in bare terms, is the genitive plural participle

of βασιλεύειν, which explicitly and formally identifies that both Antiochos and Seleukos are ‘reigning’. This is incontrovertible evidence of diarchy, not simply one king and his ‘heir’ or ‘co-regent’: the official record reflects the fact that this was a time of two regnant *basileis*.

These three texts all come from Asia Minor. The first text, from Thyateira, is a private dedication offering thanks to Apollo Pityainos for the continuing health, safety, and protection of an individual’s family.³⁰ The second, from Tabai, yields no further details, as it is extremely fragmentary after the (partially reconstructed) formula with which it opens. The third text is an honorific decree from the villages of Neoteichos and Kiddiourke in Phrygia (near the later foundation site of Laodikeia on the Lykos) for the regional financial officials Banabelos and Papos, who served under the powerful dynast Achaïos the Elder.³¹ Although we lack context and detail, perhaps even security of identification, from the second inscription, we can see clearly that the first and third were products of individual or group agency beyond the institutional bodies of fully-developed *polis* infrastructures: a record of individual religious veneration in the first text, and villages self-consciously imitating *polis* mechanisms, namely granting honorific decrees, in the third.³² That these are mediated through the regnal formula tells us, in addition to something about standard documentary protocol in the Seleukid kingdom, that the formula was a chosen component for exercises in public self-definition: reference to the structuring of the Seleukid kingship ‘officialised’ the inscriptions and oriented them in terms of participation in, and belonging to, the Seleukid realm more broadly. At any rate, the geographical spread of the three inscriptions, over locations in Lydia, Karia, and Phrygia, respectively, can reasonably be taken to indicate a full exposure of the formulation of the Seleukid joint kingship to the cities of Asia Minor.

More importantly, there is no existing Greek inscription from the period of Antiochos I’s and Seleukos’ co-reign which employs, for either king, the singular βασιλεύοντος (or βασιλεύειν in any other singular participial form) in dating formulae. This is despite the fact that there are several documents attesting to royal decision-making by Antiochos alone; in these he is designated as βασιλεύς, but not described as βασιλεύων.³³ On this basis, the dating formula seems to have been a consciously, carefully articulated ideology which underpinned the joint kingship. On the one hand, Antiochos was able to make royal decisions independent of reference to Seleukos, just as, we might assume, Seleukos was able to do so independent of Antiochos: in this way, one partner in the kingship could exercise his royal will individually. On the other hand, never during his tenure with Seleukos did Antiochos represent that he was the sole *reigning* king; nothing in the

documentary record from the Greek-speaking sphere during their partnership contravened the message that two kings were regnant in the Seleukid realm. It is worth stressing that this seems to have been an ideology devised during the period after the death of Seleukos Nikator, for during Antiochos' joint reign with Nikator, though described by del Monte as 'una vera diarchia',³⁴ there had been no such dual dating formula in Greek records.

The first Seleukid diarchy, Nikator and Antiochos I, partially prefigures, and can be used to illuminate further, some of the dynamics found in the second. For instance, in the document outlining Nikator's donations to Didyma in *c.* 288/7 (*OGIS* 214 = *RC* 5), it is clear that Nikator is writing as singular *basileus* – just as Antiochos can be found to do, later, in his joint reign with Seleukos. In point of fact, Antiochos' name is mentioned nowhere in this letter. However, in the inscribed document's explanatory preamble, immediately prior to the formal beginning of the letter (namely, lines 10–11, βασιλεὺς Σέλευκος Μιλησίων τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ χαίρειν: 'King Seleukos [Nikator], to the *boulē* and the *dēmos* of the Milesians, greetings'), the Milesian inscribing body asserts that τάδε ἀνέθηκαν βασιλεῖς Σέλευκος καὶ Ἀντίοχος τὰ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ γεγραμμένα (lines 7–9, 'Kings Seleukos [Nikator] and Antiochos dedicated the things set down in this letter'). Whether this was the Milesians' own interpretation – in response to the ideology or the reality of the Seleukid kingship's structures – or whether it was clarified to them by the royal house, is unclear, though we could perhaps consider the former possibility to be the likelier of the two: although one can certainly imagine some central influence on the particular terms in which royal decisions were publicised in various communities, one can equally suggest that, if the royal house had wanted to clarify its position to the Milesians, the clarification would have been conveyed most easily in the letter itself, either as a performative identification of the diarchic agency or in explicitly explanatory terms.

On either reading of the Milesian preamble to Nikator's letter, it remains noteworthy that, in the inscription's context of *c.* 288/7, Miletos and Didyma were not under Seleukid control, but rather were part of the extended *basileia* of Lysimachus.³⁵ This externality of the Milesian state makes the clarification of the Seleukid diarchic structure, whether it stemmed from the Milesians or the Seleukids, an even more meaningful detail: even externally, cases of individual exercises of royal will by one king were understood in terms of, and set into, a framework of diarchic responsibility and ownership. In this way, the explanatory addition to Nikator's communication to the Milesians can be understood as an earlier, less formalised manifestation of the official regnal duality that we find in the dating formulae of the three documents quoted above. We might also

consider the possibility that, on the occasions in which Antiochos I did exercise royal will independently in the second diarchy, with no reference to his son Seleukos, the receiving communities of royal letters from *basileus* Antiochos might actually have understood or interpreted, as the Milesians did in the period of the first diarchy, that this came from both *basileis*.

The formal documentary introduction of regnal unity in the second Seleukid diarchy finds agreement, conceptually, with the second prominent detail in the dating formula of the three inscriptions, namely the lack of qualification for the ordinal year. This refers to the convention of dating royal documents from Seleukos Nikator's return to Babylonia in 312/11, counting the annual years of his rule, which was then institutionalised by Antiochos I after Nikator's death: all subsequent years were reckoned according a 'Seleukid Era' that had been inaugurated in 312/11. This format entailed that time, fundamentally, 'became Seleukid, dynastic and continuous', as well as 'abstract, homogenous, and transcendent... unconstrained by the phenomenal order of things, objects, and events.'³⁶ More pragmatically, it has been suggested that Antiochos did not begin his own regnal year on his father's death because he had already been king alongside his father for over a decade (since at least 294): beginning his regnal years mid-reign, or backdating them (in the way that Ptolemy II Philadelphos did, for instance), would have been confusing, and so politically disadvantageous, in a period during which he was consolidating his royal power.³⁷ Even while allowing for a degree of political expediency motivating Antiochos' temporal innovation, however, this was an unprecedented, perhaps unnecessary change, whose implications for the ideological structuring of Seleukid diarchic rule are profound. By continuing a single, linear Seleukid Era after Nikator's death, Antiochos positioned his own prior participation in the joint kingship (294–281) as having been part of a single boundless, eternal Seleukid *basileia*, one which remained unbroken and uninterrupted by generational changeover, passing ceaselessly from father to son.

The continuation of a single regnal era that was rooted in Nikator's foundational *basileia* promoted the stabilisation of Antiochos' new position in both real and symbolic terms. The subsequent introduction, in the period of a second diarchy, of a dating formula identifying two reigning kings can be read as a complementary enterprise. As a result of the temporal and formulaic changes, another father and son duo that bore the names of Antiochos and Seleukos were now reigning in the Seleukid Era, so replicating and giving a formalised, institutionalised, and present-time character to the template which had been set, after the fact, for the first Seleukid diarchy. The era and the formula are thus mutually reinforcing,

and participate in a projection of continuous, unending Seleukid kingship. This ideological innovation distinguishes the second Seleukid diarchy from the first, and indicates a more systematic attempt to conceptualise, and accordingly represent, the nature of the joint kingship in terms of its place in the larger enterprise of Seleukid *basileia*. The unity, inseparability, and symmetry entailed by this innovation suggest, in turn, an attempt at ideologically entrenching Seleukid royal power, in tandem and coterminous with more pragmatic political and military manoeuvring that aimed at securing Seleukid rule (more on this below). Father and son, Antiochos and Seleukos, came to figure as adjacent and inseparable links on the longer chain of Seleukid *basileia* in its second period of diarchy, and as overlapping but not exclusionary phases in the longer duration of Seleukid time. In purely functional terms, this could be expected to have the benefit that, just as Antiochos did on Nikator's death, Seleukos would continue in the Seleukid kingship after Antiochos' death, leaving no potential for the further dangers of an interregnum.

The epigraphic evidence encountered thus far indicates that joint kingship in the case of Antiochos I and Seleukos functioned as a means to express the ideology of unified and continuous kingship, as well as, more pragmatically, to provide a mechanism of succession that avoided the instability resulting from an interregal period. At least under Antiochos and Seleukos the father-son royal diarchy was intended, in both real and symbolic terms, to ensure the endurance and replication of Seleukid *basileia*. The remaining two epigraphic references to Seleukos highlight further dimensions to these themes. The first is the well-known document from Ilion honouring Antiochos I's doctor Metrodoros for saving that king's life after a battle injury. The inscription's date is unspecified, so it was potentially inscribed at any point during the joint reign of Antiochos and Seleukos (279–266), to whom the inscription alludes in lines 11–12. The date matters little, however, for recognising the text's implications for the ideology of their joint kingship.

ἐπειδὴ ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίοχος ἐ<φ>έρταλκεν, ὅτι τραυματίας γενόμενος | ἐν τῇ
μάχῃ· εἰς τὸν τράχηλον | θεραπευθ<εί>η ὑπὸ Μητροδώρου τοῦ | ἱατροῦ
ἀκινδύν<ω>ς, ἐφέσταλκεν <δὲ> || περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ Μελέαγρος ὁ στρατῆγος
προορώμενος τὸ τῆς πόλ<ε>ως συμφέρον· δεδόχθαι τῇ βουλῇ | καὶ τῷ δήμῳ·
ἐπαινέσαι μὲν | Μητροδώρον Τιμοκλέους Ἀμφι|πολίτην ἀρετῆς ἔνεκεν καὶ |
εὐνοίας τῆς εἰς τοὺς βασιλεῖς | Ἀντίοχον καὶ Σέλευκον καὶ τὸν | δῆμον· εἶναι
δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ πρόξενον καὶ εὐεργέτην τῆς πόλ<ε>ως· || δεδόσθαι δ' αὐτῷ καὶ
πολιτείαν | καὶ <ἔγ>κτησιν καὶ ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τὴν | βουλὴν καὶ τὸν δῆμον
πρώτ<ω>· || μετὰ τὰ ἱερά· ἔξεῖναι δ' αὐτῷ καὶ || εἰς φυλὴν καὶ φρατρίαν ἦν
ἂν βούλῃται εἰσελθεῖν – –]

‘Since King Antiochos (I) has written that when he was wounded in the neck during the battle he was treated by the doctor Metrodoros / and is now safe, and (since) Meleager the *stratēgos* has also written about him with thought for the interest of the city, be it resolved by the council and the people: to praise / Metrodoros son of Timokles of Amphipolis for his excellence and the goodwill he shows towards Kings Antiochos (I) and Seleukos and the people, to nominate him *proxenos* / and benefactor (*energetēs*) of the city; to grant him citizenship, the right to acquire land, and priority of access to the council and the people after sacred matters; and to allow him / to [enroll] in any tribe and phratry that he wishes.’ (OGIS 220, tr. Austin² 165, c.290/79–267/6 BC)

This document is evidently the product of a number of preceding letters: from Antiochos I to Ilion, from the Seleukid *stratēgos* Meleager to Ilion, and presumably from Antiochos to Meleager. It can be regarded, then, as a quite particular mixture of royal, governmental, and civic wills – though with the royal request of honours for Metrodoros prominent in this mixture. Regardless of the extent of non-civic impetus in the formulation of its language, however, lines 11–14 of this document are highly significant. As well as reaffirming, this time outside of any dating formula, the fact that Antiochos and Seleukos each possessed the title of *basileus*, the inscription’s terms for how it conveys the effects of Metrodoros’ action are suggestive. Saving Antiochos’ life is recorded to have exhibited Metrodoros’ *eunoia*, ‘goodwill’, not just towards Antiochos but also towards Seleukos and the *dēmos*. Phrasing the objects of Metrodoros’ display of *eunoia* in this way, as τοὺς βασιλέας Ἀντίοχον καὶ Σέλευκον καὶ τὸν δῆμον, suggests the conceptual inseparability of the two kings – they are essentially a single object, ‘Kings Antiochos and Seleukos’ not ‘King Antiochos and King Seleukos’ – and a fundamental connection between the state of the kingship and the state of the people (of Ilion, in this case). While this further emphasises the unity of the two reigning kings, it also speaks of the Seleukid kingship being structured by a balance between the two kings: it is a natural extension of thought that if saving one king was beneficial to both kings, then harm to one king would have been harm to both kings. Metrodoros’ action of saving Antiochos can feasibly be seen as keeping balance within the Seleukid kingship, and thus his action was seen as essentially ramifying throughout the broader Seleukid *basileia*, involving a beneficial effect on the *dēmos* under its sway. Saving Antiochos was a nodal event: it saved Seleukid *basileia* and saved the people it ruled.

We also see represented in the inscription from Ilion a non-centrally devised estimation of the Seleukid diarchy: the people of Ilion, no less than the peoples among which the inscriptions discussed above originated, recognised diarchy as a centrally important operating structure in the

Seleukid kingship. The aggregation of these external responses should, I think, be taken to indicate a sustained ideological stress on the diarchy's importance that stemmed from the kings themselves: each community inscribing the documents above surely sought to express itself, and communicate, in terms that it thought would be amenable to the royal power; and judging the probability of that amenability was surely informed by the royal house's chosen and favoured means of self-representation. In other words, we find the unity that was ideologically expressed in the second diarchy, through reforms to Seleukid time and dating formulae, reflected back in a series of orientations and linguistic choices by various communities. In itself, this suggests not just that royal ideology served a fundamental communicative role in relation between rulers and subjects, but also that various communities were attentive to such communication and responded in a manner according to the framework it set.

The final Greek inscription referring to Seleukos, a boundary marker from Lydian Philadelphia, gives us further insight into the unity of kingship under Antiochos and Seleukos.

ὅρια τεμένους Ἀπόλλωνος Τουμουνδου, | οὐ τὰς προσόδους ἀπέδωκαν οἱ
βασιλεῖς | Ἀντίοχος καὶ Σέλευκος || τῷ θεῷ.

'Boundaries of the sacred enclosure of Apollo Toumoundes, whose revenues the kings Antiochos and Seleukos restored to the god.' (*SEG* 35.1170, c.273–267 BC).

This inscription on the marker notes that both kings were regarded as responsible for determining the relative position of a sanctuary to Apollo, namely the security of its revenues, possibly through giving a lasting official decision which defined the sacred territory with another community.³⁸ Whatever the exact nature and manner of the resolution, the important detail is that both kings are identified as being responsible for enacting it. Not only are both kings the recipient of gratitude from the temple, they are also both cast as decision-making figures. Again, the combined reference to οἱ βασιλεῖς Ἀντίοχος καὶ Σέλευκος suggests a conceptual duality of kingship; but this inscription is also notable for its very clear implication that the two kings were notionally equal in power, function, and status. It is not a huge stretch to suggest that this was part of a broader ideology which was promulgated by the kings themselves: even though we have here only a secondary record of it, the official royal decision-making can be considered to be performative, exercising creative force on the political reality, not simply reflecting it.³⁹ At the very least, this inscription exhibits remarkable coherence with the ideology of unity, continuity, and inseparability discussed above, which suggests, if not central direction, at least

sensitive attunement to central ideology on the part of the community in question.

More importantly, the Lydian inscription is unique among the epigraphic evidence for the second Seleukid diarchy, in that it actually records an instance of diarchic decision-making, not simply one of the two kings' will. It also represents a marked departure from the way in which royal decisions were construed under the first generation of Seleukid joint kingship, under Seleukos Nikator and Antiochos. Even in the last months of Nikator's life in 281 – at least thirteen years into his joint reign with his son – a royal letter to the governor Sopater, concerning the rights and status of a temple of Hades and Kore near Nysa, begins βασιλεῖς Σέλευκος καὶ Ἀντίοχος Σωπάτρῳι ([King] Seleukos and Antiochos to Sostratos).⁴⁰ The singular βασιλεὺς, referring to Nikator, and Antiochos' lack of title are thus distinctive from the later use of the plural βασιλεῖς in the second generation of Seleukid joint kingship.⁴¹ Alongside the new development in regnal formulae discussed above, in which records were dated according to the reigns of both kings, this is indicative of a much more integrated ideological structuring under development in the reign of Antiochos and his son Seleukos. The second generation of Seleukid joint kingship, therefore, capitalised on but further refined the innovations of the first. Just as the political reality had changed from Nikator's time, so too had the means by which royal power was represented and animated.

It might be suggested, too, that the process of symbolic equalisation and integration of the two *basileis* that is observable at work in the period of the second diarchy is the continuation of a trajectory which had begun during Antiochos' joint reign with Nikator, in the years in which Antiochos, as the younger joint king, had been dispatched to the Upper Satrapies as a counterweight to Nikator's royal authority in the west.⁴² Specifically, we can point to certain coins that were minted in Baktria in the mid-late 280s, which take as a reverse legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΝ ΣΕΛΕΥΚΟΥ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ ('[coin of] Kings Seleukos [and] Antiochos') and even, in one case, ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΝ ΣΕΛΕΥΚΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ ('[coin of] Kings Seleukos *and* Antiochos').⁴³ Such a double legend is unprecedented at this point in the hellenistic world, in any of the new dynasties. For our purposes, it stands as an early example of an ideology of royal unity and symmetry that would become more entrenched in the next decade under a new father-and-son pair of *basileis*. It also implies that part of the impetus for the second diarchy's ideological restructuring came from Antiochos.

The Greek epigraphic evidence, then, gives us far more insight than the literary into the nature of joint kingship under Antiochos I and Seleukos. If not the actual mechanics of joint kingship, at the very least the

inscriptional material provides insight into the *notional* functionality of royal diarchy and the ideology which underpinned it. The Babylonian documentary evidence reveals still more.

IV. Seleukos' joint reign in the Babylonian evidence

It is from the Babylonian evidence that we derive our chronology of Seleukos' joint reign. He is attested as king alongside Antiochos as early as 24 Kislīmu 32 SE, which corresponds to 4 January 279; and we know that this is not an anomalous record, for another reference to Antiochos and Seleukos as kings is made under the date 8 Tebētu 32 SE (= 17 January 279).⁴⁴ This degree of precision allows us to note that there was, at the very maximum, a little more than a year between the disappearance of Nikator from the dating formula (2 December 281 is his last appearance, even though his death occurred August or September 281) and the introduction of Seleukos.⁴⁵ All dating formulae in subsequent cuneiform documents mention Seleukos alongside his father Antiochos, with the last such record being 4 Abu 46 SE (= 14 August 266). 13 Tašrītu 46 SE (= 21 October 266) is the first document which details a new father-son diarchic pair: Antiochos I with Seleukos' brother Antiochos (II).⁴⁶ We can thus pinpoint Seleukos' tenure as joint king, as minimum estimate, to the period 4 January 279 – 14 August 266: well over thirteen and a half years of joint rule, with the point of his death presumably occurring at some point between 15 August and 20 October 266.

Beyond its crucial chronological information, the Babylonian documentation for Seleukos' joint reign provokes some additional insights. Seleukos Nikator had instituted the backdating of cuneiform documents from his return to Babylonia; thus the oldest surviving document from Nikator's reign, which bore the date of 3 Nisannu 8 SE (= 16 April 304), referred to a 'first' year of rule beginning in spring 311 of the Babylonian calendar.⁴⁷ When Antiochos I was made king alongside Nikator, his name was simply added to the dating formula, and until his father's death Antiochos figured as *šarru* ('king') alongside him.⁴⁸ Antiochos' continuation of his father's years as a dating system parallels the creation of the Seleukid era observable in the Greek epigraphic record; and incorporating his son Seleukos in the date formula as *šarru* alongside himself (the cuneiform plural of LUGAL.MEŠ is clearly used, as it was under Nikator and Antiochos) likewise mirrors the introduction of the format βασιλευόντων Ἀντιόχου καὶ Σελεύκου ('In the reigns of Antiochos and Seleukos') discussed above.⁴⁹ These details attest to the idea that the Babylonian evidence represented an ideology of unified, inseparable, and symmetrical joint kingship just as much as the Greek, and furthermore that this ideology diffused across

cultural boundaries in the Seleukid realm. Each of the two kings was βασιλεὺς in Graeco-Macedonian evidence and *šarru* in Babylonian, and normally neither title was qualified, or restricted, by territorial designation.⁵⁰ The notion that the joint kingship of Antiochos I and Seleukos was constituted, even if only theoretically, by two kings with equal titles and powers was promulgated and recorded empire-wide.

The Borsippa Cylinder from Babylonia offers perhaps the most specific insight into the ideology of joint kingship developed under Antiochos and Seleukos. Written in an archaic form of Akkadian and dating to 20 Addaru 43 SE (= 27 March 268), the inscription on the cylinder contains two direct references to Seleukos in a section of the text offering a prayer to the Babylonian god Nabû.

(O) Nabu, lofty son, wise one of the gods, the proud one, worthy of praise, most noble son of Marduk, offspring of Erua, the queen, who formed mankind, regard, (me) joyfully and, at your lofty command which is unchanging, may the overthrow of the countries of my enemies, the achievement of my battle-wishes against my enemies, permanent victories, just kingship, a happy reign, years of joy, children in satiety, be (your) gift for the kingship of Antiochos and Seleukos, the king, his son, for ever... Nabu, first son, when you enter Ezida, the true house, may favour for Antiochos, king of lands, (and) favour for Seleukos, the king, his son, (and) Stratonike, his consort, the queen, be in your mouth. (Extracts from the Borsippa Cylinder, tr. Kuhrt 1991. 268 BC)

We find a stress on the continuity of kingship that is perhaps similar to that in the Greek sources discussed above. The intriguing part of this inscription is not only that Antiochos and Seleukos are mentioned together, but also that Antiochos' wife Stratonike figures. This seems to be the construction of a family triad of father, wife, and son as a means of demonstrating the continuity of the Seleukid royal family.

Sherwin-White and Kuhrt also identify an interesting parallel with the so-called 'Cyrus Cylinder' of Babylon, which included the eponymous Cyrus' son Cambyses in the prayer section in a way that is similar to the Borsippa artefact.⁵¹ This shows some Seleukid indebtedness to previous Persian and Babylonian models and structures – a not uncommon phenomenon – but the parallel, from a different perspective, actually further emphasises the distinctiveness of the Borsippa Cylinder. Cambyses is simply named Cyrus' 'son' on the Cyrus Cylinder, while Seleukos is definitively named 'king' on the Borsippa;⁵² and while it is known that during his father's reign Cambyses was in fact, albeit temporarily, recognised as 'King of Babylon',⁵³ he was not recognised as king throughout the Achaemenid empire, unlike Seleukos in the Seleukid empire. Interestingly,

there remains another terminological distinction on the Borsippa Cylinder, albeit in a different place. Antiochos has primacy in this text through his designation as *šar mātāti* ('king of lands') as well as *šarru* ('king'); Seleukos is simply *šarru*. In a particularly Babylonian context, then, it seems that Antiochos was represented as superior to his son and co-king Seleukos. The difference in designation might simply have been intended to allow terminological variety in a dense narrative text, and so distinguish between the two royal males; but it might also reflect a hierarchy within the kingship in the localised vicinity of Babylonia. Regional limitations to system-wide articulations of royal ideology must, therefore, remain an open possibility, even while maintaining the premise of the joint kingship's unalterable representation of regnal unity.

This potential discrepancy in status distinguishes the Borsippa text from the Greek records which seem to denote parity of status within the joint kingship. Even so, this is not to say that the ideology, especially the ideology of continuity, is substantially different on the Borsippa Cylinder. The whole focus of the sections referring to Antiochos, Seleukos, and Stratonike seems to be continuity, and specifically succession. This theme operates on a number of levels. Firstly, on a basic level, there is the fact that Seleukos is specified as both 'son' and 'king'. His inclusion in such a way in the prayer to Nabû for the fortune of the dynasty thus heavily implies an emphasis on succession. Second, the presence of Stratonike in the prayer: Kuhrt and Sherwin-White have argued persuasively that she functions as a nexus of successional motifs, being the mother of Seleukos, the daughter of a king in her own right (Demetrios Poliorketes), and having been passed down as wife from Seleukos Nikator to Antiochos in order to ensure a smooth succession.⁵⁴ She also represents a familial triad with her husband and son, a potent symbol of continuity: present and future rule are signified in the figures of father, wife, and son. Third is the language of the prayer: details in the wish include the combination of 'permanent victories' and 'years of joy' with 'children in satiety' – all at the will of a god whose command is 'unchanging' – and serve to emphasise a desire for an unending kingship in the hands of the chosen descendants. Finally, there is parallel between the divine and royal families in the prayer. Marduk, Erua, and Nabû operate as a family unit comparable to Antiochos, Stratonike, and Seleukos, the one reinforcing the other as an eternal and powerful family holding sway over Babylonia for all time. This idea of divine/royal familial equation is perhaps strengthened if we consider, as Kuhrt and Sherwin-White suggest, that Stratonike's titles on the cylinder (*birtu*, 'principal wife', and *šarratu*, 'queen') only usually refer to female divinities in this period; they suggest that translation of the terms as 'divine consort' and 'heavenly

queen', respectively, might convey their nuances better.⁵⁵ Overall, Seleukos' representation as king on the Borsippa Cylinder further highlights that the institution of joint kingship transcended cultural boundaries in the Seleukid realm. From Greek inscriptions in Asia Minor to cuneiform documents in the heartland of Babylonia, Seleukos was styled as king alongside his father, implying a profusion of the ideology throughout the kingdom. The Greek and Babylonian evidence for joint kingship, then, both convey the same themes of unity and inseparability, and continuity and succession.

There is one key problem arising from the Babylonian evidence, namely the last attestation to Seleukos in the regnal formula, in the document dating to 4 Abu 46 SE (= 14 August 266). Specifically, this document does not simply designate Antiochos I and Seleukos as kings in the formula, *but also* Seleukos' brother Antiochos (II). This document, then, attests to something unique, at least at this point in time: triarchy in the Seleukid *basileia*. How can we explain this peculiarity? Is it to be read in terms of the narrative created by Trogus and John of Antioch, namely that Seleukos was executed and then replaced by his brother? Del Monte, one of the few scholars to focus on this peculiar situation of triarchy in August 266, argues that the elevation of Antiochos (II) alongside Antiochos I and Seleukos was not, as the literary record (and received scholarly opinion) would suggest, a result of a rebellion (real or suspected) on Seleukos' part. Instead, he suggests that Seleukos might have fallen prey to the 'great disease' which, according to an astronomical diary entry for September-October of 266, ravaged Babylonia in at least part of the latter half of 266 – a date which conveniently maps onto the period between Seleukos' last presence in the dating formula (14 August 266) and the first Babylonian document recording the reigns of only Antiochos I and Antiochos II (21 October 266).⁵⁶ The motivation, in del Monte's line of reasoning, was one of securing the succession, by elevating Antiochos (II) to the joint kingship in anticipation of Seleukos' imminent demise, rather than simply one of strengthening internal defences and creating a more efficient administration (the probable rationales for diarchy's first introduction by Nikator in the 290s).

This is a reasonable and plausible suggestion, and it is as good a solution to the problem as any, *faute de mieux* (as del Monte himself notes); but there are still problems with such a reconstruction, foremost among which is the irregular Greek inscription *I. Strat.* 1030 (= *Stratonikeia* 74), dating to July 268 (= Loos SE44), which already records in its dating formula [β]ασιλευόντων Ἀντίοχου καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ Ἀντ[ι]όχου ('In the reigns of Antiochos and Antiochos...'). This latter inscription suggests, perhaps, the introduction of Antiochos (II) into the Seleukid royal hierarchy over a

longer period in time, not just as a response to a specific event, namely Seleukos' supposed illness. Even this suggestion, however, is problematic, for *I. Strat.* 1030 is an anomalous piece of evidence: even six months later, in January 267 (= Peritios SE45), the inscription *IK Laodikeia am Lykos* 1 (discussed above) records the regular formula of βασιλευόντων Ἀντιόχου καὶ [Σ]ελεύκου ('In the reigns of Antiochos and Seleukos'). Şahin suggests that the former inscription (*I. Strat.* 1030) is correct while the latter inscription (*IK Laodikeia am Lykos* 1) is incorrect, and that Seleukos 'must have long since been dead' by the time of the latter, with the Laodikeian community 'unaware of the changes which had taken place in the House of the Seleukids'.⁵⁷ However, Şahin's suggestion cannot be correct as, in addition to the triarchic document of August 266, Seleukos' presence in the dating formulae of Babylonian documentation is evident also in April 267 (21 Nisānu SE45 = 16 April 267).⁵⁸ The Stratonikean inscription of July 268 BC is therefore the aberrant example here, not the remaining body of documentation; but, read alongside the triarchic document from two years later, it does suggest Antiochos (II)'s increasing prominence in the Seleukid regime.

There are no satisfactory solutions to this puzzle of conflicting regnal formulae: each conceivable solution in fact raises further problems. Even in the absence of such a solution, however, we can still draw some salient conclusions from the evidence of a triarchy about the nature of Seleukid joint kingship in its second generation. Whatever the reason for the brief introduction of a triarchy between Antiochos I and his two sons, the very fact of the triarchy itself suggests that joint kingship had come to be seen as a fundamentally important facet of how Seleukid *basileia* was constructed and represented. Its uniqueness at this point in time, and its unprecedented nature, indicate a gradually intensifying trajectory in how the Seleukid royal house used its fundamental family structure to represent imperial stability. In this way, the development of even a time-limited triarchy was a culmination of the ideological processes of creating unity and symmetry that had been at work over the course of the diarchy between Antiochos and Seleukos. We can also very much see the triarchic document as a stepping stone, a point of transition between the diarchy of Antiochos and Seleukos and the diarchy of Antiochos and Antiochos (II). This suggests that regnal formulation of the joint kingship was a principal *locus* for communicating changes in the Seleukid *basileia*, particularly in terms of its current representation and incarnation. The triarchy, while constituting the end of a particular joint kingship, also constituted the beginning of a new one, and signified the endurance of the broader institution. As on the death of Nikator in 281, Seleukid *basileia* and the Seleukid era continued,

unbroken and uninterrupted, after the death of Seleukos in 266, simply finding a new pair of representatives.

V. Contexts and conclusions

Antiochos I's reign was marked by various attempts to give structure to and systematise royal power in the Seleukid kingdom. As well as the creation of a Seleukid era, an apt example is reforms in the area of numismatic iconography. Where Seleukos Nikator before had mediated his iconography through Alexander the Great's image and imagery, incorporating Alexandrine iconography into his own new style to strengthen his position as king, Antiochos overhauled this and developed an iconographical programme which was based on the Seleukid kings themselves and their recently-claimed divine ancestor Apollo.⁵⁹ Under Antiochos these coins featured an unbearded and diademed royal portrait of Seleukos Nikator or Antiochos himself on the obverse – another innovation, since there are no unambiguous images of Nikator on Nikator's own coinage – and Apollo on the omphalos (or occasionally leaning on a tripod) as the reverse image. Each subsequent Seleukid king placed his own diademed and unbearded image on the obverse and retained Apollo on the reverse, and from Antiochos I onwards this formed a numismatic pattern which was adopted by the Seleukid kings until the mid-second century.⁶⁰ Such uniformity of coin-types, with such an emphasis on the figures of Nikator and himself, heavily suggests that Antiochos was highlighting his position as son and successor of Nikator; in other words he was creating an image of legitimacy and continuity, and this was part of a wider drive towards achieving stability.

Antiochos' various attempts to give structure and uniformity to Seleukid royal power could be interpreted as directly related to the state of the empire on the death of Seleukos Nikator. Despite the fact that Antiochos had been associated on the throne for more than a decade, regional turmoil erupted in various parts of the empire after Nikator's death in 281;⁶¹ in particular there were problems in Asia Minor with Pergamon and the Northern League. Ptolemy Philadelphos, perhaps taking advantage of a state in disorder, also began (or perhaps continued) operations in Asia Minor, taking Miletos in c. 278 and inciting discord in various other areas. Antiochos was weakened particularly in southern Asia Minor, suffering territorial setbacks in Karia, Lykia, Pamphylia, and Kilikia. Galatian invasions also occurred in this context and were particularly damaging to the *poleis* of Asia Minor.⁶² To compound all his problems, Antiochos did not possess his father's corpse, a potent legitimising symbol, at the start of his reign; Philetairos of Pergamon eventually negotiated its return from

Ptolemy Keraunos, Nikator's murderer, and then passed it on to Antiochos, who was quick to bury the remains with pomp and ceremony in Seleukeia in Pieria.⁶³ But we must imagine a significant delay from the start of Antiochos' sole rule to his receiving the corpse, a delay which very likely impacted on Antiochos' political and ideological position. Antiochos needed to work towards creating stability in the empire, and the idea of legitimate succession was an important one to attend to in the early years after Nikator's death.

Thus in the years after 281 Antiochos needed to underscore the stability of his reign in both political-military and ideological terms; and part of this was the creation of an image of kingship that was characterised by strength, resilience, and ultimately continuity. He did this through various ideological programmes, but in particular he needed to demonstrate a viable and definite heir. We might consider, then, that Antiochos' joint kingship with his son Seleukos was part of the wider attempts at consolidation and entrenchment. The joint kingship had practical benefits: it designated the successor, ensured that this eventual sole ruler would have the loyalty of the kingdom's subjects and armies, and engendered a dependency for the younger joint king's position on – and so loyalty towards – the elder joint king.⁶⁴ This is also where the themes of succession and continuity, unity and inseparability, seen adduced in both Greek and Babylonian sources for the joint kingship, achieve direct significance. Maintaining the strength and stability of the kingdom required the Seleukid kingship itself to be in a position of security; and so the ideologies which underpinned joint kingship resonated with Antiochos' wider efforts to ensure a stable Seleukid realm. Joint kingship thus had practical and ideological benefits to offer for Antiochos in his period of consolidation.

More broadly, it is conceivable that the sustained ideological stress on the unity and symmetry of the two regnant Seleukid *basileis* was partially a means to mitigate the conceptual peculiarity of diarchy and to stress that Seleukid *basileia*, though duplicated in the form of two kings, was a unified whole, in theory and in practice. Moreover, this stress was perhaps originally designed to forestall, pre-emptively, any potential disharmony in the joint kingship, whether in the form of factional alignments (a powerful elite lobbying one *basileus* and agitating against the other) or in the form of the younger king's own ambitions (usurpatory, patricidal impulses). In that sense, projecting a unified, symmetrical joint kingship was an advertisement to the elite of the stability, incorruptibility, and indivisibility of the kingly institution, with an assured successor inseparably aligned with his father, and a guarantee to the younger king that his position was (theoretically) equal to that of his father and so there was no need for precipitate action:

he was already fully *basileus*, and the entire *basileia* would become his in the fullness of time.

On balance, it seems unlikely that Trogus' and John of Antioch's narrative of Seleukos' treason and execution are correct. Instead, we can suggest that, whatever the exact circumstances – perhaps del Monte is right about a great illness in Babylonia also fatally afflicting Seleukos – Seleukos died prematurely, necessitating the elevation of his brother Antiochos (II) to the joint kingship in his place. There is no evidence to corroborate Trogus' and John of Antioch's testimony, and the fact of the brief triarchy alongside the continuation of the diarchic institution after Seleukos' death rather militates against the idea that the joint kingship broke down as a result of treasonous activity. In that case, the successful operation of the second Seleukid diarchy (Antiochos I/Seleukos) and the introduction of a third (Antiochos I/Antiochos II) can be considered testaments to the success of the reconfigured ideology of Seleukid joint kingship. It is noteworthy here that in roughly the same period the Ptolemaic kingdom, another dynasty which used joint kingship widely, did experience a failure in its diarchic enterprise: Ptolemy Philadelphos killed his rebellious joint king, a shadowy figure known to us as Ptolemy 'the Son'.⁶⁵ We must consider that the second Seleukid diarchy found an ideological solution to the structural weaknesses that might have fatally compromised the institution of joint kingship, and so contributed to the stabilisation of the Seleukid empire in the aftermath of its founder's demise.

Notes

¹ I would like to thank Kyle Erickson for his invitation to contribute to the third meeting of the Seleukid Study Group at the 2012 Celtic Conference in Classics and this resultant publication. I would also like to give special thanks to the A. G. Leventis Foundation for their generous support for my doctoral research, which I was undertaking when this chapter was first drafted.

² Distinguishing between homonymous kings remains, as ever, problematic for a coherent narrative. Other kings named Seleukos, however, will be marked out with additional qualifications of identity: e.g., Seleukos Nikator will be referred to as such, or simply as Nikator.

³ Billows 1995b, 1–11; Strootman 2014a, 101–6.

⁴ On the acclamation of the two kings Philip III Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV in the aftermath of Alexander's death, see Meeus 2008, 39–82. Curiously, they seem to have divided the honours of kingship, e.g. the *somatophylakes*, perhaps in reflection of the peculiarity and weakness of the diarchic arrangement; see here Heckel 1980, 249–50. For a recent view of their joint kingship in practice, see Funke 2005, 45–56. On Cleopatra's various joint reigns, see Ogden 1999, 101–5. Interestingly, Plutarch records (*Ant.* 54.4) that even Antony set the provision

that Cleopatra's rule would include 'Caesarion reigning jointly with her' (συμβασιλεύοντος αὐτῇ Καισαρίωνος).

⁵ cf. Strootman 2014a, 104–5.

⁶ See e.g. the table at Austin 2006, 584. Seleukos, son of Antiochos I, does not even feature on the genealogical stemma of Grainger 1997, 820 – despite full cognizance of his role as 'joint king' at 1997, 66.

⁷ There are far too many examples to cite, but 'co-regent' and 'co-regency' are by far the most common. These in particular have long roots, especially in discussions of king lists; e.g. see as early as Sachs and Wiseman 1954, 202–212 and as recently as Boiy 2011, 1–12.

⁸ cf. Bikerman 1938a, 21–4; del Monte 1997, 437, 'La posizione del coreggente è ufficialmente pari a quella del re.'

⁹ cf. Canepa 2009, 1: 'Images, performances, and ideologies of kingship, in fact, often present some dissonance when compared with the bare facts of power. Indeed, the dissonance between historical fact and ideological fiction often illuminates what lies behind the rhetoric.'

¹⁰ Ogden 2011b, 92.

¹¹ cf. Ogden 1999, 3–5; Fernández Nieto 2005, 29–44; Strootman 2014a, 101–5.

¹² On the diarchy of Philip III and Alexander IV, see note 3, above.

¹³ Eur. *Phoen.* 475–85.

¹⁴ Eur. *Phoen.* 1390–1422.

¹⁵ cf. Strauss 1993, 100–29.

¹⁶ On wider examples of dual kingship, see Millender 2009, 1–68; Sahlins 2011, 63–101.

¹⁷ See Millender 2009, 1–68; Powell 2009, 35–82; Sahlins 2011, 63–101.

¹⁸ This problem is addressed in Sahlins 2011, 63–101.

¹⁹ Drews 1983, 81. cf. Daremberg 1904, 892: 'L'historien ne peut pas donner la raison de ce partage de la royauté. L'attribuer à un calcul de politique est une pure hypothèse.' ('The historian cannot give the reason for this sharing of the kingship. Attributing it to a political calculation is a pure hypothesis.')

²⁰ Powell 2009, 35–82, esp. 77–80.

²¹ Powell 2009, 79.

²² See Strauss 1993, esp. 13–17.

²³ On Nikator's diarchy with Antiochos I, see Plut. *Demetr.* 38; App. *Syr.* 62; del Monte 1997, 436–7. On Ptolemy and Philadelphus, Buraselis 2005, 92–101.

²⁴ Historical overviews of this Seleukos may be found at e.g. Grainger 1997, 66; del Monte 1997, 433–44; Boiy 2004, 140–5.

²⁵ cf. del Monte 1997, 441, that modern historians speak of 'lo sviluppo di un oscuro e sanguinoso dramma familiare che portò il padre ad uccidere il figlio'.

²⁶ Cf. Yardley's 1994 translation of *altero rego nuncupato Antiocho* as 'appointing the other one, Antiochos, as heir to the throne'. This is a clear gloss of *rex*, and seems to represent the body of scholarship which sees joint kingship as simply 'co-regency' or the designation of an heir.

²⁷ e.g. Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 72; Şahin 1980, 212; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 37; Grainger 1997, 66; Ogden 1999, 125; Tunny 2000, 86; Boiy 2004, 145.

²⁸ Del Monte 1997, 442.

²⁹ See e.g. the records discussed at Assar 2009, 105–17.

³⁰ cf. Chiai 2015, 37–8.

³¹ See the *editio princeps*, with commentary, at Wörrle 1975, 59–87.

³² On the latter inscription, cf. Billows 1995a, 120–1.

³³ E.g. *OGIS* 221 (= *RC* 10–13), which consists of four letters: three by Antiochos I to his satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Meleager, and one by Meleager to the city of Ilion. On this inscription, see also Billows 1995a, 114.

³⁴ del Monte 1997, 440.

³⁵ cf. Dignas 2002, 41–2, with n.27.

³⁶ Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 27; Kosmin 2014, 101.

³⁷ Boiy 2004, 144.

³⁸ Capdetrey 2007, 171–2. cf. Dignas 2002, 73–4.

³⁹ cf. e.g. Ma 1999, 71–112.

⁴⁰ *RC* 9 = *Nysa* 4.

⁴¹ cf. Welles 1934, 58, commenting on *RC* 9: ‘The singular of βασιλεύς need not mean that Antiochos did not use the royal title when acting alone. He was merely not king in the presence of his father.’

⁴² See note 22, above.

⁴³ Houghton and Lorber 2002, nos 288.2 and 280.1, respectively.

⁴⁴ OECT 9 7 from Uruk (4 January), clearly recording ‘in the reigns of kings Antiochos and Seleukos’ (using the cuneiform plural LUGAL^{mes}); CT 49 103 (17 January). See also Boiy 2004, 140–5.

⁴⁵ BRM 2 5. See also Boiy 2004, 140.

⁴⁶ AION suppl. 77 no. 15 (Stolper 1993, 46ff) (14 August); CT 49 115 (21 October). See also Boiy 2004, 144–5.

⁴⁷ See Boiy 2004, 139 n.89.

⁴⁸ See Boiy 2004, 140, 144.

⁴⁹ cf. del Monte 1997, 337.

⁵⁰ The lack of territorial qualification contrasts with Persian and earlier rulers who were defined territorially; this is a point well made by Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 40.

⁵¹ Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1991, 78, where they again use the terminology ‘co-regent’ but here with reference to Cambyses; their terminology for Seleukos and Cambyses is thus the same, despite the fact that the text of the Cyrus Cylinder simply calls Cambyses Cyrus’ ‘son’, while the Borsippa Cylinder calls Seleukos ‘king’. The idea that joint kingship existed in Achaemenid practice, as suggested by Calmeyer (1976, 63–95), is denied by Briant (2002, 958), for whom ‘the king never shares power.’ Wiesehöfer (1996, 30) similarly rejects the idea of Achaemenid ‘synarchy’, as does Garcia Sanchez (2005, 223–39).

⁵² Cyrus Cylinder l. 27, 35 (see Rogers 1912, 380–84). Boiy (2002, 248) sees the royal titles on the Borsippa Cylinder as archaising.

⁵³ Shea 1991, 237 with n.7; Kuhrt 1992, 51; Zawadzki 1996, 171–83; Briant 2002, 44; Garcia Sanchez 2005, 223–39.

⁵⁴ Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1991, 84–5.

⁵⁵ Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1991, 85.

⁵⁶ del Monte 1997, 443–4.

⁵⁷ Şahin 1980, 212.

⁵⁸ LBAT 1220–1.

⁵⁹ For a recent study see Erickson 2013, 109–127.

⁶⁰ Zahle 1990, 127.

⁶¹ cf. Kosmin 2013, 209; 2014, 85–7.

⁶² See e.g. Ma 1999, 34.

⁶³ On the return of Nikator's remains, see App. *Syr.* 62–3. On the legitimating value of burying the former king's remains, see Alonso 2009, 276–98.

⁶⁴ So Strootman 2014a, 101–6.

⁶⁵ On this figure see Tunny 2000, 83–92.

THE COMING OF THE PARTHIANS: CRISIS AND RESILIENCE IN THE REIGN OF SELEUKOS II

Rolf Strootman

The Near Eastern galleries are not among the most popular of the Louvre. The least visited parts are the Elamite rooms. There, in a corner easily overlooked, is a small display case containing some remarkable figurines of south Mesopotamian or west Iranian provenance. They represent unidentified female deities. All are dated to 'The Parthian Period, c. 300 BC–300 CE'. Though they selectively engage with the 'international style' of the hellenistic *koinē*, they are neither 'hybrid' mixtures nor 'foreign' imports. They represent a local, southern Mesopotamian style in its own right. They may date to the period of Macedonian domination in the Persian Gulf region (c. 330–150 BC) or to the early Parthian period (from 140 BC).

It is amusing to see how these items apparently do not fit into any of the traditional categories of cultural history ('Classical Greece', 'The Ancient Near East', 'Persia'), and therefore have been assigned their own, peripheral corner beyond the Great Civilizations of the Ancient World. The Museum's conceptualization of the allegedly 'indigenous' Parthians as the almost immediate successors of the Persian Achaemenids is indicative of the discomfort that is still felt by many Near Eastern archaeologists when it comes to positioning the allegedly 'western' Seleukid Empire in the long-term history of Iran. But rounding off Parthian beginnings to 300 BC may also be the result of scholarly disagreement on the exact date of the secession of the Parthian Kingdom under the Arsakid Dynasty from the Seleukid Empire. Many scholars have attempted in vain to determine when 'Parthia' officially became an independent state. Estimates vary from 256 to 226/5 BC.¹ But as early as 209, a Seleukid army led by Antiochos III forced the Parthians into submission, perhaps for the second time, and there is no direct evidence thereafter for Parthian hostility towards the Seleukid Dynasty until the mid-2nd century.

The reign of Seleukos II Kallinikos (246–226/5) is crucial for modern understanding of Parthian independence. According to the conventional view, Seleukos campaigned against the Parthians but apparently was unable to 'prevent' the establishment of an independent Parthian state under the

Parthian ruler, Arsakes I. Historians therefore have regarded the reign of Seleukos II as a watershed in the history of Iran and Central Asia. Józef Wolski consistently advocated the view that the invasion of the region by a people known as the Parni (which he dates to 239/8) was a disaster for the Seleukids, cutting their empire in two. In its aftermath trade routes no longer connected Central Asia and the Mediterranean, and the Greco-Baktrian realm was cut off from the west.² This view is based primarily on Justin's epitome of the *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus, the principal source for these events, and on Strabo. In Justin's account, Seleukid hegemony in Iran and Central Asia suddenly collapsed because the Parthians and Baktrians simultaneously revolted while Seleukos II was preoccupied by fighting his brother, Antiochos Hierax. To quote the crucial passage in book 41 of Justin's world history:

[The Parni] could revolt with impunity because of the wrangling of the two royal brothers Seleukos and Antiochos, who were so eager to wrest the kingdom from each other that they neglected to suppress the rebellion. At this same time Theodotus [= Diodotos I], governor of the thousand Baktrian cities, also rebelled and had himself declared king. The populations all over the east followed his example and defected from the Macedonians.³

Recent scholarship has nuanced the view that the Parni drove a wedge between the Seleukid east and west and that they thereby caused the breakdown of the Seleukid Empire in Iran. Bernard van Wickevoort Crommelin showed that Trogus synchronized the revolts of Parthia and Baktria for dramatic effect: Trogus' work is structured according to the theory of *translatio imperii*, i.e. the conception of world history as a sequence of peoples that successively dominated the *orbis terrarum*, and accordingly out of literary and stylistic concerns Justin was obliged to find one particular date at which the Seleukid Empire collapsed and the Parthians assumed the mantle.⁴ The revolts of Diodotos and Arsakes in reality did not occur at the same time. It is furthermore clear that the settlement of the Parni in the area between the Caspian Sea and the Elburz Mountains and in the Kopet Dag region cannot have cut Seleukid communication lines with Central Asia. As Susan Sherwin-White and Amélie Kuhrt pointed out, there also was a major route running *south* of these two ranges, directly connecting Central Asia with southern Mesopotamia via Persis, Karmania and Arachosia.⁵ In an important article, J. D. Lerner has argued that since the eastern campaigns of Antiochos III in the later 3rd century, Central Asia was re-integrated into the Seleukid world empire also via the revived sea route between the Persian Gulf and India.⁶

Unsurprisingly, there is neither direct nor indirect evidence for a Parthian empire in Iran in the 3rd century. If the early Parthian polity indeed

had a territorial foundation it cannot have been more than a regional vassal kingdom. But in fact Justin does not even say that Arsakes assumed the title of king, though he later calls his principality a *regnum* (41.5.5), a rather generic term comparable to Greek δυναστεία, βασιλεία or ἀρχή, words that can also be used to denote a ‘dominion’, one’s ‘authority’, or a territory that one possesses. This lack of monarchical aspiration – which is not in itself indicative of secession – is corroborated by the visual and textual vocabulary on Arsakes’ coinage, on which he appears as a governor or local prince but not as king (see below). Justin’s claim that Diodotos, the satrap of Baktria, in contrast to Arsakes did assume the royal title is corroborated by the appearance of the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΔΙΟΔΟΤΟΥ on Baktrian coinage. Put simply, the notion of Parthian independence under Arsakes I is not supported by Arsakes’ own representation. When Justin later on states that the Parthians (*Parthi*) attained their liberty under Arsakes I, he or his source likely follows ‘official’ court historiography from the reign of Mithradates the Great, the founder of the Arsakid Empire who retrospectively dated the beginning of the Parthian Era to the reign of Arsakes, about a century earlier;⁷ the link is clear from Justin’s statement that ‘the Parthians observe the day on which [Arsakes gained a victory over Seleukos] with great solemnity, as the date of the commencement of their liberty’.⁸

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that modern conceptions of state, and of national sovereignty, do not suit political and cultural realities of the ancient Eurasian empires; and to propose an alternative explanation for the emergence of the Arsakids in the 3rd century BC.⁹ Scholars of Iranian history have in the past been perhaps too eager to find as early a date as possible for the foundation of an ‘Iranian’ Parthian Empire to end the ‘European’ Seleukid occupation. I will argue instead that Arsakes I did not establish a rival empire in opposition to the Seleukid Empire, but that he became a vassal king under Seleukid suzerainty. The establishment of a Parthian *empire* took place only after the reign of Antiochos III (223/2–187); in fact, it was not until c. 140 that imperial pretensions for the first time appear in Arsakid monarchical representation, *viz.* Mithradates I’s assumption of the title of Great King.

Rule through vassal monarchies, even as these sometimes came into being as *ad hoc* reactions to irreversible political developments, became increasingly a Seleukid policy from the reign of Antiochos I Soter (281–261). It was not until the 140s that the Seleukid Empire began to lose to the Parthians its status as the principal great power in the Middle East and Iran. Until that time, the Seleukids retained nominal imperial overlordship of the ‘Kingdom of Asia’ from Anatolia to Sogdia. Vassalization was a sign

of the Seleukids' resilience, not of their decline. The Seleukid dynasty claimed imperial status no less than the Achaemenids before them had done. But unlike the Achaemenids, the Seleukids felt that this status allowed them to invest others with royalty. The Parthian ruler, Arsakes I, initially was only one out of many of such vassals. Arsakes never adopted the title of *basileus* on his coinage. Instead he struck coins in his own name (which may have been a title of sorts) or as Arsakes Autokrator. Arsakes I did not use that title in defiance of the Seleukid hegemony but, quite on the contrary, was offered it as a prize by Seleukos II in exchange for his formal submission to Seleukid imperial suzerainty.

I. The paradox of power

Seleukos II Kallinikos ruled over his empire from horseback.¹⁰ He was continuously on campaign, as most Seleukid rulers were. But it seems as if Seleukos II's reign was particularly beset by severe military and political crises: a Ptolemaic invasion of the Seleukid heartland during the Laodikean War (246–241), a revolt in Khorasan, a full-scale dynastic war with his own full brother, Antiochos Hierax (the so-called War of the Brothers, 240/39–237/6),¹¹ and, last but certainly not least, nomadic incursions along the empire's northern frontier. The migration of a nomadic people known as the Parni (or Aparni, later called 'Parthians') from the plains of present-day Turkmenistan into Seleukid Iran was perhaps the single most important event of his reign when it comes to the *longue durée* of Seleukid history.

It has become common to describe the reign of Seleukos Kallinikos as a failure, and the standard story goes that due to the many crises under his rule the empire almost collapsed outright. As Lerner put it, 'Seleukos' utter failure...only served to speed the process of disintegration of the Eastern Seleukid realm.'¹² But to think of Seleukid history (or any empire's history, for that matter) in terms of decline-and-fall is perhaps not the most fruitful approach. The image of a steady decline obviously is at odds with the fact that the Seleukid Empire reached its greatest extent about the year 200 under Antiochos III, that is, *after* the alleged breakaway of Parthia.¹³

Seleukos II Kallinikos can be credited with laying the foundations for the survival of his family and his family's empire for another century or so, despite the severe crises cited above. The pertinent question is not why these crises took place two generations after the formation of the empire, but rather how they were overcome. After all, the dangerous Ptolemaic invasion of Mesopotamia in 246 ended with the withdrawal of Ptolemaic forces to Egypt less than a year later, while Seleukeia-in-Pieria and the Phoenician seaports that had remained in Ptolemaic hands with the peace treaty of 241 were retaken by Antiochos III in 219. The War of the Brothers

ultimately did *not* result in the breakup of the empire.¹⁴ The Seleukid realm not only survived, but emerged from these crises stronger than before.

Empires are able to 'breathe'. They can first contract and later expand again. The personalized networks that make up imperial rule in premodern societies are for a large part based on the distribution of gifts among the military class which supports the ruler, especially of land.¹⁵ Through the distribution of land and wealth by the empire's founder among the members of his entourage to assure their loyalty, a self-supporting landed aristocracy comes into being. When expansion comes to a halt, gift distribution dwindles and the imperial centre tends increasingly to lose its grip on the polities formally united by the empire.¹⁶ This is the 'paradox of power': to accumulate and maintain power, a ruler has to delegate power to others and in the process risks the formation of an autonomous interest group which seeks to defend its own privileges, and acts on behalf of its own clientèles, against the interests of the same ruler who had empowered it in the first place.¹⁷ Imperial systems based on conquest therefore often contract or collapse in the second or third generation, when expansion ceases. If however an empire survives, it is resilience, not decline that historians most of all should account for. The Ottoman and Spanish empires are notable cases in point: both were assigned an early 'Classical Age' by 19th-century historiography and assumed to have gone into decline after c. 1600, when in fact they endured for several more centuries (!). More significantly, both empires experienced a period of revitalisation and prosperity in the 18th century. The Seleukid Empire, too, was relatively successful for it remained the principal power in central Eurasia for more than 150 years, and may even have experienced a cultural renaissance, too (in the form of 'Persianism'; see below).

The Imperial Turn of the past decades has been particularly influential, and rewarding, in Ottoman studies. As new histories of the 'post-Classical' Ottoman Empire have shown, big empires can survive, and even be revived, when power networks are reorganized and the ruling dynasty is able to ally itself with new social groups, usually in combination with renewed and lucrative warfare.¹⁸ This is what happened in the reign of Antiochos III, when the Seleukid Empire after a period of contraction and disintegration regained strength by changing its networks of power in reaction to internal and external threats.¹⁹ But the process of recovery may already have begun under Antiochos' father, Seleukos II, as we will see below.

II. Parthian secession: when precisely did it happen?

Working from the premise that there can be nothing in between direct rule by a so-called foreign power and a country's complete, formal independence,²⁰

historians and others have for decades been at pains to establish a date for Parthian secession from the Seleukid Empire, as well as for the secession of Baktria.²¹

An important cause of this scholarly conundrum is the fact that the principal ancient account of early Parthian history, Justin Book 41, is imprecise, particularly when it comes to chronology. Evidence from cuneiform documents and coins provides some firmer ground, but not much.²² Justin's account (41.4.4–5) is complemented by a short reference to the 'secession' of Parthia in Strabo (11.9.2):

When rebellions were attempted by the countries at the other side of the Taurus, because of the fact that the kings of Syria and Media, who were in possession also of these countries, were busily engaged with others, those who had been entrusted with their government first caused the revolt of Baktriana and of all the country near it, I mean Euthydemus and his followers; and Arsakes, a Scythian with some of the Dahai, I mean the Aparnians, as they were called, nomads who lived along the Ochos, invaded Parthia and conquered it.

This passage is not very clear either. It is unlikely that the phrase 'the kings of Syria and Media' refers to Antiochos Hierax and Seleukos II respectively, as some have argued.²³ It should rather be seen as a generic reference to the Seleukid dynasty,²⁴ ruling a dual realm consisting of the Near Eastern lowlands ('Syria') and the Iranian highland, or Upper Satrapies ('Media'). Not much, however, can be made of this passage with regard to our question of chronology.

Appian (*Syr.* 65) says something similar, namely that the Parthians 'began their revolt taking advantage of the confusion in the Seleukid Empire'. He mentions this in passing after a short account of the Laodikean War (246–241), but like Strabo, he is far too vague to be of use in establishing a sound chronology. Justin (41.4.3) states that the Parthians 'first revolted' in the reign of the great-grandson of Antiochos I. This would be Seleukos III, who was king only from 226 to 223. But why would anyone start counting Seleukid reigns from Antiochos I? Perhaps Justin meant 'grandson' instead of 'great-grandson' – or more likely he meant the great-grandson of Seleukos I instead of Antiochos I. But Justin also relates that the Parthians revolted during the consulships of Lucius Manlius Vulso and Marcus Atilius Regulus, *i.e.* 256 BC, which in turn places us firmly in the reign of Antiochos II (261–246).²⁵ Seleukos II in that case is nowhere in sight – the principal reasons why D. Musti has advocated a 'high dating' of the Parthian secession to the reign of Antiochos II.²⁶ Justin, however, stresses that the king who fought against these elusive Parthians was called 'Seleukos'. Farhad Assar and M. Bagloo have therefore suggested another

solution, namely that Justin conflated two separate campaigns: a first, unsuccessful campaign when Seleukos was in charge of the Upper Satrapies as co-ruler and his father, Antiochos II, was still the principal king; and a second, more successful endeavour after Antiochos' death when Seleukos himself was the senior king.²⁷ This makes sense. All that we can conclude with any certainty, however, is that according to Justin the Parthians revolted against the Seleukids several times, but we still do not know how often and in what stretch of time. When Antiochos III fought the Parthians in 209 this was an attempt to suppress the rebellion of a local ruler against the imperial dynasty, not a war between two sovereign states of equal status. This is the case too with the campaigns of Antiochos IV, Demetrios II, and Antiochos VII against the Parthians, which took place much later. An additional problem is that Justin, when speaking of 'the Parthians', rarely makes clear whether or not he specifically means the Parni, i.e. the (semi)nomadic 'tribe' (or war band: see below) that settled in Parthia at an uncertain date in the 3rd century BC. Sometimes he seems to mean other people living in the province of Parthia, in Khorasan, *before* the settlement of the Parni in this region.²⁸ Justin further relates that at roughly the same time a certain Theodotos in Baktria also revolted. This too is evidently a (slight) mistake for it can be established on firm numismatic grounds that the ruler of Baktria and Sogdia at that time was called Diodotos (I).

The Parni, who like the Macedonians originated at the fringes of the Ancient Near East, initially settled in the Seleukid province of Hyrkania (present-day Mazandaran and Golestan), along the lush south-eastern coastline of the Caspian Sea. Justin describes them, derogatively, in terms that are reminiscent of a war band rather than a coherent ethnic group:

They ride on horseback on all occasions; on horses they go to war, and to feasts; on horses they discharge public and private duties; on horses they go abroad, meet together, traffic, and converse... The disposition of the people is proud, quarrelsome, faithless, and insolent; for a certain roughness of behaviour they think becoming to men, and gentleness only to women. They are always restless, and ready for any commotion, at home or abroad; ...They obey their leaders, not from humility, but from fear. ...To their word or promise they have no regard, except as far as suits their interest.²⁹

In fact, the image of the Parthians as rough, unorganized nomads may in large part have derived from Roman imperial propaganda, in which the unconquered Parthian had to be constructed as an inferior, barbaric 'other'.³⁰ The fact that the Parthian Empire, like so many other Eurasian empires, was a composite system of polities, lightly controlled by a universalistic King of Kings, of course was not a Roman or Persian invention.

Bound together by allegiance to a charismatic and successful leader, Arsakes (I), the Parni invaded the province of Parthia and killed the Seleukid governor, Andragoras, who according to Justin had also revolted. The Parni then revolted too. All of these events are enigmatic: the assertion that Andragoras revolted against the Seleukids is contradicted by his coins, on which he rather seems to present himself as a vassal of the empire, not as an independent ruler *vis-à-vis* the empire.³¹ And if he did indeed try to break away, or became too unruly for the Seleukids to maintain him as their agent, there remains the distinct possibility that the Parthians were called in by the imperial court to overthrow him.³²

It will not be necessary to repeat and review everything that has been written about (the chronology of) the various insurrections of Andragoras, Theodotos/Diodotos and Arsakes. Most important for the present argument is the observation that the confusing array of revolts and breakaways in 3rd-century Iran and Baktria as reported by Justin in Book 41 is the result of an attempt to find a single date for the beginning of the Parthian Empire in hindsight. It also merits mention in this respect that the Parthians dominated most of the Middle East in Trogus' and Justin's own time, and Parthian origins would have been an attractive contemporary topic of the Augustan period and later. A gradual, decades-long development from subordination to autonomy moreover would be at odds with Justin's simplistic view of history as a succession of empires. Justin gives himself away, in a sense, in Book 27. This, and not Book 41, is the part of Justin's history that is dedicated to the reign of Seleukos II, the time that the Parthians supposedly broke away and began their own imperial history. But in Book 27 the Parthians are not even mentioned. In fact, they are absent in all of Justin's epitomes of Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae* until the beginning of Parthian expansion in the 140s (in Book 36). It is only then that Justin formulates his ideas about Parthian beginnings.

Of course, Justin's epitome of Trogus has not been transmitted in its entirety. But we do have an additional source for the contents of Trogus' work that is independent of Justin: the so-called 'Prologues', a detailed list of the contents of the respective books of Trogus' lost universal history, collated about 300 AD.³³ The Prologues show that in Trogus' original work the Parthians are absent too until the mid-2nd century BC. The sudden 'breakaway' of the Parthians during the reign of Seleukos II is most likely a construction of Justin himself, that may be based on the official dynastic history of the Parthian court after 140; it does not occur in this way in the work of Trogus, who almost certainly dated the end of Seleukid hegemony in the Middle East and Iran more sensibly after 150, when the Parthians successively defeated Demetrios II and Antiochos VII, and conquered Media

and Mesopotamia; these events are firmly attested in the contemporaneous cuneiform record from Babylonia.³⁴

It nevertheless seems reasonable to gather from Justin's account that a Seleukid king called Seleukos – and he must be Seleukos II – campaigned against the Parthians, who therefore must have revolted at some time in the second half of the 3rd century. But we are then confronted with a subsequent problem: who won the war? Justin's narrative is so confused that modern historians are free to choose whether Seleukos' campaign was a success or a failure. Arsakes I was either defeated but saved because Seleukos was forced to march to Asia Minor in order to deal with a graver military threat (probably his brother, Antiochos Hierax, stirring up trouble); *or* Arsakes was victorious, defeating the Seleukid army in battle and forcing Seleukos to retreat to the west. Modern historiography usually favours the Parthians, and their supposed victory over the Seleukids sometimes has been constructed as *mutatis mutandis* a 'liberation' of Iran from foreign, viz., 'western', colonial occupation.³⁵ With the aid of an ambiguous statement in Athenaios, it has even been hypothesized that Seleukos was captured by the Parthians, who released him in return for his acknowledgment of Parthian independence, and that Seleukos thereupon grew a 'Parthian' beard, and had himself depicted with this beard on his coins, to celebrate his defeat.³⁶

Most historians prefer the scenario according to which the campaign of Seleukos II (as sole king) against the Parni was a failure, culminating in the establishment of an autonomous Parthian kingdom that severed the Seleukid dynasty from Central Asia. This interpretation is supported by Justin's claim that Arsakes defeated Seleukos in battle and that 'the Parthians have ever since commemorated that day as being the start of their independence' (Just. 41.4.9–10). But the only source to actually offer a brief account of the course of this war, Strabo (11.8.8), says that Seleukos forced the Parthians to abandon Parthia and Hyrkania, driving the invaders back to the Caspian steppe. A Seleukid victory therefore is more likely, as Jan Willem Drijvers rightly pointed out.³⁷

But what if *both* accounts are true? Did the acceptance by Seleukos of Arsakes' rule really amount to the creation of an autonomous state outside the empire? Or is there a possibility that Seleukos first forced Arsakes into submission and *then* made him king?

The Parthian rulers, despite their supposed independence *vis-à-vis* the Seleukid Empire, depicted themselves on numismatic portraiture with a governor's cap combined with a diadem on their coins.³⁸ They thus presented themselves as subservient to a higher king in their own representation. Because it was Seleukos, the only imperial ruler in the

region at that time, who acknowledged Arsakes, what we have here is an imperial overlord bestowing princely or royal status on a lesser ruler in return for acceptance of his imperial suzerainty. It amounted to what in the management idiom of the 1990s was called a ‘win-win situation’: for Seleukos it was a means of (re)integrating the rebellious Parthians back into the fabric of imperial hegemony; the Parthian ruler on the other hand could now present his rulership as legitimate because it had been officially sanctioned by the empire.

It has already been pointed out that according to the list of contents of the books of Pompeius Trogus, the so-called ‘Prologues’, the Parthians are conspicuously absent from the books devoted to Macedonian history until Book 35, which deals with the reign of Demetrios I (162–150). In Justin’s version, the Parthians are mentioned for the first time in the epitome of Book 36, which opens with Demetrios II’s campaign of 140–139 (Justin 36.1–6). The problem, as we have seen, is that Justin has inserted into Book 41 a flashback dating the establishment of the Parthian Empire some 100 years before the establishment of the Parthian Empire actually began. The Arsakids indeed went back that long as a *local* dynasty (as their coinage shows); but their *imperial* history, which is the main theme in Trogus’ universal history, did not (as their own coinage shows, too). Cuneiform sources show that the Parthians became a force to be reckoned with from the mid-2nd century with their southward expansion into Media and Babylonia. That is a hundred years after the breakdown of the Seleukid authority in Iran according to Justin. But as Justin himself makes clear, when the attacks against Media and Babylonia took place after 150, ‘the peoples of the East’ were still not used to Parthian rule as they supported the Seleukid ruler Demetrios II as a matter of course.³⁹

III. The Seleukid kingdom as empire

To make sense of all this apparent ambiguity, it is of fundamental importance to understand that the Seleukid Empire was not a unified ‘national state’ with well-defined borders and territory, but that it was a hegemonic, ‘universal’ empire.⁴⁰ The principal characteristic of the Seleukid Empire was its heterogeneous internal composition: the imperial framework comprised a dazzling variety of fully autonomous cities, semi-autonomous cities, provinces under governors, vassal kingdoms, mountain tribes, steppe tribes, temples, war bands, landed aristocracies, *et cetera*.⁴¹ Like most premodern empires, the Seleukid Empire tried to overcome internal political diversity by means of universalistic ideology, i.e. the idea that the civilized world was more or less a unity under a single ruler.⁴²

This may seem self-evident, but modern historians have commonly conceptualized the Seleukid Empire as a modern national state *avant la lettre*. This is evident from the customary identification of the Seleukid Empire with 'Syria', the generalization of local practices of administration in Asia Minor or Babylonia as empire-wide state policy, or the idea that the empire had a 'capital', *viz.* an 'official' administrative centre.⁴³

Like most pre-modern military empires, the Seleukid Empire was essentially a negotiated enterprise, flexible and responsive to change. The Seleukids accessed the military resources of the Middle East and Central Asia through personal networks of alliances, friendship and kinship. Approaching Seleukid *basileia* as an organization of the imperial type enables us to understand the presence of a diversity of state forms of varying degrees of autonomy as an integral part of the empire, unified by the ideological umbrella of universal monarchy and the god-like charisma of a *qualitate qua* victorious and benevolent king.⁴⁴

IV. The Parthian monarchy and the vassalization of the Seleukid Empire

After c. 250 the Seleukid Empire developed into a hegemonic power loosely uniting a growing number of autonomous vassal states and minor princedoms around a more or less directly controlled imperial core consisting of the Fertile Crescent.⁴⁵ This was partly the result of efforts of the imperial dynasty to replace established (Greek and Macedonian) elites by supporting new allies; partly it was the result of changing geopolitical circumstances beyond the dynasty's grasp, *viz.*, the rise of local (Iranian) dynasties along the imperial fringes.⁴⁶ This process began in earnest during the reign of Seleukos II, and reached its high point in the reign of his son Antiochos III, whose title *Megas*, adopted after his eastern *anabasis*, presumably referred to his status as the very big man placed above the world's lesser kings.⁴⁷ By that time, a new Parni leader, Arsakes II (c. 211–191), had broken away from Seleukid hegemony. Antiochos defeated the rebellious Parni at the beginning of his *anabasis* and reduced their leader to vassal status again (Polyb. 10.27.12–31.31).

In Asia Minor (Pontos, Cappadocia) this mechanism was perhaps as old as the empire itself,⁴⁸ but it was most of all Seleukos II who laid the foundations for this policy in the Seleukid east. He did so in reaction to growing regional autonomy, a process that could not be halted but could be accommodated in the imperial system with benefits for all parties involved. It was a means to (re)integrate local rulers into the imperial superstructure and to find new allies against established elites.⁴⁹ The bonds between the imperial family and the various vassal monarchies were often

cemented with dynastic marriages. Antiochos III in particular used dynastic marriage to bind vassals to his own family through kinship: in honour-driven societies, kinship could potentially create stronger bonds of allegiance than *philia*, the principle by which the first hellenistic kings bound powerful men to their persons.⁵⁰ Instead of financing the Seleukid war machine through the exaction of tribute, the Seleukid emperor could now hope to receive direct military aid from the lesser kings united under his suzerainty. And it worked: as late as the Parthian campaign of Demetrios II in 140 the Seleukid king could count on the rulers of Persis, Elam and even Baktria to send auxiliary troops (Just. 38.9.4).

The Fratarakā rulers in Persis are a case in point. Starting with Josef Wieschöfer's dissertation on hellenistic Persis,⁵¹ we have begun to understand that the creation of a Persid monarchy in Pārsa/Persis in c. 205 was not a sign of Seleukid weakness resulting in the breakaway of an autonomous Persid state. In fact, most of the early Fratarakā were vassal rulers under Seleukid suzerainty, as Wieschöfer showed, and both D. Engels and the present writer have placed the emergence of these rulers in the broader context of the vassalization of the Middle East in the later Seleukid Empire.⁵² These local rulers of Persis were to all accounts local monarchs of sorts, but they called themselves *fratarakā*, which means governors (or 'place-holders', 'representatives', to be more precise). Ardaxšāhr (Artaxerxes) was around the year 200 the first Fratarakā ruler with royal status. On the obverse of his coins he appears with a diadem and wearing the *kyrhasia*, the satrap's cap with chin flap – rather as the first Parthians kings did.⁵³

The more or less simultaneous development of a more or less 'national' monarchy in Persis and in Parthia, with both dynasties selectively using Iranian vocabulary in their monarchical representation, has in the past been cited in support of the claim that the Seleukids left Iran at an early date.⁵⁴ It is tempting to think that an 'Iranian Revival' took place in the 2nd century as a sign of resistance against the Seleukids. But there is no reason to assume that in the 3rd century (*i.e.*, before the presumed Iranian revival) Iranian culture had disappeared or had been suppressed; in fact, the spread of 'Greek' material culture in Iran dates mainly to the 2nd and 1st centuries BC. If there indeed was an Iranian revival of sorts among the Iranian royalty of the 2nd century – and indeed the creation of a 'Persianistic' royal style can be seen in several satellite states (Parthia, Kommagene, Pontos) – this can perhaps better be classified as a Seleukid rather than as an anti-Seleukid phenomenon.⁵⁵ Seleukid imperial culture had an Iranian component, too.⁵⁶

V. Later developments in Seleukid-Parthian relations

From the middle of the 2nd century the Parthians replaced the Ptolemies as the main military adversaries of the Seleukid dynasty. It was Parthian expansion that eventually brought down the empire of the Seleukids. Not the Romans, but the Parthians eventually took over most of the Seleukid realm. So the settlement of the Parni in Khorasan may be considered the single most important event of Seleukos' remarkable reign when viewed in a longer chronological perspective. But precisely how these migrations influenced Seleukid authority on the Iranian plateau is difficult to assess. We can be sure of one thing: historical reality was far more complicated than the neat, zero-sum view that the establishment of a Parni monarchy in the province of Parthia amounted to the formal secession of an autonomous Parthian 'state' that cut the Seleukids off from Central Asia, and in turn caused the formal autonomy of Baktria and Sogdia under Graeco-Baktrian rulers. This view, as we have seen, is flawed in several respects. First, it is teleological because it uncritically follows Justin in projecting the emergence of the Parthian Empire in the mid-2nd century back to the 3rd century, foregrounding Parni migrations; the really important historical question – how can we explain the emergence of a Parthian Empire in Iran under Mithradates I the Great (c. 171–138)? – is rarely asked in modern scholarship because of the perceived idea that a Parthian Empire had already come into existence under Arsakes I (c. 238–217?).⁵⁷ Second, it is modernistic because it thinks of both the early Parthian polity and the Seleukid Empire as modern, European-style territorial states. And third, it ignores all evidence attesting the ongoing Seleukid presence in the Upper Satrapies until 140.

In this chapter, I have proposed a different understanding of the settlement of the Parni/Parthians, working from the broader geopolitical perspective of the development of vassal kingdoms. The reign of Seleukos II was not the reign in which the dynasty proved unable to prevent the secession of autonomous regions but the reign in which the dynasty tried to deal with increasing regional autonomy. As I have suggested, the problem of insubordinate local governors was caused by what might be termed the 'paradox of power', aggravated by military setbacks during the reigns of Antiochos I and Antiochos II. The acceptance of local autonomy in the reign of Seleukos II may simply be a *solution* to the problem of growing local autonomy, replacing unruly Macedonian officialdom with Iranian royalty – a solution that for a long time proved to be quite successful, as Antiochos III's remarkable reign shows, and should be understood as historical change, viz., as a re-organization of the empire, rather than as 'decline' – a term that

like its twin, 'decadence', has a-historical romantic and orientalist connotations.

When the first Parthian kings started to strike coins on which they appeared with Iranian insignia, this was not yet a sign of secession. The 'Persianism' of the early Arsakids (i.e. the development of an ostensibly 'Iranian', dynastic identity) can be explained as a Seleukid phenomenon, a development that took place all over the empire in the context of imperial policy.⁵⁸ The headdresses that the first Parthian rulers wear on their own coins, are *governor's* insignia. On his coinage, Arsakes I did not even use royal titlature, let alone imperial vocabulary by which he would have claimed status equal to the Seleukid king and his dynasty. Instead, Arsakes I used quasi-monarchical titles with the connotation of local ruler or military leader: *autokratōr* and *karanā*, as well as his own name, Aršak.⁵⁹ Does this make the Parthians any less autonomous in actual practice? Perhaps not, but the fact that Arsakes I, according to his own representation, was a ruler of secondary or even tertiary status within a larger imperial world order definitely defies modern attempts to find a precise, clear-cut date for an irreversible Parthian breakaway from the empire. This was a gradual process and it was probably no earlier than 139 or 138 that the Parthian king Mithradates I finally assumed imperial pretensions by adopting the Greek title of *basileus megas*, Great King, on his coins, thereby openly defying Seleukid suzerainty. The use of the title Great King, and later King of Kings, put the Arsakid kings on a par with the Seleukid kings, whether the latter liked that or not. At the time, the assumption of the title of Great King by the Parthian king certainly was not an attempt to refer back to the Achaemenids. It referred to the Seleukids, albeit in a negative way. The use of imperial titlature was a claim to have succeeded the Seleukids as the overlords of the civilized world by right of victory.⁶⁰

VI. Conclusion

The reason why it is so difficult to find a precise date for the secession of the Parthian kingdom from the Seleukid Empire in the 3rd century is simply that the Parthian kingdom did not secede from the Seleukid Empire in the 3rd century. It was not until the 140s that the Parthians conquered the Seleukid core provinces of Media and Babylonia (though not Syria) and thereby terminated the existence of the Seleukid Empire as a great power. Before that time, Parthians may have been the most uncontrollable vassals the Seleukids ever had, but they were vassals nonetheless. The real breakaway of 'Parthia' must be placed after the death of Antiochos III, whose prestige had suffered badly from his defeat at the Battle at Magnesia, or perhaps even later – after the death of Antiochos IV in 164.

Between the death of Antiochos III in 187 and the Seleukid-Parthian wars of the 140s and 130s, the Seleukids gradually lost control of the Iranian plateau (though they remained in control of Western Iran until 140); but they retained even during that period strong claims to be imperial suzerains in Iran and Central Asia.⁶¹ Even if we accept the assumption that Arsakid rulers were aiming to control the Iranian plateau in the first half of the 2nd century, this still does not exclude the parallel existence of rival claims to (and local support for) empire from the side of the Seleukids. As late as 148, only a year or so before the Parthians overran Media, a Seleukid governor in Ekbatana, who was charged with the overlordship of the 'Upper Satrapies' – meaning not just Media (which this governor effectively controlled) but nominally the entire land mass east of the Zagros Mountains, including Baktria and Sogdia, has been attested in a contemporaneous document.⁶² Seleukid and pro-Seleukid imperial networks east of the Zagros Range were still operational at that time. Indeed, as late as 140, the ruler of Baktria contributed troops for a major Seleukid campaign, as we have seen above. The southern lines of communication connecting Central Asia to the central parts of the Seleukid Empire at that time apparently were not yet controlled by the Parthians, nor was the sea route that linked the Persian Gulf via the Indus Valley to Baktria. Indeed, the last attempt of the Seleukids to recover the Upper Satrapies took place as late as 130/29, and ended when Antiochos VII Sidetes was slain in battle in the winter of that same year.

The idea that the Parthians seceded from the empire under Arsakes I, and Justin's claim that the Parthians venerated this event 'with great solemnity, as the date of the commencement of their liberty', is contradicted by Arsakid coinage before the conquest of Media in 141. The Parthian kings only claimed to have succeeded the Seleukids as Great Kings when Mithradates I acquired that title on the same grounds as Alexander the Great had previously obtained this status: by right of victory, after having defeated its previous holder, Demetrios II, in battle. Mithradates may have assumed the title of Great King when he took Demetrios II captive in 139. It was only about 100 BC when the Parthian monarchy introduced its own imperial time reckoning on royal coinage: the Parthian Era, which retrospectively dated the foundation of the empire to the reign of Arsakes I; before this, the Seleukid Era continued to be used.⁶³ It is hard not to see this backdating as a form of invention of tradition.

It has not been my intention to advocate a strong view of the Seleukid Empire. The early Roman emperors, who inherited the Seleukid system of vassal states (called 'client kingdoms' by historians studying the Roman

Near East), were able to appoint and dismiss sub-kings from a distance, from Rome. This chapter aimed to foreground Seleukid *resilience* until the mid-2nd century, as an alternative to the teleological paradigm of decline. By changing its internal power structures, the Seleukid Empire under Seleukos II, Antiochos III, and Antiochos IV was able to overcome the severe crises that confronted the dynasty. Although the Seleukid dynasty ultimately failed to continue its domination of the Middle East, Iran and Central Asia after 150, this failure had causes other than growing internal political diversity. Indeed, the political organization of the Middle East as in part a complex system of autonomous vassal kingdoms unified by the charisma of a ‘Great King’ and a vigorous universalistic ideology persisted in both the Roman and the Parthian empires – and this is one of the enduring contributions of the Seleukids to the development of both Roman rule and Iranian monarchy.

Notes

¹ All dates hereafter are BC unless otherwise indicated. By ‘Parthia’ I mean the satrapy in the north of Iran, part of the greater region of Khorasan (Parthava, Parthyene). The modernistic use of ‘Parthia’ as a synonym for the Arsakid Empire falsely gives the impression that the empire was a single unified state or nation. For the location of the satrapy see Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 84–5. The most apt modern name for the empire is ‘Arsakid’, for it was a dynastic project. On the actual organisation of the Arsakid Empire as a multiform conglomerate of polities and peoples (not unlike the Seleukid Empire) see Fowler 2010, cf. Keall 1994. Because of their association with this satrapy, the Parni already in Antiquity were known as ‘Parthians’. The nature of Parni ethnicity is still badly understood, as is their relationship with the dynasty; the Arsakids probably relate to ‘Parthians’ more or less like the Achaemenids related to ‘Persians’ or the Seleukids to ‘Macedonians’, *i.e.* as a ‘conquest clan’ originally associated with a specific territory or ethnos that under the empire developed into a more open aristocracy or military people deriving its identity primarily from its association with the dynasty. On the Parni/Parthians as a people (perhaps originally a nomadic war band) see further below.

² Wolski 1993, 51; Wolski 1947, 13–70, esp. 32–7; Wolski 1956–57, 35–52; Koshelenko and Pilipko 1994, 131–50, esp. 131–2; Lerner 1999. A contrary view had already been expressed by Frye 1963, 173.

³ Just. 41.4.4–5; translation Yardley 1994, 255–6. A second important source for the Parthian revolt is Strabo 11.9.2, cited below.

⁴ van Wickevoort Crommelin 1998, 259–77, esp. 261–3.

⁵ Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 84–90.

⁶ Lerner 2004; on the integration of Baktria into the Indian Ocean trade system of the late hellenistic period see Mairs 2012.

⁷ Assar 2003; also see below.

⁸ Just. 41.4.10: quem diem Parthi exinde sollemnem velut initium libertatis observant.

⁹ See e.g. Wolski 1969, 275–80: ‘Parthien [gehörte] zur Zeit der Invasion Arsakes nicht zur syrischen Monarchie, sondern [bildete] einen unabhängigen Staat, der während des 3. syrischen Krieges (245) und als Folge des Aufstandes des Satrapen Andragoras entstanden war’ [‘Parthia at the time of Arsakes’ invasion did not belong to the Syrian monarchy but was an independent state, that had come into existence during the Third Syrian War in 245, as a result of the rebellion of the satrap Andragoras’] (p. 279).

¹⁰ In fact, Seleukos died in 226 or 225 after a fall from his horse (Just. 27.3.12). For a general overview of this king’s reign see my entry on ‘Seleukos II Callinikos’ in the *Encyclopaedia Iranica* online (2015 [2008])

¹¹ Alternative dates (241–238 BC) have been proposed by Assar and Bagloo 2006, 25–35.

¹² Lerner 1999, 37.

¹³ The image that the Seleukid Empire, like Alexander’s empire, was too big and too weak from the start, and therefore doomed to disintegrate, pervades conventional historiography of the 20th century; for some influential expressions see e.g. Will 1979, 281–90; Musti 1984, 210–20; Green 1990, 555. Bevan 1902b sees the empire as potentially strong but ascribes decline to the Seleukids’ increasing tendency to become ‘oriental despots’.

¹⁴ Dynastic infighting is often considered a fundamental weakness of the Seleukid Empire, but as Wright 2011, 41–6, reminded us, the War of the Brothers was in fact a singular occurrence in Seleukid history: with the exception of a brief incident between Philip I and Demetrios III, it is the only known instance of a military conflict between two brothers; dynastic wars between rival branches of the imperial family, much farther removed from each other, began only after the death of Antiochos IV in 164 BC.

¹⁵ Sinopoli 1994, 167. For the post-conquest distribution of land and booty to military leaders in the hellenistic empires see Roussel 1934, 40 and 46; Feyel 1935; Pouilloux 1960, 27–32; Orth 1977, 170; Wörrle 1978, 207; Hatzopoulos 1988 and 1999. On land ownership and land distribution in the Seleukid Empire in general consult van der Spek 1986; Mileta 2008. See now also D’Agostini 2013.

¹⁶ Cf. Sinopoli 1994, 168: ‘When geographic expansion ends, the costs of maintaining empires soon exceed their material benefits. This may lead to a range of outcomes, including sacrifice of some territories in order to maintain a strongly ruled central core, emergence of new forms of organization, or political collapse.’ On the paradox of power in the hellenistic empires see Strootman 2017a.

¹⁷ The concept was successfully employed by Duindam 1995 to criticize Norbert Elias’ view of the royal court as an instrument to pacify the nobility; though writing specifically about France in the age of Absolutism, Duindam notes that ‘it appears to be a universal principle that handing out favours is temporarily effective as an instrument of power, but eventually burdens the dispenser with newly-established interest-groups’ (p. 50). An interesting multipolar geopolitical dimension may be added through the use made of this term by De Vries 2007, 467–72; in understanding the cultural history of local settlements in what used to

be called Rome's imperial 'periphery', De Vries envisages 'a two- (multi)directional flow of influences, not so much between center (Rome) and periphery (frontier), but between two centers' (p. 468). According to Max Weber, as summarized by Bendix 1960, 347–351 (and I owe this reference to Arch Getty): 'When these office-holders become local dignitaries who constitute themselves as a status group of notables, they may be able to prevail over the ruler and his personal dependents. ... The decline of central authority is also furthered by the officials' physical distance from the center of authority. ... Patrimonial rulers, however, do not accept such fragmentation of their authority without resistance'.

¹⁸ See e.g. Aksan 2007; Barkey 2008; Murphey 2008.

¹⁹ Strootman 2011a, 63–89. Antiochos III, more than any of his predecessors, created vassal kingdoms along the northern and eastern fringes of the empire, often ruled by local, Iranian dynasties. By aligning his house with Iranian aristocratic families, Antiochos was able to break the power of the established Macedonian imperial elite. Also see Engels 2011 and 2014; Strootman 2012 and 2015.

²⁰ See most recently Grajetzki 2011, 10; cf. Will 1979, 281–90; Walbank 1981, 123.

²¹ Baktria, too, remained far more incorporated into Seleukid imperial networks than conventional scholarship assumes, as is argued by Wenghofer in this volume (also see Dumke 2014; Wenghofer and Houle 2016; Strootman 2017b); cf. McAuley, this volume, on Asia Minor.

²² The cuneiform evidence is discussed by Assar and Bagloo 2006.

²³ E.g. Musti 1984, 175–220, esp. 219–220.

²⁴ Brodersen 1986, 378–81, esp. 380.

²⁵ For the possibility that Seleukos II conducted two campaigns, the first when he was still co-ruler next to his father, Antiochos II, see below. The year 259 in the western Mediterranean saw Regulus' invasion of Africa, cf. van Wickevoort Crommelin 1998, 263, arguing that Trogus for dramatic effect attempted to synchronize the establishment of the Parthian Empire and the beginning of Roman overseas expansion in the First Punic War.

²⁶ Musti 1984, 219–220; against this view, and in favour of a 'low dating' for the War of the Brothers, see Brodersen 1986.

²⁷ Assar and Bagloo 2006.

²⁸ E.g. Just. 11.15.2; 12.4.12; 13.4.23. For the satrapy, and its importance for the Parni, see above, n. 1.

²⁹ Justin 41.3.1–9, transl. Watson. Arsakes is described in a similar vein as a war leader of the charismatic type rather: '[he was] a man of uncertain origin, but of undisputed bravery, who happened to arise at this time; he was accustomed to live by plunder and depredations' (41.4.6–7). This view is also held by M. Eiland, 'Parthians in Nineveh: Identifying a nomadic administration' (2003), available online at www.parthia.com (last accessed 17-07-2016). Though the Parni originally may have emerged among the conglomerate of Central Asian people called Dāha on the Daivā inscription of Xerxes at Persepolis (*XPb* 3, Schmitt 2000, 88–95; cf. Bivar 1983, 27), and spoke an Iranian language 'midway between Median and Scythian' (Just. 41.1), Eiland rightly cautions that it would be a mistake to assume that all Parthians were Iranian nomads from Turkmenistan, and that they

remained ethnically ‘pure’, as conventional scholarship often maintains, claiming instead that ‘the Parthians were probably a mixture of ethnic groups that shared common cultural features’, comparable to e.g. the Cossacks of early modern history. Eiland also draws attention to the fact that a distinctive costume for Parthian women is absent from Parthian material culture: all female figures in the (Mesopotamian) archaeological record of the Parthian period wear generic hellenistic-style ‘urban’ clothing, in contrast to the abundantly attested style of costume of the typical Parthian male warrior – an indication too that the original Parni were a flexible group of mounted warriors who took local wives in the areas where they settled (cf. the considerable discrepancy between men and women in the Justin passage cited here).

³⁰ Hauser 2005; the image later was adopted and adapted by the first Sasanian kings in order to frame Arsakid misrule as fundamentally different from their own civilized and well-ordered empire. On the in fact strong degree of continuity from Arsakid to Sasanian rule see now Alram, Curtis, Daryaei, Pendleton 2016. On the Roman image of the Parthians see Lerouge-Cohen 2007 and Schneider 1998, cf. *id.* 2007.

³¹ E.g. Mitchiner 1973, type 19, 1, a rare gold stater attributed to ‘Andragoras’ (not ‘*King* Andragoras’) on the reverse but showing the diademed head of a bearded man on the obverse; other coinage presumably struck by Andragoras carries Aramaic legends, which is indicative of a local king rather than a contender challenging the Seleukid emperor; on this coinage see Wolski 1969.

³² See also Wenghofer, this volume.

³³ On these so-called ‘Prologues’ see van Wickevoort Crommelin 1998, 259–60, with further literature.

³⁴ The best study of these sources is now Shayegan 2011; cf. the papers collected in the landmark volume Wiesehöfer 1998.

³⁵ On these trends in recent historiography see Strootman MS, a 2012 discussion paper, available as downloadable pdf on my homepage at www.academia.edu.

³⁶ E.g. Lerner 1999, 35–6; on Seleukos II’s bearded coin portraits see Lorber and Iossif 2009, who convincingly identify a campaign-beard, ‘an outward token of a vow to a god or gods to ensure the success of a particular military campaign’; cf. Wright 2013, adducing new evidence and additional arguments in support of the interpretation that Seleukos’ beard ‘was seemingly the visible expression of a vow to defeat the Parthians, not an advertisement of his defeat and humiliation’ (p. 22).

³⁷ Drijvers 1998, 278–92.

³⁸ See Engels, this volume.

³⁹ Just. 36.3: ‘the peoples of the East..., after growing used to the old empire of the Macedonians, they found [Parthian rule] difficult to bear’.

⁴⁰ In recent approaches to premodern empire, the key words in definitions of ‘empire’ are *networks*, *diversity*, and *change*. Thus, Barkey 2008, 9, defines empire as ‘a large composite and differentiated polity linked to a central power by a variety of direct and indirect relations. ... These relations are, however, regularly subject to negotiations over the degree of autonomy of intermediaries in return for military and fiscal compliance’. Similar approaches can be found in e.g. D’Altroy 2001, 125–7: ‘The outstanding feature of preindustrial empires was the continually

metamorphosing nature of relations between the central powers and the societies drawn under the imperial aegis' (p. 125) and Härmäläinen 2008, 441: 'intersecting, often shifting networks of power [rather] than rigidly structural polities.' Diversity is stressed by *inter alia* Sinopoli 1994, 159–80: 'geographically and politically expansive polities, composed of a diversity of localized communities and ethnic groups' (p. 159), and Howe 2002, 15: 'Empires must by definition be big, and they must be composite entities. ... Diversity – ethnic, national, cultural, often religious – is their essence'. Bang and Bayly 2011, 12, emphasize political diversity too: 'premodern empires normally had miniscule provincial administrations, and power was often segmented and loosely organized'; Dominic Lieven more succinctly said that, 'the relationship between an Achaemenid emperor and his regional satraps in many ways has more in common with George W. Bush's relations with the King of Saudi Arabia than with an American state governor' (D. Lieven, 'Empire's place in international relations', at www.lse.ac.uk/collections/european_institute/articles; last accessed 01-03-2008). The Seleukids had a similar relationship with the kingdoms of Bithynia and Baktria: they did not 'rule' these but could call upon them to send troops for the king's army.

⁴¹ For a comprehensive overview consult Capdetrey 2007; also see Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993; Engels 2014a.

⁴² See Bang 2011, 171–192, arguing that because premodern agrarian empires claimed unity but were never in a position to really homogenize their realms, they accentuated the paradox, emphasizing universality to make sense of diversity; cf. Bang and Kołodziejczyk 2012. On universalistic ideology in the hellenistic empires see Strootman 2007, 352–7; 2011a; 2014b, and esp. 2010, discussing the use of universalistic royal titles as a means to create ideological coherence in the Seleukid world of vassal kings and satellite states, and the endurance of the Seleukid make-up of the Near East under Roman rule (the so-called 'client kingdoms'). On hellenistic imperial universality also see Bang 2012; specifically on the use of the universalistic imperial title Great King by the Seleukids see Engels 2014b, 336–41 and Strootman in press.

⁴³ Cf. Mann 1986, 10: 'The unitary, highly centralized imperial societies of writers like Wittfogel or Eisenstadt...is mythical'. There is indeed no evidence that the Seleukid Empire was ever administered from anywhere other than the (itinerant) court – or one of several courts, as the heir and co-ruler who was sometimes appointed to rule the Upper Satrapies had a second court around him (and presumably a second field army, at least in the 3rd century), as well as sometimes the king's first wife, as in the case of Seleukos I and Apama, and Antiochos III and Laodike.

⁴⁴ Unlike other historians, ancient historians sometimes distinguish 'empire' from 'hegemony', but with the exception perhaps of the Roman Empire, such a distinction obscures rather than clarifies the multifarious forms of imperial rule in the ancient world. Thus Braunert 1964, 80–104, distinguished between *Imperialismus* and *Hegemonie*, where the latter term is understood as the supremacy of one state over another, and projected the model of modern European colonialism on the 3rd-century Ptolemaic Empire by conceptualizing Egypt as a nation state of sorts and the other parts of the empire as its 'overseas possessions', where raw materials

were obtained for the colonial ‘motherland’; there is however no evidence that the Ptolemies invested the income (if any) they derived from their empire specifically in Egypt – quite the contrary: they rather seemed to have used the riches of the Nile Valley and the Fayum to finance their maritime power. Braunert in the early 1960s had very little literature about empire at his disposal, but he does cite Rostovtzeff 1956, I, 54, who already understood that imperialism in the ancient world was not only the pursuit of territorial expansion but also the search for political hegemony and the wish to play a leading role in the political life of the civilised world in general (p. 80–1). But still Vogelsang 1992, 304–15, while convincingly evaluating the nature of Achaemenid imperialism in Central Asia as ‘recognition by local rulers of the overlordship of the... Achaemenid sovereign, with personal ties established by marriage or other connections, cemented by gifts’, maintains that this is ‘hegemony’ *in opposition to* ‘empire’, where the latter apparently is understood as direct, state-like control. Mueller 2006, 42, unfortunately does the same by disputing the validity of the word ‘empire’ for the Ptolemaic thalassocracy of the 3rd century in favour of ‘Ptolemaic sphere of influence’. Both Vogelsang’s and Mueller’s are important, path-breaking studies; my point is, that if contemporaneous sources tell us that ancient imperialism is something quite different from preconceived, modernistic definitions, this compels us to reconsider the definition, not the evidence. To be sure, virtually all modern studies of Eurasian empires after Antiquity describe and define empire in terms of diversity, including multifarious forms of indirect rule, hegemonial control and even alliances (see n. 40, above).

⁴⁵ This process has been most extensively described by Engels 2011, 19–36, and 2014. For the Seleukid Empire as a system of (non-Greek) vassal states see also Capdetrey 2007, 112–33, and Strootman 2010, 139–58.

⁴⁶ Strootman 2011a.

⁴⁷ So already Bevan 1902a, 241–44, followed by Spranger 1958, 22–58, esp. 29–33. For the chronology of Antiochos III’s use of imperial titulature see Ma 1999, 271–6.

⁴⁸ See McAuley and D’Agostini in this volume.

⁴⁹ See now Strootman 2017b, with further literature and references to the sources; the new view of the later Seleukid Empire as a system of vassal states to my best knowledge goes back to Strootman 2010 and 2011a, and Engels 2011; for a different view of Seleukid ‘indirect’ rule see Capdetrey 2010.

⁵⁰ No marriage alliance was created between the Seleukids and the Arsakids, until a century later the Parthian kings in their turn became the imperial overlords, and Rhodogune, daughter of the Great King Mithradates I, was given in marriage to the defeated and captured Seleukid king Demetrios II, reversing the hierarchy. On *philia* and imperial integration in the hellenistic world see Strootman 2014a with further literature.

⁵¹ Wiesehöfer 1994; cf. Wiesehöfer 2011, 107–22.

⁵² Engels 2013; Strootman 2016.

⁵³ But see Engels 2013, arguing that this diadem ‘also may allude to the Achaemenid custom of singling out the king’s *syngeneis* by conceding to them the right of wearing a diadem, which would imply that the Frataraka wanted to claim

a status as former Achaemenid and probably also current Seleukid courtiers in order to legitimate their power?.

⁵⁴ See above, note 1.

⁵⁵ On the methodological difficulties entailed by the idea of a 'Persian Revival' as an anti-Seleukid phenomenon (in which 'Seleukid' is equated with 'Greek') see Strootman 2011b; on 'Persianism' as a form of cultural memory in the later hellenistic period and beyond see Strootman 2017b.

⁵⁶ On the Seleukids and Iran see now Plischke 2014.

⁵⁷ In fact, we do not even know the *approximate* dates of this king, who is to the Parthian Empire what Cyrus the Great is to the Persian Empire or Seleukos Nikator to the Seleukid; see Assar 2005, proposing a radically revised chronology (165/4–132 BC).

⁵⁸ Canepa 2014 and 2016; Strootman 2016.

⁵⁹ For the titles featuring on Arsakes' coinage see Olbrycht 2011; also see Shayegan 2016.

⁶⁰ Strootman 2013; Strootman in press. On Arsakid imperial titulature see above all Shayegan 2011. On the campaigns and conquests of Mithradates see Dąbrowa 2006; Olbrycht 2010.

⁶¹ Compare Jos., *AJ* 13.185, stating that in 140 BC it was Demetrios II's final aim to reconquer all the Upper Satrapies, and that 'Greeks and Macedonians living in this region were in fact continually sending envoys to him, promising to go over to him, if he would come to them, and to join him in making war on Arsakes, the king of the Parthians.'

⁶² Robert 1963, 76; cf. Luschey 1996, 59–60. In Diodoros' account of the Macedonian empire in 318 BC, the Upper Satrapies consisted of seven satrapies, *viz* Persis, Karmania, Arachosia, Paropanisos, Drangiana, Baktria (with Sogdia), and India (Diod. 19.14.1–8); Diod. 18.39.5–7 (on the Triparadeisos arrangement) also includes Media, Parthia (with Hyrkania), and Areia (combined with Karmania), cf. Just. 13.4.9–25.

⁶³ Frye 1963, 175. The beginning of the Parthian (or Arsakid) Era is 1 Mīhr = 1 Nīsānu (14/15 April) 247 BC (Assar 2003; cf. Bickerman 1943–44; Korn 2006).

RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HELLENISTIC BAKTRIA AND THE SELEUKID EMPIRE

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Hellenistic scholars have long held that Baktria-Sogdiana, comprising roughly modern Afghanistan and southern Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, had broken away from the Seleukid Empire and established a fully independent kingdom by the middle of the third century BC. According to the consensus view, after the death of Alexander the Great, control of Baktria changed hands several times before coming under the rule of the Seleukids at the end of the fourth century BC, only to be lost to their local satraps, Diodotos I and II, at some point near the middle of the third century BC, from which time Baktria-Sogdiana became a fully independent, politically sovereign kingdom. However, new evidence relating to ancient Baktria, as well as some rather significant reinterpretations of existing evidence, must now force us to reconsider what this independence actually entailed and to re-examine the relationship of an independent hellenistic Baktria to the wider Seleukid Empire. The reappraisal undertaken below will demonstrate that Baktria, though nominally independent by about 250 BC, nonetheless remained a loyal Seleukid vassal state down to the early to mid second century BC, with one brief period of rebellion between ca. 239/8 BC and 229/8 BC. More importantly, this revised view of the relationship of hellenistic Baktria to the wider Seleukid Empire in the third and second centuries BC can also shed some much-needed light on how the Seleukid monarchs managed the eastern frontiers of their empire.

I. The common view of Baktrian independence: a critique

The scant evidence for affairs in Baktria after the death of Alexander III has led to considerable disagreement and confusion over when and how Baktria emerged as an independent Greco-Macedonian kingdom in the third century BC.¹ The literary references are extremely few, lacking detail, and seemingly contradictory at times. Much of what has been discovered thus far about hellenistic Baktria therefore rests mainly on numismatic evidence,² although discoveries in the areas of epigraphy and archaeology³

promise to shed more light on this important hellenistic kingdom in Central Asia. The most common approach to reconstructing events in hellenistic Baktria has been to try to coordinate the numismatic evidence with the scant literary evidence in order to establish a rough chronology and basic outline of a political history for the region. Unfortunately agreement, let alone certainty, has eluded most attempts owing mainly to confusion over a critical passage in Justin that is typically used as an anchor for establishing the beginning of Baktrian independence, confusion compounded by a rather problematic interpretation of the political significance of some of the earliest Diodotid coinage.

As Baktrian coins have no dating system, historians have been forced to rely upon the above-mentioned passage in Justin when trying to date the beginnings of Baktrian independence from the Seleukids. Unfortunately, Justin is notoriously sloppy when it comes to chronology as his rather convoluted reference to Baktria demonstrates. In his narrative on the growth of Parthian independence under Arsakes I Justin touches on the revolt of Baktria:

After the death of Alexander the Great, when his rule of the East was divided among his successors, the rule of the Parthians was handed to Stassanor, a foreign ally, since no one of the Makedonians considered it worthy. Afterward, when the Makedonians were led into civil war, they followed Eumenes together with the rest of the peoples of Upper Asia, [and] when he was conquered, they crossed over to Antigonos. After him they were possessed by Seleukos Nikator and Antiochos and [their] successors, from whose great-grandson Seleukos they first revolted in the First Punic War in the consulship of L. Manlius Vulso and M. Atilius Regulus. Discord of the two brothers Seleukos and Antiochos gave them impunity for this revolt, [and] while they wished to snatch the kingdom intact from one another, they neglected to pursue the rebels. At the same time Theodotus [i.e. Diodotos I], satrap of the thousand cities of the Baktrians, revolted and ordered that he be called king, which example the people of the entire East followed and revolted from the Makedonians. There was at this time one Arsakes, a man of uncertain origin, but of proven courage. This man, being accustomed to live by brigandage and rapine, when the news had been received that Seleukos had been defeated by the Gauls in Asia, being freed from fear of the king, having attacked the Parthians with a force of bandits, crushed their satrap Andragoras, and once he had been destroyed, undertook the rule of the nation [i.e. of the Parthians]. Then, not much later, for a time he also occupied the kingdom of the Hyrkanians, and so thus endowed with the rule of two states, he prepared a grand army out of fear of Seleukos [i.e. Seleukos II] and Theodotus [i.e. Diodotos I] king of the Baktrians. But, having been freed by the sudden death of Theodotus, he made an alliance and a peace with his son, who was also Theodotus [i.e. Diodotos II], and not much later, when

he had gone out to meet with Seleukos who had come in order to pursue the rebels, he was the victor. This day henceforth the Parthians observe as solemn, as though it were the beginning of their liberty.⁴

In the passage above Justin gives us several possible dates for the Parthian revolt under Arsakes which he notes occurred ‘at the same time’ (*eodem tempore*) as the Baktrian revolt. The first date Justin gives is the consulship of Lucius Manlius Vulso and Marcus Atilius Regulus. The *Consular Fasti* lists a pairing of *Caius* Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vulso for the year 250 BC.⁵ Justin’s substitution of ‘Marcus’ for ‘Caius’ is a small enough error and need not concern us.⁶ More serious is Justin’s addition that the conflict between Seleukos and Antiochos, presumably the war between Seleukos II Kallinikos and Antiochos Hierax, the so called *War of the Brothers*, traditionally dated to 241–225 BC, procured impunity for the rebels. This places the Parthian revolt well outside of the consulship of Regulus and Vulso. Appian locates the Parthian revolt in the immediate aftermath of the death of Antiochos II in 247/6 BC, as do Eusebios and Jerome.⁷ Justin’s convoluted chronology has, therefore, led modern scholars to prefer either the higher consular dating for the Baktrian revolt of around 256–250 BC⁸ or the lower dating tied to the death of Antiochos II in 246 BC.⁹ The only other mention of the Diodotid revolt is in Strabo’s *Geography* and this is of little assistance as Strabo provides no chronological point of reference.¹⁰ The chronological confusion in Justin is moreover compounded by the rather curious nature of the evidence from Diodotid coinage.

Only two names appear on all Diodotid coins, with some bearing the legend BASILEWS ANTIOXOU (of king Antiochos),¹¹ while others are inscribed with BASILEWS DIODOTOU (of king Diodotos).¹²



Fig. 1. Diodotid silver tetradrachm in the name of King Antiochos.
Coin India: <http://www.coinindia.com/MIG064f-Diodotos-136.16.jpg>



Fig. 2. Diodotid silver tetradrachm in the name of King Diodotos.
Coin India: <http://www.coinindia.com/MIG074c-Diodotos-626.28.jpg>

Both sets of coins bear the same reverse type of Thundering Zeus which is not found among the Seleukid repertoire of reverse types ascribed by numismatists to Baktrian mints,¹³ but is the only reverse type found on all Diodotid silver coinage.¹⁴ As Antiochos II is the last Seleukid monarch who is known to have minted coins in Baktria¹⁵ and since no Seleukid monarch had visited Baktria between the death of Antiochos II and the anabasis of Antiochos III, the logical tendency among most historians and numismatists has been to place the coins bearing the legend BASILEWS ANTIOXOU first in the series of Diodotid coinage in the belief that these were minted by Diodotos I on behalf of Antiochos II while the former was still merely satrap in Baktria, and then to try to assemble the rest of the coins into a relative chronological order through die linking and portrait analysis.¹⁶

The most widely cited study of Diodotid coinage to date is that offered by Frank L. Holt in his landmark 1999 publication *Thundering Zeus: The Making of Hellenistic Baktria*.¹⁷ In this work Holt conducts a rather exhaustive study of Diodotid silver coinage. Holt divided the Diodotid silver coinage into six series (series A–F) based on legends, portraiture, reverse designs, control marks, and die linkages, and used these taxonomic criteria to assign each series to one of two possible Baktrian mints (mint A and B).¹⁸ Holt then separates this silver coinage into two broad categories based on the name inscribed in the legend. As seen in the table below, the ‘Antiochos’ coins are represented by Holt’s series A, C, and E, while the ‘Diodotos’ coins are found in series B, D, and F.

Table 1

<i>Mint A</i>		<i>Mint B</i>	
<i>Old Portrait</i>	<i>Young Portrait</i>	<i>Old Portrait</i>	<i>Young Portrait</i>
A1 (Antiochos)			
A2			
A3			
A4			
A5			
A6	C1a (Antiochos)		
	C1		E1 (Antiochos)
			E2
			E3
			E4
A7	C2		E5
			E6 (Antiochos)
A8 (Antiochos)	C3 (Antiochos)		E7
			E8
			E9
	D1 (Diodotos)		F1 (Diodotos)
	D2		F2
	D3		F3
	D4		F4
	D5		F5
	D6		
	D7	B1 (Diodotos)	F6
	D8	B2	F7
		B3	F8

Adapted from F. Holt 1999: 92

Because the ‘Antiochos’ coins bear the Diodotid reverse type and a portrait that is not that of Antiochos II, Holt quite reasonably follows the general consensus in placing the ‘Antiochos’ coins earlier in time than the ‘Diodotos’ coins, thus confirming the view that the ‘Antiochos’ coins were minted by Diodotos I in the name of Antiochos II while he was still just a satrap of Baktria.¹⁹ The evidence to clinch the argument comes from very strong die linkages. According to Holt, the same obverse die was used to strike series F, 1–3 ascribed to Diodotos and E, 9 in the name of

Antiochos.²⁰ Holt thus finds confirmation for the established consensus and sees these 'Antiochos' coins as representing the first tentative steps of Diodotos I toward a gradual secession from Seleukid rule.²¹ Eventually, his son Diodotos II would feel strong enough to make the final changes presaged by the 'Antiochos' satrapal coinage and replace the name of Antiochos with his own. The conclusion thus reached by Holt and others is that at some point between 256 and ca. 239 BC, the year in which Diodotos is thought to have died, Diodotos I gradually moved towards open revolt from the Seleukid Empire, indicating his intentions by minting a series of coins in the name of Antiochos II but using his own diademed image and reverse type. Then, after the death of Diodotos I, his son and successor, Diodotos II openly proclaimed his kingship in Baktria, dropping the name of the Seleukid monarch from Baktrian coins altogether and replacing it with his own name accompanied by the title 'Basileus'. From this point forward, Baktria is believed to have severed its ties to the Seleukid Empire and to have become a fully independent kingdom in its own right.

But there are a number of problems with this reconstruction. First there is Justin's text which clearly states that it was under the first Diodotos that Baktrian independence was proclaimed.²² Holt, echoing Tarn, simply notes that Justin or his source must have been in error about which Diodotos first ruled as a fully independent king in Baktria.²³ In support of this contention Holt notes that he was unable to establish any die links between the 'Antiochos' coins and those he ascribes to Diodotos I, which he concludes were minted posthumously by Diodotos II in his father's honour, thus indicating that Diodotos I, contrary to Justin, never actually took the title of king himself.²⁴ But there is compelling evidence to prefer Justin on this point. In a recent re-examination of Holt's die links Jens Jakobsson has pointed out that the die links between Holt's series E (in the name of Antiochos) and F (in the name of Diodotos I), in the absence of obvious wear patterns, tell us that these series are chronologically adjacent to one another, but say nothing about which series is to be placed first and which one second.²⁵ Moreover, as Jakobsson notes, these 'Antiochos' coins 'do not resemble other semi-autonomous coinages' such as those of Philetairos, those issued by Ariaramnes of Cappadocia, or those issued by Magas of Kyrene.²⁶ More importantly, Jakobsson has identified several obverse types and control marks shared by the latest issues in the name of Antiochos and the earliest issues of Euthydemos I, the king who is known to have succeeded the Diodotids as ruler in Baktria.²⁷ As can be observed in the table below Jakobsson thus rearranges the order of the Diodotid coinage, placing the Antiochos coins last in the series rather than first and ascribes them to a third, hitherto unknown, Diodotid king Antiochos.

Table 2

<i>Mint B</i>	Holt Series B (Diodotos I) – Old	Holt Series F (Diodotos II) – Young	Holt Series E (Antiochos) – Young		
<i>Connections</i>		Obverse die links			
<i>Mint A</i>		Holt Series D (Diodotos II) – Young	Holt Series C (Antiochos) – Young	Holt Series A (Antiochos) – Old	Euthydemos I Early Series
<i>Connections</i>		Obverse die links		3 common monograms and very similar portraits	

Adapted from J. Jakobsson 2011, 27

In further support of Jakobsson's claim of the existence of a third Diodotid king we might turn to Polybios' account of the anabasis of Antiochos III and his prolonged and largely fruitless siege of Euthydemos I in Baktra (ca. 212–10 BC), the satrapal capital of hellenistic Baktria. Polybios notes that during negotiations to raise the siege, Antiochos III reproached Euthydemos for being a rebel, to which Polybios adds,

For Euthydemos was himself from Magnesia, and he defended himself asking him how it was just that Antiochos should be eager to cast him out from his kingdom. For he himself had not become a rebel to the king, but when others revolted, having risen against the descendants of those men, he thus held the rule of the Baktrians...²⁸

Now if this passage from Polybios is read in conjunction with the above passage from Justin, a clear and interesting picture begins to emerge. In our passage from Justin we can observe that when Arsakes I began his predatory raids into Parthia, he feared the combined forces of Seleukos II and Diodotos I who, according to Justin, is *already* king of Baktria at this time, a fact that finds support in the numismatic evidence if we accept Jakobsson's rearrangement of the Diodotid coinage. This must force us to conclude that Diodotos I and the Seleukid king were on good terms *after* the former had already been proclaimed king. Holt himself acknowledges that Diodotos I and Seleukos II do seem to enjoy friendly relations and this is why he feels that the first Diodotos never actually took the title *Basileus*.²⁹ Yet Justin is explicit. Diodotos I is already king when Arsakes attempts his first incursion into Parthia.

Polybios' remarks therefore support Justin's contention. Polybios has Euthydemos rebel against the kin (ἐγγόνους) of rebels. Now it is universally accepted that Euthydemos would have rebelled against Diodotos II. But Diodotos II could not be considered the kinsman of a rebel if his father Diodotos I was not considered one. This presupposes the existence of a third Diodotid king whom Jakobsson has identified as the 'Antiochos' on the Diodotid coin types, a theory that gains added support by the numismatic connections between the later coins of Antiochos and the earlier issues of Euthydemos I which can only mean that the latter succeeded the former and not Diodotos II. Moreover, this reconstruction makes better sense of the behaviour of the Seleukids toward Diodotid Baktria. If Diodotos I had minted coins in the name of the Seleukid Antiochos II which bore his own diademed image and reverse type as commonly supposed, it is difficult to see how this would not have posed an immediate challenge to Seleukid authority in Baktria. Yet no repercussions ensue from Antiochos II. Even after the death of Antiochos II, Diodotos I and Seleukos II still appear to be on good terms as we have just noted. The Seleukids thus could not have viewed Diodotos I as a rebellious satrap.

But the most significant confirmation that the Diodotid 'Antiochos' coins were not minted by Diodotos I on behalf of the Seleukid king comes from the commemorative medals of a later Baktrian king Agathokles (ca. 190–180 BC). Agathokles minted coins commemorating the rulers of Baktria stretching all the way back to Alexander the Great. Among these coins is a Diodotid type of Thundering Zeus bearing the legend BASILEWS ANTIOXOU NIKATOROS (of king Antiochos Nikator).³⁰



Fig. 3. Commemorative silver tetradrachm of Agathokles in the name of Antiochos Nikator: Coin India <http://www.coinindia.com/2616-Agathokles-ino-Antiochos-107.12.jpg>

The reverse type of thundering Zeus clearly identifies these coins as a commemoration of Diodotid rule, but the Antiochos named on the coin is commonly said to be Antiochos II.³¹ However, Antiochos II bore the epithet Theos, not Nikator and the reverse type is Diodotid and not Seleukid. Finally, there is no reason why Agathokles would have commemorated *satrapal* coinage which the 'Antiochos' coins would surely have been if they were issued by Diodotos while he was still only satrap of Baktria. The only logical conclusion is that the Antiochos commemorated on the coins of Agathokles is the unnamed king alluded to by Polybios, the same Antiochos who appears on the 'Antiochos' coins of the Diodotids and whom Jakobsson has placed after the reign of Diodotos II and before that of Euthydemos I.

The implications of Jakobsson's finds are therefore quite significant. The Antiochos coins were not minted by Diodotos I as a sort of halfway declaration of independence, a declaration that would not be openly proclaimed until the reign of his son and successor Diodotos II as is widely believed. The coins which Holt ascribes to Diodotos I (series B) must therefore be placed first among Diodotid coin issues. Significantly, these already bear the title *Basileus*, leading us to conclude that Diodotos I proclaimed himself king at a single stroke as Justin's account suggests and did not gradually drift toward rebellion while remarkably managing to avoid attracting the attention of the Seleukid kings. More importantly, the discovery of a third Diodotid king in Antiochos Nikator and the chronological rearrangement of the Diodotid coinage that this discovery necessitates must force us to reconsider the circumstances of Baktrian independence from direct Seleukid control and to explore precisely what the assumption of the diadem meant in light of the apparently amiable relations with the Seleukids after its assumption by Diodotos.

II. The 'independence' of Diodotid Baktria

The rearranged numismatic evidence allows us to make better sense of the seemingly contradictory stories told by Baktrian coins and of the scant literary evidence as well. Firstly, as noted above, this new perspective suggests that there was no gradual drift toward independence. Rather, Diodotos I became king of Baktria at a single stroke as per Justin and, as we shall demonstrate, must have done so with the full support and blessing of the Seleukid king. At least two of the three Diodotid kings of Baktria, Diodotos I and Antiochos Nikator, must in fact be regarded as loyal Seleukid vassals in Baktria. Second, the addition of a third Baktrian king in Antiochos Nikator allows us to make better sense of the story of Baktrian independence as it is narrated in our literary sources and allows us to alter

the chronology of events in Baktria so as to align them more closely with specific conditions prevailing in the wider Seleukid Empire.

First we must establish a timeline for the rise of the Diodotid monarchy in Baktria in light of this new evidence. For this we must return to Justin as he is the only source to provide us with specific dates. As we have seen, Justin gives us several dates and although this is somewhat confusing, it is possible to establish a workable chronology. To begin, it is important to note that Justin's narrative is about events in Parthia, not about Baktria *per se*. Justin simply uses the independence of Baktria in order to provide a chronological point of reference for events in Parthia which he describes as occurring *eodem tempore*. *Eodem tempore* ought never to be taken literally in Justin. Consider Justin's account of L. Mummius' destruction of Corinth at 34.2–3, an event generally thought to have occurred in 146 BC: but while referring to Mummius' destruction of Corinth, Justin notes 'while these things were happening' (*dum haec aguntur*) Antiochos (IV Epiphanes) attempted to invade Egypt but was turned back by the Roman ambassador Gaius Popillius Laenas, an event known to have occurred eighteen years earlier in 168 BC. Telescoping the chronology of events is thus one of the more infuriating idiosyncrasies of Justin and this is precisely what we have in his passage on events in Parthia. Significantly, however, a close reading will reveal that it was the independence of Baktria which, according to Justin, led the other peoples of the upper satrapies to revolt.³² Whether there was a causal relationship between the Diodotid claim to independence and the revolt *totius Orientis* is impossible to say. But what is clear is that the independence of Baktria occurred *before* the revolt of Arsakes I in Parthia. While it is true that there is some controversy over the precise chronology involved in the revolt of Arsakes I,³³ there can be no doubt that it occurred after the death of Antiochos II as per Appian *Syrian Wars* 65 and as confirmed by Eusebios and Jerome.³⁴ Arsakes I must therefore have revolted by 246 BC at the earliest.

This accords well enough with Justin's claim that the Parthian revolt occurred in the reign of Seleukos II and that the War of Brothers, traditionally dated to 241–225 BC, but which Coşkun revises to 246–241 BC so as to make it contemporaneous with the Laodikean War,³⁵ prevented Seleukos from immediately suppressing the revolt. Of the various chronological points of reference that Justin has given us, then, the only one that does not fit within the *terminus post quem* for the Parthian revolt is the consular date for Vulso and Regulus. As Justin has noted that Diodotos I achieved royal status in Baktria *before* the other peoples of the upper satrapies revolted, then the consular date must refer to Baktrian independence which Justin confusingly says had occurred *eodem tempore* as

the revolt of Arsakes. Diodotos I thus commenced his reign as king of Baktria in 250 BC in the consulships of Vulso and Regulus.

Moreover, that he did so with the approval of the Seleukid dynasty is also clear. First, if Diodotos I had made himself king in 250 BC contrary to Seleukid wishes, then one must wonder why no attempt was made to recover the upper satrapies until ca. 228/7 BC when Seleukos II moved to quell the revolts there. Even then, Seleukos' objective was Parthia not Baktria. In fact, no move was made to 'recover' Baktria until the anabasis of Antiochos III (ca. 212–205 BC) which is odd given the important position occupied by Baktria in the Seleukid Empire.³⁶ On the contrary, Arsakes I, after he had overrun Parthia and Hyrkania, feared the armies of Seleukos II and Diodotos I. As mentioned above, this would indicate that Diodotos and Seleukos were on good terms even though Diodotos had already adopted the title of *Basileus* as both Justin and the (revised) numismatic evidence clearly suggest.

The precise circumstances surrounding Diodotos' claim to royal status in Baktria are difficult to discern; however, there is enough evidence to allow for some reasonable if cautious speculation. Justin in his *Prologus* notes that Diodotos I repelled an invasion of Scythian nomads who managed to seize the satrapal capital of Baktra, thus earning him the epithet *Sōtēr*, a name which also appears on the coins of Agathokles commemorating the reign of Diodotos I.³⁷ In addition, the earliest coins of Diodotos I contain a wreath which is generally not taken as a mint mark owing to the fact that it also appears on Agathokles' commemorative medals of Diodotos I (see Figure 3 above),³⁸ thus leading Holt to conclude that such wreaths are 'patent numismatic signs of some great military victory,' which, he conjectures, must have involved a victory over Arsakes I in the 240s or 230s BC.³⁹ However, Strabo notes that some writers ascribe a Baktrian origin to Arsakes and adds that Arsakes fled Baktria owing to the growing power of Diodotos before fleeing to Parthia and causing it to revolt.⁴⁰ It seems a reasonable conjecture that Strabo's account of Arsakes' flight from Baktria and Justin's reference to Diodotos' reconquest of Baktra in his *Prologue* might even be taken to refer to the same event. Arsakes might have attempted to seize Baktra with the aid of Scythian allies. Foiled in his attempt by Diodotos I, he fled and undertook his revolt in Parthia which we know occurred a few years later in about 246 BC. Diodotos then, as Justin notes, liberated the satrapal capital and drove the insurgents out of Baktria, thus forcing Arsakes to flee to Parthia as per Strabo where he would stir up further rebellion several years later. If Arsakes' insurgency in Baktria occurred in or shortly before 250 BC, Diodotos might well have used such an occasion to demand a royal title.

Moreover, Antiochos II might well have been willing to acquiesce in this demand as he clearly needed a man with full royal authority to maintain Seleukid interests in the teeth of internal rebellions supported by incursions of nomadic Scythians along his eastern marches. Seleukos I had the benefit of a Baktrian wife in Apama, daughter of the Baktrian noble Spitamenes, who must have possessed personal ties with local potentates and this must have gone some way towards ensuring the loyalty of Baktria to the Seleukid house during his reign. Such local connections were certainly critical to governing Baktria successfully it seems, as Alexander's decision to marry Roxane would indicate.⁴¹ Seleukos I exercised control over his eastern frontiers by employing a joint kingship from 292–281 BC with Antiochos I, his son from the Baktrian Apama, when Antiochos I was given direct royal authority over the eastern satrapies. Antiochos II, however, was not afforded such a luxury and was, moreover, distracted by a serious crisis in the West of his empire in the Second Syrian War (260–253 BC), the final years of which must surely have aligned closely with Arsakes' rebellious activities in Baktria and with Diodotos' assumption of the diadem. If Diodotos I used the insurgency of Arsakes in Baktria and the subsequent Scythian incursions to demand a diadem, we can even see why Justin/Trogus might have chosen the word '*defecit*' (rebel) to describe Diodotos' action. In any case, whether Diodotos extorted the royal title from Antiochos II or whether the latter freely offered it, the behaviour of both kings subsequent to Diodotos' assumption of the diadem clearly indicated that Diodotos I remained a loyal Seleukid vassal, as he continued to support the Seleukids against the rebel Arsakes.

However, relations between the Seleukids and the Diodotids would not remain friendly for long. According to Justin, Diodotos I died shortly after the defeat of Seleukos II at the hands of the Gauls, presumably a reference to the Battle of Ankyra, an event traditionally dated to around 240/239 BC.⁴² Diodotos I was succeeded by his son Diodotos II according to Justin and the behaviour of Diodotos II upon his accession sheds further light on the precise nature of Seleukid-Diodotid relations. Justin notes that after the death of his father, Diodotos II immediately made peace and an alliance (*foedus ac pacem fecit*) with Arsakes I. Seleukos II would now have to face the combined forces of a much expanded Parthian power under Arsakes I, as well as those of Baktria, the erstwhile Seleukid ally. But this begs the question of how exactly Diodotos II would have benefited from this reversal of his father's policy toward Parthia and so towards the Seleukid house as well. Why the about face? A possible answer to this might lie in the reconfigured numismatic evidence proposed by Jakobsson.

As we have seen, Jakobsson has concluded that the Diodotid coins bearing the 'Antiochos' legend were minted not by Diodotos I as satrapal coinage, but by a third Diodotid king Antiochos Nikator and has linked these 'Antiochos' coins with the earliest issues of Euthydemos I, thus indicating that this Antiochos reigned after Diodotos II. If we posit the possibility that Diodotos II was not the legitimate heir to the Baktrian throne, then the policy of the second Diodotos is understandable. Jakobsson tantalizingly suggests that 'it is also possible that Diodotos I was trusted with the satrapy of Bactria because he was related to the Seleukids.'⁴³ The Seleukid use of marriage ties in order to extend political hegemony into various quarters of the empire is well documented.⁴⁴ It is thus a possibility that when Diodotos I was granted the right to style himself *Basileus* and mint his own coins by Antiochos II in 250 BC, his loyalty to the Seleukid house was ensured with a marriage to a woman of the Seleukid royal family. The notion of a marriage connection between the Seleukids and Diodotids was first suggested by W. W. Tarn in 1936,⁴⁵ but has since been widely rejected.⁴⁶ Tarn argued that it was Diodotos II who married an unnamed Seleukid princess and added that a daughter from this marriage was in turn married off to Euthydemos I. As mentioned, Tarn's position has been rightly rejected and there is certainly no positive evidence attesting to either marriage. Yet there is enough circumstantial evidence surrounding events in Bactria to make a marriage tie between the Seleukids and the Diodotids seem likely.

If Diodotos I married a Seleukid woman in about 250 BC as a condition of his assumption of the diadem, then it is reasonable to assume that any resulting male progeny would be expected to assume the diadem in their turn. It is also reasonable to surmise that Diodotos I might have given a male child resulting from such a marriage the name Antiochos in order to advertise his connection to the Seleukid house. As Jakobsson notes, 'there is a parallel in the minor kingdom of Commagene in Asia Minor, which was related to the Seleukids on the distaff side, and in which four kings were named Antiochos.'⁴⁷ If this son from his Seleukid bride is our Antiochos Nikator, who would have been perhaps ten or eleven years old in 240/39 BC when Diodotos I is thought to have died, and he was named heir to the Baktrian throne in place of his older half-brother Diodotos II, then we can understand why the latter would have reversed his father's policy regarding Parthia. It is perhaps even possible that the tension between Arsakes and Diodotos I recorded by Strabo resulted from Arsakes' support of Diodotos II against his father's intentions to pass the diadem to his younger son Antiochos. Not content either to act as regent or to be bypassed altogether, he staged a coup immediately upon the death of his father and for this

coup he would have needed allies which he found conveniently in Arsakes I who had slipped away to Parthia in order to raise a revolt there.

Our reconstruction has the added advantage of aligning the chronologies of a number of critical events in the Seleukid Empire with those in Baktria. Diodotos II can reasonably be said to have reigned for about ten years based on the number of his coin issues,⁴⁸ which means that he would have ruled Baktria from 240/39 to 230/29 BC based on our revised chronology for the assumption of the diadem by his father. Significantly, Holt notes that the Baktrian city of Aï Khanoum appears to have endured an attack around 225 BC, an event which he suggests might have been linked to the ‘emergence of Euthydemos’.⁴⁹ However, such an interpretation is ruled out of court by Jakobsson’s reconstruction. Jakobsson adopts the highest possible dating for the reign of Diodotos I and gives him a rather short reign as well (255–50 BC). This causes him to adopt a high dating for subsequent reigns so that he has Diodotos II reigning from 250–240 BC and Antiochos Nikator reigning from 240–225 BC.⁵⁰ In this way Jakobsson is able to coordinate the partial destruction of Aï Khanoum with the accession of Euthydemos I as per Holt. But if we assume that Justin erred in the consular date he provides, giving us a ‘Marcus Regulus’ instead of a ‘Caius Regulus’ as found in the *Consular Fasti*, then Diodotos I would have commenced his reign in 250 BC and died around 240/39 BC. If, then, Diodotos II, whose reign lasted approximately ten years, ruled until about 229 BC, or slightly later,⁵¹ we are close enough chronologically to the partial destruction of Aï Khanoum (ca. 225 BC) to tentatively link it to the overthrow of Diodotos II by the half-Seleukid Antiochos Nikator who would have been in his early twenties at this time. From this we would be forced to conclude that Diodotos II was a rebel against the Seleukids as the words of Polybios, noted above, indirectly imply and that his rule was brought to an end by his younger brother Antiochos. Indeed, a brief look at Jakobsson’s reconstruction of the Diodotid coinage (see Table 2 above) reveals that all the coins ascribed to Diodotos II contain a portrait of a young man, while the ‘Antiochos’ coins have portraits that age over time, which might be taken to mean that Diodotos II did not rule a long time as we might expect if he had been violently overthrown. If Euthydemos had overthrown Antiochos Nikator rather than Diodotos II, then he could indeed have claimed to have overthrown the kinsman of a rebel, however disingenuous a defence this might have been considering that Antiochos Nikator would have been seen as a legitimate Seleukid vassal king in his own right.

Our reconstruction of the events in Baktria from the accession of Diodotos I to the accession of Euthydemos I makes sense of both the

literary and numismatic evidence. But more importantly this reconstruction allows us to connect events in Baktria with those of the wider Seleukid Empire through the necessary alterations in the chronology of the Diodotid kings. As mentioned above, Diodotos I would have reigned from 250 BC until about 240/239 BC and Diodotos II from 240/239 BC until ca. 230/229 BC. Finally, Jakobsson assigns a reign of approximately fifteen years to Antiochos Nikator, which, on our modified chronology, gives him a reign running from 229/8 BC to about 214/13 BC. These dates align significantly with known Seleukid activities in the upper satrapies and perhaps even help to explain them.

First, if Diodotos I were a legitimate vassal king of Antiochos II, then the inaction of the latter when Diodotos assumed the diadem and started minting his coins in 250 BC needs no explanation. Upon his father's death in 240/39 BC, however, Diodotos II, resentful of being passed over as king, seized the diadem and immediately allied himself with Arsakes I, thus forestalling an attempt at recovery on the part of Seleukos II, who, as Justin notes, was in any case preoccupied with wars against Antiochos Hierax and Ptolemy III. Unfortunately, the fate of Antiochos Nikator at this stage is not knowable, but he must have been safely ensconced somewhere in Baktria-Sogdiana and likely surrounded by loyal satraps as he does ultimately become king in about 229/8 BC, probably after overthrowing his older half brother as the consistently youthful image of Diodotos II on his coins and the apparent violent attack on Aï Khanoum at about this same time both would seem to indicate. If Antiochos was the legitimate heir to the Baktrian throne because he was a Seleukid on the distaff side, then his victory over Diodotos II somewhere between 229 and 225 BC might well have been the decisive factor inducing Seleukos II to move against Parthia at precisely this same time. This is why Justin mentions Seleukos' attempt to recover Parthia at this time but says nothing about Baktria. Baktria by this point had returned to loyal vassal status under Antiochos Nikator, thus leaving Parthia vulnerable and ripe for recovery, stripped as it was of its powerful ally.

Moreover, on our revised chronology Euthydemos I would have overthrown Antiochos Nikator around 214–13 BC. This aligns chronologically quite neatly with the anabasis of Antiochos III into Baktria. As Polybios notes, Antiochos called Euthydemos a rebel which he would indeed have been if Antiochos Nikator whom he had just overthrown had been recognized by the Seleukids as their legitimate vassal in Baktria. It is therefore probable that Antiochos III marched into Baktria at this time not to recover a satrapy that had rebelled almost forty years earlier, but to recover a satrapy that had only just revolted from the legitimate Seleukid

vassal king Antiochos Nikator. The fact that Euthydemos did not claim to have overthrown a rebel, but the descendant of a rebel further supports this claim. It was, to be sure, a weak argument on the part of Euthydemos and one that Antiochos did not accept. This is ultimately why Euthydemos had to resort to threats of allowing the nomadic Scythian hordes to descend into Baktria in order to force Antiochos to recognize his claim to the diadem.⁵² Antiochos perceived the threat and saved face by proposing a marriage between one of his own daughters and Demetrius, a son of Euthydemos,⁵³ and thus, after extracting a formal treaty and receiving military tribute, he returned Baktria to the status of a client kingdom.

Diodotos I thus became king of Baktria in 250 BC just as Justin has suggested. That he did so by means of an agreement with the Seleukids is strongly indicated by the friendly relations between the Seleukid and Diodotid dynasties down to the death of Diodotos I and by Antiochos III's view of Euthydemos I as a rebel, an accusation that would make little sense if the Diodotids were likewise considered rebels. They were not. The only exception to this claim is Diodotos II. His alliance with Arsakes I would clearly have made him a rebel to the Seleukids. But it is clear that Diodotos I, Antiochos Nikator, Euthydemos I, and his son Demetrius I all held the diadem in Baktria as Seleukid vassal kings with Seleukid approval, even if that approval might have been a grudging one.

That the Seleukid kings should have employed sub-kings in the eastern marches of the empire should not be considered unusual as such a policy was not without precedent. Alexander left Porus with the title of king in India⁵⁴ and there is very good reason to believe that he would have left Dareios III himself with this same title in Persia.⁵⁵ Indeed, Seleukos I left Chandragupta Maurya with the title of king and, after he had contracted a marriage alliance with him, ceded part of Arachosia to him as well.⁵⁶ That Chandragupta was vassal king to Seleukos is suggested by the fact that he rendered military tribute to Seleukos as part of the treaty which recognized his royal status.⁵⁷ Thus Appian could legitimately claim, in spite of the handing over of part of Arachosia to Chandragupta, that Seleukos ruled a vast stretch of territory all the way up to the Indus.⁵⁸ It is not surprising then that Antiochos III would apply a very similar policy towards the Euthydemid kings during his anabasis. It is reasonable to conjecture, based upon the pattern of Seleukid behaviour toward their eastern satrapies and the few shreds of evidence pertaining to the accessions of Diodotos I and II, that a similar policy was employed by Antiochos II toward Baktria.

III. Implications for understanding the Seleukid Empire

What is clear is that too much has been read into Diodotos' minting of coins in his own name and his assumption of a royal title. The standard view of such a move on the part of a satrap is that it must represent a loss of Seleukid control to the rebellious dynast and therefore must also represent a weakness inherent in Seleukid methods of imperial control. Thus Graham Shipley makes the following observation regarding Seleukid methods of governance and control:

When Alexander defeated Dareios he took over the existing system of provinces ruled by satraps, usually Persian men though sometimes local nobles. Alexander appointed both Macedonians and occasionally Persians; Seleukos continued the practice. The Persian system had been designed to ensure the loyalty of the province – meaning, in effect, its ruling elite – as a reliable source of tribute and, when necessary, military manpower on the rare occasion of a major levy. The limited design meant that the Persians did not have to create a complex, interventionist administration; indeed, they seem to have had no aspirations to change the economy or society of a province, desiring to get out of it only what they wanted. The system, however, offered the satrap many opportunities to further his own power, even to the extent of refusing to pay tribute for a long time. If this happened a province could only be won back by military action on the part of the king.⁵⁹

But does every assumption of the royal title on the part of a satrap or a local dynast necessarily imply a rebellion? In clear cases of open rebellion such as those of Achaïos, of Molon or of Arsakes I, there followed almost immediate reprisals from the Seleukids.⁶⁰ But we hear of no attempt whatsoever to recover Baktria until the anabasis of Antiochos III, some thirty to forty years after Diodotos is thought to have revolted. However, as we have seen, there were clear precedents for granting kingship to a dynast in exchange for loyalty and tribute. Alexander exercised such a policy with respect to Porus, Seleukos I did so with regard to Chandragupta Maurya, and Antiochos III employed such a stratagem to retain the loyalty of Euthydemos I in Baktria itself. Given the apparently friendly relations between Diodotos I and Seleukos II and the lack of any attempt to recover Baktria by the latter, we must be correct in conjecturing that Antiochos II applied such a policy toward Diodotos I in the middle of the third century BC.

We must therefore regard the practice of securing the loyalty of local dynasts by conceding the title of king as a deliberate and considered policy on the part of the Seleukids for managing their Eastern frontiers. The Seleukid Empire was to a large degree one of influence, where the Seleukid

house sat at the centre of a series of personal bilateral relationships with various other dynasties and polities. David Engels, in a recent examination of the causes of the long Seleukid decline, has described the Seleukid Empire as a quasi-feudal sort of polity whereby a central power, in this case the Seleukid dynasty, has only limited control over local and regional officials whose position *perforce* often became hereditary and independent.⁶¹ This semi-feudal structure of imperial administration was, according to Engels and others, inherited from the Achaemenids.⁶² The Achaemenids certainly had a practice of employing sub- or vassal kings and regarding themselves as 'Great King' or 'King of Kings,' a practice which appears to have continued inside the independent kingdom of Baktria itself in the reign of Antimachos I as evidenced by a vellum tax receipt issued in the name of kings Antimachos and Eumenes.⁶³ Fascinatingly, while there are coins attesting to the reign of Antimachos I in Baktria,⁶⁴ there is no other evidence beyond this tax receipt itself for the reign of a king Eumenes. Gunnar Dumke thus warns us against concluding that the assumption of a diadem necessarily implies a declaration of sovereign independence.⁶⁵ The fact that the nominally independent kingdom of Baktria seems itself to have employed sub-kings ought to caution us against assuming that a local Seleukid dynast's adoption of this same title necessarily implied open revolt or true sovereign independence. Indeed, we might also surmise that the practice of employing sub- or vassal kings was simply the preferred mechanism of governance that kings of Baktria had taken over directly from the Seleukids who themselves had precedents for this form of imperial control in the practices of both Alexander and their Achaemenid predecessors.

Graham Shipley thus rightly cautions us against seeing the claim to royal status in over-legalistic terms.⁶⁶ This is sound advice. While Justin notes that Diodotos I revolted (*defecit*) from Seleukid rule, it seems probable that far too much importance has been placed on this single word. Justin likely chose this word because Diodotos no doubt used the political and military pressures that were confronting Antiochos II in order to demand a diadem. Moreover, in the relevant passage from Justin he is speaking mainly of the Parthian revolt, which appears to have been an actual revolt in the truest sense of *deficio*, thus causing considerable confusion in his narrative as he conflates events in Baktria with related events in Parthia, just as he does with the dates surrounding the 'independence' of these satrapies. We might therefore argue that if Diodotos I used the great difficulty that the Seleukids must have faced in exercising control over the distant marches of their empire in order to demand greater autonomy and perhaps even a diadem, then Justin's use of *deficio* to describe Diodotos' actions in Baktria

might even be arguably apropos if somewhat overstated. However, there is no reason to assume that this 'revolt' constituted a total and decisive break with the Seleukid Empire. On the contrary, the weight of the evidence would suggest that granting of a diadem was a well-established policy of the Seleukids for maintaining control over the eastern frontiers of their empire.

Notes

¹ On the problematic state of the literary sources for hellenistic Baktria and their interpretation cf. Holt 1999, 55–60; Lerner 1999; Coloru 2009.

² Although the bibliography on Greco-Baktrian numismatics is vast, the fullest and most up-to-date treatments can be found in Bopearachchi 1991; Holt 1999; and Kritt 2001.

³ For a general summary of the most current archaeological research on the hellenistic Far East cf. Mairs 2011, esp. Ch. 5.

⁴ Justin 41.4. Post mortem Alexandri Magni cum inter successores eius Orientis regna diuiderentur, nullo Macedonum dignante Parthorum imperium Staganori, externo socio, traditur. Postea diductis Macedonibus in bellum ciuile cum ceteris superioris Asiae populis Eumenen secuti sunt, quo uicto ad Antigonum transiere. Post hunc a Nikatore Seleuco ac mox ab Antiocho et successoribus eius possessi, a cuius pronepote Seleuco primum defecere primo Punico bello, L. Manlio Vulsone M. Atilio Regulo consulibus. Huius defectionis inpunitatem illis duorum fratrum regum, Seleuci et Antiochi, discordia dedit, qui dum inuicem eripere sibi regnum uolunt, persequi defectores omiserunt. Eodem tempore etiam Theodotus, mille urbium Baktrianarum praefectus, defecit regemque se appellari iussit, quod exemplum secuti totius Orientis populi a Macedonibus defecere. Erat eo tempore Arsaces, uir sicut incertae originis, ita uirtutis expertae. Hic solitus latrocinii et rapto uiuere accepta opinione Seleucum a Gallis in Asia uictum, solutus regis metu, cum praedonum manu Parthos ingressus praefectum eorum Andragoran oppressit sublatoque eo imperium gentis inuasit. Non magno deinde post tempore Hyrcanorum quoque regnum occupauit, atque ita duarum ciuitatum imperio praeditus grandem exercitum parat metu cum Seleuci et Theodoti, Baktrianorum regis. Sed cito morte Theodoti metu liberatus cum filio eius, et ipso Theodoto, foedus ac pacem fecit, nec multo post cum Seleuco rege ad defectores persequendos ueniente congressus uictor fuit; quem diem Parthi exinde sollemnem uelut initium libertatis obseruant.

⁵ *Consuls of the Roman Republic*, <http://www.ualberta.ca/~csmackay/Consuls.List.html> (Last accessed January 18, 2013).

⁶ Sidky 2000, 140–1.

⁷ App. *Syr.* 65; Euseb. *Chron.* 207c; Jerome *Chron.* 1769.

⁸ Smith 1844, 1018–19; Gardner and Poole 1886, XX; Narain 2003, 26; Mitchener 1975, 34; Grainger 1997, 87.

⁹ Tarn 1997, 72–3; Newell 1978, 249; Bopearachchi 1991, 42; Holt 1999, 94–101; Sidky 2000, 140–5; Adams 2006, 47.

¹⁰ cf. Strab. *Geog.* 11.9.2–3.

¹¹ Mitchner 1975, types 63–69, pp. 41; Bopearachchi 1991: # Diodote I et II, série 1–4, pp. 147–9; Holt 1999, Appendix A, Series A, C, and E, pp. 140–50; cf. Figure 1.

¹² Mitchner 1975, types 70–75, pp. 41–42; Bopearachchi 1991: # Diodote I et II, série 5–15, pp. 149–53; Holt 1999, Appendix A, Series B, D, and F, pp. 151–63; cf. Figure 2.

¹³ Cf. Mitchner 1975, types 46–62, pp. 28–32; Newell 1978, 228–249, specimens 657–726; Kritt 1996, *passim*; Hoover 2007, series 97, 99–100, 121–138.

¹⁴ Cf. Mitchner 1975, types 63–83, pp. 39–44; Bopearachchi 1991: # Diodote I et II, série 1–15, pp. 147–153.

¹⁵ Sidky 2000: 131; cf. Kritt 1996.

¹⁶ Narain 1957; Mitchner 1975; Bopearachchi 1991; Tarn 1997; Holt 1999; Sidky 2000; Kritt 2001.

¹⁷ Cf. Kritt 2001 for a more current review of the coinage. However, Kritt does not materially alter Holt's reconstruction.

¹⁸ Holt 1999, 92.

¹⁹ Holt 1999, 94–101; cf. also Gardner and Poole 1886, XX; Narain 1957, 27–8; Mitchner 1975, 36; Tarn 1997, 72–4; Whitehead 1969, 68; Bengtson 1969, 252; Bernard 1985, 151–2; Grainger 2010, 141; Bopearachchi 1991, 41–6 refuses to allocate Diodotid coinage to a specific Diodotos.

²⁰ Holt 1999, 92, n.9. See Figure 3 above.

²¹ Holt 1999, 101.

²² See p. 152 above.

²³ Tarn 1997, 73; Holt 1999, 100–101.

²⁴ Holt 1999, 100.

²⁵ Jakobsson 2011, 26.

²⁶ Jakobsson 2011, 22–23.

²⁷ Jakobsson 2011, 29–30.

²⁸ Polybios, *Histories*, 11.34, 1–2. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ Εὐθύδημος Μάγνης, πρὸς ὃν ἀπελογίζετο φάσκων ὡς οὐ δικαίως αὐτὸν Ἀντίοχος ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας ἐμβαλεῖν σπουδάζει· γεγονέναι γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀποστάτης τοῦ βασιλέως, ἀλλ' ἐτέρων ἀποστάντων ἐπανελόμενος τοὺς ἐκείνων ἐγόνους, οὕτως κρατῆσαι τῆς Βακτριανῶν ἀρχῆς.

²⁹ Holt 1999, 94–101.

³⁰ Cf. Bopearachchi 1991, 177, Agathocle, série 13.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Eodem tempore etiam Theodotus, mille urbium Baktrianarum praefectus, defecit regemque se appellari iussit, quod exemplum secuti totius Orientis populi a Macedonibus defecere.

³³ Cf. Bickerman 1943; Wolski 1947; Musti 1984; Brodersen 1986.

³⁴ See p. 152 above.

³⁵ Cf. Coşkun this volume.

³⁶ Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 103–13; Shipley 2000, 283. For a general summary of the population and productivity of hellenistic Bactria see Aperghis 2004, 43–44. On the general importance of Bactria in the Achaemenid period and to Alexander the Great, cf. Holt 1995.

³⁷ Cf. Just. *Procl.* 41. For the epithet ‘Sōtēr’ ascribed to Diodotos I see the commemorative medals of Agathocles in Bopearachchi 1991, 178, série 14.

³⁸ Bopearachchi 1994, 516–17; Holt 1999, 98 *contra* S. Kovalenko 1996.

³⁹ Holt 1999, 99.

⁴⁰ Strab. *Geog.* 11.9.3.

⁴¹ Plut. *Alex.* 47.4; Q. Curt. 8.4.25.

⁴² Again, the date for the Battle of Ancyra will have to be reconsidered in light of Coşkun (this volume).

⁴³ Jakobsson 2011, 21.

⁴⁴ Cf. McAuley, ‘The Genealogy of the Seleukids.’

<http://www.Seleukid-genealogy.com/Home.html>, especially ‘The Related Dynasties,’ http://www.Seleukid-genealogy.com/Related_Dynasties.html. (Last consulted on April 8th, 2013).

⁴⁵ Tarn 1997, 73.

⁴⁶ Cf. Holt 1999, 67–72 for a well-reasoned rejection of Tarn’s reconstruction.

⁴⁷ Jakobsson 2011, 21–2. See McAuley this volume for the argument that it was far more normal for daughters of princesses married out from the Seleukid house to take Seleukid names.

⁴⁸ Narain 1957, 308 gives a reign of ca. 13 years. Holt 1999, 101–6 suggests a reign of ten years. Jakobsson 2011, 27 follows Holt and provides a reign of years for the second Diodotos. Mitchiner 1975, Bopearachchi 1991, and Sidky 2000 refuse to assign dates to the reigns of the Diodoti.

⁴⁹ Holt 1999, 63, 106.

⁵⁰ Jakobsson 2011, 26.

⁵¹ Note that Narain 1957, 308 gives Diodotos II a reign of 13 years bringing his reign to an end precisely in the year 225 BC.

⁵² Polyb. *Hist.* 11.34.3–5.

⁵³ Polyb. *Hist.* 11.34.7–9.

⁵⁴ Diod. Sic. 17.89.6.

⁵⁵ cf. Diod. Sic. 17.54.6.

⁵⁶ cf. Strab. *Geog.* 15.2.9; App. *Syr.* 55.

⁵⁷ Strab. *Geog.* 15.2.9.

⁵⁸ App. *Syr.* 55.

⁵⁹ Shipley 2000, 293–4.

⁶⁰ Polyb. *Hist.* 5.40–54, 57–8, 87.

⁶¹ Engels 2011, 20.

⁶² Engels 2011, 19, n. 2.

⁶³ Clarysse and Thompson 2007.

⁶⁴ Cf. Bopearachchi 1991, 183–2, Antimache I Théos, série 1–10

⁶⁵ Dumke 2012, 392: ‘Man sollte also vorsichtig sein und den Königstitel nicht gleich unbedingt als eine unabhängige Machtposition verstehen’.

⁶⁶ Shipley 2000, 283–4.

IRANIAN IDENTITY AND SELEUKID ALLEGIANCE:
VAHBARZ, THE FRATARAKA AND
EARLY ARSAKID COINAGE

David Engels

I. The evidence

The reign of the Frataraka is a chapter in the history of Persia that is often overlooked, though in many ways it constitutes the missing link that joins the Achaemenid and the Arsakid empires and provides an important clue for our understanding of the early Seleukids' policies towards their Iranian subjects. Indeed, although the Seleukid intention of creating royal legitimacy through continuity with the Achaemenid and the pre-Achaemenid past has become obvious everywhere in modern research, very little is known about how the early Seleukids acted in Persia itself. Furthermore, the age-old topos of Graeco-Persian antagonism has tempted nearly all scholars to interpret what few sources remain from the age of the Frataraka as evidence for anti-Seleukid behaviour. In a recent study, I tried to contest this view and showed that the same sources can also be analysed as witnesses for a loyalist attitude of the Persian dynasty towards their Seleukid overlords,¹ but it is useful to reconsider the main arguments pertaining to the rule of the dynast Vahbarz, since he is generally presented as a key figure in the 'conflictual' model of Frataraka rule and is supposed to have reigned in the middle of the 3rd century – at least among the proponents of a 'high chronology' of Frataraka rule.

Let us quickly recall the numismatic evidence. In the early years of his rule, Vahbarz seems to have adopted the iconography of the coins issued by his predecessor, Ardashir (Figure 1 = coin A), the first native Persian dynast since the demise of the Achaemenids, and whose coinage features a curious blend of Seleukid and Achaemenid iconography. Vahbarz also appears to have borne the title of a 'Frataraka', which was attested in the Achaemenid empire² in order to qualify a subsatrapal governor.³ On what appears to be his first series of coins⁴ (Figure 2 = coin B),⁵ Vahbarz used the same and now apparently somewhat worn obverse die as Ardashir,⁶ but subsequently adopted a new die which associates the ruler's portrait with the word *pr̥s*, i.e. 'Persia'.⁷ Some of Vahbarz's coins were even struck



Fig. 1. Coin A: Ardashir, AR tetradrachm, Klose and Müseler 2008, no. 2/9 (reused by permission).



Fig. 2. Coin B: Vahbarz, AR tetradrachm, Klose and Müseler 2008, no. 2/11 (reused by permission).

on an earlier Frataraka obverse undertype, confirming the relative chronology of Vahbarz as successor to a previous dynast, Ardashir.⁸ A coin type (Figure 3 = coin C)⁹ that can likely be dated to after these initial series had at first been considered a modern fake,¹⁰ as it contrasts starkly with the usual iconography. However, since a second drachm with the same iconography has been found, the coin is now held to be genuine.¹¹ Whereas the obverse shows the usual portrait of the dynast, its reverse now depicts a Persian king slaying an armoured soldier. The coin's legend also shows significant changes, as we now find the ruler's name, then what has been read as *kmy*, and finally a hitherto undeciphered word. On a third series (Figure 4 = coin D), usually placed after coin C – though the order might be reversed, as we will discuss, – Vahbarz uses the same obverse and reverse design as on coin B, but there is a Greek monogram under the fire sanctuary, and the legend refers to both the ruler's name and the word *kmy* again.

Besides the numismatic evidence, there are also some literary sources which probably refer to Vahbarz who is usually identified with the Oborzos mentioned in Polyainos:¹²



Fig. 3. Coin C: Vahbarz, AR tetradrachm, Klose and Müseler 2008, no. 2/16a (reused by permission).



Fig. 4. Coin D: Vahbarz, AR tetradrachm, Klose and Müseler 2008, no. 2/15 (reused by permission).

When Oborzos was informed that a conspiracy had been formed against him by three thousand settlers in Persia, he discharged them, and banished them to a place in Persia, called Komastos, to which they were escorted by a strong guard. The country abounded with villages; it was very populous, and the roads were well accommodated with inns. In the towns, where they were lodged, they were dispersed in several inns; and the inn-keepers were ordered by the guards, who escorted them, and who surrounded the towns, each to kill his lodgers. Accordingly they made their lodgers drunk, and then killed them. In this way, the three thousand were murdered in the night, and buried, without any tumult or confusion.¹³

This episode is strikingly reminiscent of an anecdote in Polyainos associated with the Macedonian commander Seiles:

In order to rid himself of three thousand Persians, who had been involved in a revolt, Seiles pretended to have received a threatening letter from Seleukos. He told them that, by their assistance, he hoped to bring Seleukos to reason. For this purpose, he instructed them to assemble at Randa, a town not far distant, and he promised to meet them there. In a deep and sheltered valley nearby, Seiles posted three hundred Macedonian and

Thracian cavalrymen, along with three thousand heavy-armed troops. He ordered them, as soon as they saw a bronze shield raised up, to charge out and cut the Persians to pieces. The Persians assembled as they had been instructed; and Seiles' plan was executed so effectively, that all three thousand were massacred.¹⁴

Until now, the numismatic and literary evidence has always been exclusively analysed on the basis of a 'conflictual' model of Frataraka history in which the Frataraka violently assert their independence from their Macedonian overlords. Accordingly, the texts by Polyainos are interpreted as indicators of anti-Seleukid unrest in Persia, most probably triggered by the Frataraka dynast Vahbarz himself. Coin C is thus generally held to represent a stylised Persian 'king' slaying a Seleukid soldier and is interpreted as a direct illustration of the political events alluded to by Polyainos.¹⁵

The precise historical interpretation of the evidence mainly depends on the general chronology assumed for Frataraka rule. A high dating of the Frataraka sees both texts as variants of a single model and uses the reference 'king Seleukos' in the Seiles episode to date the similar episode involving Oborzos to the time of the first¹⁶ or the second king to bear the name of Seleukos,¹⁷ relying on the model of a 'weak' Seleukid empire in order to explain Persia's secession. The low dating, however, separates both texts, seeing the Oborzos episode alone as a reference to a late 3rd- or early 2nd-century Vahbarz, whereas the Seiles episode is dismissed as an isolated event from the reign of Seleukos I. Thus, Vahbarz's coin and Polyainos' texts become, for 'high' and 'low', evidence for a very early Persian struggle for national freedom.¹⁸ Once this circular hypothesis has been stated, the archaeological remains are generally scanned for possible corroborations, dating issues that still remain controversial like the partial destruction of the citadel of Pasargadai, the Tell-i Takht,¹⁹ according to the chosen chronology. This broad chronological context is then assumed to furnish also a date for a text from Pliny who alluded to a double victory of the Seleukid general Noumenios over a Persian army and fleet during the reign of a 'king Antiochos':

Noumenios, who was made governor of Mesene by king Antiochos, while fighting against the Persians, defeated them at sea, and at low water, by land, with an army of cavalry, on the same day; in memory of which event he erected a twofold trophy on the same spot, in honour of Jupiter and Neptune.²⁰

In the 'conflictual' model, King 'Antiochos' is identified with various rulers based on the high or low chronology: Antiochos I or even Antiochos II²¹ if one adopts the former, or subsequent rulers such as Antiochos III or Antiochos IV if one opts for the latter.

II. Vahbarz, a rebel?

Nevertheless, if we re-examine both texts from a 'pacific' point of view, and if we are adopting the 'high chronology' which, for reasons argued elsewhere,²² is highly plausible,²³ an entirely different pattern emerges. First, let us reconsider the literary evidence. It is quite obvious that the two texts by Polyainos must be the result of the accidental duplication of one and the same anecdote through the hazards of tradition, as the general line of narration is perfectly symmetrical.²⁴ Indeed, in the Seiles episode, a Greek or Macedonian²⁵ official stationed in Persia²⁶ uses Graeco-Macedonian troops²⁷ in order to quell unrest among Persian auxiliary troops; in the Oborzos episode, a Persian official uses the obedience of his troops to strike down Greek or Macedonian *katoikoi* moving through Persia.²⁸ Though it is impossible to reconstruct the original version, it has been argued that the texts attest the existence of an anti-Greek rebellion in what appears to be early Seleukid Persia. However, both texts only show the submissive attitude of soldiers and settlers in front of an imperial representative belonging to the respectively 'other' ethnos and depict a political situation clearly characterised by general obedience despite dissatisfaction, not by open rebellion and fighting.

If the original story which was accidentally duplicated by Polyainos or his sources was the one referring to the 3000 Persian soldiers, one has to underline the fact that military control over Persia obviously still lay in the hands of important contingents of Persian auxiliary troops commanded by Greek or Macedonian officers. Thus the Seleukids seemed to have been fairly convinced of their subjects' long-term loyalty, as the garrisoning of Persian soldiers in the heartland of the former Achaemenid Empire might have been seen as a great risk to imperial security. Moreover, the soldiers did much more than simply follow the orders of their Greek commander Seiles: they visibly trusted his intention of resolving the matter at hand through open discussion and believed he might defend their case in front of a 'misinformed' king Seleukos. If, however, the version recounting 3000 Greek or Macedonian *katoikoi* was the original, one observes that a Persian official seems to have been endowed with enough military or civil power to organise the journey of Seleukid settlers to (or from) their new homes and to assign them to temporary lodgings.

Neither version is a situation in which Persian rebels raided helpless Greek colonists, but is on the contrary simply the account of a Seleukid military official with a Persian name (Oborzos), perhaps presiding over auxiliary troops, who had to face the hostility of a smallish contingent of Greek settlers.²⁹ These settlers were probably discontented either with their new homes or the esteem the Persian nobility enjoyed from the new

government, and the official used his troops in order to re-establish order in favour of the actual government. This vision of things is by no means exaggerated, as it exactly parallels the case of the well-known revolts of the Greek colonists in Baktria in 325 and again in 323 after the death of Alexander,³⁰ brutally struck down on both occasions. Even more interesting, Diodoros, perhaps confusing both events,³¹ states that during the first uprising 3000 Greek settlers were killed by the Macedonian soldiers, whereas two years later another group of 3000 settlers (perhaps even the same?)³² was first granted free leave, but then was treacherously annihilated. Why Diodoros or his source, Hieronymos of Kardia,³³ as well as Polyainos or his source, spoke of 3000 settlers must remain speculation. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the parallelisms in narrative as well as in figures might suggest that, at one point, the source describing the killing of Greek settlers by the troops under the orders of Oborzos was embellished after a description of how the Baktrian uprising was quelled. The 'Seleukos' in question is then either still Seleukos I, making Ardashir's rule probably too short-lived, or Seleukos II. In the latter case, the revolt of the *katoikoi* may even have been related to the war between Seleukos II and Ptolemy III Euergetes or Antiochos Hierax or to the secession of Baktria from the Seleukid Empire.³⁴

III. The word *kerny*

The word deciphered as *kerny* on two of Vahbarz's coin series gives another typical example of the limitations of the 'conflictual' model. The word, which does not exist in Aramaic, is usually thought of as referring to the Persian office of *κάρανος*, a *hapax* attested only in Xenophon:

Kyros, who had come in order to be ruler of all the peoples on the coast and to support the Lacedaemonians in the war, brought with him a letter, addressed to all the dwellers upon the sea and bearing the King's seal, which contained among other things these words: 'I send down Kyros as *karanos* of those whose mustering-place is Kastolos.'³⁵

The title of *κάρανος* clearly refers to an Achaemenid official who supervised military issues such as the mustering and leading of troops in a territory composed of several satrapies.³⁶ Despite this rather restrained aim, defenders of the 'conflictual' model consider the title, referring here only to the empire's Western satrapies along the coast, to be an equivalent for the aforementioned office of commander of the upper, Iranian, satrapies.³⁷ Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the office of governor of the upper satrapies was ever labelled with the title *κάρανος*. Furthermore, the regular designation of a governor of the upper satrapies is not even attested during the Achaemenid period, but is only attested for the hellenistic era.

Antigonos and Seleukos, who used this office as the administrative basis of his son Antiochos' co-regency, both appointed such officials. Thus, a *hapax* on a Frataraka coin using the Aramaic alphabet (and at least also partially the Aramaic language) is identified with a Greek *hapax* in Xenophon at least a century earlier. Additionally, the Achaemenid military office whose continuity is (re)constructed from this evidence is not analysed by means of the Achaemenid evidence alone, but by contaminating the issue with data that is only pertinent to Seleukid rule.

Even more inconsistently, the 'conflictual' model interprets the adoption of the title *κάρωνος* as evidence for the supra-regional ambitions of the Frataraka and thus as proof for their aggressive insolence,³⁸ as they seemed to have claimed a vice-regal power over all 'upper satrapies' equal to the power once wielded by Antiochos I. Furthermore, they underline that the title was adopted by the Frataraka in order to show that they still wanted to avoid the title 'king', as this would have been seen as open rebellion.³⁹ This is a curious argument, as, from a Seleukid point of view, the title 'king', assumed by minor secessionist dynasts like the Attalids, the Arsakids and the Diodotids since the middle 3rd century, would have been much more acceptable than the arrogation of the administration of the whole of the upper satrapies.⁴⁰

But if we accept that Polyainos' Oborzos and the Frataraka Vahbarz was nothing other than a loyal Seleukid official or client dynast who was obeyed by Greek and Macedonian settlers, his apparent aggression might be seen in a wholly new light. Obviously, Vahbarz first adopted the conventional designs of his predecessors when taking his office, as shown by coin type B (Figure 2), but at some point of his career he seems to have gained a new status, displayed on the coin types C (Figure 3) and D (Figure 4) and related to the word *krm̐y*. We saw that the identification of *κάρωνος* with the office of vice-king of the upper satrapies and thus the supposition of Vahbarz's anti-Seleukid Iranian expansionism seems somewhat rash. First, such a usurpation would imply temporary control over more than just Persia; an expansion that would have had to be quelled by the Seleukids, but left no trace whatever in our records. Second, at least from a Seleukid point of view, the titular usurpation of the vice-regency over the East would have been much more difficult to tolerate than the title 'king' (*mlk*) which the Frataraka eventually adopted in the 160s under Daryan I.

If we want to find a more convincing explanation for the legend of coin types C and D, we need another interpretation of the title *krm̐y* (קרני). In light of our interpretation of the Polyainos episode, it seems most likely that *krm̐y* was not in itself a sign of anti-Seleukid behaviour, but was instead

the display of a title or function that was more or less voluntarily conceded or conferred upon the Frataraka by the Seleukids themselves, as the right to muster and command native troops, thus making the Frataraka, previously the subordinates of the Persian satrap, military commanders in their own right in an emergency. And if we consider the rest of ancient evidence for the office of *κάραυος*, it becomes clear that the *κάρανοι* were not permanent vice-kings commanding several satrapies, as was the case with Antiochos' exceptional co-regency over the upper satrapies, but simply supra-regional military officials specifically appointed to muster and occasionally lead troops from several satrapies to accomplish precise objectives, sometimes not even officiating themselves as satraps, as has been convincingly summarized by Klinkott:⁴¹

The 'Karanoi/*Stratēgoi* of those at the Sea' were commanders, within the context of large military zones, in charge of a part of the assembly of the general troop levy at special gathering places which were attested in Alexander's time. Such a Karanos had to supervise the maximum levying of troops from the different satrapies, the satrapal armies themselves, the mobile imperial troops from the garrisons and perhaps even contingents of mercenaries; he had also to keep them fit through training and to optimize logistics, equipment and organization of this army group in view of its final deployment. [...] Given his broad competences, the Karanos was superior, within the military hierarchy, to the different Strategoi or Satraps. However, this does not imply that he could also order by himself the assembling of troops or actively dispose of the army, though the Karanoi could also, in addition to their proper function, assume the duties of Strategoi. (trans. Engels)⁴²

Strangely, it has not yet been noted that the Persian dynasts were not the only ones to have adopted the title of *κάραυος*. Arsakes, the founder of the Parthian empire, also used the title *krny* (𐭠𐭣𐭥) beside his name on a bilingual coin.⁴³ Several similarities with and differences from Frataraka coinage are obvious. First, the use of the same title suggests a similar political situation or at least external representation of the dynasts, as it should not be forgotten that the Aramaic title was addressed to a different audience than the Greek legend. Second, the other coin types of Arsakes offer us the chance to see how he wanted the Aramaic title to be understood in Greek: he maintained the same iconography but simply used the word *autokratōr* instead of *krny*.⁴⁴ Third, one has to consider that Parthian coinage immediately begins with Arsakes' *autokratōr*- and *krny*-coins, whereas the Frataraka coinage offers an example of much slower progress towards the eventual assumption of the title *krny* which disappears under Vahbarz's successors.

These similarities and differences permit the following hypotheses.

It seems well attested in our sources that Andragoras, the *praefectus Parthorum*, had already seceded from the Seleukid Empire before the Parni conquered the area and ended his short-lived reign.⁴⁵ This made it rather probable that Seleukos II, whose attention was focused during the middle of the 3rd century on the confrontation with Antiochos Hierax and with the Ptolemies, viewed the incursions of the Parni into Parthia as either a potential stroke of luck or he outright invited it. Thus, he might have hoped that nomadic raids would prevent Andragoras from possibly expanding into the weakened East of the empire, all the while keeping the Baktrians occupied and prevented them from annexing the South-Eastern Iranian Satrapies. Furthermore, whereas a seceding Andragoras made it impossible for the Seleukids not to react, his elimination by the Parthians enabled the Seleukids to look for a diplomatic solution without losing face.⁴⁶ Even when Arsakes finally stabilised the situation in the 240s, the Seleukids might have seen the new Parthian state, fully occupied with its inner stabilisation⁴⁷ and the confrontation with the Baktrians under Diodotos I,⁴⁸ as a smaller threat to their power and to the loyalty of their troops and colonies than a charismatic seceding satrap such as Andragoras. However, the alliance concluded by Arsakes and Diodotos II at some point after the death of Diodotos I in 239 endangered the balance of powers in the East and provoked the subsequent anabasis of Seleukos II around 228.⁴⁹ Seleukos II seems to have been initially successful, forcing Arsakes to seek refuge with the Sacae. Nevertheless, the outbreak of new hostilities in the West compelled Seleukos II to conclude a formal treaty recognising Arsakes' power over Parthia,⁵⁰ but obviously forestalling any further Parthian expansion at least until the accession to power of Antiochos III.⁵¹ It is notable that neither Arsakes I nor Arsakes II, unlike Diodotos II, adopted the title of *basileus*: Arsakes I confined himself to the title *autokratōr* and *kēmy*, whereas Arsakes II only displayed the word *Arsakes* which by then had become a quasi-monarchic title.⁵²

Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to date the coins of Arsakes I precisely,⁵³ the title of *autokratōr* or *kēmy* should thus be considered as the official title conferred (or conceded) by Seleukos II on the Parthian dynast in order to define Arsakes' official status within the realm. A similar context and proceeding should then also be assumed for Vahbarz. Furthermore, the high-dating of Vahbarz's reign proposed in this study and his possible association with Seleukos II through the Oborzos episode implies the strong possibility that his *kēmy*-coins antedated those of Arsakes, who may have imitated Vahbarz when he adopted the title *kēmy*. If so, this points even more to the idea that Vahbarz did not want to challenge Seleukid rule, but proposed from the beginning a *modus vivendi* already successful in Persia.

Regardless, the new title borne by Vahbarz as well as Arsakes would not have been a provocation, but a carefully negotiated compromise, acknowledging their role as pro-Seleukid *autokratōr* in a situation of obvious military emergency which clearly designated their status as a client dynast. This fact was later emphasised by Antiochos III who explicitly considered the Parthian and Baktrian rulers as his satraps,⁵⁴ and he would doubtless have had a similar attitude towards Persia.

IV. The legend on coin C

It is impossible to elucidate the mystery of the *κάρανος* Vahbarz without discussing the fundamental philological issue of the legend of coin type C (Figure 3). This coin not only mentions, like coin type D, the title *krm̐y*, but also has some other elements which diverge from the usual terminology of *prtrk' zy-'lly*'. Whereas the dynast's name appears as usual on the left side of the coin (*whwbrz*) and his title on the right, the illegible words appear at the bottom of the coin and have been read as *dnt-zy* (דנ-ת) ⁵⁵ or as *wzt-zy* (ז-ת) ⁵⁶. Unfortunately, neither word makes sense in Middle Persian or Aramaic, ⁵⁷ and we are not helped by the fact that in the Aramaic alphabet, many letters such as D, K, R and W (ܕ, ܕ, ܕ, ܕ) look nearly identical. Moreover, on Frataraka coinage, Persian and Aramaic terms are very often intermingled with Achaemenid and hellenistic official terminology, and the poor orthography of many Frataraka coins is often marked by missing or misspelled letters. Thus, the first letter has been read as D or W, but may also be an R or K. The second one has been read as Z or N (ܕ, ܕ), and the third has usually been seen as a T (ܕ), but a contraction of two other letters or even an inversion of another similar letter such as H or 𐎧 (ܕ, ܕ) cannot be excluded.

The last two letters have been associated with the letters Z and Y, forming the word *zy* (ܕ), which is well attested on many other Frataraka coin legends. However, *zy* is a classical relative particle which always forms a construction expressing genitive relationships between the two words linked by *zy*, ⁵⁸ like the Hebrew *ba-* or the Arabic *al-*. This leaves us with a major problem: there is a word before the *zy*, but not after, though neither *krm̐y* nor the dynast's name makes any sense as the second element in a *zy*-construction. But it would be quite curious if, on a carefully crafted coin such as coin C with a relatively short legend and plenty of space between script and image, a whole word had been forgotten. This case is even more perplexing because there is enough space on the left side of the coin to add the 'missing' word in a similar way as *'lly* has been added (albeit clumsily) on several other Frataraka coins. The obvious solution would be to identify the undeciphered letters not with the two first words of an

imperfect $\aleph$ -construction (leaving us with an additional missing word and making the whole coin incomprehensible for us, (as for the contemporary Persians)), but instead to suppose that this five-letter word probably is not Aramaic – based like most Semitic languages on two- or three-consonant radicals – but Persian, an Indo-European language based on words with a variable number of consonants and vowels.

If one reconsiders the last two letters without looking for a $\aleph$, they might also be read as N and Y or even W and Y, which both adds to our uncertainty, but also creates new possibilities. We must first make a methodological disclaimer, though: it would be preposterous to propose anything without mentioning that, given our lack of information concerning Frataraka history and writing habits, any hypothesis is a pure guesswork. A distinct possibility would be not to read the word, as has been done until now, as Aramaic *dnt- $\aleph$* (דנת- $\aleph$) or *n $\aleph$ - $\aleph$* (נת- $\aleph$), but rather as Persian⁵⁹ *wntwy* (ونموي), vocalised *WaNaTaWY*, expressing the Persian word for ‘victory’, *vanatay*,⁶⁰ and stressing the obvious military iconography of the coin. One might even consider that the beginning of the word points not to *vanatay*, but to *vanana*, ‘victorious over’, asking for a complement to express a place. Indeed, if we suspect that the second N might have been skipped in order to avoid the reduplication, and if we suppose that what has been read as a T is in fact a retrograde H, faults not unusual at all in early Frataraka coinage,⁶¹ then this would in turn leave us with *wn(n)-hwy*, a word which could be vocalised *WaNa(na)-HuWaYa* (וננ-הוי), *vanana^bhwaja*, meaning ‘victorious over Susiana’,⁶² referring to a successful military expedition of Frataraka forces into Susiana, perhaps during Ptolemy’s III invasion of Babylonia in 245 during the Third Syrian War, as we will discuss later.⁶³

V. The control monogram and the historical context

Thus, Vahbarz may not have been a self-styled Iranian vice-king who usurped control over the whole Upper Satrapies in defiance of Seleukid authority, but a client dynast who occupied, in a situation of military emergency, a higher military office extending over Persia and perhaps some adjacent Eastern satrapies such as Gedrosia, Drangiane or Karmania. In this sense, he would not appear very dissimilar to the Armenian nobles Artaxias and Zariadres, who were named satraps of Armenia and Sophene by Antiochos III.⁶⁴ This would also explain why one of Vahbarz’s coins (coin D, Figure 4) shows a distinctly Greek monogram. It has been supposed that the monogram was further evidence for Vahbarz’s anti-Seleukid hostility,⁶⁵ but this assumption seems quite absurd: why should an anti-Greek rebellion have used a Greek control monogram on its first

independent coinage, and what would have been the audience for such an attempt? It is much more probable that the control monogram is exactly what it should be: a technical link attesting the involvement of an official Seleukid mint in the fabrication of Vahbarz's coin. This hypothesis is strengthened by the monogram itself. It combines the letters ΠΤΥΜΑ and is identical with a control monogram found only on certain coins from Antiochos' I co-regency 294–281 or even his subsequent sole rule, probably struck in Drangiane or Western Arachosia as suggested by their known provenances.⁶⁶ In such a situation it would not be surprising that he had to deal with the smaller Eastern Iranian satrapies adjacent to Persia, which would explain why his new office and his military successes were advertised by the local mints. As the relative chronology of coin types C and D has never been convincingly studied, we may even assume that coin type D, whose reverse follows the classical Frataraka schema apart from the title and the monogram, antedated coin type C and thus celebrated Vahbarz's new status. Coin type C would then show Vahbarz's subjects that his pride was not unjustified, as it shows a Persian ruler stabbing an armoured soldier with his knife and explicitly registering his 'Victory' through the coin's legend.

This leads us to the crucial question of who is the slain soldier. If we assume that the 'king Seleukos' associated with Oborzos is Seleukos I, then we can link the coin to the presence of Persian troops under the walls of Damascus during the reign of a king Antiochos.⁶⁷ If the identification of this monarch with Antiochos I is accepted, his subsequent victory over Ptolemaic forces through a clever military stratagem intimately related to his Persian soldiers would offer a perfect explanation of why Vahbarz would have wanted (and been permitted) to commemorate a military victory over 'Greek' troops in his coinage and to style it after the example of traditional Assyrian or Achaemenid symbolism.

If, however, we associate 'king Seleukos' from Polyainos with Seleukos II – and this is the more probable solution –, we may suppose that Persian troops under direct control of a Frataraka dynast became active during the troubled years of the Third Syrian War 246–241 and the more or less simultaneous 'War of Brothers',⁶⁸ the secession of the Parthian satrap Andragoras and the subsequent infiltration of the Parni between 247 and 238,⁶⁹ or at the time of the secession of the Baktrian satrap Diodotos between 255 and 239,⁷⁰ whose son Diodotos II would go on to conclude an alliance with the Parthians against the Seleukids.⁷¹ In all these cases, Persia gained an important geostrategic status. To the north, Persia was henceforth only separated from the new Parthian frontier by the great salt desert and the important West-Eastern road at the south of the Elburz

mountains probably still under Seleukid control.⁷² Similarly, Persia also commanded access to the Eastern road leading from Persis to Karmania, Drangiana and Arachosia,⁷³ satrapies still partially under Seleukid control, but potentially under threat from Baktria, which also explains Vahbarz's nomination as *κάρανος* and the presence of an Eastern-Iranian control monogram on his coins. Finally, we should not forget that at roughly the same time, in January 245, during the Third Syrian War, Ptolemy III managed to lead his armies to the walls of Babylon, as is attested by cuneiform chronicles.⁷⁴ He then installed his own governors and even boasted that he subdued the most important Iranian satrapies (Susiana, Persis and Media) as far as Baktria.⁷⁵ The reasons why Ptolemy III agreed in 241, despite the temporary occupation of central parts of the Seleukid Empire, to a peace treaty leaving him only with the possession of Seleukeia Pieria, have never been convincingly elucidated, though revolts in Egypt and the death of Seleukos' II rival Antiochos, son of Berenike,⁷⁶ have often been cited to explain the dissolution of Ptolemaic control over Syria and Mesopotamia.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, we should not exclude the importance of the bonds of loyalty the Seleukids would have managed to construct with their Oriental subjects. It might be possible to suppose that fresh troops from nearby Persia may have made the decisive difference in southern Babylonia or Susiana. Thus they would have compelled Ptolemy to retreat to Syria in order to defend his overstretched conquests, though at the same time legitimating the Lagid's boast of having subdued (meaning 'fought') the lands up to Baktria, which indeed gained a certain autonomy from Seleukos II during these years. All these situations would have given the Persian Frataraka sufficient possibilities to show their loyalty to the Seleukids and to fight against troops using Greek military equipment; exploits then commemorated on their coins advertising their 'victory'.

VI. The stabbed soldier

All this shows the questionable nature of the 'conflictual' interpretation of coin type C, for which the armoured soldier stabbed to death by a Persian 'king' in a position reminiscent of similar Assyrian and Achaemenid scenes⁷⁸ must be a Seleukid soldier,⁷⁹ and for which the aggressiveness of the scene illustrates Polyainos and corresponds to the destruction level of period II or, depending on 'high' or 'low' chronology, level III of Pasargadai.⁸⁰

However, if we accept a 'non-conflictual' model of Frataraka-Seleukid coexistence, the slain soldier's apparently 'Greek dress' does not necessarily point to Seleukid soldiers,⁸¹ but rather to the Seleukids' numerous internal and external Greek enemies, as the tradition of depicting the killing of one's own (Greek or Macedonian) enemies goes back before the beginnings of

Hellenism in the East. Already the north fronton of the so-called Alexander sarcophagus shows very similar scenes of killing between Greek and Macedonian soldiers.⁸² Thus, the celebration of a Persian victory over the 'Greek' troops of the Ptolemies scarcely would have annoyed the Seleukid king, be it Antiochos I in the context of the First Syrian War or Seleukos II who might have been rather content to receive Persian support against his many 'Greek' foes from Lagid Egypt, Andragorid Parthia, Diodotid Baktia or the territories held by Antiochos Hierax. Indeed, a revival of local patriotism on a limited series of loyalist Frataraka coins may even have been seen as an interesting propagandistic means of strengthening Seleukid rule by appealing to traditional animosities. And, at exactly the same time, the Babylonian chronicles present the invasion of the Egyptian troops as an incursion of 'godless' 'Hanean' soldiers armed 'with iron weapons'⁸³ – three interesting descriptions, as they show how local officials used traditional resentments in order to discredit the enemy. The godlessness of course suggests that the Egyptian enemies are also enemies of the divine order, defended by the righteous king of Babylon, the Seleukid king, whereas the use of iron (or bronze) armour, characteristic of course not only of the Ptolemaic, but also the Seleukid army, also occurs in much older descriptions of Assyrian armies. The mention of the 'Haneans' finally refers to Hana, a kingdom from Old and Middle Babylonian times situated on the middle Euphrates, but is used in hellenistic times as equivalent for Macedonia and thus to characterise the Greeks and Macedonians.⁸⁴ Hence, a traditional, no longer extant term is thus first used to qualify the new Macedonian rule. Then, after its general acceptance, as evidenced by the Borsippa-cylinder, where Seleukos is qualified as Macedonian, but not Antiochos, or by other texts, where the Seleukid army becomes the army of Akkad, the term is reutilised in order to denigrate the Egyptian ruler's Greek army.

Not only the Seleukids, but also the Ptolemies took care to present their victories against their enemies to their oriental subjects as being the fulfilment of traditional resentments. Thus, Ptolemaic victories over Seleukid troops regularly become 'Egyptian' victories against a 'Persian' enemy in order to strengthen the new dynasty's legitimacy and enlarge its popular support within the traditionally anti-Persian Egyptian population.⁸⁵ Even though it has been disputed whether an ostrakon from Karnak really designated Antiochos II as 'friend of the Persians',⁸⁶ numerous testimonies show us that the Ptolemies tried to adopt the usual pharaonic stereotype of the hereditary Persian enemy.⁸⁷ Ptolemy I⁸⁸ claimed to have restored divine statues robbed by Cambyses,⁸⁹ and similarly, Ptolemy II boasted on a stele from Pithom that he had restored, during the First Syrian War,

captured Egyptian statues from 'Prstt' (Palestine?).⁹⁰ The women parading as the personification of the Greek cities in Asia 'once under the rule of the Persians' during the *pompē* of Ptolemy II around 262 also more than likely had an anti-Seleukid edge,⁹¹ celebrating the Ptolemies as liberators from the new 'Persian' domination. Similarly, the Euergetes papyrus from 246⁹² insists on the vicious role played by the Persian Seleukid satrap Aribazos against the righteous claims of the Berenike-party and gloats over his public execution.⁹³ Ptolemy III also associated his campaigns against the Seleukid empire with attempts to repatriate divine images robbed by the Achaemenids,⁹⁴ and Ptolemy IV insisted as well, on a stele celebrating the victory of Raphia, that king Antiochos III had mutilated the statues of Egyptian gods and that the Ptolemaic king spent valuable time in rescuing these statues.⁹⁵ Moreover, the Ptolemaic king is shown in a syncretistic style as Pharaoh sitting Macedonian-style on a rearing horse, a representation not unlike earlier depictions of Seleukos II on horseback, minted at Seleukeia and an (as yet) undefined mint in order to commemorate the expulsion of the Ptolemies.⁹⁶ But what is interesting is that while Seleukos II is depicted alone, Ptolemy IV is shown accompanied by his wife Arsinoe and appears transfixing, with his spear, a kneeling enemy presented to him by the god Atum.⁹⁷ Unfortunately, the figure of the vanquished soldier is badly mutilated. However, both possible aspects of his iconography are intriguing. Either, the artists represented the 'enemy' as a Greek, implying thus not only that the Pharaoh himself was above such ethnic distinctions, but also that he authorised the representation of his fellow countrymen as traditional 'enemies': this hypothesis might make it quite interesting for the Seleukid king to tolerate, in a similar fashion, the issuing of Vahbarz's coin type C. Or the enemy was represented following the traditional Egyptian iconography of the bearded 'Asian' soldier,⁹⁸ in which case it is equally interesting to consider that official Ptolemaic art and propaganda viewed the Seleukid enemies not as Greeks, but as Asian barbarians.

Hence, Babylonian chroniclers as well as Ptolemaic kings drew heavily on traditional ethnic stylisations and national resentments at more or less the same time in order to stabilise the new hellenistic rule and find a compromise between the realities of the mid 3rd century and canonised pre-Alexandrian modes of historical and political expression. In depicting themselves as patriotic champions, victorious against outer enemies, be they shown as Greeks, Egyptians or Persians, they tried to obscure the fact that the political situation of the hellenistic world had ceased to resemble the political framework evoked by a canonised iconography. In such an atmosphere, it seems quite implausible that the Seleukids themselves would not have tolerated a similar patriotic iconography from their Persian

subjects. Indeed, one might even suppose that they simply did not feel personally concerned by the representation of a defeated ‘Greek’ soldier on a client dynast’s coin. Seleukos I had already chosen to depict on his own trophy-coins⁹⁹ from 305/4–295 Nike crowning a trophy built out of the distinctively Greek-style weapons representing the enemies of the Seleukids. Similarly, Seleukos II, a direct contemporary of coin type C in the chronology presented here, depicted himself on some bronze coins as riding horned king stabbing a fallen soldier, identified by his shield as Galatian (or Ptolemaic),¹⁰⁰ with his sarissa.¹⁰¹ In this perspective, the ‘Persian’ ruler killing a ‘non-Persian’ soldier should not be taken at face value as evidence for anti-Seleukid resentments, but may symbolise exactly the opposite and show the victory of a Persian dynast loyal to the Seleukid house fighting against Ptolemaic, Andragorid or Baktrian troops.

In this respect, we need not regard the Noumenios episode narrated by Pliny as evidence for conflicts between imperial and rebellious Persian troops during the early Seleukid rule.¹⁰² If one considers Persia’s lack of sea-ports with any direct connection to the central plain around Persepolis, and if we recall the strong military presence of the Seleukids in Media, Mesopotamia and Babylonia, the military and economic heart of their empire, it would be rather surprising if a rebellious Persian dynast, surrounded by hostile Seleukid satraps, spent his time and money in order to construct a substantial fleet and to antagonise the strong Seleukid navy in the Persian Gulf instead of simply fortifying the mountain passes and cutting off Seleukid trade by raiding harbours such as Antiocheia in Persis by land. Thus, it is much more probable that the episode narrated by Pliny simply refers to an expedition against Iranian pirates established in coastal strongholds.¹⁰³ If we consider moreover the interest Antiochos III had in Gerrha¹⁰⁴ and the reintegration of the coastal route from Karmania to Elymais during his Anabasis,¹⁰⁵ and if we recall the new foundation of Charax under Antiochos IV, the obvious dating of Pliny’s Noumenios-episode is to the period of Antiochos III¹⁰⁶ or IV,¹⁰⁷ but certainly not to that of Antiochos I or II. As testimony for the Frataraka, Pliny’s anecdote concerning Noumenios is of no value in any case.

VII. Conclusion

As a conclusion to this study, let us briefly re-examine the results obtained through a combination of high chronology and the perspective of Seleukid loyalty. At some early point in Seleukid domination over Iran, the new hellenistic rulers would have instituted a working alliance with one of the great Persian noble houses in order to gain the support of the aristocracy and stabilise their influence over the former centre of Achaemenid power.

To this end, the Seleukids granted a certain degree of political power to this noble house, elevated it to the dignity of Frataraka and combined this position with the right to mint coins in order to cover their protocolary, administrative and military expenses and advertise the new, partly autonomous position of central Persia. The first Frataraka, Ardashir, accordingly expressed his new status by merging Seleukid and Achaemenid iconography on his coins (coin type A) and thus drew his legitimacy from his Seleukid overlords as well as from his cultural commitment to Achaemenid heritage. This was also expressed in the construction of a new palace at Persepolis and in the use of spolia in subsequent constructions throughout Persia. The presence of trophy coins from Seleukos I in Frataraka coin hoards and the occasional overstriking of these pieces has led me in a previous paper¹⁰⁸ to date Ardashir's coins to the time of the first Seleukid rule. At the same time I also stated that it seems possible that it was mainly Antiochos I who enhanced or even established this agreement either during his co-regency (294–281) or during his years as sole ruler (281–261). His personal political vision as half-Iranian and his experiences in the upper satrapies may have convinced him that greater Persian autonomy might contribute to the stabilisation of the empire, rather than to its fragmentation.

Depending on the identification of the 'king Seleukos' mentioned in the Seiles episode from Polyainos, one must either confine Ardashir's rule to the first years of Seleukos' I rule over the East only or place him rather in the time of the co-regency and the beginning of the sole rule of Antiochos I in order to enable his successor Vahbarz to be a contemporary of Seleukos I or II. As explained above, the latter variant seems much more likely, as Persia's strategic situation in the mid 3rd century was much more prone to enhance suddenly the Frataraka's political status and to permit an iconography based on a violent ethnic stylisation of the enemy. Thus, Ardashir's successor Vahbarz has to be dated in the last years of Antiochos I, the rule of Antiochos II (261–246) and at least the first tormented years of Seleukos II (246–226). In this context, it is difficult to say if the aforementioned role played by Persian troops before Damascus during the First Syrian War (274–271) has to be associated with Ardashir or with Vahbarz. The first possibility seems marginally more plausible, as an association with Vahbarz would lead us to assume that he kept the same coin series for ca. 30 years without any changes.

After his confirmation as 'Frataraka' by Antiochos I (coin type B), Vahbarz was then at some moment promoted *karanos* of a larger Eastern Iranian territory (coin type C) as shown by the control monogram associated with a mint in Drangiane or Western Arachosia. He was

successful in distinguishing himself in a military context and issued a third series of coins in order to celebrate his victory (coin type D). This special assignment may have been related to unrest from ‘rebellious’ Greek *katoikoi* cited by Polyainos. However, the iconography of coin type D makes it possible that Vahbarz played a role in Seleukos II’s confrontation with Andragorid or Diodotid troops in the mid 3rd century or was even involved in the resistance against the Ptolemaic invasion of Mesopotamia during the Third Syrian War (246–241). The Smyrnaean decree from 244 honouring Persian soldiers¹⁰⁹ also seems to imply that the Seleukids still had access to Persia as a basis for the recruiting of troops during this period, and even if it cannot be excluded that these Persian soldiers may have come from the Iranian diaspora in Asia Minor, the text shows once more the possibility of mutual confidence between the Seleukids and their Persian subjects.

In any case, the traditional vision that the wars of the mid 3rd century triggered the beginning of the Iranian plateau’s ambition to national ‘independence’ from hellenistic rule must be abandoned. On the contrary, the high probability that the Frataraka were loyal Iranian dynasts shows that the Seleukids had managed to construct a system of successful and long-enduring cooperation with the local elites.

Notes

¹ Cf. my 2013 study which first advanced many of these arguments. See now also Plischke 2014 and Engels 2017.

² Cowlay 1923, no. 20, l. 4; no. 27, l. 4; no. 30, l. 5; no. 31, l. 5. Compare also Henning 1968; Bresciani 1984; Wiesehöfer 1991.

³ Cf. Boyce and Grenet 1991, 110–112; Wiesehöfer 1994, 105–108 with literature; Callieri 2007, 128–130; Klose and Müsseler 2008, 18f.

⁴ Cf. Alam 1986, 167 f. (n° 526–532); Boyce and Grenet 1991, 114 f.; Wiesehöfer 1997, 110; Klose and Müsseler 2008, 26–30 (n° 2/11–2/16).

⁵ This type corresponds to the coins (tetradrachms, hemidrachms and obols) in Alam 1986, n° 526–532 and Klose and Müsseler 2008, n° 2/11–14 (the obol from 2/14 is somewhat of an exception, as its reverse shows only the standard; the coin, without any legend, could also be assigned to Ardashir); the tetradrachm shown here as example corresponds to Klose and Müsseler 2008, n° 2/11 (Alam 1986, n° 526).

⁶ Cf. Alam 1986, 166 f. (corresponding to the die used for the coin n° 520); Houghton and Lorber 2002, 213 f., Klose and Müsseler 2008, 26.

⁷ See Klose and Müsseler, 2008, 26.

⁸ Cf. Curtis 2010, 387.

⁹ This iconography is now attested on two drachms corresponding to Klose and Müsseler 2008, n° 2/16 (with ill. 17 and 18).

¹⁰ Alam 1987, 147–155; Wiesehöfer 2007, 48, n. 22: ‘The previously unknown two coins that show Wahbarz / Oborzus killing a kneeling Macedonian soldier are probably fakes.’

¹¹ Cf. Wiesehöfer 2010.

¹² Head 1911, 196. Wiesehöfer 1994, 110 rightly points to the fact that nobody has yet challenged this identification, established by Justi 1895, 341.

¹³ Polyae. 7.40 (transl. P. Krentz and E. Wheeler, Chicago 1994). (Ὀβόρζος τρισχιλίου ἀνδράς τῶν ἐν τῇ Περσίδι κατοίκων ἐπιβουλευόντας αἰσθόμενος ἀπεπέμψατο δοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῶν ὁδῶν, οἱ προήγαγον αὐτοὺς εἰς τινὰ τόπον τῆς Περσίδος, [ὅς] καλεῖται Κωμαστός, ἔνθα κῶμαι πυκναὶ καὶ λεῶς πολλὸς καὶ σταθμοὶ πολλοί. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλος ἐν ἄλλῳ σταθμῷ κατήγετο, φυλακῆς ἰσχυρᾶς κυκλωσαμένης τὰς κόμας, ἕκαστος τῶν σταθμούχων τὸν ἴδιον ἐπίσταθμον εἰ μάλᾳ καταμεθύσας ἀπέκτεινε, τὰ δὲ σώματα τῶν τρισχιλίων ταφέντα διὰ νυκτὸς ἀφανῆ ἐγένοντο.) There is no discussion of this passage in Primo 2009a.

¹⁴ (24) Polyae. 7.39. (Σείλης τρισχιλίου Περσῶν νεωτερίζοντας κτεῖναι βουλόμενος ἐσκήφατο Σέλευκον αὐτῷ δι' ἐπιστολῆς χαλεπῶς ἀπειλεῖν· αὐτὸς δὲ τῇ τούτων συμμαχίᾳ χρησάμενος ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν προλαβεῖν. ὅπως δ' ἂν βουλὴν ἀγάγοιεν, συνέταξεν αὐτοῖς ἀπαντᾶν ἐς κόμην Ῥάνδα καλουμένην. οἱ μὲν πιστεύσαντες ἦκον, ὁ δὲ, ἦν γὰρ ἕλος βαθὺ καὶ κοῖλον ὑπὸ τὴν κόμην, ἐνταῦθα Μακεδόνων καὶ Θρακῶν ἱππεῖς τριακοσίους, ὅπλιτας τρισχιλίου ἀποκρύψας συνέταξεν, ὅταν ἴδωσι πέλτην χαλκὴν ἄρθεισαν, ἐκδραμόντας ἀναιρῆσαι πάντας τοὺς ἡθροισμένους. ἀνεδείχθη μὲν ἡ πέλτη, οἱ δὲ ἐκδραμόντες τοὺς τρισχιλίου Πέρσας κατεφόνευσαν.) A discussion of this major text seems to be missing in Primo 2009a.

¹⁵ Curiously, despite dating the Seiles anecdote in the time of Seleukos I, Wiesehöfer 2010, 112–114 seems to consider the anecdote as concerning Oborzoz whom he identifies with Vahbarz as belonging to the 2nd century, preferring thus to ignore the evident parallels of both traditions.

¹⁶ E.g. Bickermann 1966, 96 n. 44; Bar Kochva 1976, 33; Grainger 1990, 213; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 29; Sekunda 2007. Bar Kochva even tried to identify the 300 Thracian and Macedonian cavalry with the 500 Thracian cavalry 'from the upper satrapies' attested in the army of Eumenes in 317 by Diod. 19.27.5, which is of course highly speculative.

¹⁷ Mittag 2006, p. 314; Klose and Möseler 2008, 26. However, Seleukos IV (Stiehl 1969, 376) has also been considered.

¹⁸ Klose and Möseler 2008, 26.

¹⁹ Cf. Stronach 1978, 155 f.; Wiesehöfer 1994, 115–117.

²⁰ Plin. 6.152 (transl. J. Bostock / H.T. Riley, London 1855.) ([...] *Numenium, ab Antiocho rege Mesenae praepositum, ibi vicisse eodem die classe aestuque reverso iterum equitatu contra Persas dimicantem et gemina tropaea eodem in loco Iovi ac Neptuno statuisse*).)

²¹ Klose and Möseler 2008, 32.

²² Engels 2013.

²³ The 'high chronology' has generally been defended by: Herzfeld 1935 (around 300); Hill 1922, clxi (around 250); Newell 1938, 154–151 (around 280); Jenkins 1978, 198 (280); Stronach 1978, 146–155 (around 280); Koch 1988, 89–95 (1st half 3rd century); Mørholm 1991 (between 290/285–250); Boyce and Grenet 1991, 116 (around 250); Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 76f. (vaguely speaking of 'third or early second century', but strictly separating the first coin series from the second, dated into 'the later second century'); Klose and Möseler 2008;

Houghton and Lorber 2002, Curtis 2010. Compare the useful compilation of 20th-century scholarship on this point in Wiesehöfer 1994, 115–118.

²⁴ Cf. however Sekunda 2007, 231, believing that ‘it is tempting to suggest that the hoplites were settled on the estates of the Persian rebels, and were the ancestors of the later *katoikoi*. This suggestion is, of course, highly speculative [...]’

²⁵ Cf. Sekunda 2007, 231 connecting the otherwise not attested Σείλης with the Macedonian name Σέλης, known from *LGP* IV, 307, and proposing that Seiles was a Macedonian.

²⁶ On Randa and Comastus, see the short notices in Kiessling 1914, 226 and Herrmann 1921, 1132.

²⁷ Contrary to Wiesehöfer 2010, 110, I see nowhere in the Seiles episode a reference to these troops as *katoikoi*.

²⁸ The identification of these *katoikoi* with Greek or Macedonian rather than Persian soldiers seems rather obvious to me, as it would have seemed rather pointless and dangerous to install Persian *katoikoi* in Persia instead of other regions. Cf. also Oertel 1921, 1–26. However, the term *katoikoi* could indeed point to the inhabitants of an autochthonous *kômē*; cf. Launey 1949, 337–353 (contra: Virgilio 1999, 137 f.). Nevertheless, if one assumes that the *katoikoi* massacred by Oborzos were Persians, the story would point even more to the loyalty of the Persian aristocracy and make it impossible to see, on the basis of Polyainos, Oborzos / Vahbarz as a client dynast attempting to secede from the Seleukid empire.

²⁹ This has already been seen by Bevan 1902b, 291, but generally been forgotten. Cf. Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 29; Grainger 1997, s.v. Seilas and Oborzos.

³⁰ 323: Curt. Ruf. 9.7.1–11; Diod. 17.99. 325; 18.7.1–9 etc.

³¹ Goukowsky 1981, 13.

³² Holt 1988, 89; *contra*: Bernard 1990a, p. 33 f.

³³ Hornblower 1981, 74–87.

³⁴ See Wenghofer, Strootman and Coşkun in this volume.

³⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.3 (C.L. Brownson, London 1930) (καὶ Κῦρος, ἄρξων πάντων τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ καὶ συμπολεμήσων Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἐπιστολήν τε ἔφερε τοῖς κάτω πᾶσι τὸ βασιλεῖον σφράγισμα ἔχουσαν, ἐν ᾗ ἐνήν καὶ τάδε· Καταπέμψω Κῦρον κάρανον τῶν εἰς Καστωλὸν ἀθροιζομένων. τὸ δὲ κάρανον ἔστι κύριον.).

³⁶ Petit 1983; Petit 1990, 133–143, proposing *karan(a), ‘he who commands the *kāra*’ (people or army) as etymology. Cf. Keen 1998.

³⁷ For more explanations, see Engels 2017.

³⁸ Cf. Klose and Müseler 2008, 28, speaking of ‘ungeheure Anmaßung’.

³⁹ Klose and Müseler 2008, 28: ‘Er stellte sich also noch nicht auf die gleiche Stufe wie sein seleukidischer Oberherr und vermied dadurch gerade noch die offene Anmaßung – anders als dann Arsakes [...]’

⁴⁰ See Wenghofer and Strootman in this volume.

⁴¹ Of 17 possible *karanoi*, only 5 were satraps: Klinkott 2005, 325 f.

⁴² Klinkott 2005, 329: ‘Die *Karanoi*/Strategen derer am Meer waren die Oberbefehlshaber, die einen Teil des Gesamtaufgebotes an bestimmten Sammelplätzen, wie sie aus der Alexanderzeit bekannt sind, innerhalb militärischer Großbereiche kommandierten. Solch ein *Karanos* hatte die maximalen Truppenaufgebote der verschiedenen Satrapien, die Satrapenheere selbst,

die beweglichen Reichstruppen der Garnisonen und vielleicht sogar die Söldnertruppen zu kontrollieren, durch Training einsatzbereit zu halten, sowie Logistik, Ausrüstung und Organisation dieses Heeres für den Ernstfall zu verbessern. [...] Durch die übergreifende Verfügungsgewalt stand der Karanos in der militärischen Hierarchie über den einzelnen Strategen oder Satrapen. Das bedeutet allerdings nicht, daß er den Befehl für die Aufstellung aussprechen oder über diese Truppenmasse aktiv verfügen konnte, obwohl die Karanoi zusätzlich zu ihrem Amt auch gewöhnliche Strategenpflichten erfüllen konnten.’ Compare somewhat differently, but essentially similar, Petit 1990, 143: ‘Le karanos avait pour seule tâche de conquérir, pour le Roi et l’Empire, de nouveaux territoires: Samos (Otanès [1]), la Thrace et la Péonie (Mégabaze), l’Hellespont, Imbros et Lemnos (Otanès [2]), la Grèce (Mardonios, Datis et Hydarnès). Est-ce à dire qu’une fois à la tête de leur armée ils pouvaient agir à leur guise? Point. Il apparaît au contraire que chaque karanos devait rendre compte régulièrement des progrès de sa mission ou, si l’éloignement empêchait une liaison régulière, qu’ils avaient reçu, à leur départ, des instructions très précises.’

⁴³ Sellwood 1980, type 3. Cf. also Abgarians and Sellwood 1971, 104. Cf. also the bilingual coin Sellwood 1980, type 4, corresponding to the general disposition and iconography of type 3, but featuring what has been judged to be a slightly different Aramaic legend.

⁴⁴ See Sellwood 1980, type 1 and 2. The title’s ‘analysis’ in Verstandig 2001, 32 is somewhat misleading.

⁴⁵ Just. 41.4.6 f.

⁴⁶ This point is made very clear by Euthydemos, who according to Polyb. 11.34.1–2 complained [...] πρὸς ὃν ἀπελογίζετο φάσκων ὡς οὐ δίκαιως αὐτὸν Ἀντίοχος ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας ἐβαλεῖν σπουδάζει: γεγονέναι γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀποστάτης τοῦ βασιλέως, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρων ἀποστάντων ἐπανελόμενος τοὺς ἐκείνων ἐκρόνους, οὕτως κρατῆσαι τῆς Βακτριανῶν ἀρχῆς. The same argumentation will have been presented by the Parthians.

⁴⁷ Just. 41.5.1–2.

⁴⁸ Just. 41.4.9. Compare Wenghofer in this volume.

⁴⁹ Compare Coşkun this volume for an earlier date (before 246) for Seleukos II’s campaign against the Parthians.

⁵⁰ Just. 41.4.9 f.; cf. Wolski 1947, 68.

⁵¹ The details of a possible Parthian expansion between Seleukos II and Antiochos III are difficult to assess. An occupation of Hyrkania after Seleukos II (Wolski 1947, 62) is debatable: Polyb. 10.29 and 48.8 suggests Hyrkania was part of the Parthian zone of influence, but this was already the case since before Seleukos II’s campaign (Just. 41.4.8: *Non magno deinde post tempore Hyrcanorum quoque regnum occupavit*) and due to the fact that Hyrkania was part of the satrapy of Parthia at the time of Andragoras (*SEG* 20,325). Similarly, it is not at all clear from Strabo 11.9 that the occupation of Choarene and Komisene dates from before Antiochos III (Schmitt 1964, 51 and 64). Compare Strootman this volume.

⁵² Why then did Antiochos III declare war on the Parthians? There are two possibilities: either, the Parthians broke the treaty with Seleukos II after his death, perhaps even backing Molon and Alexandros, or, as Antiochos III only began his anabasis after the death of Arsakes I in 211, he felt perhaps bound by the treaty

concluded between Seleukos II and the Parthian ruler, rendered invalid, in typical hellenistic fashion, at the latter's death. This hypothesis would explain why Antiochos III attacked the Parthians around 209, whereas troops from the Dahae still fought for the king at Raphia in 217 (Polyb. 5.79.3), though it has also been supposed (Walbank 1957, 607) that the troops came from a (Seleukid) part of Hyrkania or were simply mercenaries or enemies of the Parthians (Schmitt 1964, 64). See also Engels 2014.

⁵³ Cf., in addition to Sellwood 1980, Alram 1998. See also Sellwood 1983.

⁵⁴ Cf. the plural used in Polyb. 11.34.15. Concerning the details of the treaty (Just. 41.5.7), cf. Bengtson 1952, Schmitt 1964, 63 f.; Engels 2014.

⁵⁵ Public talk by A. D. H. Bivar at the 10th international numismatic congress, London 1986, cited by Klose and Möseler 2008, 39 n. 136; Alram 1987; Boyce and Grenet 1991, 114 n. 246.

⁵⁶ Klose and Möseler 2008, 27.

⁵⁷ Compare Alram 1987.

⁵⁸ Compare Folmer 1995, p. 259–324.

⁵⁹ As to the debate whether the Aramaic legend of the Frataraka coins was read in the Persian language (the use of Aramaic words would then have been heterograph) or still in Aramaic, cf. Wieschöfer 1994, 107. Another example of the many difficulties imposed by the late- and post-Achaemenid use of Aramaic for the notation of the Persian language is the inscription on the tomb of Dareios at Naqsh-e Rostam; cf. Frye 1982, 85–90. In any case, the presence of technical terms like *κάρωνος* or *frataraka* shows that the reader must have been aware that some words had to be read in Persian, not in Aramaic, making it possible for him to decipher the word correctly.

⁶⁰ Further occurrences in Bartholomae 1904, 1353. It was only after the completion of this manuscript that I was able to consult Shayegan 2011, who proposes a somewhat similar reading of the undeciphered words (*wbbrz wnt ZY krm*), also referring to the notion of 'victory'. However, Shayegan offers no convincing explanation of the place of *krm* within the *zy*-construction and analyses it as a simple apposition, translating (p. 170): 'Wahbarz was/may be victorious, (he) who (is) the commander [the *κάρωνος*]'.

⁶¹ Cf. Klose and Möseler 2008, 34 concerning the coins of Ardashir, Vahbarz's predecessor: 'Der Ardashir-Name wird häufig mit vertauschten, retrograd gesetzten Buchstaben geschrieben, einzelne werden ausgelassen.'

⁶² Cf., for the other attestations of the words, Bartholomae 1904, 1354 and 1846.

⁶³ The possibility cannot be ruled out that the elusive signs refer to another personal name. As the name of the dynast himself is already present, as frequently in Frataraka coins, on the left side, the reader would have immediately identified the *κάρωνος* on the right side and the unidentified word on the bottom as a status constructus, meaning '*κάρωνος* (of the) X'. But to resolve the puzzle of this X, further investigations into Persian onomastics or administrative terminology would be necessary.

⁶⁴ Strabo 11.14.5 and 15.

⁶⁵ Klose and Möseler 2008, 29: 'Unserer Überzeugung nach imitiert Vahbarz

mit diesem auf den Münzen der Frataraka einzigartigen Zusatz die Siegesprägungen Seleukos' I. aus Susa und aus Persepolis [...]. Sichtbar wird hier auf jeden Fall das fortgesetzte Streben des Statthalters zu Persepolis mit seiner wahrscheinlich vorhandenen iranischen Gefolgschaft nach einer verstärkten Emanzipation vom seleukidischen Königshaus.'

⁶⁶ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 94 f., n° 241–243. However, it should be noted that the monogram may have been used by a mint master continuing his office even under Frataraka rule, as a similar case of identical monograms used on coins issued first by one, then by the next ruler is attested e.g. in Soloi in Cilicia, passing in 197 from Ptolemy V to Antiochos III. See Lorber and Kovacs 1997, 82–99.

⁶⁷ Polyæn. 4.15. See the relevant chapter in Engels 2017.

⁶⁸ For a thorough re-evaluation of the traditional chronology, see the contribution by A. Coşkun in this volume.

⁶⁹ Just. 41.4. For a different version of this chronology see Strootman in this volume.

⁷⁰ Trogus, *Prol.* 41; Just. 41.4–5; Strabo 11.9.2. Cf. now Coloru 2009.

⁷¹ Just. 41.4.

⁷² Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 72 f.

⁷³ This road was later used by Antiochos III during his return from his anabasis (Polyb. 11.34.13 f.); cf. also Engels 2014.

⁷⁴ *BCHP* 11.

⁷⁵ *OGIS* 54.

⁷⁶ Porphyrios, *FGrH* 260, F 43; Val. Max 9.14 ext. 1 and 9.10 ext. 1; Polyæn. 8.50; App., *Syr.* 65.345; Just. 27.1.2.

⁷⁷ Compare now Grainger 2010 and Coşkun this volume.

⁷⁸ Klose and Müseler 2008, 28 f. refer e.g. to the seals (ill. 5.5. and 5.6.) depicted in Boardman 2000, representing the killing of an Egyptian king and of a (completely nude) Greek soldier, and, most striking, to a funerary relief from Limyra from around 360 BC: Borchardt, Schulz and Neumann 1985.

⁷⁹ Klose and Müseler 2008, 27: 'Persien in Gestalt eines Mannes in der Tracht der ehemaligen achaimenidischen Großkönige besiegt – selbstverständlich zum Ruhm der Götter – den griechischen "Erbfeind".'

⁸⁰ Wieschöfer 1994, 129 and 2010, 114.

⁸¹ Cf. e.g. Klose and Müseler 2008, 27: 'Am Boden kniet hier eine männliche Gestalt in der Halbrüstung des griechischen bzw. makedonischen Hopliten, ohne Waffen und ohne Helm, aber mit dem typischen großen Rundschild.'

⁸² I have to thank Panagiotis Iossif for drawing my attention to this parallel and refer the reader to his forthcoming study *Stabbing the Enemy. 'Oriental' and 'Greek' Ways of Killing the Enemy*. Cf. in general also von Graeve 1970.

⁸³ *BCHP* 11 (BM 34428), l. 6–15.

⁸⁴ Cf. Briant 1994. The term thus also appears in the Dynastic prophecy (Grayson 1975a, 28 f. and 30–36; see now Neujahr 2005) and in numerous other historical texts, even describing, as in Sachs and Hunger 1988, 211, the confrontation between the (Greek and Macedonian) troops of Peithon and the (Greek and Macedonian) colonists from Baktria wanting to leave their new homes in 323.

⁸⁵ Cf. Funck 1996, 200–207.

⁸⁶ Cf. Winnicki 1991.

⁸⁷ Cf. Kienitz 1953, 136–139.

⁸⁸ Cf. the satrapal stele at Cairo from 311, published in Sethe 1904, 11–22.

⁸⁹ Diod. 1.46.49; Hieron., *Comm. Dan.* 11.7.9.

⁹⁰ CGC 22183, dated between 280 and 274 and referring to the First Syrian War, if ‘Prstt’ means Palestine: Bernard 1990b, 535 f.; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 35 f.

⁹¹ Athen. 201e; cf. also Rice 1983; Foertmeyer 1988; Hazzard 2000, 59–79.

⁹² *Papyrus Gurob*, publ. in *P. Petr.* II 45; III 144.

⁹³ Cf. Funck 1996, 202–205.

⁹⁴ Cf. *OGIS* 54. Cf. similarly the letter to Aristes, where the Achaemenids are held responsible for injuries done to the Jews and contrasted with the Ptolemies’ generous tolerance. Very probably, this was also part of the propaganda fed to the native Egyptian troops who were trained in the Macedonian way in order to fight the Seleukid troops at Raphia – a dangerous idea, as the confidence gained by the Egyptian troops triggered a rebellion and the creation of a competing Egyptian kingdom under the pharaohs Hugronaphor and Ankhmakis that was to last for 20 years (207–186); cf. Polyb. 5.65; 79–87.

⁹⁵ *Pithom Stele II* (Bertrand 1992, 197–201).

⁹⁶ Cf. Houghton and Lorber 2002, 233.

⁹⁷ Cairo 50048 = 47806. Cf. e.g. Stanwick 2002; Ma 2003, 189 f.

⁹⁸ Cf. Müller-Wollermann 2009.

⁹⁹ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 71 with n° 173.1 and 173.14. Cf. also Iossif 2004, identifying the shield depicted on the coin as an Antigonal one.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Salzmann 1980.

¹⁰¹ Houghton and Lorber 2002, n° 767 f. Cf. now Iossif 2012.

¹⁰² I cannot follow the elaborate argument of Shayegan 2011, 152–168 concerning a hypothetical link between this obscure episode and the even more obscure passage in *Hamzae Ispahanensis Annalium* 108 f. = 137 (*Ita Sacht terris Cenditarum et Hadharamaut et locis adiacentibus diu imperauit nescio tamen quo tempore ac rege deus melius nouit*) which Shayegan, based on Blau 1873, 331 n. 2, not only identifies with Sagdodonacus, father of Hyspaosines from Charax (Pliny 6.139: *Spaosines Sogdodonaci filius*), but also sees as a ‘margrave’ instituted by Vahbarz and defeated by Noumenios, thus allegedly adding an argument to the ‘conflictual’ model.

¹⁰³ Will 1982, 64.

¹⁰⁴ Polyb. 13.9.4–5.

¹⁰⁵ Polyb. 11.34.13.

¹⁰⁶ Bengtson 1964 (vol. 2), 145; Tarn 1951, 213 f. and 482 f.

¹⁰⁷ Schmitt 1964, 49; Mittag 2006, 305. Mørholm 1966, 169 even refers to Antiochos V.

¹⁰⁸ Engels 2013.

¹⁰⁹ *OGIS* 229 (= I Magnesia-ad-Sipylos, 1 = Austin 182).

THE WAR OF BROTHERS, THE THIRD
SYRIAN WAR, AND THE BATTLE OF ANKYRA
(246–241 BC): A RE-APPRAISAL*

Altay Coşkun

I. Introduction

The first three generations of the Seleukid House reflect a remarkable degree of dynastic stability, if not harmony. With the – possible, though no longer probable – exception of Seleukos, son of Antiochos I Soter,¹ kings ruled for an extended period unchallenged by their own kin, and were able to pass on their empire smoothly to their eldest surviving sons after appointing them co-rulers years before. The situation changed dramatically with the death of Antiochos II Theos in 246 BC. The succession of Seleukos II Kallinikos, the eldest son of his first wife Laodike, was contested from two sides within the family: by his brother Antiochos Hierax as well as by the offspring of his father's second wife Berenike (nicknamed *Syra* or *Phernophoros*), daughter of Ptolemy II Philadelphos – or rather by the boy's uncle Ptolemy III Euergetes, who pretended to act in the names of his relatives.

The two sets of conflicts that arose from this challenged succession led to the outbreak of the 'Third Syrian War', which Seleukos fought with Euergetes from 246 to 241, and of the 'War of Brothers', which Hierax forced upon him. The start of the latter conflict is traditionally dated after or around the end of the Third Syrian War, that is 241, or occasionally even as late as 236. With some possible interruptions, fighting between the brothers is believed to have continued until Hierax died in 227.² However, in this chapter it will be argued that such a chronological sequence is mistaken: the conflict with Hierax started around the same time as the war with Euergetes, that is during the summer of 246, and it ended for good prior to the peace between Syria and Egypt, thus in 242 or early 241. If this revision holds true, the history of a complete generation of hellenistic rulers needs to be rewritten.

Unlike many other cases of dynastic transition, the difficulties for this period do not stem from the lack of evidence. On the contrary, the ancient sources are relatively numerous. Rather, the problem is to make judicious

choices amongst the novelistic narratives and fragmentary reports, as well as to account for their frequent contradictions, if not for the tensions within their own broader contexts. It will be argued that nearly all modern views have been trapped by the distortions of ancient historiographers and Ptolemaic propagandists. What is required is to disentangle the various threads and to establish a solid chronology of the major events, as the single most important basis for any further historical interpretation.

The argument will proceed as follows: first, we have to look at the prehistory of the succession crisis, to better understand the aggressive role the Ptolemies were playing. Likewise, the propagandistic strategies of their courtiers and historiographers, who laid the blame for the Third Syrian War on the Seleukids, need to come under scrutiny. It will be shown that Euergetes was not responding to wrongdoings perpetrated by Laodike. Rather he himself escalated the conflicts in a vigorous attempt to resettle the balance of the Second Syrian War, thereby causing the deaths of his sister and his nephew (Section II). Next, the crisis that triggered the violent chain of events will be revisited: the betrayal of Laodike by Sophron, the commander-in-chief of the Seleukid fleet of Ephesos, as well as the immediate effects this had on most of the north-eastern Mediterranean coastline (Section III). Thereafter, an investigation of the main historiographical sources will show how the chronological confusion in Justin's narrative came about (Section IV). Subsequently, Laodike's role as the alleged instigator of Hierax' usurpation needs to be challenged (Section V). We are then prepared to reconstruct the chain of events from Seleukos' defeat at Ankyra to his 'Beautiful Victory' (Section VI), his war against Hierax in Syria, Mesopotamia and Armenia (Section VII) as well as in Asia Minor until the reconciliation of the brothers in 242 and the peace with Egypt in 241 (Section VIII). The results of this study are first summarized in a very brief account (Section IX), and next unfolded in a detailed chronological table (Section X).

II. The pre-history of the wars: two Seleukid queens and the Ptolemaic drive for expansion

When Antiochos II died around July 246, the most immediate danger lurked from Ptolemy III Euergetes. He would inflict the heaviest damage on the Seleukid Empire since its foundation: while his generals occupied Ephesos and some other places in Ionia, Karia and Kilikia by September 246, the king himself invaded Syria and launched an attack on Babylon in December. This advance happened with tremendous speed, which is as remarkable for ancient as for modern warfare.³ In this undertaking, Euergetes acted on behalf of his sister Berenike, a widow of Antiochos II,

and their little son – at least if we continue to believe the court propaganda, which has been spiced with highly dramatic and moralizing distortions in the historiographical tradition. Along these lines, scholars claim that, at the end of the Second Syrian War (260–253), Antiochos had promised to marry Philadelphos' daughter Berenike and to designate their expected offspring as successor to the Seleukid throne.⁴ The same sources accuse Laodike of the poisoning of her husband as well as of the slaughter of the rival queen and her son; all perpetrated with the intention that Laodike's eldest son Seleukos might rule.⁵ In an inscription from Kildara in Karia, the latter's half-brother is even called 'King Antiochos'.⁶ But that the boy was ever appointed king effectively is in stark contradiction with the remaining evidence, even with the official propaganda of the court at Alexandria as reflected in the Gourob Papyrus. The document from Kildara thus clearly reflects pro-Ptolemaic improvisation in times of turmoil.⁷

As I have tried to show in a recent study, criticism of the chain of events has to start with the end, if not the course, of the Second Syrian War. At the same time, a revision of the accusations laid against Laodike is required, and the various propagandistic and misogynist layers of the tradition need to be teased out. In any event, Philadelphos had suffered many set-backs during the war. When he sued for peace in 253 to prevent further harm to his empire, he was in no position to impose conditions on Antiochos. The views that Laodike and her offspring were abandoned in 253/52 or that the succession of Seleukos had been questioned by Antiochos any time prior to his death in 246 can now safely be rejected.⁸

Soon after the Second Syrian War, however, Egypt regained strength. Cyrene was reunited to the main land, and Antigonid control in southern Greece and the Aegean was curbed. At the same time, the secession of some satrapies weakened Seleukid power. Particularly the revolt of Andragoras in Parthia in 247 put significant pressure on Antiochos and absorbed the resources needed for further expansion into Thrace. What has to be pointed out, though, is that the situation was brought under control, again, shortly before Antiochos died.⁹ However, it might well be that the Ptolemies' decision to wage war on their rivals had been made in the fall or winter of 247/46, without taking the defeat of Andragoras into account. Since Philadelphos passed away in January 246, it cannot be decided with ultimate certainty whether Philadelphos had been planning a direct attack on Seleukid possessions or only a campaign in western Thrace; the latter option would not break the peace of 252 immediately, but might still result into an open war with Antiochos. At all events, the forceful presence of the Egyptian fleet west and south of Asia Minor clearly demonstrates that Philadelphos' successor Euergetes was out for an opportunity to challenge

his rival. Thus he did not hesitate to launch a major attack when hearing of Antiochos' death in July 246.¹⁰

The traditional chronology has Euergetes leave Egypt for Syria in September 246. The surviving (pro-Ptolemaic) sources present his departure as a reaction to the oppression of Berenike and her son.¹¹ This, in turn, followed soon after the death of Antiochos, which most likely occurred early in July.¹² But September is barely compatible with the start of Ptolemaic aggressions in western Asia Minor. In July or early August, Ptolemy Andromachos, the commander of the Aegean fleet, was ready to strike, as we shall see in the next section which discusses the events in and around Ephesos in 246. No later than August or early September, Tlepolemos, the commander in Karia, acted with similar instructions. At the same time Euergetes must have been on the watch, not in Alexandria, but on Cyprus, having with him the main body of the Egyptian fleet.¹³ How else should we understand the speed of Euergetes' campaign into Syria and Mesopotamia (his troops arrived at the gates of Babylon in December) – unless he had made long-term preparations for such an unprecedented invasion?¹⁴ As will be argued in the subsequent sections, the Ptolemaic incursions into Ionia, Kilikia and Syria induced pro-Seleukid courtiers to eliminate Berenike and her son, lest Euergetes use them as pawns in his conquest of the empire.

III. The betrayal by Sophron and the outbreak of the Third Syrian War in 246 BC

The decisive event which escalated the tensions between the two major powers was the betrayal by the *stratēgos* Sophron, commander-in-chief of the Seleukid fleet that was harboured in Ephesos. Our main source is an anecdote about his consort Danae. It is told by Athenaios, who draws – as ultimately all of our surviving literary sources – on the *Histories* of Phylarchos of Naukratis:¹⁵

Danae was a chosen companion of Laodike, and was trusted by her with all her secrets; and, being the daughter of that Leontion who had studied with Epicurus the natural philosopher, and having been herself formerly the mistress of Sophron, she, perceiving that Laodike was laying a plot to murder Sophron, revealed the plot to Sophron by a sign. And he, understanding the sign, and pretending to agree to what Laodike was saying to him, asked two days to deliberate on what he should do. And when she had agreed to that, he fled away by night to Ephesos. But Laodike, when she learnt what had been done by Danae, threw her down a precipice, discarding all recollection of their former friendship. And they say that Danae, when she perceived the danger which was impending over her, was interrogated by Laodike, and refused to give her any answer; but, when she was dragged

to the precipice, then she said, that ‘many people justly despise the Deity, and they may justify themselves by my case, who having saved a man who was to me as my husband, am requited in this manner by the Deity. But Laodike, who murdered her husband, is thought worthy of such honour.’¹⁶ (Transl. C. D. Yonge (1854) adapted from Attalus.org)

The friction between the queen and Sophron must have occurred very shortly after the death of Antiochos, most probably still in July 246. Ephesos and its *stratēgos* were then at least nominally under the control of Laodike. The naval campaign that Antiochos had been planning to conduct was put on hold, and soon the queen moved the court back from Ephesos inland to Sardis. This had been the main royal residence in Asia Minor since the 6th century,¹⁷ and was certainly a more suitable place during the height of summer, as long as the fleet was lying anchored in the harbour. An independent source – fragments of the Ptolemaic ‘War Bulletin’ preserved in the Gourob Papyrus – confirms how closely the execution of Danae must have followed upon the death of Antiochos. A few days after the outbreak of hostilities, when Ptolemaic ships landed in Kilikia and caught the *stratēgos* Aribazos by surprise, the latter was still of the belief that Laodike was residing in Ephesos.¹⁸ Apparently, Seleukid communication on horseback had been overtaken by the enemy fleet. At that time, Seleukos was on his way back from the east. He had accompanied, if not directed nominally, the successful campaign against Andragoras in Parthia, who would have been defeated in 247 or by early spring 246; at least, Seleukos and his siblings Hierax and Apama are attested in Babylon in May.¹⁹ Seleukos’ elevation to the position of a co-ruling king must have taken place around mid-July, when he departed from Babylon towards Asia Minor at the head of his victorious army. He was probably back later in Lydia in September, where he was opposed by his uncle Alexander and his brother – events that we shall consider later in sections IV and V.²⁰

At this point, it is of interest to return to the allegations laid against Sophron. While Athenaios explains the conflict in purely personal terms, which is typical of hellenistic historiography, the motivations for Sophron’s and Laodike’s actions remain opaque, as long as our perspective rests on the just-quoted anecdote. Previous explanations contextualized the conflict against the background of the succession crisis caused by the second marriage of Antiochos. But it is remarkable that the anecdote does not acknowledge any honourable motivation of Sophron, let alone claim his innocence. Phylarchos would have been likely to mention such circumstances, if he had known about them, given his anti-Seleukid and pro-Ptolemaic sentiment. Neither would Athenaios have filtered out such nuances entirely, since it would have strengthened the moral authority of

Danae. We are thus safe to assume that the *stratēgos* was facing punishment for a serious crime, which Seleukos would not have condoned either. This conclusion is further strengthened by my recent study of the position of Berenike: the view that her son had been the designated successor to Antiochos has been shown to be a later fabrication, which not even the official version of the Ptolemaic court claimed. Hence, there is no reasonable way around accepting that Seleukos had been appointed co-ruling king – and thus sole successor – during his father's life time. This is not at all surprising, given that Seleukos was the only son fit for kingship at the time.²¹ As a result, whatever the historical Sophron had done or was planning to do, it had nothing to do with a potentially ambiguous position of the court of Antioch.

The ensuing events should therefore leave little doubt that a conspiracy with Euergetes, through his admiral of the Aegean fleet, Ptolemy nicknamed Andromachos,²² is a much more probable motive. For it would not only fit the kind of diplomacy that Philadelphos had deployed very successfully in Greece right after the Second Syrian War, but also be compatible with the outcome of the conflict: Sophron – and with him Ephesos – were driven straight into the arms of the Ptolemies.²³ In fact, Phylarchos' anecdote gives further support to this assumption, because Laodike was not openly pursuing the *stratēgos* for a specified crime, but she was rather attempting to ascertain a suspicion. This is why she was trying to trap him, but this way eventually gave him the opportunity to escape.

If more proof were needed for this reconstruction, such would be provided by the speed of the backlashes after Sophron's flight. The invasion of Kilikia in August 246 has been mentioned before. We also have positive evidence for Kildara in Karia, which went over to the Ptolemaic commander Tlepolemos. Since Berenike and her son were still believed to be alive, these events occurred around the same time, in August or September at the latest.²⁴ Less certain is the evidence for nearby Mylasa, which seems to have been conquered by the same Tlepolemos early during the Third Syrian War, possibly also still in the later summer of the first year.²⁵ Several other violent incidents fall into the summer or autumn of 246, even though they need some further discussion.²⁶

The first of those incidents takes us back to the case of Sophron. It appears to be closely linked with the naval battle of Andros, in which Antigonos Gonatas inflicted a major defeat on the aggressor and thus seems to have regained supremacy over the Aegean for a few years. The conquered admiral is called *Oprona* in the manuscript tradition of Trogus' *Prologi*, but C. Müller's correction <S>oprona found wide acceptance (either form represents a Greek accusative).²⁷ While the context of the

Prologi seemed to imply a date sometime during the War of Brothers, the identification with Laodike's opponent speaks for a time following more closely the death of Antiochos. Accordingly, K. Buraselis' argument for 246/45 has been received favourably. While Buraselis shows a preference for early 245, August 246 can now be established with a high degree of certainty.²⁸

However, before the historical context is looked at in more detail, it has to be conceded that Müller's correction has not remained uncontested. A. N. Oikonomides points out that *Opron(a)* is not a *hapax legomenon*. M. D. Gygax adds that our sources do not even state that Sophron went over to the Ptolemies.²⁹ But these objections seem to have little weight. *Opron* remains extremely rare, with not a single attestation in LGPN. And the chronological, geographical and political implications are so strong that it is difficult not to accept Müller's emendation. With the new chronology of the wars established, the case appears to be even more clear-cut. Phylarchos' anecdote attests Sophron's escape to Ephesos, where the Seleukid fleet was harboured; Ptolemaic control of the city can now be dated to about September thanks to Porphyry's *Chronicle*;³⁰ and even the strongest Ptolemaic fleet would not have had the resources to strike nearly at the same time in Thrace, Ionia, Samos, Karia, Kilikia and Syria without the unexpected support of the Ephesian fleet.

We may still consider two choices at this point: either Sophron at once called in Ptolemaic reinforcements and therewith a new supreme commander, or Ephesos was sufficiently fortified, as long as the *stratēgos* could count on the cooperation of the Ptolemaic fleet. The second must have been much more attractive to Sophron, and possibly even to Andromachos. The latter had to be careful not to overstretch his forces, part of which were likely to be deployed further east. The fact that 'Ptolemy' (Andromachos) was holding Ephesos as early as September (which is argued in section IV) might at first seem to contradict this view; but the conclusion to draw is rather that Sophron (and not Opron) had joined the blitz attacks on former Seleukid allies in the Aegean. It would indeed have made sense to strike as quickly as possible, as long as Antigonos Gonatas would still have been thinking that the Ephesian fleet was siding with him rather than Andromachos. The latter, in turn, was then free to chase down Thracian allies of Seleukos and Gonatas, who could not count on support from either Macedon or the Seleukids. But, for whatever reason, Gonatas prevailed at Andros and Sophron perished, so that our sources are henceforth silent about the traitor. Andromachos, in turn, decided not to try to avenge Sophron, but to secure the possession of Ephesos.³¹

IV. The historiographical sources, the Battle of Ankyra and the synchrony of the wars

In the previous section, it has been taken for granted that the Third Syrian War and the War of Brothers did not happen subsequently, as Justin wants to make us believe, but rather that they started around the same time in the summer of 246 BC. This synchrony is clearly implied in Porphyry's account: the first combat between Hierax and Seleukos took place after the betrayal by Sophron (by August), but prior to Euergetes' landing in Syria (early October). While scholars have hitherto rejected this relative chronology as garbled, and have preferred the sequence offered by Justin, I would rather suggest taking the Battle of Ankyra as the decisive hinge to date the early events of the two wars, and also as a key to explain the temporary success of Euergetes' campaign.

A closer look at Justin's narrative reveals that it is much less clear-cut than appears at first glance. The persona of Hierax is introduced prior to the end of the Third Syrian War, more precisely after the failed naval campaign of Seleukos,³² which may date to 243 or 242. In chapter 2 of his 27th book, Justin writes:³³

From there Seleukos wrote a letter to his brother, Antiochos, begging for his assistance and offering as remuneration for his aid the port of Asia within the boundaries of the Tauros range. Although Antiochos was only fourteen, he had a lust for power beyond his years, and he grasped this opportunity, but not with the brotherly love with which it was being offered. Instead, he harboured a larcenous desire to take everything from his brother; and boy though he was, he was possessed of the villainous audacity of a man. This is why he was given the nickname 'Hawk' – he resembled a bird of prey more than a human being, making his living by preying on the possessions of others. In the meantime, Ptolemy had learned that Antiochos was coming to Seleukos' aid and, to avoid fighting both at the same time, he made a ten-year peace treaty with Seleukos. But the peace which the latter was granted by his enemy was broken by his brother, for Antiochos hired an army of Gallic mercenaries, and the man whose help he had sought brought Seleukos not assistance but war, and behaved not as a brother but as a foe. In the ensuing battle Antiochos was, indeed, the victor, thanks to the valour of the Gauls; but then the Gauls, thinking that Seleukos had fallen in the engagement, turned their weapons against Antiochos himself, expecting to have a freer hand in pillaging Asia if they wiped out the royal line entirely. When Antiochos realized this, he paid them a ransom for himself as one would to bandits, and made an alliance with his own hired soldiers. (Transl. adapted from Yardley 1994)

In the third chapter, Justin first turns to Hierax' problems with 'King Eumenes of Bithynia' (a weird conflation of Eumenes and Attalos of Pergamon with

Ziaelas of Bithynia), and further fights with Galatians, conflicts that were indeed carried out for the most part after 241. But when Justin resumes the theme of the War of Brothers, it is surprisingly intermingled with Euergetes' drive for revenge, the main subject of the first chapter:³⁴

The brothers Seleukos and Antiochos were at war over Asia, while Ptolemy, king of Egypt, though ostensibly wishing to avenge his sister, was really lusting after Asia. (Transl. Yardley 1994)

The next paragraph speaks of a war fought almost by all against all in Asia Minor,³⁵ before Hierax' successive defeats are listed up until his very end (in 227).³⁶

Thus Asia was being ransacked by the Bithynian Eumenes, on one side, and by the Gauls, ever the force hired by the weaker camp, on the other; and while she was beset by all these brigands, no one could be found to defend her. / After defeating Antiochos, Eumenes had seized most of Asia, but not even then could the brothers come together, although the prize for which they were at war was lost. Ignoring the enemy from without, they revived hostilities in order to destroy each other. In these hostilities Antiochos was once more defeated. Exhausted by a flight which lasted many days, he came finally to his father-in-law, Ariamenes, king of Cappadocia. At first he was given a cordial welcome by Ariamenes; but within a few days he discovered that a plot was being hatched against him and he fled to save himself. Finding no safe haven in his flight, he went to his enemy Ptolemy, whom he thought he could rely on more than his brother (for he had in mind either what he had intended to do to his brother or what he had deserved to suffer at his brother's hands). But Ptolemy was no more sympathetic towards Antiochos when he surrendered than when he was a declared enemy, and he had him placed under close arrest. Antiochos escaped from here, too, with the help of a courtesan he had come to know a little too well; he gave his guards the slip, but in his flight he was killed by bandits. (Transl. adapted from Yardley 1994)

Book 27 ends only after likewise referring to the inglorious death of Seleukos, which happened soon afterwards (225): he is said to have fallen from his horse allegedly after losing his kingdom, whatever this is supposed to mean.³⁷ Justin makes the moral clear: they had to pay for their trespasses.³⁸

Not all difficulties of this narrative can be tackled here, but only those that are most relevant for our chronological problem and the main chain of events. To begin with, why would Seleukos ask his brother Hierax for help when the former was supposed to be the sole legitimate king whereas the latter was not king at all and only 14 years old? There is no mention at all of either Laodike as ruler of Asia Minor or of her brother Alexander as the successor of Sophron as *stratēgos* of western Asia Minor. Next, why

would Seleukos pay his brother a tremendous price for such a support: the rule of all Asia Minor beyond the Taurus? And why was Hierax dissatisfied with the offer, so that Justin cannot hold back his rant against the youngster's rapaciousness even before the revolt was supposed to start, i.e. after Euergetes had offered peace? Most importantly, what was so terrifying for the king of Egypt that Hierax was supporting Seleukos? The traditional view (based on Justin) takes for granted that there had not yet been a dynastic rift within the House of Seleukos. In other words, what was so spectacular about Seleukos' attempt at also drawing on the resources of the Anatolian part of his kingdom around 242?

Only occasionally, some scholars have noticed that this seems to imply an earlier start of tensions among the brothers, if not in fact of the outbreak of the war. However, such observations were confined to passing remarks.³⁹ Conspicuously, Justin condenses all military confrontations between the brothers into one major combat which saw Hierax victorious over Seleukos very soon after the peace with Euergetes. Justin deliberately does not name the battlefield. For whoever knows the tradition preserved by Porphyry would have been aware that not Hierax, but Mithradates II won the decisive combat. That this battle took place at Ankyra, we also know from Trogus, Justin's source.⁴⁰ The implication of the location goes beyond the name of the warlord: it also raises the question why Hierax, who had generously been offered trans-Tauric Asia Minor, was fighting against his brother in Asia Minor and not in Syria or Mesopotamia. According to the apparently pseudo-historical framework that Justin has created, the war against the Ptolemies was already over and Asia Minor had been ceded, so that Seleukos' strong military presence near Ankyra would have made him the aggressor, not Hierax.

Justin, as it appears, is less interested in history than in moral education, book 27 being a teaching unit on brotherly love, or on the perils of falling short of this affection. In chapter 1, Seleukos' murder of his half-brother, the son of Berenike, leads up to the loss of nearly his whole kingdom to Ptolemy Euergetes. The latter was only incidentally forced to reduce his engagement in the Seleukid Empire due to turmoil in his own kingdom. But he was effectively overcome only when the brothers Seleukos and Hierax joined forces towards the end of chapter 2. Instead of learning the lesson, however, those decadent epigones resumed war immediately after the peace with Egypt, throwing Asia Minor and further parts of the empire into complete anarchy. Throughout their lives as kings, they either fought for survival or sought safety in flight, and finally neither escaped his deserved punishment. Both first lost their realm and then died most unworthy deaths.⁴¹

It will not come as a surprise that in nearly all cases for which we have a parallel tradition Justin can be shown to have altered substantially, or at least re-contextualized, individual events, to make them fit into his overall plot.⁴² How useless his testimony can be to reconstruct even the fundamentals of a war is perhaps best illustrated by the conflation of three kings of two different realms, to yield the 'king of Bithynia Eumenes' (< Eumenes + Attalos + Ziaelas). When it comes to explaining causality, arguably one of the main tasks of historiographers since Herodotos, Justin can be utterly ingenuous: all cities are said to have turned away from Seleukos for the murder of his brother, but to have forgiven him out of pity for his losing the entire fleet. This is as remote from historical analysis as it may possibly be.⁴³

Porphry's *Chronicle* will in fact help us understand that Justin very clumsily covers up the fact that the conflict among the brothers had been ongoing since the start of the Third Syrian War. Admittedly, Porphry's own narrative is not without difficulties, due at least in part to the fragmentary state of transmission. But if one is alert to the aforementioned problems, a fresh reading of the relevant sections of the *Chronicle* will immediately show its superiority. Drawing on Porphry, Eusebios reported in some detail on the events in his *Chronicle* (F 32.8). The Greek original is lost, so here I present an adapted version of Toye's English translation; this, in turn, is based on Jacoby's German, which translates the Armenian rendering of Eusebios' *Chronicle* (the subdivisions by letters are my own):⁴⁴

a) When Seleukos Kallinikos was still alive, Antiochos, his younger brother, did not desire to behave peaceably and to concern himself with his own affairs. He had an ally and supporter in Alexander, who had control of the city of Sardis and who was also the brother of his mother Laodike. He also had Galatians as allies in two battles.

b) Seleukos was victorious in Lydia, but he captured neither Sardis nor Ephesos since Ptolemy had possession of the city. But when he went into a second battle against Mithradates in Cappadocia, 20,000 of his soldiers were slain by the barbarians, and he himself was missed as if killed in battle.

c) But Ptolemy, also called Tryphon, seized a stretch of Syria and his siege of Damascus and Orthosia ended in the third year of the 134th Olympiad when Seleukos returned to this region.

d) Yet Antiochos, the brother of Kallinikos, passing through Greater Phrygia, subjected the inhabitants to tribute

e) and unleashed his generals and armies in the field against Seleukos. After he was handed over to the barbarians by his own courtiers, Antiochos escaped from them with a few men and reached Magnesia. On the following day he formed his battle lines. Once again with the hard-earned assistance of his ally Ptolemy, Antiochos was victorious.

f) And he married a daughter of Ziela.

g) In the fourth year of the 137th Olympiad Antiochos went into battle twice in Lydia and was defeated. Also he offered battle against Attalos in the area of Koloe. In the first year of the 138th Olympiad Antiochos fled to Thrace to escape Attalos after a battle in Karia and he died.

Paragraph a) sets the scene for the revolt of Hierax. Similarly to Justin, though much more concisely, Porphyry presents a moralizing explanation for the usurpation: the youngster's immoderate desire to rule. This alone, of course, does not yet explain how the ambitious prince found support for his plan. While the fragmentary version does not allow us to reconstruct the political motivations, it does substantiate the physical power base needed to pursue the endeavour. His uncle Alexander and the Galatians are specified as supporters. The former implies also those Seleukid forces that had remained in or near the royal residence of Sardis, and the second, since Porphyry seems to have spoken of *symbachoi*, are to be identified not with mercenaries, but with allies, likely the Galatian Tolistobogioi and their following.⁴⁵

A third source of Hierax' power is alluded to in paragraph b): Ptolemy, who was holding Ephesos. Independent sources allow us to understand that this was not Euergetes, but his half-brother Andromachos, *stratēgos* of the Aegean.⁴⁶ Admittedly, these particular lines of Eusebios' excerpt from Porphyry do not make it explicit that Andromachos was siding with Hierax, but since, in the later course of events, Ptolemy's support is qualified as a 'renewed alliance', the interpretation appears to be justified. There is further support for this reconstruction. An inscription from Priene attests a certain 'Antiochos appointed by King Ptolemy' as a leading official in Western Asia Minor. Although the context is fragmentary, it is still sufficiently clear to rule out any identification of Antiochos other than with Hierax, and of King Ptolemy other than with Euergetes.⁴⁷ This conclusion is further corroborated through Porphyry's narrative of the Third Syrian War, which he deployed in his *Against the Christians*: as we shall see later, Euergetes would pass on the control of Kilikia to his 'friend' Antiochos, who was none other than Hierax.⁴⁸

At any rate, paragraph b) is about the direct military engagements of Seleukos. The first was with his brother, whom he defeated, though did not yet annihilate, in Lydia. Given the overall speed of the events, one may doubt that Seleukos laid siege to Sardis or Ephesos; he probably did not even reach the coast. If the 'second' combat is located in 'Cappadocia', it can be assumed that his western campaign was aborted, for the king's intervention was required further east even more urgently. Seleukos must have learnt about the Ptolemaic invasion of Kilikia or of Mithradates' occupation of eastern Phrygia; either intrusion put his supply lines at risk

and required an immediate response. The disastrous outcome of Mithradates' attack implies that Cappadocia has to be understood in its broadest sense, encompassing eastern and central Anatolia. Porphyry thus refers to the Battle of Ankyra, the only place in Asia Minor where Seleukos is known to have suffered a defeat.⁴⁹

According to Porphyry, Hierax was not directly involved in the Battle of Ankyra; he names Mithridates II as the victor. Trogus, in turn, ascribes the victory to the Gauls, i.e. Galatians, as if they were fighting in their own right; in all likelihood, these were the Tektosages who had been hired two generations before by Mithradates I. It was only after this conquest that the king of Pontos allowed them to settle in the area. Justin, in turn, combines all of Seleukos' combats in Asia Minor and has Hierax defeat his brother with the aid of Galatians, though without locating the decisive fight at Ankyra, as has been discussed above.⁵⁰

The deleterious outcome of the battle is confirmed by three anecdotes which we shall look at in section VI. But not a single source offers a precise date. Suggestions in modern scholarship vary between 241 and 235, which implies that all have so far agreed that the battle post-dated the peace with Euergetes. However, Porphyry's account requires a day late in September or very early in October 246: following the news of the king's death, Ptolemy 'Tryphon' (i.e. Euergetes) was emboldened to intrude even into Syria (c). His arrival there must have happened by October, as the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries allow us to conclude.⁵¹

The narrative of the Syrian War is then reduced to a minimum in Eusebios' *Chronicle*, one sentence each being dedicated to its beginning in 246 and its end in 242/41. The choice of information offered appears so arbitrary that it is easy to fathom that Eusebios picked the first and last sentences he found in Porphyry's account on the war as these conveniently offered absolute dates. He did not make an effort to smooth the transition by using connecting particles other than a vague δὲ – which is of course typical for the genre.

The account as it has come down to us is confusing in a further regard, for it is uncertain whether the remaining events presented from d) to f) happened after the start or after the conclusion of the war in Syria. The account becomes more precise when it turns to the final steps of Hierax' life (g): now Olympiad years are used, thus for the (last?) war with Attalos in 229/28 and his murder in Thrace in 228/27. Since Hierax must have exploited the opportunity that Seleukos was occupied with the war against Euergetes, we should indeed assume that section d) followed soon after the invasion of Syria. The second sentence which reports the end of the Third Syrian War should thus be regarded as a kind of chronological digression

or completion of a topic before the narrator returns to the main thread of events. Parallels for this method abound among historiographers and chroniclers.⁵²

Accordingly, Hierax immediately set out to consolidate his rule over western Asia Minor after his brother had been defeated at Ankyra and vanished from the scene (d). Moreover, the fact that Hierax later attacked Seleukos (e), and not the other way round, seems to suggest a time when the latter had not yet recovered Syria, which means soon after his 'Beautiful Victory' over the Ptolemaic bulwark on the Euphrates in 245 or 244 (below, section VI). The revolt of his own courtiers and his extradition to the barbarians – probably the Tolistobogioi – seems to match Justin's allegation that the Galatians turned against Hierax after Seleukos' defeat, in order to establish their own rule over Asia Minor. Justin then speaks of large payments, followed by an alliance, which would recognize that the Tolistobogioi were not his subjects, but shared in the rule over the newly gained territory.⁵³ This does not exclude that, in the course of the conflict, there had been a battle with the same Galatians at Magnesia.

Most likely, the revolt of the Galatians occurred very soon after Seleukos had defeated his brother for the first time: probably, Hierax had been camping outside Sardis, but was then chased down the Hermos valley towards Magnesia at the Sipylos. He apparently fled into the city after having been beaten first by his brother and then pursued by the Tolistobogioi.⁵⁴ If indeed he dared to give battle to those Galatians, this must have been due to the arrival of the troops of Ptolemy (sc. Andromachos) that came from Ephesos. Eusebios calls this support 'repeated'. Following the logic of the transmitted text, this seems to imply that holding Ephesos would have been the first support, unless a more active role mentioned by Porphyry has simply been suppressed by Eusebios. But since the alliance with Ptolemy was still so fresh, probably dating from early September, it may well be that no troops from Ephesos had reached Hierax prior to his arrival in Magnesia.

It is worthwhile pointing out the implications of insisting on 242/41 as a *terminus post quem* for the events d) to f): this would imply a renewed alliance between Hierax and the Ptolemies, which could have resulted in new tensions with Seleukos, rendering Justin's characterization of the hostility between Hierax and Ptolemy even less clear. It is definitely more convincing to date this Ptolemaic support for the usurper prior to 241, and most reasonably to the later part of 246. After Seleukos had left Asia Minor, Hierax worked towards extending his control of Anatolia, depending on Tolistobogian support on the one hand, but, on the other, also on Ptolemaic aid to keep the upper hand in this dangerous game.

The *Chronicle* is silent about any further incidents relating to either the War of Brothers or the Third Syrian War. I therefore suggest synchronizing the beginnings of the two wars. The sequence of events in 246 thus appears to have been as follows: the betrayal by Sophron, the loss of Ephesos, the betrayal by Hierax, Seleukos' victory in Lydia, the Battle of Ankyra, and finally Ptolemy's invasion of Syria. At the other end, we should accept from Justin that Seleukos' agreement with Hierax shortly preceded the peace with Euergetes in 242/41. As will be seen, all remaining events that are attested as relating to the War of Brothers can reasonably be fitted into the time span between 246 and 241. While the time after 241 was anything but peaceful and harmonious for the Seleukid Empire, at least open hostilities between the two brothers or between Seleukos and Euergetes seem to have been avoided throughout.

V. Laodike, Ptolemy Andromachos and Alexander

A better understanding of the War of Brothers requires a closer look at Laodike's role, since she is commonly regarded in modern scholarship as the instigator of Hierax' revolt.⁵⁵ Sometimes it is specified that she first forced Seleukos to appoint Hierax as king in Asia Minor as a reward for support against Euergetes around 242.⁵⁶ Since none of the main narrative sources studied so far make any such allegation, we have to turn to a passing remark in Plutarch's *On Brotherly Love*:⁵⁷

But Antiochos might be condemned because of his lust for dominion, yet admired because his love for his brother was not altogether extinguished thereby. For he went to war against Seleukos for the kingdom, though he was the younger brother, and had the aid of his mother. (Transl. adapted from W. C. Helmbold, Loeb ed., 1939)

True enough, Laodike's splendid reputation among ancient and modern scholars alike has seemed to be sufficient to confirm Plutarch. Her lust for power and her recklessness appear almost as self-evident conditions for the coup against her son. And the young age of the pretender – he was only fourteen⁵⁸ – would speak against his capability of revolting without the guidance from his own kin, an impression that is confirmed by the naivety of Hierax implied in the anecdote on his brotherly love. Indeed, the very active role Laodike played after Antiochos' death seems to make her the ideal candidate for the crime. Although the various accusations of her violent interventions in the succession of Seleukos have been discarded, we can still point to the persecution of Sophron and the execution of Danae. Her position as ruling queen is further implied in the report on the invasion of Kilikia transmitted in the Gourob Papyrus.⁵⁹ Above all, the fragmentary reference to a 'Laodikean War' on the abovementioned inscription from

Priene underlines her political prominence.⁶⁰ Hence, Laodike definitely assumed control of the court of Ephesos as Antiochos' widow.⁶¹

These considerations notwithstanding, Laodike deserves to be acquitted of the accusation of stirring up Hierax against his brother, just as much as of the purported murder of her husband or the liquidation of Berenike and her son. As far as I can see, only K. L. Nourse has until now presented an argument in her defence: Plutarch's allegation remains vague and is possibly mere literary flourish, reminiscent of Parysatis' role in Kyros' rebellion against his brother Artaxerxes II.⁶² While these observations are pertinent, they have not been compelling. But stronger arguments can be invoked.

First of all, if indeed Laodike has been behind the fraternal discord, this partisanship could not have escaped contemporaries: she would have stayed at the court of the son she was supporting (that is Sardis in the case of Hierax, while Seleukos was itinerant during his first two years). But the entire ancient tradition agrees that the queen perpetrated, ordered or at least encouraged up to three dynastic murders, in order to secure the succession of Seleukos – and not Hierax! This is even more important since the revised chronology allows us to date the first military confrontation between the brothers to September 246, thus at a time when Berenike and her son might still have been alive.

Next, with the single exception of Plutarch, no ancient author alludes to tensions, let alone frictions, between Laodike and Seleukos. In an excerpt preserved by Jerome, Porphyry even claims that Laodike was ruling together with Seleukos when Euergetes mistreated them.⁶³ Since this statement must relate to Laodike's sole rule of Asia Minor during the absence of Seleukos in the summer of 246, it at least implies that Porphyry was unaware of a rift between the mother and her eldest son. In fact, by the time that Seleukos showed up again in western Asia Minor, she had disappeared from all of our literary sources. Justin and Porphyry, who have been quoted extensively in the previous section, make no more mention of her. Of course, one has to be careful when it comes to *argumenta e silentio*, and, admittedly, Justin's silence could still be explained away by the fact that he is showcasing the lack of fraternal love. Previously in the same book, however, Justin has at least granted a passing remark to Laodike's share of the guilt for the dynastic murders.⁶⁴ In addition, one may point towards a decree of Smyrna dating to late 245 or 244, in which the citizens emphasize the king's piety as shown by his 'affection towards his parents'.⁶⁵

Moreover, Seleukid forces in western Asia Minor were very much weakened when Seleukos had taken a major part of the troops into the east in 247 and Ephesos had gone over to the Ptolemies together with the fleet in 246. As a result, resistance against Seleukos would have stood a chance

only in alliance with Euergetes, and it can barely be doubted that Hierax could only have been the junior partner. Porphyry attests such a relation three times: prior to the Battle of Ankyra, shortly thereafter and in the spring of 245. Additional indirect support can be drawn from Justin, for his claim that the cooperation between the two brothers compelled Euergetes to end the war would imply that, beforehand, it had been up to Euergetes to either use the resources of Asia Minor against Seleukos or at least neutralize them.⁶⁶ In the face of this, it is hard to see what Laodike was supposed to gain by allying with her most dangerous enemy, other than the self-laceration of the most powerful empire that existed at the time. After all, she had just lost Sophron and killed her friend Danae out of enmity for the Ptolemies.⁶⁷

Most critical is Porphyry's report of Seleukos' return to the west. Sardis closed its gates to him when he was trying to take control of Lydia. As the commander-in-chief of the city, Alexander, the brother of Laodike and thus son of Achaïos the Elder, is named. He is attested elsewhere in a prominent, probably vice-regal, position under Antiochos II.⁶⁸ Shall we construe, on the basis of this relation, also the involvement of the sister (or mother respectively)? This would be a questionable conclusion, not least since the two other brothers of Alexander and Laodike remained loyal to Seleukos.⁶⁹ The accusation against Laodike depends on the assumption that she continued to stay in the main royal residence of Asia Minor, which, however, is neither attested nor likely.⁷⁰ After all, would it not be awkward to mention Alexander, the second most important supporter of Hierax, while being silent about his foremost ally Laodike? Skepticism of Laodike's involvement in the usurpation gains further support from the above-quoted section of the inscription from Priene: this mentions 'Antiochos (Hierax) appointed by King Ptolemy (Euergetes)' as a leading official in Western Asia Minor.⁷¹ The aforementioned friendship between Hierax and Euergetes had thus started in September 246, and this certainly without the instigation of Laodike.

The only plausible solution to the problem is that Laodike had died before Hierax and Alexander usurped power. This assumption is not only fully compatible with Porphyry's account, but also matches precisely Appian's brief sketch of the dynasty's history, according to which Ptolemy had killed Laodike before the War of Brothers broke out.⁷² To date, scholars have either ignored, rejected or redated this assertion. Such a suspicion did make sense within the traditional chronological framework. According to this, the usurpation occurred after Seleukos and Euergetes had ended the war, and since the Third Syrian War lasted until 241 BC, little room was left for further hostilities between the Ptolemies and Laodike.⁷³

However, with the new chronology established, the conflict with Sophron did offer an opportunity for Euergetes to get rid of Laodike. Sophron or Ptolemy Andromachos, who took control of Ephesos by the end of August 246,⁷⁴ could have fought against the troops loyal to the queen late in August or very early in September. This might have taken place by the walls of Ephesos; Laodike would then have been reclaiming the city with force. An alternative location would be the lower Maeander valley, which was not too far south of Ephesos. For it is in the territory of Priene that the name ‘Laodikean War’ has been attested.⁷⁵ Yet another possibility is that Sophron still had friends at the court of Sardis who could have murdered the queen soon after the execution of Danae. If a wild speculation were allowed, we might even think of her own brother Alexander. One way or another, Laodike became the victim of Ptolemaic machinations while defending the interests of her dynasty with vigour – interests that Alexander and Hierax blatantly betrayed.

There are several further conclusions to draw. We might reconsider the notion of ‘Laodikean War’. It can barely have denoted the war between Seleukos II and Euergetes (‘Third Syrian War’), as common opinion has it. Antiochos’ first wife neither brought about the conflict nor played a noticeable role once Seleukos arrived in western Asia Minor to confront the aggressor, Andromachos, in the first place. The term ‘Laodikean War’ was more likely created for the local conflict around Ephesos, in which she lost her life. At any rate, we do not have sufficient evidence to confirm that it ever became an official designation.⁷⁶

The reasons for Alexander’s and Hierax’ usurpation remain uncertain. In all likelihood, the initiative was taken by Andromachos. Even after the losses Laodike had just suffered, he was facing the counter-attack of Seleukos, whose victorious land forces would arrive within one or two weeks, while Gonatas’ fleet was aggressively reclaiming supremacy over the Aegean.⁷⁷ Ptolemy was thus in urgent need of a strong ally. He will have approached Alexander in the first place, offering him and possibly Hierax much more than they were expecting under the rule of Seleukos, most likely the control of major parts of Asia Minor. In fact, a few years later this would be the price Seleukos would pay to buy peace with his brother.⁷⁸

How, then, did Plutarch’s confusion about Laodike’s role in the usurpation come about? The latter, or an intermediary authority who was drawing on Phylarchos, would have read about the active involvement of ‘Alexander, the brother of Laodike’, as can still be found in Porphyry or, more precisely, Eusebios, quoting the latter. It is not too difficult to fathom that a quick reading can lead to the distorted recollection of Laodike as the

instigator, especially after she had been ascribed so many other misdeeds shortly before. We cannot even exclude that Plutarch made the change deliberately, replacing the less known Alexander by his more prominent sister. At any rate, the Hierax he presents is still more a child than an adult, and identifying a plausible driving force behind his usurpation would give more credibility to Hierax' inconsistent display of brotherly love after the Battle of Ankyra.

VI. From Seleukos' defeat at Ankyra to his 'Beautiful Victory' at the Euphrates

Porphry specifies that 20,000 troops of Seleukos were slain at Ankyra. While casualties given in myriads need to be read with some caution, the fact that the king had vanished gives further credence to the decisiveness of Mithradates' victory. Without providing these details, Justin and the *Prologi* of Trogus emphasise its importance.⁷⁹ Moreover, three anecdotes have been transmitted elsewhere that illustrate some remarkable behaviour within the broader context of the same battle. All of them further attest to the severity of Seleukos' losses. The first of them we have already touched upon: Plutarch's portrayal of Hierax' somewhat naive reaction to his brother's fate at Ankyra. He grieved when hearing about Seleukos' death and burst out in happiness when learning of his survival.⁸⁰

The other two anecdotes come from Polyainos. In one case, he reports on the fate of Seleukos' mistress Mysteria:⁸¹

When Seleukos, surnamed Kallinikos, was defeated by the Gauls at Ankyra, and fell into the hands of the enemy, his wife⁸² Mysteria threw aside her royal robe, put on the ragged dress of a lowly servant, and as such was sold amongst the prisoners. After having been conveyed amongst the rest of the slaves to Rhodes, there she revealed her true identity. The Rhodians immediately re-purchased her from the buyer, dressed her in a manner suitable to her rank, and conducted her to Antioch. (Transl. adapted from Attalus.org)

Apparently, Seleukos' court had been routed completely at Ankyra. And if we can rely on the information that Mysteria was conducted to Antioch, it would have taken some three years for the couple to be re-united.

Given the outcome of the Battle of Ankyra, it emerges why Euergetes felt emboldened to set sail from Cyprus to Syria. Those in charge of Seleukeia-in-Pieria were quickly persuaded that, after the deaths of Seleukos and Laodike, resistance was futile. Accordingly, Euergetes received a friendly welcome in the harbour city and soon thereafter in Antioch, too. This, at least, is what he reported back to Alexandria. The Gourobo Papyrus, which contains the official court version of these arrivals, will thus be

mainly correct, except from a few deliberately misleading details.⁸³ The claim that Euergetes visited his sister in Antioch is certainly fictitious. Berenike must have been killed shortly before his arrival. But when the rumour of Seleukos' death was about to be superseded by the news of his survival and Euergetes decided to pursue him, Euergetes' further intrusion into Syria and Mesopotamia could be helped by the pretence that he was acting at the behest of the royal widow Berenike.

The moment of Seleukos' resurfacing from the dusts of the Battle of Ankyra is remembered in another anecdote told by Polyainos:⁸⁴

Seleukos, after an unsuccessful battle with the barbarians, fled towards Kilikia. To conceal himself, in those circumstances, even from his own troops, he was attended only by a few friends, and took on the appearance of the armour-bearer of Amaktion, the general of the royal forces.⁸⁵ But as soon as a sufficient number of cavalry and infantry, the shattered remains of his army, had assembled, he put his royal clothes back on, revealed himself to his army, and again put himself at their head. (Transl. adapted from Attalus.org)

Polyainos allows us to trace, if only vaguely, one stage of Seleukos' retreat. Marching into Kilikia was evidently not without risk, given that Ptolemaic forces had occupied much of it. That he still headed for Kilikia seems to reveal that he intended to reach Antioch as quickly as possible, secure the Seleukis and reorganize his forces there to return into Asia Minor.⁸⁶ But soon he would learn that Seleukeia and Antioch had fallen into Euergetes' hands. The remains of his defeated army were apparently insufficient to confront the invader directly. At least, the forces at his disposal provided him with some protection and authority on his way further east where he had better chances to recruit new troops. This would have led him through the Kilikian hinterland, which cannot yet have been firmly under Ptolemaic control. Next, it would have been obvious for him to cross the Euphrates at Zeugma as soon as possible. There he would have two alternatives: either to move through Edessa straight into Media, or to turn south-east to reach Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris. The latter option, however, was less likely, since it implied a higher risk of being intercepted by Euergetes, who had left Antioch soon after hearing of Seleukos' escape. Euergetes would probably try to confront him on his march to Babylonia, passing through either Beroia or Palmyra.⁸⁷

For a better understanding of Euergetes' actions, it would be helpful to know more precisely under which 'flag' he was campaigning. Contrary to modern opinion, his gains in Asia Minor and Syria had been in his own name, not in that of his sister or nephew. This much is clear even from Ptolemaic propaganda transmitted to us in the Gourob Papyrus and the

Adoulis Inscription. To these can be added the semi-official version expressed in the – widely misunderstood – letter that Tlepolemos addressed to the citizens of Kildara.⁸⁸

According to the Gourob Papyrus, the peaceful handing over of Antioch was interpreted as a submission of the whole empire, including the eastern territories. One can imagine that the festive *adventus* and the council held subsequently in Antioch included public homage to Euergetes by individuals from many different provinces. Despite the document's explicit claim to the opposite, there is no reason to assume that any of the eastern satraps would have been amongst those who received him in Antioch.⁸⁹ The highest representatives of the royal administration were not expected to leave their districts.⁹⁰ It is further noteworthy that those satraps and *stratēgoi* remain without name or geographical specification, although the term satrap would normally refer to a governor of an eastern province, not of the Seleukis. What matters is that the council assembled in Antioch explicitly assumed responsibility for the whole empire (περὶ τῶν ὅλων βουλευόμενοι).⁹¹ We are certainly facing an ideological construction that reveals Euergetes' best hopes at an early stage of the campaign, but tells us little about the factual extension of his influence, let alone the reach of his army.

More detailed in geographical terms is the Adoulis inscription. It generously describes the inherited territories of Euergetes as 'the kingdom of Egypt, Libya, Syria, Phoinikia, Cyprus, Lykia, Karia and the Cyclades islands' before boasting that his own conquests put him:⁹²

in control of all the territories this side of the Euphrates and of Kilikia, Pamphylia, Ionia, the Hellespont, Thrace and of all the forces and Indian elephants in these lands, and having reduced to his obedience all the rulers in the regions, he crossed the river Euphrates, and subdued Mesopotamia and Babylonia, Sousiana, Persis, Media and all the remaining territory as far as Baktria. (Transl. adapted from Austin 2006, no. 268)

One gains the impression that, in this version, the very crossing of the Euphrates constitutes the claim over all the eastern territories.⁹³ From what else we know of his campaign, advancing to or even beyond the Tigris seems to be as much out of the question as the voluntary submission of the governors beyond the Euphrates.⁹⁴

A short version of such an 'uninhibited' piece of propaganda found its way into Polyainos' novelistic account on the death of Berenike, for it ends with an outlook on the peaceful subjection of the territory 'from the Tauros to India'. These gains, however, are styled as the result of Panariste's fabulous ruse: as the queen's female retainer, she falsely asserted her survival after her assassination in Daphne near Antioch. This stratagem

allowed Ptolemy to send out letters in the names of both Berenike and her son to all parts of the empire. But a comparison with the documentary evidence demonstrates that the replacement of the corpse by the retainer was a later fabrication, though based on Euergetes' decision to pretend that his sister was still alive.⁹⁵ This change of his official PR version was in all likelihood due to the latest news of Seleukos' survival, which belied the condition on which Euergetes had been received into Seleukeia and Antioch. The pretence of acting also on Berenike's or her boy's behalf had at least the potential of smoothing opposition to Euergetes' illegal acquisitions in that it offered a bridge to those ready to collaborate but shrinking from outright treason (as in the case of Kildara). Otherwise, we need not assume that the fabrication found credence in Antioch, where the murders had happened publicly, or that they mattered among Seleukid loyalists, who cared as little about Berenike as about her brother. However, the invention of Panariste's ruse met with great success in the sensationalist historiography: through the pro-Ptolemaic writer Phylarchos, it reached a large audience in antiquity and beyond. While not all modern scholars were inclined to believe in the feasibility of the ruse itself, the story still seemed to confirm that Euergetes' reaction was a response to Seleukid wrongdoing, rather than a cold-blooded aggression.

At any rate, all other ancient testimonies that have come down to us show more restraint as to Euergetes' military achievements. Some of them are panegyric in nature and thus seem to go back to an official Ptolemaic version. Take, for instance, Justin's allegation *totum regnum Seleuci occupasset*. Although it sounds similar to the initial boasting, the counterfactual subjunctive indicates that this would have been the result only without the domestic insurgence in Egypt (on which see below).⁹⁶ Also the 66th poem of Catullus deserves to be taken into account, since it is closely following a now-lost love elegy for Euergetes and his wife Berenike composed by the famous courtier Kallimachos. The Latin version asserts that the intention of the campaign had been 'to pillage the Assyrians', whereas the result was the 'conquest of Asia and its addition to the territory of Egypt'. Both geographical terms are deliberately ambiguous. This said, Asia should probably be understood in the Roman sense as the province of Asia: Ephesos and Miletos were the most important gains in Ionia besides some places in Karia, whereas Kilikia had been given up to Hierax by this time.⁹⁷

More detailed is Porphyry, according to whom the initial result of the campaign was the capture of Syria, Kilikia and the upper parts of the Euphrates. To this is added 'nearly all of Asia'. The first three territories mentioned correspond to the dispositions the king made when he returned to Egypt in the spring 245, although at least a semi-independent status

seems to be implied for Kilikia and the provinces beyond the Euphrates.⁹⁸ 'Nearly all Asia' is therefore less likely to be recalled by Catullus' reference to Asia Minor, but rather Justin's vague claim about the potential conquest of the whole Seleukid kingdom.

Brief but relatively precise appears the circumscription that Appian offers in his overview of the Seleukid dynasty: Euergetes 'invaded Syria and advanced as far as Babylon'.⁹⁹ Babylon as the furthestmost point of his campaign seemed to be confirmed by the fact that, as early as 11 July 245, a document from Uruk mentions King Seleukos in its dating formula. Based on this evidence, the domestic revolt in Egypt, Euergetes' withdrawal from Mesopotamia and the establishment of a certain Xanthippos as *stratēgos* (*dux*) of the provinces beyond the Euphrates, i.e. of Assyria or northern Mesopotamia, tend to be dated to spring 245.¹⁰⁰ However, the use of the source from Uruk as a *terminus ante quem* is not without difficulty: it implies that previously either Euergetes or Berenike or her son had been recognized in the area, for which view there is no positive evidence. Instead, it can be demonstrated that Seleukos had been acknowledged as king even prior to the death of Antiochos II, whereas not a single document confirms that he had ever been rejected in Babylon, let alone further south or east of it.

While, in theory, Ptolemaic control of Mesopotamia north of Babylon might have lasted a few years, the chain of events suggests that Euergetes' presence east of the Euphrates was very short indeed. Fragments of a recently found Babylonian chronicle, which have been pre-published by B. van der Spek and I. Finkel, shed more light on the turning point of Euergetes' campaign. The latter reached '[Seleukeia, the royal city on the] Euphrates and at the Canal' as early as December 246. While the name and titulature of the city can be reconstructed with confidence due to the formulaic nature of the text, the localization of this Seleukeia is more controversial. Nearly all scholars have argued for Seleukeia-Zeugma, the most important crossing of the Euphrates in north-eastern Syria or north-western Mesopotamia respectively. However, van der Spek and Finkel have put forward strong arguments against this identification, especially the lack of a canal in the area.¹⁰¹ They argue for Sippar slightly north-west of Babylon which would have been refounded as Seleukeia under Seleukos I.¹⁰² The argument can be corroborated through further information provided in the same inscription: this Seleukeia functioned as the basis for at least two campaigns against the giant city of Babylon, to which even siege engines were transported. This would fit Sippar, but not Zeugma.¹⁰³

The inscription also mentions several military engagements within the city, extending at least from later December into February. Most

remarkable is that the loyalists under the ‘chief guardian’ continued to hold the highly-fortified palace area, after they had also held out in the Bêlet-Ninua Citadel until mid-January. About the same time (20 January), the Egyptian prince gained access to Esagila, the most famous temple of Marduk. Since the Babylonian source is clearly anti-Ptolemaic, it is noteworthy that the extant fragments tell about rituals performed without mentioning any looting. This implies that the mission was still to take permanent possession of Babylon rather than to pillage and leave.¹⁰⁴

However, the chief guardian renewed his resistance, attacking the invaders on the very day that their commander was visiting Esagila, and once more in the course of the next month (24 Jan–22 Feb). While the chronicle emphasizes the many losses on the guardian’s side, it needs to be pointed out that the palace was held continuously, and the defeats had not discouraged further counter-attacks by the defenders.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, in the course of February, relief came from outside under the lead of a certain ‘Seleukos, the *epistatēs* (*pahat*) of Seleukeia’. As far as the remaining fragments can be reconstructed, they report one defeat of this Seleukos and yet another defeat of the troops under the guardian, while the reference to events in Seleukeia are too fragmentary to allow any certain conclusions, at least at the current stage.¹⁰⁶

Without discussion, van der Spek and Finkel take for granted that the latter city was identical with Seleukeia-Sippar, ‘the royal city on the Euphrates and at the Canal’. This is surprising in two regards. First, we would have to assume that the *epistatēs* had recovered Sippar and was then turning against the invading troops in Babylon, where, however, he failed, at least initially; alternatively, he would have fled from Euergetes in December, but two months later came to the support of the chief guardian of Babylon with his remaining or newly recruited forces. Such sequences of events cannot be ruled out, but are not very probable. Second, all three occurrences of Seleukos’ Seleukeia remain without epithet, whereas Seleukeia-Sippar is three times called ‘the royal city which is on the Euphrates’, and once with an additional reference to the canal. Terminology thus speaks against the identity of the two homonymous cities. Moreover, the area north-west of Babylon would not have been the most promising recruitment area for a local commander during the Ptolemaic occupation. I would therefore suggest that Seleukos was the *epistatēs* of Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris. It would thus appear that the city under his command was not only safe from Ptolemaic attacks, but also loyal enough to rally support for the chief guardian of Babylon.¹⁰⁷ The latter assessment seems to reflect that the satrapies east of the Tigris were stable, too, and possibly that

further relief from Media or Persia, if not under the lead of the king himself, was to be expected soon.¹⁰⁸

At any rate, there is no indication that Euergetes himself ever made it to Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris, let alone beyond that river. Nor is there any hint at collaboration with the grandees of the east. That Andragoras remains unmentioned seems to confirm the view that Seleukos had done away with him prior to his father's death. And since Euergetes could not enlist the *karanos* Arsakes or Diodotos of Baktria either, we are safe to assume that they rather sided with Seleukos.¹⁰⁹

Hence, key to understanding the king's return to power is the loyalty of most if not all of the eastern satrapies: the amount of resources that Seleukos could draw from them was sufficient to induce Euergetes to retreat.¹¹⁰ This may have been as early as mid-February or as late as autumn 245. I would suggest that it was Euergetes' fear of a direct confrontation with Seleukos that induced him to withdraw. It is easily imaginable that the new troops outnumbered those of the invader by far, so that open defeat or siege in Sippar seemed to be a realistic possibility. But even an undecided combat would have left Seleukos with the advantage of easy access to further recruits and supplies, whereas Euergetes' return to Egypt would have been like running the gauntlet. So it must have been the unexpectedly quick and powerful return of Seleukos that tipped the balance towards withdrawal, rather than the uprising in Egypt, however important it may have been.¹¹¹ Once the decision had been made, the areas that could not be held were plundered mercilessly. Porphyry (Jerome) specifies the harvest of this raid as 40,000 talents of silver and 2,500 valuable objects such as vases and sculptures, an amount which may have included also the booty from Kilikia and Syria.¹¹²

Further revealing is the report of Porphyry (Jerome) on the strategic dispositions Euergetes made at his departure: 'And Syria, at any rate, he maintained himself, but Kilikia he gave to rule to his friend Antiochos, and to Xanthippos, the other leader, the provinces beyond the Euphrates'.¹¹³ Based on the evidence of Porphyry (Eusebios) and the inscription of Priene, it has been argued above that this Antiochos is none other than Hierax, who had previously cooperated with Ptolemy Andromachos in western Asia Minor. That Porphyry concedes Antiochos the title *philos* reveals a certain degree of independence. In fact, he based his claim to rule on his royal descent. The notion that Euergetes effectively gave up on Kilikia is also implied in the antithetic statement that he kept Syria for himself: given that he did not remain in Antioch either but moved on to Alexandria, there is clearly a different kind of sovereignty implied. One may well assume that he left behind a *stratēgos* also for Syria, who remains unnamed.¹¹⁴

As regards 'the other leader' Xanthippos: his position appears to have been somehow detached from the king, too. Possibly he was a former Seleukid official who had changed sides for personal advancement. Thus he would have been a good candidate first to support the invasion of Euergetes and then to lead the defence against Seleukos.¹¹⁵ In all likelihood, Xanthippos tried to fortify the valley of the middle Euphrates from Sippar up to Zeugma and was also given control of a major part of north-eastern Syria to supply his garrisons. But the organization of such a defence line would have needed more time and resources, if indeed it was designed to become a permanent bulwark against Seleukos. Ultimately, Xanthippos did no more than buy Euergetes time for an orderly retreat of the camel caravans richly laden with booty.

At all events, Seleukos must have defeated Xanthippos either later in 245 or in the first half of 244. This was the 'Beautiful Victory' that regained him access to Syria and won him the acclamation *Kallinikos*.¹¹⁶ Direct evidence for the motivation of the cognomen is no longer extant, but the *Chronicon Paschale* reports the foundation of the city of Kallinikos by Seleukos Kallinikos in Mesopotamia around 244. Since this city maintained strategic and administrative importance until the Byzantine period, it can be identified with the Umajjad re-foundation Ar-Raqqah on the Euphrates, about 160 km east of Aleppo.¹¹⁷

VII. The second phase of the War of Brothers: from the fight for Syria to the assumption of the diadem by Hierax

The location of Kallinikos is of some importance for the further development of the conflicts. On the one hand, it was still at some distance from Zeugma, which lay on the most direct road to the royal cities of the Seleukis; on the other hand, it provided access to southern Seleukis and thus to the northern boundaries of Ptolemaic Phoenicia. Without substantial reinforcements, the progress of Seleukos into Syria could not be stopped. This was probably the occasion when Euergetes decided to concentrate his available forces near the re-emerging frontier along the Eleutheros River.¹¹⁸ It would be a plausible assumption that, to this aim, his troops evacuated Seleukis, certainly not without carrying away tons of loot, before allowing Hierax to take possession of the area. Hierax was well positioned in Kilikia where he seems to have gained the support of Armenia and Cappadocia as well. The fresh troops he could bring into Syria from Asia Minor, together with the dynastic prestige that Euergetes was lacking in the area, would enable Hierax to halt Seleukos' further progress for about two years.

There is a possible alternative to this reconstruction: Seleukos might

have taken back the Seleukis swiftly from Euergetes (with the exception of Seleukeia and Orthosia); he could then have taken his land forces against his brother in Kilikia, while attacking Euergetes with a new-built fleet; if so, he would have failed on both fronts. But the random evidence we have for Arados seems to speak against this view (see below). In addition, we should keep in mind that Euergetes was weak in mustering and supplying large-scale armies. This shortcoming explains why he had to cede Kilikia to Hierax in the first place, and likewise telling will be Justin's explanation of the end of the war: with Hierax changing sides, Euergetes' defence lines crumbled nearly immediately. Against this background, the subsequent attempt at a reconstruction of the history of Syria from 244 to 241 will be based on the plausible, though ultimately unproven, assumption that Euergetes ceded at least Seleukis, if not a larger part of Syria as far south as Arados, to Hierax; this way, he secured the retreat of his followers laden with booty.

No consistent narrative of this phase of the war has come down to us. Justin's (fanciful) account of the Third Syrian War entirely omits Hierax' presence in Syria. But the latter seems to be implied in Strabo's report on Arados. For the geographer mentions that Arados opted for Seleukos when having to choose between the two brothers.¹¹⁹ Various suggestions for the history of this Phoenician harbour city during the Second and Third Syrian Wars have been made. They are all based on the assumption that the civic era of Arados begins with year 259/58, although it is admitted that the first autonomous coin types were issued only in 243/42. The role of Hierax could, however, not be understood adequately, since his potential influence was dated only after 241. Within the framework of the revised chronology, a more convincing outline may now look as follows: Arados had been granted far-reaching autonomy by Antiochos II in 259/58, which was subsequently respected also by Euergetes, Hierax and Seleukos. This allowed the Aradians to avoid a specific commitment during the first years of the war, but to opt openly for Seleukos once he had returned into the area in 244 or 243. It is to be assumed that a parcel of further privileges went along with this choice.¹²⁰

Especially, the peculiar grant of *asylia* to the city attested by Strabo fits much better into the new chronological framework. Seleukos promised to respect the safety of all refugees in Arados, but in return it was conceded that none of them was to leave the narrow confines of the city (which was in fact an island) without his explicit permission. Such conditions would have been of little benefit, if indeed the War of Brothers had been opened only after the peace with Euergetes, for the new conflict would not have affected Syria directly. Given Seleukos' defeat at Ankyra (traditionally dated

to 241 or later) and his previous failure to seize further cities in Asia Minor, there would have been no need for the elites attached to Hierax to emigrate; at the same time, seeking protection from Seleukos in his immediate vicinity would have been absurd. The fugitives mentioned by Strabo rather came from among the compromised elites of Syria, especially Antioch. Offering such a safe haven would weaken the support for Hierax in Seleukis as much as it would strengthen the cause of Seleukos. In addition, if the refugees opted for Arados rather than Euergetes' or Hierax' dominions, a reconciliation with Seleukos and thus an eventual return home (as mentioned by Strabo), would be more likely.¹²¹

It cannot be decided, however, whether the formal agreement with Arados preceded or post-dated Seleukos' return to Antioch. Justin's account is once more of little help. He speaks of a naval campaign against the cities that had defected, which, on the one hand, resulted in shipwreck, but, on the other, led up to a voluntary submission of the cities 'out of pity'. Whether the king's 'return' to Antioch thereafter is to be understood literally, i.e. that Antioch had been the starting point of this campaign, or if Justin simply assumes that Seleukos had resided in Antioch prior to the defection of the cities to Euergetes, remains open, too.¹²² Given the traces of Seleukos' re-conquests that we have so far identified, one may at least hypothesize as follows: he moved northwards from Arados by land and sea, gradually regained Laodikeia, Apameia and Antioch, but then suffered a shipwreck, so that Seleukeia could not be taken back.¹²³ At any rate, Hierax seems to have held a firm grip on the main royal residence for about two or three years, thus until 243 or even 242. This reconstruction would make him a viable candidate also for authorizing the highly controversial *Antiochos Soter* coinage (unless we ascribe it to his father Antiochos II). The traditional motifs struck onto the coins and the general trend of commemorating deceased Seleukid kings would certainly align well with Hierax' later coinage in Asia Minor, and the avoidance of his own portrait would reflect the anomalous situation that, as a ruler of minor age and acting at least partly under the authority of Ptolemy Euergetes, he did not yet bear the royal title.¹²⁴

This title he would only assume in a later phase of the war, when he had lost all his stakes in Syria. Once again, it is Polyainos who provides us with further information: after suffering defeats in Mesopotamia and Armenia, Hierax' soldiers pretended that he had died and offered to surrender their camp; the persecutors ceased being cautious and were thus trapped and defeated. The episode ends as follows: 'But Antiochos showed himself bestowing the royal symbol on himself (σχῆμα τὸ βασιλείον ἀναλαβὼν), demonstrating that he was alive and victorious'. Based on Justin's confused

series of events, this battle has traditionally been dated close to the end of Hierax' life.¹²⁵ As a result of this apparent misdating,¹²⁶ little attention has been paid to the bestowal of the diadem.¹²⁷ Its full implication only emerges in its effective chronological context around 242: Hierax had, after a couple of setbacks, re-asserted his position, and decided to have himself acclaimed king at the age of ca. 18 years. The beginning of the anecdote helps us to further define the context:

After having revolted, Antiochos, the brother of Seleukos, fled into Mesopotamia; Arsames, since he was his friend, received him, when he was marching through the mountains of the Armenians from there. The *stratēgoi* of Seleukos Achaios and Andromachos chased him with a strong army.

The initial march into Mesopotamia seems to have happened when Hierax was in possession of his dominions in Asia Minor and continued to enjoy the loyalty of Arsames of Armenia. The most convincing situation would have been around 243 when he was still in control of Antioch and other parts of northern Syria; he would have been trying to cut Seleukos off from his supplies that were coming in through Mesopotamia. In hindsight, one may well interpret this bold attempt at halting his brother's further progress into the Seleukis as flight. But in the case of his effective defeat in Syria, he would probably have withdrawn into Kilikia rather than into Mesopotamia. At any rate, Seleukos sent his most experienced generals, who, as members of the royal family, would also counteract Hierax' dynastic claims in Mesopotamia.¹²⁸ Seleukos himself could now slowly proceed towards Antioch. News of Hierax' defeat in Mesopotamia, in combination with the offer of exile to Arados for those who had compromised themselves, would ease the surrender of the royal city by 242.

So far, Seleukos had come a long way: he had regained Mesopotamia and occupied most of Seleukid Syria. But it appears that the defeat of his troops in Armenia and the loss of his fleet off Laodikeia or Seleukeia meant major setbacks very soon thereafter. It is easy to imagine that Euergetes responded with increased pressure on the coastal cities. This was the time to buy peace from Hierax by acknowledging his royal status and supremacy over Asia Minor. I would question Justin's allegation of an active cooperation between the brothers, and suggest that Hierax tried to maintain neutrality instead. At least, there is no evidence that he attacked Ptolemaic positions in Asia Minor.¹²⁹ This notwithstanding, the agreement allowed Seleukos to concentrate his forces on southern Syria and press into the Ptolemaic Kingdom. As Seleukos' last military operations, Porphyry reports that he laid siege not only to Orthosia, which is just north of the Eleutheros River, but also to Damascus, which is much farther to the south, in the Syrian

hinterland, where Seleukos was apparently prevailing. This discrepancy seems to reflect well that Euergetes had been able to defend his naval supremacy, which slowed down Seleukos' progress along the Levantine coast.

Justin may at least be right that it was Euergetes who sued for peace.¹³⁰ In all likelihood, the latter offered to end all hostile naval operations in return for Seleukos' withdrawal from the territories south of the Eleutheros, while otherwise respecting the status quo. Seleukos must have seen the risk of over-exploiting his subjects by prolonging this costly war.¹³¹ And perhaps he was not certain either about the worth of the peace with his brother. So he was ready to accept the offer, despite the painful loss of Seleukeia-in-Pieria. He understood that, in the near future, he would not be able to compete with the Ptolemaic fleet, while further gains in Koile Syria would have to be paid for by ongoing raids on the Syrian coasts. As a result, ending the war was in the interest of both kings in 242/241.

VIII. Digression: the War of Brothers in Asia Minor

After analysing the impact of the Battle of Ankyra, our attention has shifted away from western and northern Asia Minor, partly because the main confrontations happened further to the east, partly because the current source basis prevents us from writing a coherent narrative of the Greek cities and principalities of Asia Minor between 246 and the accession of Antiochos III.¹³² In what follows, at least a few spotlights will be thrown on the more active players, with no claim to completeness. The problematic alliance of Hierax with the Tolistobogioi and the Bithynian King Ziaelas, whose daughter he married, as well as the uncertain roles of Eumenes and Attalos of Pergamon will be omitted here, as their treatment would mainly be based on the evidence for the wars that took place after the end of the Third Syrian War. Their study would exceed the scope of the present paper.¹³³

Let us start with Mithradates II who brought about the first major defeat of Seleukos probably late in September 246. Hierax or Alexander cannot have had much to do with his involvement, since they were so much at the losing end that they would have little to offer. Thus either Ptolemaic diplomacy was reaching as far as Pontos, or Mithradates took the initiative himself. It is telling that he is never mentioned among the allies of Hierax or Euergetes, whether before or after 241, although in the later course of his rule, Hierax held hostage the young daughter of Mithradates II for whatever reason.¹³⁴ In a different context, Justin claims that Seleukos Kallinikos offered the hand of his sister Laodike to Mithradates, adding Eastern Phrygia as a dowry.¹³⁵ Previous scholarship has wrestled not only with the date, but also with identifying the relative of Laodike responsible

for marrying her off. But the tradition can be trusted: Seleukos' active role implies a date between 246 and 242. Most likely would be the time after his return into Syria when he was trying to increase the pressure on Hierax. The support of Pontos and the Tektosages could be enrolled at an affordable price: the concession of an undetermined chunk of Phrygia which was out of his own reach anyway. The peace with Hierax in 242 or by 241 would be the *terminus ante quem*, for otherwise Seleukos would have impinged on the agreement with his brother.¹³⁶ And as to the king of Cappadocia, he probably decided to establish more friendly terms with Seleukos, when Hierax was returning from Armenia. This at least is a more likely context for Ariamenes' attempt to plot against him than in the 220s, when Hierax was unlikely to return to eastern Asia Minor.¹³⁷

As regards Lykia and Karia, we can assume that most of these areas remained under Ptolemaic control. A leading position was held by Tlepolemos of Xanthos, who has been mentioned before in the context of the treason committed by Kildara. Ptolemy of Telmessos, a relative of Euergetes, may well have been active beyond his own city of residence.¹³⁸ However, thanks to the decision of Olympichos of Alinda, major parts of north-western Karia were regained for Seleukos, including Mylasa and Labraunda, most probably in 244. It is in fact unclear how he behaved after the brothers had made peace. There is no evidence for a conflict with, or subjugation to, Hierax. A high degree of autonomy he seems to have held also under Antigonid rule which started in 227. Olympichos' attitude in this critical year will have been important to everyone involved, but it cannot be specified with any certainty.¹³⁹

Among the most important allies of Seleukos were the citizens of Smyrna. This can be deduced from a very detailed decree regulating their *sympoliteia* with Magnesia-on-the-Sipylos and the adjacent garrison colony of Old Magnesia. Very explicitly, this political unification was styled as a measure to overcome local hostilities by choosing joint citizenship under the overall rule of Seleukos.¹⁴⁰ The same document states that Smyrna showed allegiance to the king at two different times when he crossed into Seleukis.¹⁴¹ The first occasion must have been when he returned from Babylon after his father's death in 246, the second time followed the 'Beautiful Victory' in 245 or 244. While previous scholarship assumed that Magnesia had been under Ptolemaic control, Ihnken proposed that it had chosen the side of Hierax. Since the latter fled to Magnesia after his defeat by his brother in September 246, Ihnken's suggestion is much more likely, although his argument is based on several difficult premises.¹⁴²

Smyrna's political decisions can now be contextualized within a chronologically coherent narrative. The city's initiative seems to reflect

Hierax' absence in the east (probably together with a strong Tolistobogian contingent), whereas Ptolemy Andromachos does not seem to have commanded sufficient troops to control the hinterland of the Ionian coast. At any rate, Seleukos reacted to this welcome support of his cause with a declaration of freedom, tax exemption and *asylia* to both the city of Smyrna and its temple of Aphrodite Stratonikis in 244 or 243. While we do not hear anything further from the city under either brother's rule, it is likely that even Hierax was supposed to respect this freedom. Whether he did so, is of course a different matter.¹⁴³

More controversial is the case of Miletos. It is only certain that this city was very quick to react with homage after Seleukos had become king. Traditionally, the honorary decree of the Milesians has been dated shortly after Antiochos' death. However, our only source, Seleukos' friendly reply, which was inscribed at Didyma, does not allow us to exclude a slightly earlier date following Seleukos' appointment as co-ruling king around June 246. It appears more certain that the correspondence was composed before the king received news of the outbreak of the 'Laodikean War', although this view is controversial, too.¹⁴⁴ Some scholars claim that, despite the exchange of such flatteries, Miletos did not hesitate to go over by the end of 246, as it had done in 279, despite the high regard in which it was held by the Seleukids. But the vague boasting of the abovementioned Adoulis Inscription, which counts Ionia among Euergetes' conquests, has very little weight in this discussion. Rather it seems that the city gradually regained effective autonomy, while two Seleukid parties and the Ptolemies paralyzed each other for a couple of years.¹⁴⁵

A final note is owed to the dossier which assembles the letters recognizing the *asylia* of Kos in the summer or autumn of 242.¹⁴⁶ While there is relatively little controversy as to the documents composed at the courts of Ziaelas of Bithynia, Ptolemy Euergetes of Egypt and Eumenes (or Attalos) of Pergamon, the one so far ascribed to Seleukos needs to be reconsidered. The text implies that the author (whose name is lost) ruled somewhere over western Asia Minor. The attribution to Seleukos is based on the assumption that a) he still ruled over the area in 242, b) he visited this part of his kingdom in the same year, and c) Hierax' rule only started later.¹⁴⁷ However, all three conditions have been shown above to be erroneous: Hierax usurped power over some western parts of Asia Minor in 246, moved eastwards in 245 and returned to Ionia after assuming the diadem in Armenia around 242. Seleukos, in contrast, was operating in Syria that year; whether or not he was also approached by the Koans to endorse their *asylia* remains open. At any rate, opting for Hierax would also explain the stylistic discrepancies as compared to the letters by Antiochos II and Seleukos.¹⁴⁸

IX. Results: revised chronology of Seleukos' wars with Euergetes and Hierax

The preceding investigation has tried to demonstrate that the Third Syrian War resulted mainly from three factors: the sudden death of Antiochos II, the absence from Ionia of Seleukos and a large part of the army, and Euergetes' desire for military glory and territorial expansion. The defection of Sophron in July or early August 246 accelerated the Ptolemaic attack on Asia Minor, which however would have been likely to happen anyway. Within a few weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, Laodike had been killed and the Seleukid grip on Western Asia Minor was shattered. At the same time, the Ptolemies lost the advantage of the newly-gained Ephesian fleet nearly immediately with Antigonos Gonatas' naval victory at Andros in August. When Seleukos was returning westwards unexpectedly, immediate reinforcements were necessary to retain Ephesos. Ptolemy Andromachos won over Laodike's brother Alexander, who was then *stratēgos* based in Sardis, and with him the young prince Antiochos Hierax. This coup notwithstanding, Seleukos curbed their revolt by the end of September, but instead of bringing about their surrender, he had to abort his campaign upon notice of the invasion of Eastern Phrygia (and perhaps also Kilikia).

Having turned east, he was attacked by Mithradates II of Pontos and the Galatian Tektosages. He suffered the most crushing defeat of his life, was reported dead himself, but still managed to escape into Syria and hence into Mesopotamia. The notice of his defeat was of the utmost benefit to Euergetes, who could then negotiate a peaceful reception in Seleukeia-in-Pieria and Antioch-on-the-Orontes in October. By the time of Euergetes' arrival, Seleukid loyalists had done away with his sister Berenike and her son, preventing them from serving Euergetes as puppet rulers. They effectively became relevant for his campaign only after their death, when it became known in Antioch that Seleukos had survived and escaped. From then on, the king of Egypt had to pursue him quickly, hoping that his march eastwards would be aided by spreading news of the survival of his sister. Early in December, he reached Seleukeia-Sippar on the Euphrates, and a few weeks later, his troops began fighting within the city of Babylon.

Despite serious losses, the Seleukid commander-in-chief of Babylon held out in loyalty and effective relief probably came in from Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris in the later course of winter. At the same time, Seleukos had gathered a new army, with which he pursued the retreating invaders. By the end of the summer of 245, Euergetes may have been back to Egypt, having ceded Kilikia to Hierax, who was supported by Tolistobogian allies. Xanthippos had the task of hindering Seleukos' return into Syria, but was defeated on the Euphrates probably later in 245. By 244, Seleukos was

back in the Levant, operating in the southern parts of Seleukis (around Arados), whence he slowly worked his way through to Antioch by 242.

His main opponent of those years was Hierax, who had been called into Antioch by Euergetes after the defeat of Xanthippos. In 243 or 242, Hierax took the war into northern Mesopotamia, but was defeated and retreated back into Asia Minor. After managing to slaughter his pursuers in Armenia, he assumed the diadem for the first time. Seleukos, who was then in possession of Antioch, but had lost his fleet before being able to recapture Seleukeia-in-Pieria, decided that a compromise with his brother was needed to finally overcome Euergetes. He bought peace from Hierax by acknowledging his royal rule over Asia Minor in 242 or 241, which allowed him to march all his available troops into Koile-Syria. This move induced Euergetes to offer peace on the basis of the status quo.

Both the Third Syrian War and the War of Brothers had thus begun in 246 and ended by 241. There is no evidence for further military conflicts between Seleukos and Hierax or Euergetes respectively. As a result, the history of the remaining years of those kings will also have to be rewritten (see below, section X, for an outline).

Appendix: revised chronicle for the years 253 to 226

By 253/252: Antiochos II prevailed over Ptolemy Philadelphos in the Second Syrian War. The marriage with Berenike sealed the peace treaty, whereby the enormous dowry served as a disguised war indemnity; Ptolemy was not able to insist that Seleukos divorce Laodike or disinherit his sons from her.

252–246: Philadelphos persistently worked towards weakening the Antigonid grip on central and southern Greece and re-establishing Ptolemaic thalassocracy in the Aegean and possibly in the south-western parts of the Black Sea.

247/46: Seleukos II was sent at the head of strong military forces to fight the usurper Andragoras in Parthia. The latter was also attacked by Arsakes, leader of the Parnians, who became *karanos* (*stratēgos*) of Parthia; Andragoras was soon defeated.

246: Philadelphos' death in January 246 delayed the planned naval campaign in the Aegean, but, in the summer of 246, his son and successor Ptolemy Euergetes was waiting on Cyprus for an opportunity to strike.

246: In spring, Antiochos decided to appoint Seleukos as his co-ruler; he was proclaimed king in Babylon later in July. It is possible, though by no means certain, that, around the same time, Antiochos acclaimed Laodike *basilissa*, thus empowering her to rule the court in case of his own or his son's absence.

246: Probably in early or mid-July, Antiochos died in Ephesos; he was reported dead in Babylon in the course of September.

246: Still in July, Laodike moved the court back to Sardis. She soon suspected the *stratēgos* Sophron of conspiring with Euergetes or the latter's admiral in the Aegean, Ptolemy Andromachos. Her attempt to trap him failed due to the betrayal of Danae, who was immediately executed.

246: By the beginning of August, Sophron had escaped to Ephesos and, together with the city and the fleet, he openly went over to the Ptolemies. Andromachos launched an attack in southern Thrace (thereby killing the dynast Adaios), while Sophron fell upon the fleet of the former ally Gonatas in Samos. When the latter prevailed unexpectedly, Andromachos quickly retreated from Samos to take control of Ephesos no later than September.

246: In August or September, the Ptolemaic *stratēgos* of Karia, Tlepolemos, extended his control over some Seleukid places: Kildara went over to him voluntarily, while Mylasa may well have been conquered around the same time.

246: In August or early in September, Laodike died, either through machinations of Sophron or in the context of an open war ('Laodikean War') that she waged to recapture Ephesos or to curb further Ptolemaic encroachments on Seleukid territory.

246: After news of Sophron's cooperation with Andromachos had reached Euergetes in Cyprus, he ordered the invasion of Kilikia, where the satrap Artabazos was killed later in August.

246: In the face of Sophron's defeat and Seleukos' near arrival, Andromachos was in urgent need of allies to maintain old and new Ptolemaic acquisitions in the west. Perhaps early in September, he won over Alexander, Laodike's brother, and through him her younger son Antiochos Hierax, aged 14. In all likelihood, he promised them the control of all remaining Seleukid possessions in Asia Minor as a reward for collaboration.

246: In September, Seleukos arrived in Lydia, but was excluded from Sardis by Alexander. Hierax was staying in a garrison outside the walls. He was defeated and possibly pursued by Seleukos, but escaped to Magnesia-at-the-Sipylos.

246 In the course of September, Mithridates II invaded the Ankyra region (with Galatian Tektosages), possibly to relieve Hierax and Andromachos. Seleukos now had two urgent reasons to abort his campaign in the west and decided to deal with Kilikia only after putting down Mithradates. But the king of Pontos managed to destroy his army (20,000 victims are reported) and even sack his court (his concubine Mysta was sold into slavery). Seleukos was thought to have been killed, but escaped via Kilikia, northern Syria and Mesopotamia into Media.

246: Early in October, Euergetes heard about Seleukos' defeat and immediately set course to Seleukeia-in-Pieria. Berenike and her son were likely under house arrest since the conflict with Sophron had broken out, but were murdered by Seleukid loyalists once news of Euergetes' operations in Kilikia or Syria reached Antioch. But rumours of Seleukos' death undermined further resistance. Euergetes was received as the new king in Seleukeia and in Antioch. But when it was becoming clear that Seleukos had survived, Euergetes pretended that Berenike was still alive, to facilitate his further campaigns.

246: In December, Euergetes' troops arrived first in Seleukeia-Sippar and next in Babylon, where loyalist troops were resisting under the 'chief guardian'.

245: In January, the acropolis and the temple of Marduk were lost to the invaders, who had been reinforced by a 'prince' of Egypt, but the guardian continued to hold the royal palace.

245: In February, the loyalists were relieved through forces under Seleukos, the commander (*pahat*) of Seleukeia (-on-the-Tigris?). The defenders suffered further setbacks, but the Ptolemaic forces never gained full control of Babylon.

245: Between February and summer 245, Euergetes decided to retreat from Babylonia, from which point his campaign turned into a raid. One may doubt that the uprising in Upper Egypt was the only reason. More likely, Seleukos was approaching with a strong army gathered in the Upper Satrapies. Euergetes left behind Xanthippos as *stratēgos* (?) of the provinces beyond the Euphrates, which probably relates to the north-western parts of Mesopotamia from where access into Syria and Armenia was to be blocked. Kilikia was entrusted to his 'friend Antiochos' (Hierax). He was hoping to keep Syria for himself.

245/244: Seleukos achieved the 'Beautiful Victory' over Xanthippos which yielded

him both his cognomen 'Kallinikos' and access to Syria. The city of Kallinikos (Ar-Raqqah) was founded on the Euphrates.

245/244: Once it became clear that Seleukos was returning into Syria, Euergetes called Hierax into the Seleukis, hoping that his descent and fresh troops from Asia Minor might halt the progress of Seleukos. Euergetes kept Seleukeia-in-Pieria and possibly also southern Syria, while Hierax took control of Antioch and probably most other cities in north-western Syria.

245/243: Hierax may have fortified Antioch, profiting from the alliance with Ptolemaic Seleukeia and the resources coming from nearby Kilikia. Still a teenager, he abstained from the royal title and issued coins with motifs celebrating the ancestors of his dynasty.

244/43: Seleukos gradually moved into Syria, trying to win over as many cities with as little violence as possible. While the northern coastal area was inaccessible at first, he probably reached the Mediterranean shore for the first time in Arados, which voluntarily opted for him.

244: Smyrna had so far resisted the Ptolemies and Hierax; upon hearing of Seleukos' return into Syria, it took his side openly. *Sympoliteia* was offered to the citizens of Magnesia-at-the-Sipylos and a garrison established at Old Magnesia as a prize for changing sides.

244: Around this time, Olympichos from Alinda in northern Karia also showed open support for Seleukos, receiving the order to 'free' Mylasa (and Labraunda) from Ptolemaic control.

244/242: The allegiance of most other cities of Asia Minor remains uncertain. Miletos slipped into independence; Pergamon remained in a 'splendid isolation' under Eumenes I.

246?/227?: Sardis probably continued to be controlled by Alexander and Ephesos by Andromachos, although it is unclear if they outlived the year 246. Andromachos was assassinated in Ephesos, either soon after the Battle of Andros or only in the 220s in the context of Antigonid intrusions into Asia Minor. Ephesos remained Ptolemaic until its reconquest by Antiochos III in 197.

244/243: Hierax continued to control Kilikia and most of Seleukis, enjoying the support of the Tolistobogioi and possibly of the kings of Cappadocia and Armenia, too. His marriage with the daughter of Ziaelas of Bithynia also seems to date to these years.

244/242: Seleukos actively wooed kings and dynasts in Asia Minor, to exert pressure on Hierax. He married off his sister Laodike to Mithradates II of Pontos, granting him the possession of Phrygia as a 'dowry'.

243/242: Philetairos, *hēgemōn* of Cretan mercenaries, and Dionysios of Lysimacheia, possibly a leader of a Thracian contingent, are attested among Hierax' forces during the invasion of Mesopotamia. This was less likely the result of his flight

from Syria than a bold attempt to cut Seleukos from his power base. However, he was beaten by Achaïos and Andromachos, brothers of Queen Laodike and the traitor Alexander. Despite his flight, King Arsames of Armenia was still friendly to him, but Seleukos' generals defeated Hierax again. He overcame his pursuers through a ruse. In his victory celebration, he assumed the diadem and was hailed king, aged around 18. He then returned to Kilikia.

243/242: Seleukos gained control of Antioch and other parts of Seleukis except Seleukeia-in-Pieria. His fleet was wrecked through storm.

242/241: The recent setbacks taught Seleukos that a compromise with Hierax was required to overcome Euergetes. By acknowledging his brother as king of Asia Minor, he reduced the costs of securing the northern frontiers of his kingdom, while Euergetes had to invest more in maintaining his holdings in Asia Minor. There are no clear indications regarding the conditions of Smyrna and Mylasa or the allegiance of Olympichos after the agreement. It is likely that they maintained a high degree of autonomy.

By 241: Seleukos recovered Syria except Seleukeia-in-Pieria. Operations along the coast went more slowly than deeper inland, so that he was laying siege simultaneously to Orthosia just north of the Eleutheros River and to Damascus deep in Koile Syria. Euergetes offered peace, probably on the basis of the status quo, if not allowing Seleukos some further gains in northern Koile Syria in return for Seleukeia-in-Pieria and Ephesos.

Outlook

240–227: It appears that Hierax maintained peace with his brother for the rest of his lifetime. Initially, Kilikia and Lydia will have been the centres of his power, whereby the Bithynians and at times also the Tolistobogioi allied with him. He worked successfully towards extending his rule into Ionia, Aiolis and Mysia as well as into southern and western Phrygia, while eastern Phrygia (later 'Galatia') remained under Tolistobogian and Tektosagan (or Pontic) control. Conflicts with Attalos I of Pergamon may date rather late, and seem to have brought about his downfall, when Euergetes (or Andromachos, if still alive) refused to support him. The condition of Seleukid possessions in Thrace after 246 remains uncertain, but Hierax' hopes to find there a safe haven when escaping from Attalos were not fulfilled. His murderers, however, may have been from among his own Galatian mercenaries.¹⁴⁹

241–225: Whether or not Seleukos and Euergetes had really intended to uphold the peace for long, may well be doubted. But apparently both had to consolidate their kingdoms, and having overstrained their subjects, revolts in Upper Egypt as well as in Parthia and Baktria respectively (plus one in Antioch around 238)¹⁵⁰ should not have come as a surprise.

226/25: According to Justin, Seleukos died by falling from a horse. This report was designed to vilify the king, but it is nevertheless indicative of his relentless efforts to regain lost parts of the realm.¹⁵¹

Notes

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¹ Cf. Holton (in this volume) for a sophisticated argument on the traditional view of a revolt of Seleukos the Son. However, according to Del Monte 1995 (cf. idem 1997, 37; 228; Savalli-Lestrade 2003, 73), the eldest son of Antiochos I never revolted against his father nor was he executed, but rather fell terminally ill. His brother Antiochos II was thus appointed co-ruling king prior to his death. This created the rule of three kings for the transitional period 268 to 266. Cf. also Corsten 1997 ad *I.Laodikeia* no. 1 for the complex evidence, though not yet with this solution.

² For the traditional chronology, cf., e.g., Jacoby on *FGrH* 260 F 32.8, p. 870; Dodd 2009, 73; Kosmin 2014, 19; for more references, see below, n. 55 f. Occasionally, however, the beginning of Hierax' rule in Asia Minor, whether peaceful or violent, is dated to sometime between 246 and 242, though never with a consistent argument; see below, n. 39.

³ Main sources: *P.Gourab* = *FGrH* 160 = Piejko, *APF* 36, 1990, 13–15 = Austin² 266 on Kilikia and Seleukis; Adoulis Inscription = *OGIS* I 54 = Austin² 268, listing nearly all parts of the Seleukid Empire (but cf. Hauben 1990, 30–2 on Babylon as the farthest point; differently Otto 1928, 51); on Kildara and Mylasa in Karia see below, nn. 6 and 25. Cf. also Just. 27.1; Polyæn. 8.50; Hieron. in *Dan.* 11.6–9 = Porphyr. *Contra Christianos*, *FGrH* 260 F 43. On the Babylonian sources for the death of Antiochos, the succession of Seleukos as well as the arrival and withdrawal of Euergetes, see below, VI. On the speed of Euergetes' campaign, see below, n. 14. More recently, another inscription was found in El-Khazindariya near Alexandria, the tri-lingual 'Synodaldekret' of Alexandria (i.e. decree of the priest council) dated to 17 Sep. 243 (ed. princeps and German translation by el-Masry, Altenmüller, and Thissen 2012, 153); it describes the splendour of the booty Euergetes brought home from 'both Retenu, Charu (=Syria), Chereg, Seger and Susa'. I would like to thank C. Lorber for bringing this document to my attention.

⁴ According to Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43 ll. 11 f., Laodike was repudiated together with her sons, but later became a *concubina*; this demotion is completely isolated in the ancient record. By stressing the young age of the son of Berenike, the pro-Ptolemaic account of Polyæn. 8.50 ultimately confirms that Antiochos never challenged Seleukos' role as his crown prince. With the exception of Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 90, Laodike's disgrace was accepted almost universally, e.g., by Bevan 1902b, 158; Macurdy 1932, 83; Hölbl 1994/2001, 42; Kobes 1996, 137 f.; Ogden 1999, 128: 'he constrained Antiochos II by war to marry his daughter Berenice "Phernophoros" and to divorce Laodice and reduce her to the status of concubine'; Huss 2001, 338 f.; Errington 2008, 120. This view has recently been contested by Martinez-Sève 2002/3, 693–7; 701 f. and Coşkun 2016a, 112–8.

⁵ Phylarch. *FGrH* 81 F 24; App. *Syr.* 65.344 f.; Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 43 ll. 14 f.: *quae metuens ambigui viri animum, ne Berenicen reduceret, virum per ministros veneno interfecit*. However, a natural death is implied in the Armenian version of Porphyry's *Chronicle*, *FGrH* 260 F 32.6 (sickness) as well as in Trog. *prol.* 27; Polyaen. 8.50; Val. Max. 9.10 ext. 1. Just. 27.1.1 alone blames Seleukos for the murder of Berenike and her son, though he is said to have been encouraged to this deed by his mother. For an in-depth discussion of the representation of Laodike in ancient historiography, cf. Coşkun 2016a.

⁶ *I.Kildara* = Blümel, *EA* 20, 1992, 127–33 = *SEG* 42.994 = Gauthier, *BE* 1994, 571–3 no. 528 = Austin² 267. The boy's designation as king by Antiochos II or his proclamation by Berenike is believed, e.g., by Bevan 1902b, 181; Otto 1928, 52 f.; Will 1979, I 249; Blümel 1992; Sartre 1995, 27; Shipley 2000, 289; Huß 2001, 338–40; Houghton and Lorber I.1, 2002, 225–7; Savalli-Lestrade 2003, 75; Grainger 2010, 150; 155 f.; McAuley 2011 f. s.v. Antiochos II.

⁷ Cf. Coşkun 2016a, 128–30. We cannot even be absolutely sure that Antiochos was the boy's name and not a (fictitious) throne name.

⁸ Cf. Coşkun 2016a, 112–22, with in-depth discussion.

⁹ The challenges to Seleukid rule in the eastern satrapies are currently a major focus of scholarly attention. According to the traditional views (as still prevalent, e.g., in Kosmin 2014, 19), secessions began under Antiochos II and attempts at redressing the balance of power were either short-lived or complete failures. Such pessimistic verdicts are now yielding to more nuanced arguments. However, recent attempts to date the revolt of Andragoras to the beginning of the Third Syrian War (e.g., Coloru 2009, 157–63; Plischke 2014, esp. 228 f.) do not convince: their chronological premises (two phases of the War of Brothers 241–236 / 230–228/27 framing Seleukos' failed eastern campaign) are no longer tenable. The late date further ignores the relevance of the beginning of the Arsakid era on the 1st Nisan 247 BC (on which cf. Luther 1999), the role of Arsakes as *karanos*, which is Persian for 'satrap' (cf. Coşkun 2016a, 120 with reference to Engels 2013; Engels in this volume; differently, Coloru 2009, 158). See also below, n. 110. But also see differing views of Strootman and Wenghofer in this volume.

¹⁰ On Philadelphos, cf. Coşkun 2016a, 130–2, with Grainger 2010, 142–55; also Pfeiffer 2004, 19: based on the political climate in Egypt, he regards Euergetes' desire to gain military glory as the main motivation for his campaign. Note that even the pro-Ptolemaic account of Justin (on which more below) does not avoid a note on the aggressive intentions of Euergetes in 246: Just. 27.3.4, quoted below, n. 34. Cf. also Lehmann 1998, 93–5 who emphasizes the preparation required for the campaign, in contrast to, e.g., Otto 1928, 66–74. – On July, see below, n. 12.

¹¹ The ancient sources are inconsistent as to whether Euergetes embarked on his campaign to rescue or to avenge his sister and nephew. Justin is the only one who reflects awareness of both traditions. But he first applies the latter motivation (revenge), then the former (rescue), before somehow blending them by stating that Berenike and her child were eventually dead when Euergetes arrived (27.1.2–7). This may be seen as symptomatic for the whole of Justin's account: moral indignation is what matters (cf. § 5 *tam indignae fortunae*; § 7 *indigna res*), whereas he remains unconcerned with a precise chronology.

¹² Cf., e.g., Hauben 1990, 29; Ehling 2003, 308; van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11. Definitely too late is August, as implied or claimed by Del Monte 1997, 47 f.; Lehmann 1998, 87; Martinez-Sève 2002/3, 703 n. 77; for, even if the fragmentary entry in the Babylonian Chronicles for August should relate to the notification of the king's death, he would have passed away in Ephesos about a month before.

¹³ Scholars tend to agree that Euergetes first landed on Cyprus before invading Syria: cf., e.g., Lehmann 1998, 90; Ehling 2003, 308 f. Spuler 1953, in turn, assumes that 'sailing along the coast' (*P.Gouroub* II) implies that Euergetes sailed northwards along the Levant coast; the first landing place in Seleukid Syria mentioned in the papyrus is Posideon, which is located in-between Laodikeia and Seleukia-in-Pieria; however, the papyrus confines this movement to one single day. For a combination of both ways, cf. Grainger 2010, 156 f.: 'Meanwhile Ptolemy with a larger naval force had sailed, probably from Egypt, as far as Posideion, a minor port north of Laodikeia on the Syrian coast, where he waited for word that all was arranged for his landing in Syria'; 158: ships came from both Cyprus and Egypt; likewise Piejko 1990, 17.

¹⁴ With amazing speed (Just. 27.1.6 *advolat*), Ptolemy arrived in Seleukeia-in-Pieria 'with all his forces' (Just. 27.1.6) and at a time when most subjects of the Seleukid territories would still believe that at least Berenike, if not also her son, was still alive, he was welcomed in Antioch as liberator. Polyae. 8.50 explains how the ruse of Berenike being still alive was made up by her maidens after her murder, though according to the same source, it was her father Ptolemy II who came to her support. *P.Gouroub* III–IV in fact pretends she was alive and even visited by her brother. Also the inscription from Kildara (n. 6) presupposes that both Berenike and 'King Antiochos' were alive during the initial stage of the Third Syrian War.

¹⁵ Phylarch. *FGrH* 81 F 24 = Athen. 13.64 (593b–d). On Phylarchos as the most likely source of the entire literary tradition on Laodike, cf. Primo 2009a, 124.

¹⁶ The quotation is preceded by this summary: 'And Sophron the governor of Ephesos had a mistress, Danae, the daughter of Leontion the Epicurean, who was also a courtesan herself. And by her means he was saved when a plot was laid against him by Laodike, and Danae was thrown down a precipice, as Phylarchos relates in his twelfth book in these words.'

¹⁷ Cf. Martinez-Sève 2002/3, 702; Errington 2008, 120; note also the forthcoming work by G. Ramsey on Seleukid residences in Asia Minor.

¹⁸ *P.Gouroub* II. – Lehmann 1998, 90 f., too, takes this as an indication of a very early date of the papyrus and the invasion. Otto 1928, 53, followed by Ehling 2003, 10, claims that Syria was invaded first, then Kilikia. But this contradicts both *P.Gouroub* and Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8.

¹⁹ On the 11th day of month II (12/13 May), Seleukos celebrated the Akitu Festival together with his brother Antiochos (Hierax) and sister Apammu (Apama, an otherwise unknown daughter of Laodike, or identical with Laodike, the later wife of Mithradates II of Pontos?). The female sex of the latter has now been firmly established by van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11, Text A 13; cf. Coşkun 2016a, 121 n. 63 for a bibliography. Seleukos is further mentioned alone in month III (after day 12) = (after 11) June 246, though probably not yet with the royal title. This is compatible with the view that Hierax returned westwards earlier.

²⁰ According to Sachs and Hunger 1989, II 68–72 to year 66 SE = 246/45 BC,

Antiochos II was still supposed to be alive (in Babylon) at least until month VI, which started on 28 August; there is barely space for the arrival of the news of his death before day 27 (23 September). Seleukos II, in turn, was known as co-ruler (in Babylon) in month V (starting on 28 July) 246; his appointment must have been reported in a lost part of the inscription (after month IV, day 15 = 14 July and before month V day 26 = 24 August). Previously, however, the arrival of the news of Antiochos' death was dated to 20 Abu (month V) 66 SE = 19 August 246: del Monte 1997, 48; Savalli-Lestrade 2003, 76; van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 in their commentary on *BM* 34428), but on rather shaky grounds, cf. Coşkun 2016a, 119–20.

²¹ Coşkun 2016a, 118–23, who points out that Phylarchos, in his narrative of Antiochos' death, does not question the legitimate succession of Seleukos. Differently, e.g., Otto 1928, 58: Berenike had stirred up Sophron (similarly, Heuß 1975, 405; Ehling 2003, 311); Jacoby ad *FGrH* 81 F 24 and *FGrH* 260 F 32.6: Ephesos was part of the dowry of Berenike, so that Sophron was attached to her; Will 1979, I 249: Sophron may have had the order to control Laodike after her repudiation and later opted for Berenike; Buraselis 1982, 134 f. argues for Sophron's disagreement with Laodike's dynastic politics (though differently 137: 'Der Feind seines Feindes musste sein natürlicher Freund sein'); similarly, Hölbl 1994, 46 f.; Lehmann 1998, 88 regards the episode as pro-Ptolemaic apology. Cf. also Errington 2008, 120 f. – Note that Gygas 2000 denies Sophron's transition to the Ptolemies. According to Grainger 2010, 158, Sophron seized the dynastic crisis as an opportunity for self-promotion (but to what end?); however, id. 160 regards the revolt as a reaction to Berenike's murder.

²² *Ptolemaios epiklesin Andromachou* (thus named in *P.Haun.* 6, with Bülow-Jacobsen 1979) is mostly considered a natural son of Philadelphos, adopted by a certain Andromachos, and thus identical with the priest of Alexander and the Theoi Adelphoi of 251/50 (cf. Bennett 2001–2013 s.v. Ptolemy Andromachou; *contra* Buraselis 1982, 136 f.), or as a natural son of the Diadoch Lysimachos and Arsinoe (II), later adopted by Philadelphos, and nicknamed Andromachos possibly because of his defeat at Andros (e.g., Huß 1998). Cf. also Crampa 1969; Oikonomides 1984a; Ravazzolo 1996; Grainger 1997, 167; Tunny 2000; Gygas 2000 and 2002. More plausibly, he should be distinguished from both: Ptolemy the Son of Ptolemy (sc. Philadelphos) and co-ruler 267–259 and the homonymous son of a Lysimachos; he is rather identical with Ptolemy the Brother of King Ptolemy (sc. Euergetes) mentioned by Olympichos around 244/242; cf. Coşkun 2016b.

²³ Similarly, and within the broader context of the Ptolemaic–Antigonid rivalry, Buraselis 1982, 135–76. This is denied, however, by Gygas 2000, 359; 366.

²⁴ *I.Kildara* (as n. 6), esp. ll. 5–8, with the discussion of Coşkun 2016a, 128–30, modifying the views of Blümel 1992.

²⁵ The 'liberation' of Mylasa through Olympichos (*I.Labraunda* 3 l. 30; 5 l. 34; 7 ll. 9 f.) had previously been dated to 246 (cf. Crampa 1969, 80–5; Ma 1999, 44; 68; 168; Virgilio 2003b, 174 with n. 449; 175) or 240 (Blümel 1987, 11; Austin² no. 179 p. 326). But since Olympichos acted at the behest of Seleukos, the most likely context is provided by the year 244, cf. Coşkun 2016b, also on 'Ptolemy the

Brother of King Ptolemy' (=Ptolemy Andromachos) mentioned in *ILabraunda* I 3 ll. 4–8.

²⁶ August: the Battle of Andros resulting in Sophron's death, the occupation of Ephesos by Ptolemy Andromachos, and the Laodikean War in Ionia which cost Laodike's life. September: Andromachos reached an agreement with Hierax, Alexander and Mithradates II, resulting in Seleukos' battle against Hierax at Magnesia and Seleukos' defeat at Ankyra. October: Euergetes took Seleukeia-in-Pieria and Antioch; December: his troops reached the walls of Babylon. Incursions into the *chōra* of Smyrna may also be dated to autumn 246. All of these events are accounted for in the subsequent sections.

²⁷ Pomp. Trog. *prol.* 27, followed by O. Seel in his ed. of Justin and by most scholars, e.g., Heuß 1975, 405.

²⁸ Battle of Andros in 245: Buraselis 1982, 123–41; 145, followed by Walbank 1988, 306; 587–95; 599 f.; Reger 1985/93, 155; 158; id. 1994, 33 et al. (with the most detailed geo-strategic evaluation of the effect of the battle, concluding that Antigonid control of the Cyclades was short-lived and that the islands soon slipped into independence); Lehmann 1998, 93; Huß 2001, 348 f.; Ehling 2003, 311. Differently, however, Grainger 2010, 158, who dates the Battle of Andros after the death of Antiochos II, but before the 'coup' of Sophron: 'The crisis in the Seleukid kingdom will have frightened Antigonos as much as it encouraged Ptolemy, and he no doubt acted in the Aegean to reduce Ptolemy's local naval power while he still had the chance. In the circumstances Ptolemy, seeing the possibility of a much greater prize available in Syria, could afford to ignore the defeat.' Cf. also Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 103: ca. 246/243; Crampa 1969, 105–13: 262 BC; Hölbl 1994/2001, 41; 43: by ca. 250 BC, followed by a quick recovery of the Ptolemaic fleet.

²⁹ Oikonomides 1984b (with reference to *P.Tebt.* III 2.890.14 f. and 2.174; 2nd cent. BC), followed by Grainger 1997, 118 (differently, idem 2010, 154; 158); Gygax 2000, 359; 366. – Cf. also the fanciful interpretation of Crampa 1969, 100; 103 f.: ὁ(μ)π(ά)τ(ρ)ι(ον) ἀ(δελφόν), identifying the aforementioned conqueror of Adaios as Ptolemy Euergetes.

³⁰ See below, after n. 43.

³¹ On Ptolemy Andromachos, cf. *P.Haun.* 6 = Bülow-Jacobsen 1979, and see above, n. 22.

³² Just. 27.2.1–5, on which see below, with n. 122.

³³ Just. 27.2.6 ff.: Inde ad Antiochum fratrem litteras facit, quibus auxilium eius inplorat oblata ei Asia intra finem Tauri montis in praemium latae opis. **7** Antiochus autem cum esset annos XIV natus, supra aetatem regni avidus occasionem non tam pio animo, quam offerebatur, adripuit, sed latronis more fratri totum eripere cupiens puer sceleratam virilemque sumit audaciam. **8** Unde Hierax est cognominatus, quia non hominis, sed accipitris ritu in alienis eripiendis vitam sectaretur. **9** Interea Ptolomeus cum Antiochum in auxilium Seleuco venire cognovisset, ne cum duobus uno tempore dimicaret, in annos X cum Seleuco pacem facit; **10** sed pax ab hoste data interpellatur a fratre, qui conducto Gallorum mercenario exercitu pro auxilio bellum, pro fratre hostem inploratus exhibuit. **11** In eo proelio virtute Gallorum victor quidem Antiochus fuit, sed Galli

arbitrantes Seleucum in proelio cecidisse in ipsum Antiochum arma vertere, liberius depopulaturi Asiam, si omnem stirpem regiam extinxissent. 12 Quod ubi sensit Antiochus, velut a praedonibus auro se redemit societatemque cum mercennariis suis iungit.

³⁴ Just. 27.3.4: Seleucus et Antiochus fratres bellum propter Asiam gerebant, Ptolomeus, rex Aegypti, sub specie sororiae ultionis Asiae inhiabat.

³⁵ Just. 27.3.5: Hinc Bithynus Eumenes, inde Galli, humiliorum semper mercennaria manus, Asiam depopulabantur, cum interea nemo defensor Asiae inter tot praedones inveniebatur.

³⁶ Just. 27.3.6–11: Victo Antiocho cum Eumenes maiorem partem Asiae occupasset, ne tunc quidem fratres perduto praemio, propter quod bellum gerebant, concordare potuerunt, sed omisso externo hoste in mutuum exitium bellum reparant. 7 In eo Antiochus denuo victus multorum dierum fuga fatigatus tandem ad socerum suum Ariamenem, regem Cappadociae, pervehitur. 8 A quo cum benigne primum exceptus esset, interiectis diebus cognito quod insidiae sibi pararentur, salutem fuga quaesivit. 9 Igitur cum profugo nusquam tutus locus esset, ad Ptolomeum hostem, cuius fidem tutiorem quam fratris existimabat, decurrit, memor vel quae facturus fratri esset vel quae meruisset a fratre. 10 Sed Ptolomeus non amicior dedito quam hosti factus adservari eum artissima custodia iubet. 11 Hinc quoque Antiochus opera cuiusdam meretricis adiutus, quam familiaris noverat, deceptis custodibus elabitur fugiensque a latronibus, interficitur. – The year of his death is attested by Porphyry. *Chron. FGrH* 260 F 32.8.

³⁷ This may relate to revolts in Bactria and Parthia, but ignores the fact that the areas from Persia to Syria had remained under his control, and even parts of Asia Minor had been recovered. – His year of death is given as 227/26 by Porphyry. *Chron. FGrH* 260 F 32.7,9.

³⁸ Just. 27.3.12: Seleucus quoque iisdem ferme diebus amisso regno equo praecipitatus finitur. Sic fratres quasi et germanis casibus exules ambo post regna scelerum suorum poenas luerunt.

³⁹ Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 105 explains the strange tone of the correspondence between Seleukos and Hierax towards the end of the Third Syrian War with Justin's anticipation of Hierax' treason. The following explanations are useless speculations: Seleukos is reproached for having abandoned Asia Minor, which led to the revolt of Hierax, though Ptolemy III did not even show an interest in it. Walbank I 600 concedes that Seleukos made his brother king of Asia Minor during the Third Syrian War, 'and failed to recover this area when the war was over'. Grainger 1997, 47 (cf. 168) suggests that the War of Brothers began in 244, without further discussion. Toye, in his commentary on *BNJ* 260 F. 32.8, points out that the war must have broken out before the end of the Third Syrian War; Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 240 f. specifies that the marriage of Seleukos's sister with Mithradates II pre-dated the Battle of Ankyra around 245. Ihnken 1978, 32 f. dates the beginning of the usurpation (though not yet of the effective war) to 246 or 245. More traditionally, Heinen 1984, 422 dates the beginning of Hierax' rule (still in agreement with Seleukos) to 242. See also above, n. 2, and below, n. 55 f., for further references.

⁴⁰ Trog. prol. 27: Seleuci bellum in Syria adversus Ptolemaeum Tryphonem;

item in Asia adversus fratrem suum Antiochum Hieracem, quo bello Ancurae victus est a Gallis.

⁴¹ On their deaths, cf. Coşkun 2016b, section 7, with Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8.

⁴² On Justin as a non-historiographer, cf. Bartlett 2014; on his sloppiness in chronological matters, cf. Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 197 f.

⁴³ Just. 27.2.1–5; 27.3.1.

⁴⁴ Jacoby, *FGrH* 260 F 32.8, translates: a) ‘nachdem es sich begeben hatte zu lebzeiten eben des Kallinikos Seleukos, daß Antiochos der jüngere Bruder desselben sich friedlich zu verhalten und lediglich seine sachen zu versehen nicht gewillt war – er hatte nämlich bundesgenossenschaft und unterstützung von Alexandros, der die stadt der Sardier inne hatte, der auch der bruder war von seiner mutter Laodik; und hatte auch die Galater zu bundesgenossen in zwei treffen –’ b) ‘siegte im Lydierlande Seleukos, nahm jedoch weder Sardis ein noch Ephesos, da Ptolemeos die Stadt besetzt hielt. Als es aber in Cappadocia und mit Mithridates zum zweiten Zusammenstoße kam, wurden zwei Myriaden desselben von den Barbaren niedergemacht, und er selbst war als erschlagen verschollen.’ (incorrect Toye: ‘...was struck down and died’). c) ‘Ptolemeos aber, der auch Tryphon, nahm die syrischen Striche ein; und die belagerung, die gegen Damaskos und Orthosia stattfand, nahm ihr ende in der 134. olympiade <im> 3. jahre (242/1), als Seleukos dorthin zurückgekehrt war.’ d) ‘Antiochos jedoch, der bruder des Kallinikos, unterwarf, Großphrygien durchziehend, die bewohner dem tribute’ e) ‘und ließ feldherrn auf Seleukos los. da ward er ausgeliefert von seinen höflingen den barbaren, von welchen entkommend mit nur wenigen er nach Magnesia gelangte. und am folgenden tage stellte er sich in schlachtordnung auf. abermals bundesgenössische hilfe von Ptolemeos erlangt habend, siegte er;’ f) ‘und heiratete die tochter des Zieles.’ g) ‘und im 4. jahre der 137. olympiade (229/8) im Lydierlande zweimal in ein treffen sich einlassend, unterlag er. auch gegenüber Koloe lieferte er eine schlacht wider Attalos; und im 1. jahre der 138. olympiade (228/7) nach Thrakien flüchtig geworden vor Attalos nach der schlacht, die in Karia stattgefunden hatte, starb er.’

⁴⁵ Porphyry. *Chron.* *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 speaks of ‘bundesgenossen’ in Jacoby’s version, admittedly odd for the role of Alexander. But for the Galatians, cf. also Just. 27.2.12 (*societatem*). On the Tolistobogioi, cf. Coşkun 2011.

⁴⁶ See above, with n. 22.

⁴⁷ *I.Prienē*² I (=IK 69) 132, l. 175: [Ἀντί]οχον τὸν ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ Πτολεμαίου τεταγμένον. Since he is mentioned only very briefly after [King Alexa]nder (l. 167), Ant[igonos] (sc. Monophthalmos) (l. 170), [King Lysima]chos (l. 172) and King Antiochos (II) (l. 173), Blümel (p. 326) is right to identify him with the official mentioned by Porphyry.

⁴⁸ Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 43 ll. 28–30. According to Bevan 1902b, 189 n. 5 and Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 103 f., this identification goes back to Niebuhr, though it has been rejected on the ground that the revolt of Hierax has normally been dated to 241; since he was 14 years old when he revolted (Just. 27.2.7), he would have been too young in 245 to become a *philos*. This argument is worthless, since becoming a *philos* of Euergetes in 245 implies revolt. Hierax had thus been born in 260 or 259.

⁴⁹ On the wide notion of Cappadocia encompassing the domains of the Mithradatic kings, cf. Ballesteros Pastor ca. 2016.

⁵⁰ On Mithradates, the Tektosages and Ankyra, see below, with n. 134 f. on Just. 38.5.3. The military conflict is attested by Porphyry. *Chron. FGrH* 260 F 32.8; Trog. *prol.* 27; Just. 27.2; see also below, section VI.

⁵¹ On which see below, VI around n. 101.

⁵² For the former, I recall the ‘Schleifentechnik’ of Herodotos; for the latter, we only need to look into the context of Porphyry’s *Chronicle*: he first mentions the rule of Seleukos Kallinikos from his succession to his father to the succession by his own son Seleukos Keraunos (F 32.7 f.), and then goes back in time to relate the conflict with Hierax.

⁵³ Just. 27.2.11 f. One is reminded of the alliance that Leonnorios struck with Nikomedes of Bithynia in 278: Memn. *FGrH* 434 F 11 = Phot. 4.227b–228a (Henry pp. 63 f.); cf. Liv. 38.16.

⁵⁴ Magnesia remained under his control, before Smyrna won it over around 244; see below, with nn. 140–3.

⁵⁵ E.g., Bevan 1902b, 191–3 (pressure before 241, revolt thereafter); Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 107 (around 237); Macurdy 1932, 86 f. (in 241); Ihnken 1978, 32 f.; Kobes 1996, 136; Ogden 1999, 131 (‘cannot be doubted’); Boehringer 1993, 44 (the royal aspirations of Hierax in 246 reflect Laodike’s effort to counter the rule of Berenike); Duyrat 2005, 232; Plischke 2014, 229. See also above, n. 39. D’Agostini and McAuley 2012b s.v. Alexander have Laodike only siding with Hierax.

⁵⁶ Cf., e.g., Schmitt 2005, 967.

⁵⁷ Plut. *mor.* 489a = *De fraterno amore* 18: Ἀντιόχου δὲ τὴν μὲν φιλαρχίαν ψέξειεν ἄν τις, ὅτι δ’ οὐ παντάπασιν αὐτῇ τὸ φιλάδελφον ἐνηφανίσθη, θαυμάσειεν. ἐπολέμει μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας Σελεύκου νεώτερος ὢν ἀδελφὸς καὶ τὴν μητέρα συλλαμβάνουσαν εἶχεν.

⁵⁸ On his age, see above, n. 48.

⁵⁹ *P.Gourab* II; see also above, n. 6, on the evidence of Kildara.

⁶⁰ Blümel and Merkelbach, *I.Priene*² I (=IK 69) 132, l. 129 (date of the inscription: 197/190 BC); cf. Hiller von Gärtringen, *I.Priene*¹ 37, l. 134. Traditionally, this reference is identified with the entire Third Syrian War: e.g., Bevan 1902b, 181; 184; Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 95; Otto 1928, 48; Macurdy 1932, 86; Ihnken 1978, 32; Heinen 1984, 419; Savalli-Lestrade 2003, 74; Ehling 2003, 304; Schmitt 2005, 966; Errington 2008, 111; Kosmin 2014, 19; Toye on *BNJ* 260 F 32.8 and F 43. But see below, with n. 75 f., for some specification.

⁶¹ According to Bielman Sánchez 2003, 49, the influence of queens was strongest during the rule of their sons, not husbands, thus slightly contrasting with Macurdy 1932, 6–8, who also allowed for the absence of the husband, but mentions as a further requirement ‘an extremely strong character and will’ of the queen.

⁶² Nourse 2002, 269 f.

⁶³ Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 43: [lacuna] Seleuci cognomento Callinici, qui cum matre Laodice regnabat in Syria, et abusus est (sc. Ptolemaeus Euergetes vel Tryphon) eis et obtinuit in tantum, ut Syriam caperet... Of course, ‘rule in Syria’ in this case must mean rule of the Seleukid Empire or part thereof.

⁶⁴ Just. 27.1–2.

⁶⁵ *OGIS* I 229 = Ihnken, *I.Magnesia* (=IK 8) 1 = Petzl, *I.Smyrna* II.1 (=IK 24.1) 573 = Austin² 174, l. 6. For the date and context, see below, section VIII with n. 140.

⁶⁶ See section IV on Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 and Just. 27.1–2. For a similar argument, cf. also Ihnken 1978, 33; but, despite his early date of the usurpation (246 or 245), he does not seem to let the effective War of Brothers start before 241.

⁶⁷ Ihnken 1978, 33 justifies Laodike's usurpation with Seleukos' complete failure against Euergetes, but the defeats that he adduces do not fit his own chronology (p. 41): a revolt in 246 or early 245, nor does Ihnken date the events of the War of Brothers reported by Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 prior to 241. See also above, n. 55 on Boehringer 1993, 44.

⁶⁸ Porphy. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8. Some scholars take *I.Bargylia* (=I.Iasos II) 608 and *I.Smyrna* II 1 = *I.Magnesia* l. 101 to attest the start of his career under Antiochos I (e.g., Billows 1995a, 97; Grainger 1997, 75; Capdetrey 2007, 295–7), but the Antiochos mentioned seems rather to be II (cf. Bevan 1902b, 307), and Alexander's interaction with Magnesia need not be contemporary with the concessions of King Antiochos (e.g., Welles, *RC* p. 134 dates it after 244, which may be too late though). Since there is no clear reference to Alexander after 246, he likely did not survive the War of Brothers. At any rate, it is unclear why D'Agostini and McAuley 2012b s.v. Alexander prefer to assume, if only hypothetically, his survival into the 220s (without source reference). Possibly, they think of the Alexander mentioned in a letter to Mylasa in the 220s (Welles, *RC* 29 l. 4), whom Welles identifies as Laodike I's brother (dating to sometime after 244). But since he is called 'Son Alexander', this must be the son of Seleukos II before his accession to the throne as Seleukos III in 225; cf. Robert and Robert 1970, 454 f. On Alexander and the House of Achaïos, cf. also Merkelbach 2000; D'Agostini 2014, and see next n.

⁶⁹ Polyain. 4.17 mentions Achaïos and Andromachos serving as the *stratēgoi* of Seleukos in a campaign in Armenia against Hierax; Polyb. 8.20.11 specifies that the Younger Achaïos was the son of a certain Andromachos, who in turn was the brother of Laodike II, the wife of Seleukos II. Billows 1995a, 96–8 (with stemma on p. 110) very tentatively identifies Achaïos the Elder with a son of Seleukos I and the father of Laodike I, Alexandros, Andromachos (Billows dates his campaign against Hierax to ca. 228 and regards him as the father of Laodike II and Achaïos the Younger), and Antiochis (the mother of Attalos I). But on p. 97, he calls for more caution: 'Perhaps we should be content to state that Achaïos I was most probably a close relative of the early Seleukids, and hence almost certainly a Macedonian.' D'Agostini and McAuley 2012c follow the traditional date of the campaign (ca. 227 BC) and identify Andromachos with a grandson of Achaïos the Elder and thus a nephew of Alexander and Laodike I, and the Achaïos mentioned by Polyainos with Achaïos the Younger who later usurped against Antiochos III. In fact, the usurper is known to have been the son of an Andromachos; but since Polyainos mentions Achaïos first and Andromachos second, this genealogy appears to me counter-intuitive. No more convincing is Plischke 2014, 54, who

regards Achaïos as the son of Alexander and (as it would seem) opponent of Andromachos. More plausibly, Grainger 1997, 5; 8; 47; 693 considers Andromachos a son of Achaïos the Elder and the father of the later usurper Achaïos the Younger, even though Grainger 1997 seems to be unaware of the involvement of an Achaïos in the Armenian campaign (which he dates to ca. 229 BC); likewise, Schmitt 2005, 959; 967, pointing out that Andromachos was also the father of Laodike II, wife of Seleukos II; also Ehling 2007, 497 n. 4. Note, however, Grainger 2010, 178: Hierax ‘was defeated by an army commanded by Andromachos and Akhaïos, brothers-in-law of both of the Seleukids (their elder brother, Alexandros, was governor of Sardis, and perhaps of Lydia, for Hierax)’; also 171 f.: Achaïos I, son of Seleukos I and a noblewoman of Asia Minor (cf. p. 176); his children included Laodike I and Andromachos, the latter being the father of Laodike II. I suggest that the campaign took place around 243/242 BC (see below, section VII). Given this early date, the *stratēgos* Achaïos probably was the oldest brother of Andromachos and Alexander, which explains why he bore their father’s name.

⁷⁰ See above, with n. 17 on Sardis.

⁷¹ *I.Priene*² I (=IK 69) 132, l. 175, see above, n. 47.

⁷² App. *Syr.* 65.346; cf. Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 43 (as quoted above, n. 63) for the punishment, though without mentioning Laodike’s death. The donation of estates to Babylon, Borsippa and Kutha by Laodike and her sons Seleukos and Hierax, which the Lehmann Document attests to have been written down in 236, does not require that the transaction took place that year, as is often assumed (e.g., Crampa I 55 n. 1; Kobes 1996, 138; Plischke 2014, 83 n. 473); much more likely, it took place in the times of Antiochos II; cf. also Virgilio 2003b, 153–6. Moreover, Seleukos (II) and Antiochos (Hierax) are called ‘the sons’ without the royal titles, which both of them held in 236.

⁷³ For a rebuttal, cf. Macurdy 1932, 86; Lehmann 1998, 87; Nourse 2002, 267. For a later date, cf. Bevan 1902b, 328 (230s BC), even though he concedes that Appian’s testimony as such would seem to require a date in 246; Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 107 (after a failed but unattested attempt to recapture Ephesos); Brodersen 1989, 202 (during the War of Brothers and during the Third Syrian War); Huß 2001, 342 n. 30.

⁷⁴ On *Ptolemaïos epiklēsin Andromachou* = Ptolemy Andromachos (not Ptolemy, the son of Andromachos), see above, with n. 22 and 26. For further references, also on Sophron, see below, with n. 77.

⁷⁵ *I.Priene*¹ 37 l. 134 = *I.Priene*² I 132, l. 129; see above, n. 60, for further references. Note also Ihnken 1978, 32: the term was coined by someone loyal to Euergetes, as Priene would have been.

⁷⁶ See above, n. 60.

⁷⁷ We do not know precisely when Ptolemy’s fleet prevailed over Adaios, the Thracian ally of Antiochos II and Gonatas, or when Sophron was defeated at Andros, though the former battle may have taken place in 246, while the latter must fall between autumn 246 and spring 245. Cf. Trog. *prol.* 27; Buraselis 1982, 123–76, esp. 138–40, followed by Reger 1985/93, 155; 158; id. 1994, 33 et al.; Walbank 1988, 306; 587–95; 599 f.; Gabbert 1997, 57; Gygas 2000, 354; Coşkun

2016a, 131 and 2016b (with further discussion, e.g., of Grainger 2010, 154). No longer tenable is a date around 250 or during the Second Syrian War, as considered by Will 1979, I 235–8.

⁷⁸ Just. 27.2.

⁷⁹ Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8; cf. also Just. 27.2.10 and Trog. *prol.* 27. See my discussion in section IV.

⁸⁰ Plut. *mor.* 489ab = *De fraterno amore* 18, on which see above, section V.

⁸¹ Polyæn. 8.61. On Mysta, cf. also Athen. 13.64 (593de), who specifies Phylarch (*FGrH* 81 F 30) as the common source; also Primo 2009a, 124.

⁸² Athenaios more convincingly regards her as a mistress, which is confirmed by Ogden 1999, 132; cf. also Schmitt 2005, 967.

⁸³ *P.Gourob*, with Polyæn. 8.50 and Coşkun 2016a, 123–7 on the ruse. For an analysis of the social strata involved in the welcome of Euergetes, cf. Ehling 2003, 310 f., even though his conclusion on the broad support for Euergetes does not sufficiently account for the tendentious nature of the source. Such criticism is likewise missing in Kosmin 2014, 151–7, but his analysis of the king's reception within the wider context of the ceremonial arrival of a Near Eastern king in a subject city (*apantēsis*), especially the focus on the demonstration of consensus, remains very valuable.

⁸⁴ Polyæn. 4.9.6. This section is the last attributed to Seleukos I, but it is hard to see which crushing defeat by barbarians he might have suffered in Asia Minor. Note that book 4 contains anecdotes on Antiochos I, II and Hierax, but none that is explicitly attributed to Seleukos II. Similarly, though without discussion, Grainger 1997, 124 s.v. Anon. (2), attributes this anecdote to Seleukos II.

⁸⁵ There is no entry for Amaktion in Grainger 1997; *LGPNI*–VA.

⁸⁶ Alternatively, one might consider that he avoided Armenia deliberately, perhaps out of a suspicion arising from the unexpected betrayal of Mithradates II. Note also that Arsames, king of Armenia, would soon become a friend of Hierax (Polyæn. 4.17 ad ca. 442 BC), though I would prefer to regard this as a result of Hierax' presence in Kilikia as of 245.

⁸⁷ Still in December, he arrived at Sippar-Seleukeia and his troops even entered Babylon. Had Seleukos safely taken control of Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris by then, he could have gathered forces to relieve Babylon by February. And this would likely have been noted in *BCHP* 11, on which see below, with nn. 100–7.

⁸⁸ *P.Gourob* II–IV, on which see above, with n. 83; Adoulis Inscription, on which see above, n. 3. The letter of Tlepolemos (*I.Kildara*, see above, n. 6) has been understood as an expression of the official Ptolemaic propaganda by Blümel 1992, whose views have been widely accepted; cf., e.g., Lehmann 1998, 88; Ehling 2003, 311: 'Aus Polyæn läßt sich schließen, daß der Ptolemäer mit Hilfe schriftlicher Erlasse, die den Namen der Berenike und ihres Sohnes trugen, regierte, als dessen *epitropos* der 3. Ptolemäer sehr wahrscheinlich fungierte.' According to Toye ad Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8, he was acting in the boy's name. With slight modification, Piejko 1990, 22: 'In Seleucia and Antioch Ptolemy appears (at least for the moment) in the role of the supreme arbiter of all things in the Seleukid Empire.' Such views are as incompatible with the historical context as with the text from Kildara itself, cf. Coşkun 2016a, 128–30.

⁸⁹ The allegation is taken at face value, e.g., by Hölbl 1994, 47 f.; Ehling 2003, 313; Schmitt 2005, 967; Toye ad Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8. But cf. Piejko 1990, 24: 'It is hardly possible that too many of the "satraps" were at hand to greet Ptolemy, or had time to send messages of their allegiance, or submission. This must be partly an exaggeration, and it probably happened only later in the campaign that the governors of the more remote eastern provinces offered their nominal adherence. This may explain the supposed subjugation of Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Susiana, Persis, Media, even Baktria!'

⁹⁰ And even if someone had arrogated to himself the authority to summon them, this would have been after the Battle of Ankyra, so that the messengers might not yet even have reached any eastern satrap.

⁹¹ *P.Gourab* IV 24 f.; similarly, Lehmann 1998, 89, even though it is uncertain which of the leading officials of the empire had remained in Antioch after Antiochos II had left the city a few years previously. It is thus questionable to call Antioch the 'seleukidische Zentrale' for this particular time.

⁹² Adoulis Inscription (see n. 3). For assessments of the territories held by Philadelphos by 246, cf. Grainger 2010, 139–55; Coşkun 2016a, 111; especially for Thrace, cf. also Avram 2003 and Dumitru 2011.

⁹³ Similarly, Lehmann 1998, 92, with further remarks on the territories in Asia Minor on p. 93.

⁹⁴ See below on the Babylonian epigraphic sources.

⁹⁵ Polyæn. 8.50 (who confuses the father Philadelphos with the brother Euergetes), with Coşkun 2016, 125–7.

⁹⁶ Just. 27.1.9. Note, however, that Just. 27.1.8 claims: *universae civitates...Ptolomeo se tradunt*. This is accepted by Ehling 2003, 313, despite the evidence to the contrary (see sections VI–VIII); likewise counterfactual is the same scholar's claim 'Nirgends stieß er auf militärischen Widerstand.'

⁹⁷ Catull. 66.12,36. For the anachronistic use of *Asia*, also cf. Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 23.

⁹⁸ Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43: *obtinue in tantum, ut Syriam caperet et Ciliciam superioresque partes trans Euphratem et prope modum universam Asiam. ...et Syriam quidem ipse obtinuit, Ciliciam autem amico suo Antiocho gubernandam tradidit, et Xanthippo alteri duci provincias trans Euphraten*.

⁹⁹ App. *Syr.* 65.346. Ehling 2003, 308; 311 assumes that *P.Gourab* also included a report on Euergetes' campaign into the Upper Satrapies.

¹⁰⁰ Thus the common opinion based on Otto 1928, 66, with reference to the document from Uruk and Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43 naming Xanthippos. Otto is followed, e.g., by Ehling 2003, 312 f.; van der Spek and Finkel, Commentary on *BCHP* 11. On the domestic revolt, see below, with nn. 111 f. I mention only in passing the *terminus ante quem* of Sep. 243 for Euergetes' return to Egypt, see above, n. 3.

¹⁰¹ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 obv. 2'–3', with commentary. Less compelling is the lack of direct evidence for the title 'royal'.

¹⁰² van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 obv. 4' (operational base); 6'–8' (equipment); 12'–14' (further attack by the Egyptian 'prince', whom the editors identify as Xanthippos).

¹⁰³ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 obv. 6'–11'; 11'–14'; possibly also rev. 1'–5' (unless this is the continuation of the second attack; in the preserved text, it is not specified where the battle equipment came from); rev. 6'–7' (though it is not stated where the new attack had started; the inimical troops might have remained in Babylon after their previous attack); rev. 9'–11' (if at all it was the same Seleukeia, see below, with nn. 105–107).

¹⁰⁴ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 obv. 4'–15'; rev. 1'–4'; rev. 3' ('they gave to the Babylonians') may imply an attempt to win over the populace, perhaps by food donations? – For Euergetes' intention to make permanent conquests, cf. also Hauben 1990, 29 and 37.

¹⁰⁵ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 rev. 4'–8'.

¹⁰⁶ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 rev. 9'–15'. The impression of upheavals on the streets of Seleukeia is mainly based on a supplemented text (rev. 12'; cf. rev. 11').

¹⁰⁷ van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 rev. 8': 'Seleukos *pabat* of Seleukeia'; the same city seems to be mentioned in ll. rev. 11'–12', too (see previous n.). – 'Seleukos *pabat*' is further mentioned in *BCHP* 10 obv. 5', the subsequent line being highly fragmentary. van der Spek and Finkel read '[of Seleucia which is on the Euphrates, and the King's Canal]', but the river's name may well have been the Tigris, to which this Seleukeia was also connected through a canal. Possibly, the city was once more mentioned in ll. rev. 11' and 12', though the lacunae do not allow us to ascertain whether epithets followed after the city's name. In theory, one might even hypothesize that ll. 12' relates to fighting in the streets of Seleukeia-Sippar, which would then mark the turning point of the Ptolemaic invasion. But it is better to await the full commentary before indulging in wild speculation. At any rate, van der Spek and Finkel regard *BCHP* 10 as the 'Seleukid Accessions Chronicle', whereby rev. 5' is thought to refer to 246 and 245; this is possible, though far from certain. Only referring to the latter inscription, Grainger 1997, 116 surprisingly speaks of a 'district officer of Babylon'.

¹⁰⁸ See Engels (in this volume).

¹⁰⁹ See Strootman and Wenghofer (in this volume).

¹¹⁰ If he had really suffered all the losses that ancient sources and modern voices claim, his return to power would have been miraculous. Apparently, the defection of Andragoras had been checked by Seleukos with the loyal support of the *karanos* Arsakes in 247 BC (see above, n. 9). Moreover, there is no need to doubt the loyalty of the Frataraka of Persia around that time (see n. 9). There is admittedly some uncertainty regarding Diodotos of Baktria, but Wenghofer (in this volume; also Wenghofer and Houle 2016) and Rolf Strootman (in this volume) have shown that they had not seceded permanently. For an exhaustive discussion, though partly with different conclusions, cf. Plischke 2014, 204–39.

¹¹¹ For a defence of the official version of Euergetes' court, cf. Hauben 1990, esp. 33; 35; 37, though still with concessions to the vigour of Seleukos' military response. The revolt has received much scholarly attention, mainly as the first indigenous movement against the rule of the Ptolemies: Hauben 1990, 32–7; Hölbl 1994, 48; Huß 2001, 374. However, the ethnic focus may well be misconceived, and a hunger crisis would be more likely: Pfeiffer 2004, 20; 304 et al. For numismatic evidence on the revolt, which might confirm its seriousness,

see Lorber, forthcoming. As an important reason for Euergetes' return, the uprising is also adduced by Lehmann 1998, 95 n. 25; 100 and Ehling 2003, 312. Differently, Otto 1928, 67–70: Euergetes returned from the east to Antioch when hearing of Berenike's murder and a revolt in Antioch (cf. Ehling 2003, 211, though with doubts regarding her late death expressed in n. 68); Otto further claims Justin confused this with a *seditio domestica* in Egypt.

¹¹² Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43: cumque audisset in Aegypto seditionem moveri, diripiens regnum Seleuci quadraginta millia talentorum argenti tulit et vasa pretiosa simulacraque deorum duo millia quingenta, in quibus erant et illa quae Cambyses capta Aegypto in Persas portaverat. The revolt is the cause for Euergetes' premature departure also in Just. 27.2.8 f.: universae civitates... Ptolomeo se tradunt, qui nisi in Aegyptum domestica seditione revocatus esset, totum regnum Seleuci occupasset. Loot brought back to Egypt is further mentioned in the Adoulis Inscription (n. 3), ll. 20 f., the decree of Alexandria (n. 3), and the Kanopos Decree (*OGIS* 56 = Pfeiffer 2004 = Austin² 271, ll. 10 f.); the latter's reference to a hunger crisis is often regarded as an allusion to the abovementioned domestic revolt. On the booty, cf. also Pfeiffer 2004, 20 et al.

¹¹³ Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43: ...et Syriam quidem ipse obtinuit, Ciliciam autem amico suo Antiocho gubernandam tradidit, et Xanthippo alteri duci provincias trans Euphraten.

¹¹⁴ Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 and *I.Priene*² I (=IK 69) 132, l. 175, discussed above in section IV. On further documentary evidence for Ptolemaic presence in Syria (esp. Seleukeia, Laodikeia, Poseidion), cf. Duyrat 2005, 230 f.

¹¹⁵ However, van der Spek and Finkel, *BCHP* 11 regard him as an Egyptian prince, see above, n. 102. It is unclear whether Grainger 1997, 121 s.v. Xanthippos really means what he writes: 'appointed to be the ruler of the trans-Euphratean provinces – perhaps, that is, Mesopotamia – by Seleukos II after 246'.

¹¹⁶ For his cognomen, but without historical explanation, cf. Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 32.7, 8; F 43; for a complete documentation, cf. Muccioli 2013, 342 f.

¹¹⁷ *Chron. Pasch. Ol.* 134.1 (244/43 BC). The date is also accepted by Grainger 1997, 168. Note, however, how unreliable the dates of this work are; the preceding entry on the accession of Ptolemy Euergetes ("Tryphon") is dated to *Ol.* 132.2 (250/49 BC). 244 for the victory or for the order to found the city is still a good guess; on the date, cf. also Huß 2001, 350 f. On Ar-Raqqaq, cf. Meinecke 1995. It is a re-foundation of Nikephorion, a colony established by Seleukos I or Alexander (also Plischke 2014, 132 f.); in the Byzantine period, it was temporarily renamed Leontopolis (Mango 1991).

¹¹⁸ For Seleukos' return into Syria, see below, with n. 141. On the Eleutheros as long-term division between the two kingdoms, cf. Kosmin 2014, 122.

¹¹⁹ Strab. *Geogr.* 16.2.14.

¹²⁰ Most developed is the reconstruction of Duyrat 2005, even though it is still based on the traditional narrative of the War of Brothers (pp. 230–2: 241?–239? BC): the beginning of the civic era in autumn 259/58 marks the grant of freedom by Antiochos II, which was meant to secure lasting loyalty against the Ptolemies (pp. 227–9). However, the first coins with this era date were minted in 243/42 (pp. 229 f.), while previous issues without era may have started ca. 246/45 (pp. 37–9

and 231). Among the latter, tetradrachms with Alexander's portrait are of interest; they were used until 240/39, then only sporadically until 219/18 (pp. 231–3). Duyrat points out 'leur parfaite intégration à la circulation monétaire du royaume séleucide' (p. 231) in times of crisis, since they were expressions of continued loyalty to Seleukos II. The rewards may well have included territorial gains on the *peraia* north of the Eleutheros river, though, ultimately, the conditions of their acquisition are uncertain (p. 233). Less convincingly, Grainger 1997, 61; 168 dates the grant of freedom to ca. 242.

¹²¹ According to Duyrat 2005, 232 f., Seleukos attempted to regain the territories he had conceded to Hierax in Asia Minor during the Third Syrian War, and was hence defeated at Ankyra in 240 or 239; but still the war was restricted to Asia Minor, and the grant of privileges, such as *asylia*, was a means to ensure loyalty during his Anatolian campaign; Duyrat further specifies that the asylum was not sacred, but administrative. But the political value of such an asylum was much higher when Hierax was still active in Syria or just about to be driven out. Cf. also Rigsby 1996, 11 on the conditions offered to the asylum-seekers in Arados and the mutual benefits for the city and the king. At the same time, Kosmin 2014, 122 may be right to explain that the privileges ensured that Arados would be an autonomous, but pro-Seleukid buffer between Seleukis and the Ptolemaic Kingdom; alternatively, one might follow the view of Duyrat 2005, 232 f. (even if somewhat inconsistent) that the grant was instrumental to gaining the support of the Aradian fleet.

¹²² Just. 27.2.1–5. Grainger 1997, 168 dates the shipwreck to 244 soon after Seleukos' recapture of Antioch.

¹²³ Differently, Kosmin 2014, 170 locates the shipwreck in the Aegean, claiming that Seleukos' fleet probably had Ephesos as its base – which is incompatible with the permanent loss of this city under Sophron in 246.

¹²⁴ Previous views were undecided between Berenike, Euergetes or a pro-Seleukid party before the arrival of Euergetes (cf. Hoover 2009, 56), but the new reconstruction of the year 246 is incompatible with such identifications. Erickson (in Coşkun 2012a, 1 f. and 2012b, 2) was the first to suggest Hierax as the minting authority, but more recently prefers to argue in favour of Antiochos II (Erickson in this volume).

¹²⁵ Polyæn. 4.17; Just. 27.3.7. Cf. esp. Jacoby on *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 (p. 871) for the unfortunate harmonization of the differing accounts, by which the campaign into Mesopotamia was connected with the flights to Cappadocia, the Ptolemaic Kingdom and Thrace.

¹²⁶ Justin only speaks of Cappadocia as the eastern-most refuge of Hierax, whereas Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 does not allow for a flight to the east after his defeat by Attalos. Cf. Coşkun 2016b, section 7.

¹²⁷ For the connection of verb and noun, cf. also the documents prescribing annual ceremonies commemorating the assumption of the diadem by Antiochos I of Kommagene: Wagner and Petzl 1976, 213 (l. 17) and 220.

¹²⁸ See above, n. 69 on the offspring of Achaïos the Elder.

¹²⁹ Differently, e.g., Boehringer 1993, 45 f., according to whom Hierax attacked Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor in ca. 241.

¹³⁰ Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8 and Just. 27.2, discussed above in section IV.

Cf. also Huß 2001, 351 with n. 106, who accepts incursions into Ptolemaic territory, but concludes from *Dan.* 11.9 that Seleukos was driven back.

¹³¹ The uprisings in Parthia and Bactria within a few years may well be seen within this context.

¹³² For an attempted summary, cf. Ma 1999, 44–9, who lists Ephesos, Miletos, Samos, Priene, Kolophon, Lebedos and perhaps Teos as well as Nagidos and Arsinoe in Kilikia among those cities which went over to Euergetes, while Mylasa is (erroneously) believed to have remained loyal to Seleukos.

¹³³ For the time being, cf. Coşkun 2011a.

¹³⁴ Laodike, the daughter of Mithradates II (and thus also the daughter of Laodike, the sister of Seleukos and Hierax, see below, nn. 135 f.) was held hostage by Hierax: Polyb. 5.74.4 f.; Walbank I 600; she was later married to Achaios the Younger: Polyb. 8.20.11. Walbank II 96 rejects the older view that she was also his fiancé (Bouché-Leclercq I 1913, 148). Ambiguous is Petkovic 2009, 379: ‘The legal or pseudo-matrimonial position of Laodike implies that Mithradates, formerly an ally of Seleukos, was the junior partner of Hierax.’ Petkovic pp. 380–3 goes on to suggest that Mithradates and Hierax allied around 228, though operated independently, with Mithradates trying to capture Sinope (in vain). Recently, Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 240 has tried to reinstate the idea that Laodike was Hierax’ wife, arguing that Just. 27.3.7 (*Antiochus...ad socerum suum Ariamenem, regem Cappadociae, pervenitur*) confuses Ariamenes of Cappadocia with Mithradates II.

¹³⁵ Just. 38.5.3; cf. also Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.6 on a time prior to the Battle of Ankyra. Note that Stephanos of Byzantium s.v. Ankyra, following Apollonios of Aphrodisias, Karika, claims that the Galatians (i.e. the Tektosages) had allied with Mithradates I against Ptolemy II before ‘founding’ Ankyra; the alliance seems to be factual and can be dated to 277 (cf. Coşkun 2011a, 88 f.; id. 2018), whereas the ‘foundation’ of Ankyra has been conflated with the take-over of the Ankyra region by the Tektosages under Mithradates II as of 246.

¹³⁶ Most scholars agree to date the marriage prior to the (traditional late date of the) Battle of Ankyra: Bevan 1902b, 327 (under Antiochos II or very early in the reign of Seleukos, though without entirely excluding a date after Ankyra); Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 103 (ca. 243); Macurdy 1932, 83 and Grainger 2010, 175 (ca. 245: the dowry of Phrygia was to keep Mithradates and the Galatians busy with each other; cf. p. 171); Erciyas 2006, 14 (245, to keep Euergetes and Hierax occupied – without explaining the role of Hierax though); Petkovic 2009, 378 (ca. 245); Toye ad Porphyry. F 32.6 (ca. 250/246). The very early date under Antiochos II, as first suggested by Bevan, has recently regained popularity: McAuley 2011 ff. s.v. Laodike I of Pontus (with Bevan); D’Agostini 2013a (250s); Plischke 2014, 30 n. 70.

¹³⁷ Just. 27.3.9–11; cf. Porphyry. *FGrH* 260 F 32.8.

¹³⁸ See above, n. 88, on Tlepolemos; cf. Coşkun 2016b on Ptolemy of Telmessos, disagreeing with Huß 1998.

¹³⁹ Some scholars believe that Mylasa was freed by Seleukos in 246, but see above, n. 25.

¹⁴⁰ *OGIS* I 229 (ca. 244 BC) = Ihnken, *I.Magnesia* 1 (=IK 8) (first half of 245) = Petzl, *I.Smyrna* II 1.573 (= IK 24.1.573) = Austin² 174 (ca. 241), l. 6. Cf. also Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 102 (ca. 243 BC); Crampa 1969, 86 (ca. 246 BC); Cohen

1978, 60 (ca. 243); Billows 1995a, 98 (ca. 240). Without precise year, but in the course of the Third Syrian War, the inscription is dated by Ma 1999, 44 f.; 49 f. (extension of Smyrna disguised as act of loyalty for Seleukos); 118 (the soldiers of Old Magnesia stood under the command of Seleukos, but see below). But Ma later supposes (p. 161) that the grant of freedom, tax exemption and *asylia* (on which see below, n. 143) predates the *sympoliteia* decree. More pertinently, he states (p. 235): ‘The Smyrnians conducted their annexation of a Seleukid colony at Magnesia under Sipylos in the language of loyalty towards Seleukos II and concern for his interests’. At any rate, Ma (p. 44 f.) seems to confuse Magnesia-on-the-Maiandros with Magnesia-on-the-Sipylos.

¹⁴¹ *OGIS* I 229 = Ihnken, *I. Magnesia* (=IK 8) 1 = Petzl, *I. Smyrna* II.1 (=IK 24.1) 573 = Austin² 174, ll. 1 ff.: Ἐδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ, στρατηγῶν γνώμη: ἐπειδὴ πρότερόν τε καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὁ βασιλεὺς Σέλευκος ὑπερ- / 2 ἔβαλεν εἰς τὴν Σελευκίδα, πολλῶν [κ]αὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων περιστάντων τῇ πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν / χῶραν, διεφύλαξεν ὁ δῆμος τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίαν τε καὶ φιλίαν, οὐ καταπλαγείς τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔφοδον / 4 οὐδὲ φροντίσας τῆς τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀ[π]ωλείας, ἀλλὰ πάντα δεύτερα ἡγησάμενος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ διαμεῖ- / ναι ἐν τῇ αἰρέσει καὶ ἀντιλαβεῖσθαι τῶν π[ρ]αγμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν καθότι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπέστη. – Traditionally, the king’s arrivals in Seleukis were understood as his departures from Asia Minor into Syria in order to confront Euergetes, cf., e.g., Will 1979, 257; Ihnken 1978, 31 f.; 41.

¹⁴² Cohen 1978, 60 assumes that Smyrna’s initiative was about keeping Magnesia and Old Magnesia loyal to Seleukos ‘in the face of the omnipresent Ptolemaic Aegean fleet’, cf. Austin 2006, 65. *Contra* Ihnken 1978, 18; 31–41: the rule of Hierax (and Laodike) results from the geostrategic assumption that the Ptolemies could not have occupied a territory east of Smyrna without controlling the harbour city itself. His suspicion that the usurpation of Hierax predates 242/41, is convincing, but the argument remains inconsistent, since he ignores the loss of Ephesos to Ptolemy in 246 (p. 31 f.).

¹⁴³ The rewards for Smyrna are specified in a decree from Delphi: *OGIS* I 228 = Rigsby 1996, 102 f. Based on a completely different argument, Rigsby 95–105 (with further documentation) is undecided between 245 and 244 or 243 for the *asylia* grant. Ma 1999, 89, in turn, dates Smyrna’s independence as late as the 220s.

¹⁴⁴ *OGIS* I 227 = Welles, *RC* 22 = *I. Didyma* II 493 = Austin 2006 no. 175. This inscription probably dates to July or August 246. Note that Seleukos was depending on his ‘father’s advisors’ as much before the latter’s death as shortly afterwards. – Welles, *RC* 22, p. 107 dates this letter a little later, while Seleukos was already marching from western Asia Minor to Syria, which was thought to be under Euergetes’ control. Welles further speculates about the grant of *asylia* for the Didymeion; but this should be dated to the rule of Antiochos III; cf. Rigsby 1996, 172–8.

¹⁴⁵ Welles, *RC* 22, p. 107 for the Adoulis Inscription (on which see also above, with n. 92); cf. also Ma 1999, 44; 49 (though suggesting on p. 47 that it was free in the 220s). – Ehling 2003, 311: Miletos remained loyal in 246; cf. Günther 1971, 67 f.

¹⁴⁶ Welles *RC* 26 = Rigsby 1996, no. 9 = *IG* XII 4.1.210, esp. ll. 22–8: παραδεχόμεθα / δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀσυλίαν καθό- / τι ὁ δῆμος ἡξίωσεν καὶ εἰς / (25) τὸ λοιπὸν δὲ πειρασόμεθα / τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὄντων ἐν ἡ- / συχαίαι μὴ ἀχαριστεῖν ἡμῖν / ἐν τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις.

The date (ca. summer 242) has been firmly established by Rigsby 1996, 106–9. Welles, *RC* 25–8 dates the texts to ca. 240.

¹⁴⁷ Herzog 1930, 463–7 attributes the letter to Seleukos II, since the same ambassadors were involved that would then go on to Ziaelas in Bithynia (*RC* 26 ll. 16 f. with *RC* 25.3); the Ptolemies (*RC* 27) and Attalids (*RC* 28) are excluded as recipients of *RC* 26. Cf. also Rigsby 1996, no. 9. The lack of a reference to a previous relation with Kos (cf. Welles p. 128 on ll. 12–16), which was within the Ptolemaic sphere of interest, does not help us decide between the brothers.

¹⁴⁸ Wells *RC* 26 p. 127 discusses stylistic discrepancies in comparison with *RC* 15 (Antiochos II); 22 (Seleukos II to Miletos); 31 (Antiochos III). – For further references indicative of links between cities of western Asia Minor and Seleukos II between 246 and 241, cf. Capdetrey 2007, 356 n. 262 on Pitane.

¹⁴⁹ Cf., e.g., Boehringer 1993; Primo 2009b; Coşkun 2011a. That Hierax died in Thrace is confirmed by Polyb. 5.74.4.

¹⁵⁰ Stratonike, sister of Antiochos II and repudiated wife of Demetrios II of Macedon, held out in Antioch for six months, but failed to get the support of her nephew Seleukos II whom she expected to marry according to Ios. *Contra Apionem* 1.22 (= Agatharchides *FHG* 3.196 = *FGrH* 86 F 20); cf. Macurdy 1932, 9; 70 f.; 81; 229; 233. On different grounds, Ehling 2003, 313 f. rejects the view that Hierax was involved, but rather wonders if Stratonike was hoping for support from Euergetes. Less convincingly, Nourse 2002, 270–2 (with reference to Just. 28.1.4) dates the riot to the lifetime of Antiochos II.

¹⁵¹ The year is controversial: Toye *ad* Porphyry. F 32.7 discusses the years 228–225, accepting 226 with Grainger 1997, 61.

ANTIOCHOS SOTER AND THE THIRD SYRIAN WAR

Kyle Erickson

One of the more vexing problems of Seleukid iconography has been to determine the issuer of the Antiochos Soter coinage. These coins, long known to numismatists, have defied attempts to fix their origin either to a particular group, a particular time or even a particular mint. While uncertainty of origin in itself is not unusual, the iconography of the coins as well as their legend makes them a particularly interesting challenge.

The most intriguing feature of the coinage is the legend, ANTIOXOY ΣΩΤΗΡΟΣ ('Antiochos Saviour'). Unusually for the early Seleukid empire, the king is given his cultic. For this reason, the coin types with this legend may help us shape an understanding of early Seleukid ideology. The simplest explanation for the appearance of a portrait of Antiochos I along with his name would be that this coinage was issued during his lifetime. However, as discussed below, it is unlikely that the coinage was in fact manufactured during the reign of Antiochos I; rather the evidence suggests that it was likely produced posthumously. If this was the case, then based on the dating of hoards of coins containing the type, the most probable time for the issuing of these coins was at the latest the tumultuous period following the death of Antiochos II. To date, the interpretations of the evidence have suggested that, owing to the fluctuations of power at the time, Antioch was the probable minting location and the coins were issued during the Third Syrian War. So while the location of the mint and the timing of the issuance have been more recently regarded as settled, the identity of the minting authority has remained a matter of mystery and controversy.

In this volume, Coşkun has proposed a new chronology which combines the Third Syrian War and the War of the Brothers. This chronology opens up new possibilities for the interpretation of these coins which may solve many of the numismatic quandaries. The present chapter analyses the weaknesses of the prior attempts at attribution and shows how Coşkun's new chronology provides another contender for the production of the Antiochos Soter coinage.¹ However, even that attribution faces challenges and in conclusion I will suggest that the best match for the production of



Fig. 1. Antiochos Soter, AR Tetradrachm DEL mint (Freeman & Sear/Harlan J Berk – Gemini I, Session 1 Lot: 199 reused by permission).

the coinage is in fact Antiochos II, who up until now has been overlooked as the issuer.

A brief discussion of the so-called ‘Antiochos Soter’ types of coins is necessary before discussing their origins. As we have seen, the coinage is unique for the Seleukids before the reign of Antiochos IV owing to the inclusion of the epithet.² There also are other features that make the origin of this coinage difficult to determine. The type appears in three denominations that are normally grouped together: gold octadrachms, silver tetradrachms, and a bronze. The gold and silver types are the same, with the obverse depicting the diademed head of Antiochos I facing to the right with a dotted border. Portraits of Antiochos I had been used on the issues of both Antiochos I and Antiochos II. The reverse for both types shows Apollo seated facing left on the omphalos, holding an arrow and resting his left hand on a grounded bow (Figure 1). There are no control or mint marks on either the gold or silver coinage of this type to help with the determination of the mint or minting authority.³ However, the bronze denomination may be related to the type as it shares the same legend, although not the same reverse. The obverse of the bronze type features the diademed head of Antiochos I facing right, while the reverse shows an anchor flanked by the caps of the Dioskouroi (Figure 2). The bronze coinage has a control mark: DEL which also appeared on coins minted for Seleukos II and Antiochos III on gold, silver and bronze coinage.⁴

In addition to the unique legend, the production of this coinage is significant in several ways. First, the gold octadrachm found in the excavations at Gordion⁵ is the first Seleukid gold octadrachm produced.



Fig. 2. Antiochos Soter Bronze (www.slaveycoins.com).

The coin was not struck from a unique die, but utilised one of the tetradrachm dies. As Houghton and Lorber observe, the very large denomination coin could be linked either with the famed wealth of the Ptolemies or with a Seleukid attempt to counter Ptolemaic influence.⁶ Another significant feature of this coinage is the large number of dies used: there are 4 obverse and 22 reverse dies.⁷ A similar production at Antioch was only achieved by the third tetradrachm issue of Seleukos I with 6 obverse dies and 12 reverse dies.⁸ Mints only used large numbers of dies for simultaneous production or because extended use caused significant die wear; in such cases it is clear that many coins of the type must have been minted. This output of coinage strongly suggests a large need for fresh coins and may point to an area and time of conflict when ready money was required to obtain supplies, pay troops and meet other demands of active warfare. While periods of conflict are hardly rare within the empire, the distinct legend which is difficult to place with any particular king suggests a greater period of turmoil, when there would have been multiple claimants to the diadem.

I. History of scholarship on the coinage

A brief history of scholarship on the attribution of the coinage to a mint and to a faction is necessary before considering the implications of Coşkun's new dating. We noted that a first reaction might be to attribute the Antiochos Soter type to Antiochos I. However, that position has been rejected on the basis that the lack of the title *Basileus* suggests that the coinage was issued posthumously, a contention that seems to hold consistently true for the epigraphic record of the Seleukid kings.

Furthermore, the assignment of a cultic epithet to the living king on his coinage has generally been discounted in the empire until after the reign of Antiochos III.⁹

The first substantial treatment of the coinage was by Newell¹⁰ who argued for a date in the interregnum period after Antiochos II's death and the death of Berenike and her child, Antiochos.¹¹ He attributed the coinage on the basis of style and similarity of fabric to a mint at Apameia.¹² The number of find spots in northern Syria and Mesopotamia also points to a mint in this region.¹³ As the legend, the choice of obverse, and the location of production were all abnormal, he attributed the production to the garrison at Apameia which he speculated had not taken sides in the conflict and awaited the outcome. In this argument, the image and legend of the deceased grandfather of both potential kings would have served as a non-controversial image which could have been used by either side in the conflict. However, the subsequent identification of a large number of coins using a wide range of reverse dies suggests a large volume of coinage which is incompatible with a single garrison mint attempting to hedge its bets.¹⁴

After the discovery of the gold octradrachm in the excavations at Gordion,¹⁵ alongside another gold octradrachm (in this case of Seleukos III) produced in Antioch, D. H. Cox produced a new hypothesis that attempted to solve some the difficulties created by Newell's garrison mint theory. Cox assigned both coinages to Seleukos III, from Apameia and Antioch mints respectively, and cited his campaign against Attalos I as the origin of the hoard. In this argument, the Antiochos Soter coinage would have been designed to recall his successes in Asia Minor against the Galatians and rally support for his war against Attalos.¹⁶

After the publication of Cox's work based on the Gordion excavations, several more hoards appeared which prompted a significant re-evaluation of the coinage by G. Le Rider in his analysis of the mints at Antioch.¹⁷ One problem that must be considered is that the Meydancikkale hoard does not contain any tetradrachms with the Antiochos Soter legend, despite its burial between 240–235.¹⁸ However, it does contain four tetradrachms from the DEL mint. As Le Rider notes, it is dangerous to draw any conclusions from the lack of Soter coinage in the hoard,¹⁹ and we should be wary of producing an argument from the silence. One important point that Le Rider makes is that we do not necessarily have to associate the gold and silver production (both of which lack control marks) with the bronze coinage as the production of a single mint in a single period. Finally, after raising some of the issues concerning the assignment of this coinage to Seleukos II based on style and iconography, an issue to which we will return, he rejects Cox's attribution of the coinage to the mint at Apameia

and proposes that the source was a new mint operating near Antioch which he names DEL and associated with partisans of Seleukos II.

Houghton and Lorber in their catalogue of Seleukid coins follow Le Rider in assigning the coinage to the DEL mint and link it with the bronze coinage, although they express considerable reservations.²⁰ They refrain from associating the coinage with any particular group, although they suggest that the high value gold coinage and the large output may tempt one into connecting the coinage to the wealthy Ptolemaic coffers.

Having outlined the prior scholarly attributions of these coins, let us now highlight the unsolved problems with each of the views. If we are willing to accept, as most modern scholars do, that the coinage was produced during the period of turmoil that followed the death of Antiochos II, then we must look at the groups that controlled Antioch during this period to determine the issuer. On the traditional view of the chronology of the Third Syrian War and the Laodikean War, there are three possible parties that could have produced the Antiochos Soter coinage in Syria: Berenike and her son Antiochos; the Apameian or Antiochean garrisons as proposed by Newell; and Seleukos II. Let us examine the problems with each of these proposals in turn, starting with Berenike and Antiochos. Beginning with Seleukos I, all Seleukid kings place their own name with the title 'Basileus' on their coinage. It would be surprising if Berenike and her young child deviated from this established pattern particularly while involved in a conflict where their right to the diadem was under attack. Nonetheless it is possible that they followed the general Ptolemaic practice of placing an ancestor on their coinage. However, despite the suggestion of Houghton and Lorber that they looked back to Antiochos I as a king who had killed his older son to avoid dynastic strife,²¹ Antiochos I is an odd king for a Ptolemy to choose for coinage given the lack of connections and the conflict between the two houses in that generation. If, as is done in the traditional scholarship on the period, we consider the inscription from Kildara as evidence of support for Berenike's position,²² then it is interesting for our study of the coinage that there is no mention made of Antiochos I, but only the immediately relevant parties to the dynastic struggle: Ptolemy and his wife and the boy, here named King Antiochos, and his parents.²³ It seems likely, therefore, that if Berenike was attempting to use this coinage to establish legitimacy for her son, then more appropriate choices would have been his father, or perhaps even his great-grandfather, Seleukos I, who had not only founded the dynasty but had done so with Ptolemaic help. On the other hand, one could argue that the name Antiochos may have been the overriding factor as well as a desire to issue a coinage distinct from but also reminiscent of that issued by his

father. Furthermore, Antiochos I was a popular figure on the coinage of Antiochos II.²⁴ In this case, the refashioning of Antiochos I's coinage and the inclusion of his cultic epithet may have represented a functional merger of the Ptolemaic practice of continuing to use the established iconography of Ptolemy I on its coinage, and the greater variety of images used by the Seleukids to highlight continuity. Pursuing this line of argument, the epithet 'Soter' may have been used to highlight Berenike's control of the Seleukid familial cult at Seleukeia in Pieria.²⁵

However, it seems unlikely under both the traditional chronology, and Coşkun's new proposal, that Berenike and her partisans controlled any territory beyond Antioch.²⁶ Despite speculations that might link the coinage to Berenike, the decisive argument against her and her partisans' ability to produce this coinage is the volume of production discussed above. The few months during which Berenike remained alive after the death of Antiochos II (at most until about September of 246) is extremely unlikely to have provided enough time to mint the amount of coinage that was produced.

Therefore if we are to exclude the possibility of Berenike, on the basis of the traditional chronology and further supported by Coşkun's new chronology, the next option to turn to would be Newell's garrison at Apameia as the source of the coinage. Le Rider has forcefully rejected this theory and has been followed by others who have reassigned the mint to Antioch.²⁷ While it is possible that Newell's garrison could have been posted at Antioch rather than at Apameia and in theory could have controlled a part of the city, there is no evidence for this, nor evidence for such a large concentration of the army in Antioch that was opposed to both sides as Newell had proposed for Apameia. Furthermore the large output of the mint suggests that it was beyond the capabilities of a single garrison. Nor do we have any other evidence for the production of royal coinage outside royal mints, or by the army without the support of a member of the ruling house.

Thus according to the traditional chronology and our current understanding of the minting authority, if we rule out Berenike and Newell's garrison, there remains only one other candidate who has previously been suggested as the authority for the production of this coinage. Le Rider,²⁸ followed tentatively by Houghton and Lorber,²⁹ attributes it to Seleukos II. But even in his attribution of the coinage to Seleukos II, Le Rider expressed some doubts surrounding the use by the king of the portrait of Antiochos I and the legend. As with coinage that might have been issued by Berenike and her son Antiochos, one would expect to see the portrait of Seleukos II on coinage issued by him, or to see strong evidence of a



Fig. 3. Seleukos II, AR tetradrachm, Sardes Mint (Freeman & Sear, F&S Mail Bid Sale #11, Lot 157 reused by permission).

connection to his ancestor on his other coinage.³⁰ However, rather than a continuation of the seated Apollo reverse favoured by Antiochos I Soter and by his father Antiochos II, Seleukos II's coinage is far more innovative. This break from the seated Apollo image is, in fact, what we see with the majority of Seleukos II's coinage from Antioch where the type present on the Soter coinage does not appear. A further problem arises when discussing Seleukos II's iconographic programme. While the Soter coinage reproduces an earlier type first produced by Antiochos I, the reverse image of Apollo seated on the omphalos was also used by Antiochos II and seems to have become the standard image of Seleukid silver coinage during his reign. Seleukos II is the first Seleukid king to have deviated from this representation of Apollo and does this in a fairly radical way. Rather than Apollo seated on the omphalos, Seleukos II's Apollo often stands resting his arm on a tripod (Figure 3). But there is no standardised system and a greater degree of variation: in some types Apollo rests on a tripod but in others he stands resting his weight on his bow. In another departure from the practice of his father and grandfather, Athena is used more often on drachms and on other denominations.³¹ Furthermore, there are even exceptions to the general change in reverse type, in particular Ecbatana stands out as retaining the traditional reverse.³² Therefore, the distinctive Soter coinage would mark a significant deviation from the rest of Seleukos II's coinage. Finally, in his coinage Seleukos II does not highlight a strong connection to his grandfather or father, and at most made occasional reference to the founder of the dynasty and his namesake, Seleukos I. Hence the Soter coinage would stand as a significant anomaly in Seleukos II's coinage production.

To summarise briefly, there are good grounds to reject the attribution of the coinage to any of the three parties which have previously been proposed, Berenike and Seleukos II on iconographic grounds, and Newell's Apameian garrison on political and production grounds. With no good candidates for the production of these coins, we have been left with a perplexing issue outside the normal frame of Seleukid coinage.³³

II. Criteria for producers

To unravel the mystery it may be useful to clarify briefly what criteria would make it possible to attribute this coinage to any particular party. It is now generally accepted that the coinage was produced at a mint in or connected with Antioch, although we have not yet necessarily placed it within a sequence of coinage produced there. So whoever produced it must have been in control of Antioch. Secondly, the scale of the production of the coinage was significant and therefore the producers of the coinage must have had access to the necessary finances and either the time or the scale to produce the coinage. The coinage is unlikely to have come at a point when there was also large scale production of a different type of silver coinage at the same mint since that would have overburdened the production capacity of even a very active mint.

In addition to the practical considerations around production of the coins, there are the iconographic factors, such as how the images relate to other coinage attributed to the same authority. The image of Antiochos I on the obverse combined with the seated Apollo on the reverse alongside the introduction of the epithet Soter has a defining significance to the production of the Antiochos Soter coinage. As such it would be surprising if the coinage came from a king whose iconography deviated significantly from this pattern. I would propose as a first step in our search for attribution that we should look towards kings who produced coinage with the image of Antiochos I, and at the very least used the seated Apollo iconography, beginning with Antiochos I himself. As a second step, the large scale production and what has hitherto been defined as a limited time frame; which means we can either accept that this coinage was produced to commemorate a specific event or to fulfil an interim need such as financing a military campaign, or we must reconsider the time scale. Next any attempt to solve the riddle must also provide a suitable environment for the coinage production.

One final point of discussion must be addressed. The coinage has a fairly wide distribution, appearing at least in the excavations at Gordion, Homs, and two Mesopotamian hordes but it does not appear in the relatively large horde in Kilikia that is normally dated to this period. Thus any solution must not rely on a significant control over that region.

III. Possible new interpretations

In this volume Coşkun has proposed a new chronology of both the 'War of the Brothers' and the Third Syrian War. This new chronology, whether it is fully accepted or not, provides a new range of potential producers of the Soter coinage, and it is worth exploring whether any of the groups to whom Coşkun assigns control of Antioch could have produced the coinage. If Coşkun is correct, then the parties involved at the start of the Third Syrian War are more numerous. Let us summarise briefly the events that impact on Antioch according to Coşkun's reconstruction.³⁴ In April–May 246, Seleukos II, Antiochos Hierax and their sister Apame were in Babylon likely attending or participating in the Akitu festival on behalf of their father.³⁵ Seleukos II was also recognised as joint-regent in the normal fashion sometime in the spring. In early September, Babylon heard that Antiochos II had died and Seleukos II was recognised as sole-king. The presence of the two male children of Laodike and the connection to the Akitu festival and Seleukos' immediate accession suggest that they were not excluded from the royal court but remained as the rightful successors. The movement of Hierax in this period is difficult to reconstruct but Coşkun associates him with Alexander in Sardes in September.³⁶ Seleukos' movement is easier to follow: after being confirmed king, he moves westwards with an army, so that he was on his way to Ionia when hearing of his father's death. Thus at no point in 246 do either Seleukos or Antiochos Hierax control Antioch, but each is active in Babylonia and Asia Minor respectively.

Under this reconstruction, Seleukos has already been named king and recognised as such in Babylon before his father's death. Accordingly, we should reject the repudiation of Laodike suggested by Porphyry³⁷ and not assume that Berenike's child was the designated successor. Coşkun suggests that this arrangement was accepted at Antioch, at least until news arrived of Seleukos II's supposed death at Ankyra and the subsequent Ptolemaic invasion in September/October 246.³⁸ Under this version of events, Antioch remained loyal to Seleukos and his partisans either kept Berenike under house arrest from July until October or had her killed in the same period. Thus, unlike the traditional chronology, Berenike had a limited impact on the events after the death of Antiochos II. Nonetheless, it remains possible that she requested her brother's aid even if it did not arrive until after he had news of Seleukos' death. As in the traditional chronology, Berenike had already been killed by the time Ptolemy arrived in Antioch.³⁹ While elements of this reconstruction seem probable, it is difficult fully to accept the inactivity of Berenike in this period; it was certainly possible for Ptolemaic allies to recognise her child as king, even if the only evidence

for such an act comes from the (potentially misinformed) commander at Kildara.⁴⁰ However, it remains difficult to see how Berenike could have access to sufficient resources to allow her to produce the Soter coinage while simultaneously defending her position in Antioch.

Ptolemy Euergetes, according to both the traditional and Coşkun's chronology, arrived in Antioch in early October and was welcomed into the city.⁴¹ He reached Babylon by late December 246 and returned to Egypt by August 245.⁴² Therefore, if we wish to place the Soter coinage within the hands of Ptolemy himself, we are left with the relatively defined period between October 246 and August 245. While it is certainly possible that the production of the Soter coinage took place during this year, it would have required an exceptionally intense production. While the Ptolemaic coffers might have been able to support this range of minting activity, there still remains the difficult question of iconography. It is conceivable to connect bronze coinages that might be linked to the Soter coinage to Ptolemy; the reverse of this type shows an anchor flanked by the caps of the Dioskouroi. The caps of the Dioskouroi (as well as the stars which may also represent the gods) appear framing the cornucopia on coinage which features Ptolemy's wife Berenike on the obverse.⁴³ While it is possible that the coinage was produced for Ptolemy, it seems unlikely, in light of his own production of coinage in Egypt, that he would produce coinage naming Antiochos I to whom he had no connection. It may have been possible that the coinage was produced while he claimed guardianship over Berenike's child, but there is no evidence that he ever recognised the deceased child. Of course, as has been emphasised earlier in this volume, the continuity of local imagery may have played a factor in attempting to combine the two systems.

Let us return to the fresh options presented to us by Coşkun's new chronology. Following his return to Egypt, Ptolemy left behind a varied group of men in charge of the regions under his control. If we follow the account in Porphyry, then Ptolemy gave over Kilikia⁴⁴ in mid-245 to be governed by his friend Antiochos.⁴⁵ As Coşkun has suggested, it is likely that this friend of Ptolemy was Hierax who had already opposed his brother in Asia Minor in the previous year.

Staying with the new chronological narrative, in mid-245 Ptolemy returns to Egypt leaving Xanthippos in charge of the campaign against Seleukos on the eastern side of the Euphrates and Antiochos (Hierax) to continue the conquest of Kilikia. Seleukos campaigned successfully against Xanthippos and defeated him in late 245 or early 244.⁴⁶ After this, Seleukos should have been able to move quickly to recapture the Seleukis.⁴⁷ However, it seems that he was unable to do so and his progress was

hindered by Ptolemaic forces. Coşkun suggests that Ptolemy allowed Hierax to move into the region as he withdrew his own forces and that Hierax was able to hinder Seleukos for some further two years.

The evidence for Hierax's control of the Seleukis is slim, amounting to a passage in Strabo (*Geographica* 16.2.14) in which during the war between Hierax and Seleukos the people of Arados sided with Seleukos. Furthermore, they had agreed with Seleukos that they could freely harbour refugees, but not let them leave without his permission.⁴⁸ According to Strabo, those who fled to Arados were generally wealthy and possessed significant status. Thus the choice of Arados, away from the other major courts, suggests the possibility of conciliation with Seleukos.⁴⁹ While this is possible, it is also conceivable, given the nature of Strabo's statement about the inability of Seleukos to gain access to those refugees, that they fled from him. As Coşkun sees this treaty as beneficial to Seleukos and detrimental to Hierax, he proposes that the main area of dispute between the two brothers was near the city. Accordingly, he argues that Hierax was allowed by Ptolemy to control the Seleukis in his stead and that he was able to control Antioch until either 243 or 242,⁵⁰ giving him up to two and a half years in control of the city.

If this identification is secure, then by mid-245 at the latest we have a new potential candidate for the production of the Soter coinage. Having accepted that Hierax could have been in control of Antioch from sometime near the end of 245 until 242 at the latest, let us now return to the problems posed by the iconography. One of the major reasons for rejecting the assignment of this coinage either to Seleukos or to Berenike and her child is the lack of connection between them and Antiochos I. But the same cannot be said for Hierax. In contrast to his brothers, Hierax's known coinage variously portrayed all of the three Seleukid Antiochoi – himself, his father, and his grandfather – on the obverse and on the reverse retained the Apollo seated on the omphalos for the majority of his coinage.⁵¹ The focus on his ancestors was expanded to include deified versions of them at Alexandria in Troas, Lampsacus and Ilion where the portraits sometimes featured the inclusion of a wing on the diadem. The use of the winged diadem varies across these mints, relatively rare in Lampsacus⁵² and Ilion,⁵³ but common at Alexandria in Troas.⁵⁴ One of the dies used for the obverse in Ilion featured a portrait of Antiochos I recut to include the wings, suggesting his deification and a link with the mint at Alexandria in Troas (Figure 4).⁵⁵ Furthermore, Hierax consistently used the Apollo-on-the-omphalos reverse favoured by those two kings. Hierax's principal mint in Asia Minor appears to have been Alexandria in Troas, and excepting the production of Series II of Workshop B, almost all of the portraits that



Fig. 4. Antiochos Hierax, AR Tetradrachm, Alexandria Troas mint (Harlan J Berk – Inv#: cc80009 reused by permission).

appear on the obverse from that mint feature more or less idealised versions of Antiochos I.⁵⁶ Thus, the majority of Hierax's coinage fits within the iconographic pattern of the Soter coinage. Both sets of coinage place considerable emphasis on the ancestry and divinity of Hierax's predecessors while also appearing to be somewhat reluctant to foreground his own image. This reluctance to place his own image on coinage is normally assigned to his youth,⁵⁷ but the creation of a '*persona*' which places Antiochos firmly as part of the dynastic tradition seems a far more convincing opinion.⁵⁸ The two explanations are not mutually exclusive. One further consideration that has not been previously raised is that Hierax took inspiration from the coinage of his early patron Ptolemy III who likewise often looked back to the founder of the dynasty as a show of continuity.⁵⁹ If the iconography fits within the general outline of Hierax's coinage, the next problem to consider is that of the legend. Why would Hierax refuse to name himself as the authority behind this coinage?

For a possible solution to this question, let us now return to the evidence for Coşkun's reconstruction of the chronology. From the text of Porphyry, the person Antiochos placed in charge of Kilikia is not referred to as king but rather as a friend of Ptolemy.⁶⁰ If Coşkun is correct and this Antiochos is in fact Hierax, then we have no evidence that at this point in his career he had begun to call himself king. If this is the case, and Hierax was in a position to produce coinage, then it would have been expected that he would not use his own portraits as he was acting as a Ptolemaic ally. Thus, during the immediate aftermath of the Ptolemaic invasion, Hierax would have been put in the position of defending himself in Kilikia from his brother and establishing his own power, as we have discussed above.

Furthermore, he may have been subordinate to Alexander in Sardes, who would have been the senior military commander in the region.⁶¹ With his proposed movement into the Seleukis, Hierax would have had access to the mint at Antioch and could have moved to produce coinage to issue payments to his soldiers or procure military supplies. He does not seem to have been willing to assume the diadem at this point, but issued coinage that recalled the successes of his grandfather. He perhaps chose to gloss over his father owing to the problems his father's marriage had created while Hierax attempted to deal with them. Furthermore, this solution may also be able to help to explain the Dioskouroi caps with the anchor. While the Dioskouroi had been popular gods for the Seleukids, they are most notably associated with the Ptolemies, as discussed below.⁶² Perhaps the choice of the caps of the Dioskouroi was to show Hierax's acknowledgement of Ptolemaic support. On the other hand, under Antiochos II Tarsus in Kilikia had produced several bronze types which featured the Dioskouroi, and all of these coins also featured an anchor.⁶³ This may point to a combination of Ptolemaic support for a Seleukid prince, support that was only acknowledged on bronze coinage.

If the attribution of the coinage to Hierax is correct, this leaves the question of the continuation of the mint marks after Antioch came under the control of Seleukos II. I would suggest that, in the alliance which helped end the Third Syrian War with Hierax forgoing the war against his brother in exchange for Asia Minor, the mint officials did not travel with Hierax but remained at Antioch and joined Seleukos II.

If we are willing to accept this new combined chronology for the Third Syrian War and the War of the Brothers then a fresh solution is available to the vexed question of the Soter coinage. Rather than being a product of the warring factions in Antioch or supporters of any one side, the coinage was produced by Hierax during his period of control over the city. This solves many of the iconographic problems which various scholars since Newell have faced. Nevertheless several problems still remain. It seems that Hierax did not take much of this coinage with him to Asia Minor during his retreat, since it does not appear in the relevant hordes. Nor have all the ramifications of Seleukos' brief campaign in Asia Minor been fully understood.

Despite Hierax's emerging as an interesting candidate as the issuer of the Antiochos Soter type, another candidate also deserves attention. The discussions of the iconography of the Soter coinage converge on several points, regardless of which authority is supposed to have issued it. The coinage postdates the reign of Antiochos I, it highlights the significance of the king, it is likely produced at Antioch and the bronze uses the mint

mark that continues until the reign of Antiochos III. If we were to look simply at the legend and the imagery of the coinage, the most logical point of production would have been late in the reign of Antiochos II. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that, following his death, Antiochos I was deified by his son in the same manner as Antiochos I had done for his own father Seleukos I Nikator.⁶⁴ If we assume that Antiochos I was deified by his son and joined his father in the temple at Seleukeia-in-Pieria,⁶⁵ then it is entirely possible that the coinage was designed to highlight this event and that the Antiochos Soter coinage was designed to commemorate the creation of a new god and his cultic epithet. This would make the Soter coinage parallel to that issued by Antiochos I on his arrival in Sardes where the coinage paired the horned diademed portrait of Seleukos I with the reverse of either the horned horse typical of Seleukos' coinage or Apollo seated on the omphalos.⁶⁶ In this case, we would have numismatic advertisement of the deification of the first two members of the Seleukid house. Unfortunately for this argument, it seems unlikely that this event alone required the significant production of coinage that we see for the Soter coinage, although it is possible. Also, it seems difficult to explain the caps of the Dioskouroi which appear on the bronze coinage within this model.

While Houghton and Lorber have highlighted the possible Ptolemaic link with the caps of the Dioskouroi,⁶⁷ the question has not been fully explored. Since the caps only appear on the bronze and not the silver or gold,⁶⁸ they are an iconographic feature that is often considered secondary to the interpretation of the imagery. While this imagery is important, it does not necessarily follow that the silver and gold coinage and the bronze were initiated at the same time. Rather it would be possible for the production of the silver and gold coinage to have begun before the bronze and for both coinages to have continued in production thereafter. However, in terms of the iconography, I would propose that we should follow Houghton's and Lorber's initial suggestion and consider the iconography of the coinage together, with either a single iconographic message or a paired message, with the caveat that the bronze may have built on the existing ideology behind the silver coinage. In this case, the caps of the Dioskouroi became rather significant. While the Dioskouroi were important for the Seleukids, this particular iconography (rather than the gods themselves) does not appear elsewhere on Seleukid coinage. Instead, the caps of the Dioskouroi may have a clearer link with the Ptolemies, in particular with Ptolemaic queens.⁶⁹ The importance of the Dioskouri as a symbol for the Ptolemaic dynasty and especially the queens has been recognised elsewhere.⁷⁰ Thus the merger of the anchor with the symbol for a Ptolemaic princess would make for a suitable commem-



Fig. 5. Berenike, AR Pentakaidekadrachm, Alexandria mint (CNG 69, Lot: 729, <https://www.cngcoins.com/Coin.aspx?CoinID=66861> reused by permission).

oration for the merger of the two royal houses. It may be possible to push this conjecture slightly further: Hazzard has suggested that the Berenike honoured on Egyptian coinage featuring the caps of the Dioskouroi surrounding the double cornucopia is not in fact Berenike wife of Euergetes but instead his sister, Berenike Phernophoros the wife of Antiochos Theos.⁷¹ (Figure 5) Although the coinage is normally explained as Euergetes' honouring his wife after her death and deification, Fulińska points out that there are no other markers of divinity on it, and that the use of the title *Basilissa*, Queen, is rather rare.⁷² It may be that Euergetes honoured his full sister, perhaps in conjunction with his invasion to 'rescue her',⁷³ as the rightful Queen, not of Egypt but of the lands controlled by the Seleukid kings. This would fit with the traditional description of Ptolemy's attempt to aid his sister, and would explain the lack of titles for Berenike wife of Euergetes on the coinage, titles which are so familiar from her cult and that of her husband. If this, admittedly speculative, argument is in fact correct, the use of the caps of the Dioskouroi could be seen as a symbol of Berenike, both on the Egyptian coinage and the Soter bronzes, and their use together with the anchor would highlight the merger of the two houses.⁷⁴ In this case, the bronze coinage produced by Tarsus in Kilikia during the reign of Antiochos II which featured the Dioskouroi and the anchor could also be seen to reinforce this message.⁷⁵

It is clear that Antiochos II controlled Antioch and that the iconography of the Soter coinage fits within the overall iconography of his coinage. Antiochos II utilised the portrait of his father in Asia Minor. This coinage would be the only instance of the practice from Tarsus east to Seleukeia on the Tigris, which issued exclusively portraits of Antiochos I.⁷⁶ Thus the

Soter coinage might fit neatly into the patterns of Antiochos II's coinage by adding Antiochos I's portrait into all the major regions of the empire.

Thus Antiochos II meets the first two criteria which I have argued are necessary to identify the producer of the coinage. One final hurdle remains: in order to move the production of the coinage from the period of turmoil following Antiochos II's death, a suitably important background needs to be assigned to the coinage. I have suggested already that the deification of Antiochos I on its own would not have been a suitable event for the production of this coinage within a short time frame. However, this does not exclude the notion that this deification was also celebrated alongside other major events in the reign of Antiochos II, or that the coinage was produced over a longer period beginning with the deification of Antiochos Soter. One obvious event which may have been further marked by coinage in Antioch has already been hinted at: Antiochos II's marriage to Berenike after the end of the Second Syrian War. This would have given him the opportunity to further highlight the strength of the Seleukid dynasty by confirming the empire of his father and in the more available bronze coinage to highlight the link between himself and the Ptolemaic princess. The famed dowry of Berenike⁷⁷ would have contributed to Antiochos' ability to produce the gold coinage found in the series, which may have been produced at this point. One argument against placing the coinage during the reign of Antiochos II at Antioch would be that it would have overshadowed Antiochos' other production at the mint. Newell had assigned a gold coin type to the mint in celebration of the wedding to Berenike.⁷⁸ However, Le Rider in his study of the mint questioned the attribution not only of the gold coinage but of five other tetradrachms that Newell had located there.⁷⁹ This would reduce the production of the mint during Antiochos' reign by about a third.⁸⁰ Furthermore, there is a complete break in the high value coinage, with only bronze sharing control marks and iconography between the reigns of Antiochos I and Antiochos II.⁸¹ In light of this extra capacity, it seems entirely possible that the Soter coinage could have been struck at the mint at Antioch during this longer period. This would provide a form of continuity between the reigns of the two kings. Furthermore, it would not be necessary to assume that the production of the tetradrachms and the bronze coinage was co-terminous. The silver coinage could have begun at any point after the deification of Antiochos Soter, and the bronze coinage would have been used following the wedding, thus the mint officials responsible for the DEL mint mark may have only been active during a later stage of production. In any case, the Soter coinage would have formed the majority of Antiochos II's tetradrachm production at Antioch.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, we have shown the problems in identifying any of the traditional candidates for the production of the Soter coinage, and have proposed two new candidates in a different period. If we were to maintain the original dating by Newell of this coinage, to the period of turmoil that followed the death of Antiochos Theos,⁸² then there would be considerable difficulty in assigning it to any of the various factions which participated in the wars. As I hope to have shown, the partisans of either Berenike or Seleukos II are unlikely to have produced the coinage for different reasons. If we remain convinced that the coinage was produced within this period, then Coşkun's new chronology provides a more suitable candidate in the form of Antiochos Hierax with his years in control of Antioch. Nonetheless, as the silver series is not die-linked to any other Seleukid coinage its placement remains an enigma, and we are limited by the use of the mint marks on the bronze coinage alone. Accordingly, I believe that we should not be restricted by Newell's argument on the dates. By placing the coinage at Antioch during the reign of Antiochos II, we can tie the coinage to his deification of his father, his victory over the Ptolemies in the Second Syrian War and to his marriage to Berenike. This provides a suitable context for the coinage, increases the length of time in which it could have been produced and provides a suitable moment in which Antiochos may have chosen to highlight the achievements of his family.

Notes

¹ For the sake of simplicity in the volume, I have referred to Coşkun's chapter for the discussion of the chronology rather than repeat the arguments found there; for a version of the traditional chronology see Grainger 2010.

² See Muccioli 2013, 120–1.

³ de Callatay 2012 for the function of control or mint marks on hellenistic coinage.

⁴ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 227.

⁵ Cox 1966, 52, pl. 4.

⁶ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 225.

⁷ Le Rider 1999, 74–5.

⁸ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 225.

⁹ Cf. Erickson 2018 for the contention that Seleukid ruler cult is never codified in the same manner as Ptolemaic cult and the use of cultic epithets is more varied than hitherto accepted.

¹⁰ Newell 1977, 163–5.

¹¹ The name of the child is given in an inscription from Kildara in Karia: Austin² 267 = *SEG* 42.994 = Blümel 1992, 127–33 = *Bull.* 1994, 528 (P. Gauthier); *contra* Coşkun in this volume who does not believe that the child was ever named king.

¹² Newell 1977, 164 notes the similarity of style and fabric to Newell 1977, nos. 1142–3.

¹³ Newell 1977, 164 was aware of coins from the Homs 1934 hoard, Gejou's Mesopotamian Hoard, and Dunne's Mesopotamian hoard.

¹⁴ Waage 1952, 7 already questioned this view and assigned the coinage to Antioch; Le Rider 2000.

¹⁵ Cox 1966.

¹⁶ Cox 1966. However, Coşkun 2012, 69 has rejected any connection between the Antiochos Soter coinage and the Galatian victory of the second Seleukid king.

¹⁷ Le Rider 1999, 74–96.

¹⁸ Westmark 1991 argues for several deposits in the hoard to account for some of the issues that need not be dated before this period. However, this does not solve the pertinent problem of the lack of Soter coinage in the horde from this period.

¹⁹ Le Rider 1999, 82.

²⁰ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 225; Houghton, Lorber and Hoover 2008, 657 for a reconfirmation of the reservations.

²¹ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 226. For the removal of Seleukos as co-regent see Holton this volume and for disbelief in his rebellion see Del Monte 1995; Del Monte 1997, 37, 228.

²² See Coşkun this volume for the argument that this inscription does not reflect the reality of the conflict, but only the conflict as it could have seemed to someone outside the immediate events.

²³ Austin² 267 = SEG 42.994 = Blümel 1992, 127–33 = *Bull.* 1994, 528 (P. Gauthier).

²⁴ Houghton and Lorber 2002, p. 169.

²⁵ The existence of a cult of Seleukos I at a sanctuary is confirmed by Appian *Syr.* 68; the existence of a cult of the rest of the Seleukid dynasty at the temple might be assumed from the existence of the priest list for the deceased kings (*OGIS* 245). Whether or not this temple was part of an imperial cult or merely civic cult is here irrelevant for the question whether Berenike could have claimed control over Antiochos' body. One could have further speculated that the need to highlight a connection to a prominent Antiochos was even more significant if the name of this child was originally Apames and Antiochos was chosen as a throne name. See Del Monte 1997, 46f; while it is possible that the child mentioned in the Sachs and Hunger 1989, -245 A Rev. 13 was the son of Berenike, it is now more likely that the child mentioned was female: van der Spek 2014 *contra* Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 231; van der Spek 1993, 72 note 7; Del Monte 1997, 46f; Coşkun this volume. As van der Spek 2014 points out, this provides the name for one of the two daughters of Antiochos and Laodike mentioned by Eusebios in his *Chronographica: FGrH* 260 F 32, 6.

²⁶ Coşkun this volume argues that Berenike never even controlled Antioch.

²⁷ Le Rider 1999, 89–90; Houghton and Lorber 2002, p. 227 follow Le Rider in his attribution of the coinage to Antioch although they do not rule out a Ptolemaic influence.

²⁸ Le Rider 1999, 89–90.

²⁹ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 227.

³⁰ Le Rider 1999, 83.

³¹ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 232.

³² Houghton and Lorber 2002, nos. 806–8, 810–11.

³³ It is worth noting that the coinage has its own section in Houghton and Lorber's catalogue and is not grouped with any particular monarch.

³⁴ See Coşkun this volume for the evidence behind this reconstruction.

³⁵ Sachs and Hunger 1989, 245.

³⁶ One problem not yet accounted for in this new chronology is the coinage of Seleukos II that is normally assigned to Sardes (Houghton and Lorber 2002, no. 652–663). This coinage is rather significant in scale, particularly given the limited duration that Seleukos controlled the city on the traditional chronology. That he is excluded entirely by his uncle would require a new attribution for the coinage. While it should be possible that Alexander who controlled the city continued to mint coinage for Seleukos, even as he opposed him, the coinage from Sardes already shows the innovative types of Seleukos II and the abandonment of the seated Apollo type. This suggests some form of control by Seleukos over the minting authority in the city. Unfortunately, there has been no full die study which might help shed light on this issue. The rest of Seleukos' coinage in Asia Minor is similarly difficult to align with this new chronology.

³⁷ Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43 ll. 11f.

³⁸ Coşkun this volume; Coşkun here dates the battle of Ankyra to September 246 and the Ptolemaic invasion of Antioch to shortly after this event in October.

³⁹ Justin 27.1.7; *FGrH* 160 = Austin² 266; Polyainos 8.50.

⁴⁰ Austin² 267 = SEG 42.994 = Blümel 1992, 127–33 = *Bull.* 1994, 528 (P. Gauthier). Whether or not this was in fact the case, it was not outside the realm of possibility. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that Berenike would not have claimed the throne for her child if she had the chance. This may have been the cause of the demise of both the mother and son at the hands of partisans of Seleukos II (or Laodike). See Polyainos 8.50; Val. Max. 9.10.ext. 1; Just. 27.1. It is probably best to imagine that Berenike attempted to control Antioch and sought help through her familial allies, but was ultimately defeated by forces loyal to Seleukos before her brother arrived.

⁴¹ P.Gourab II–IV; *OGIS* 54; Polyainos 8.50. It is irrelevant to our discussion here whether or not, or even how many, officials came to Ptolemy in Antioch or the extent of his claims, but only that he in fact did control the city.

⁴² For the non-literary evidence see BCHP 11; *OGIS* 54. See BCHP 11 commentary for the date of Seleukos II's restoration to power in Babylon to 22.III.67 SEB = 11 July 245 BC.

⁴³ Svoronos 1904, 1114 pl. XXXV 2–5; Cf. Clayman 2014, 129–30 and Hazzard 1995, 5. See also discussion below.

⁴⁴ The control of Kilikia was constantly in contention between the two major powers, but it seems that parts of Kilikia had unsuccessfully resisted attempts at Ptolemaic control: *FGrH* 160 = Austin² 266.

⁴⁵ *FGrH* 260 F43: et Syriam quidem ipse obtinuit, Ciliciam autem amico suo Antiocho gubernandam tradidit, et Xanthippo alteri duci provincias trans

Euphraten. The Xanthippus who was appointed to control Mesopotamia may have been the unnamed official of King Ptolemy discussed in BCHP 11 obv. 12, rev. 3, 6.

⁴⁶ See Coşkun this volume for the chronology.

⁴⁷ Cf. *OGIS* I 229 = Ihnken, I. Magnesia am Sipylus (=IK 8) = I.Smyrna II.1 (=IK 24.1) 573 = Austin² 174, 1ff. for Seleukos' crossing into the region.

⁴⁸ Strabo *Geogr.* 16.2.14; for traditional arguments on the dating of this agreement see Duyrat 2005, 227–233; for the purpose of this agreement see Kosmin 2014, 122 (as an independent buffer between the Ptolemies and the Seleukids); Rigsby 1996, 11 for the conditions and the benefits to both parties; Grainger 1997, 61 and 168 who dates the grant of freedom to Arados to c. 242.

⁴⁹ See Coşkun this volume.

⁵⁰ Coşkun does not account for the fact that even after Seleukos' alliance with Hierax and subsequent peace with Ptolemy the port city of the Seleukis, Seleukeia-in-Pieria, remained in Ptolemaic hands. Whether the Ptolemaic garrison which controlled the city remained loyal to Ptolemy after Hierax switched allegiances, or whether Hierax never controlled the city but only Antioch, is unknowable.

⁵¹ See Houghton and Lorber 2002, p. 293–4; Fleischer 1991, 28–29 and Boehringer 1993, 38 for portraits of Hierax and the difficulty in identifying them.

⁵² Houghton and Lorber 2002, no. 850 (young king, possibly Hierax).

⁵³ Houghton and Lorber 2002, no. 871–2.

⁵⁴ Houghton and Lorber 2002, no. 874–886.

⁵⁵ Houghton and Lorber 2002, no. 871.

⁵⁶ Houghton and Lorber 2002, no. 874–886, with no. 879 and 883 not clearly identifiable portraits of Antiochos I.

⁵⁷ Boehringer 1993, 38.

⁵⁸ Chrubasik 2011, 51–54, cf. Erickson 2009, 183–4.

⁵⁹ Mørkholm 1991, 28.

⁶⁰ *FGH* 260 F43.

⁶¹ In assessing this new chronology the place of Alexander needs to be further reviewed. Given that he never controlled Antioch where we have assigned this coinage, it seems impossible for him to have produced it. However, if it becomes clear that Antiochos Hierax operated both as his subordinate as well as Ptolemy's it might be possible that Alexander lay behind the choice of imagery.

⁶² See Houghton and Lorber 2002, p. 226.

⁶³ Houghton and Lorber 2002, nos. 565–7. Under Antiochos I, bronze coinage also included symbols of the Dioskouroi at Tarsus but not their caps. Houghton and Lorber 2002, nos. 332–334.

⁶⁴ The various later lists of priests for the ancestors of the living king invariably include Antiochos; e.g. *OGIS* 233 from Antioch in Persis; *OGIS* 246 from Teos; and *OGIS* 245 from Seleukeia-in-Pieria. No scholar appears to have suggested that there was not a posthumous cult of the Seleukid kings following the deification of Seleukos I. For Seleukid ruler cult in general see: Bevan 1901; Bikerman 1938b; Chanotis 2003, 436–7; Habicht 1970; Hazzard 2000; Ma 1999; van Nuffelen 1999; van Nuffelen 2004.

⁶⁵ Admittedly we have no evidence that this temple served as a royal tomb along

the Ptolemaic model, we do have evidence for priests for Antiochos Apollo Soter from the reign of Seleukos IV (*OGIS* 245).

⁶⁶ Houghton and Lorber 2002, nos. 322 and 323. Iossif 2011, 268–272 has rightly suggested that origin of the Apollo type is Seleukia on the Tigris. In this case, the deified form of Seleukos that appears at the mint of Sardes was likely produced prior to Antiochos' arrival in 276. The significance of the deification can also be seen in Philetairos' production of Seleukos in a horned helmet before he transferred the body of Seleukos to Antiochos: Houghton and Lorber 2002, no. 309.

⁶⁷ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 225.

⁶⁸ Houghton, Lorber and Hoover 2008, 657 for the possibility of the bronze coinage being separate from the silver and gold coinage.

⁶⁹ Fulińska 2010, 83; Hazzard 1995, 5.

⁷⁰ Here I would suggest that, rather than referring to the dynasty in its entirety, the use of the caps of the Dioskouroi was limited as a marker to female members of the Ptolemaic royal house, see Clayman 2014, 129–30 and Hazzard 1995, 5.

⁷¹ Hazzard 1995, 4–5.

⁷² Fulińska 2010, 83–89 makes a convincing argument that the use of the term *Basilissa* reflects an Egyptian view of the importance of the role of wife of the Pharaoh.

⁷³ See above for a discussion of the Third Syrian War and the causes of Ptolemy's intervention.

⁷⁴ The Dioskouroi are of course common in Asia Minor and it is always difficult to identify any particular set of deities with a particular Queen (or King).

⁷⁵ Houghton and Lorber 2002, nos. 565–7. Under Antiochos I, bronze coinage also included symbols of the Dioskouroi at Tarsus but not their caps: Houghton and Lorber 2002, nos. 332–334.

⁷⁶ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 169.

⁷⁷ Porphyr. *FGrH* 260 F 43 ll. 11f.

⁷⁸ Newell 1977, no. 570.2

⁷⁹ Le Rider 1999, 40–4.

⁸⁰ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 200 follow Le Rider's reattribution of the coinage.

⁸¹ Houghton and Lorber 2002, 200.

⁸² Newell 1977, 163.

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